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1. General Introduction 
This doctoral thesis presents five empirical essays on the impact of corporate taxes on 
companies’ decisions. Insights into empirical evidence are very valuable contributions to the 
scientific literature. They test to what extent the wide analytical models and assumptions on 
tax effects as well as anecdotal evidence correspond to reality in a general sense. 
Empirical tax research is not l’art pour l’art. Apart from science itself, sound empirical 
evidence on tax effects is interesting and relevant to corporations and to policy makers. 
Corporations gain information on how the market, i.e. their competitors, react to taxes and can 
easily compare this behavior to their own reactions. Policymakers see the real effects of their 
tax instruments, allowing them to draw conclusions on imposed excess burdens, evasive 
actions and tax revenue implications. 
All five papers are based on detailed and comprehensive micro datasets. The conclusions 
which are drawn from each of the five papers can therefore be considered as fairly 
representative. The observations used for identification stem from thousands of corporations 
which are traced over several years. Thanks to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects, such panels 
provide a sound image of tax effects on the average firm. Empirical research as applied in this 
thesis is not about tracing the sophisticated tax planning strategies of a single company, but 
about the reactions of the entire market or at least of clearly defined subgroups. 
Empirics and analytics are not counterparts, but complements. Without an empirical 
validation, even the nicest analytical model has to cope with latent doubts on its right to exist. 
Empirics without an analytical basis are equally miserable. Just looking freehandedly at what 
the data tell the reader does not comply with scientific requirements. As can be seen in all five 
papers of this thesis, analytics and empirics need to build on each other and cross-fertilize. 
The hypotheses to be tested are to be based on analytical considerations. The insights from 
empirically testing them, however, may enlighten additional analytical aspects which 
remained hidden at first sight. Such aspects do not lead to a revision of the general analytical 
expectations, but in turn add up to them. There is no valuable empirical research without a 
sound analytical basis. 
The five essays of this doctoral thesis cover the tax impact of three of the most important 
decisions of corporations: the decision of how much to invest, the decision of how to finance 
such investments, and the decision of what group structures to embed the investments in. 
Given that I fully concentrate on corporations, the only big tax question which is not regarded 
here is the choice of the organizational form. The three aspects of investment, financing and 
structuring are discussed one by one. The first three essays deal with the impact of taxes on 
investment, the fourth essay focuses on financing, and the fifth essay provides empirical 
evidence of tax-induced group structuring. 
1. General Introduction 
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The very first essay, bearing the general title The Impact of Corporate Taxes on Investment, 
provides a comprehensive access and introduction to this thesis. Regarding both the contents 
and the methodological approach, this essay is more explanatory and more illustrative than 
the four that follow. Serving as a starting point and setting the basis, this first paper does not 
focus on the tax effect on investment alone, but also provides an outlook into the other two 
topic areas to be covered in this thesis. This first paper is the reason for my keeping the 
introduction compact. In doing so, I avoid redundancies. 
All five papers deal with corporate taxes. Three of them solely focus on the impact of profit 
taxes on corporations’ decisions, while two of them, The Impact of Tax Treaties and 
Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited and Form Follows Function, also take source taxes into 
account. Each of the five papers contains descriptive statistics and, in each of them, the tax 
hypotheses are derived in detail. 
I have no intention of maximizing the size of this doctoral thesis. What I am eager to achieve 
is maximum clarity and maximum value to the scientific reader. Therefore, in one respect, I 
am not innovative: I refrain from enlarging or profoundly adjusting the essays as compared to 
the versions in which they were or are submitted to scientific journals. All of them had earlier 
versions which were considerably bigger. I am convinced, however, that the papers are in 
their best shape as they are right now. The structure of each paper, along with the abstract, is 
meticulously designed to enable the reader the best conceivable insight into a research topic. 
This equally refers to the respective paper’s appendices and its list of references. Thus, as can 
be seen from the table of contents, I decided to keep present each of the essays in full and I 
refrained from appending additional explanations as well as from cutting out certain elements. 
The titles of the essays can be seen from the table of contents. The reader who is interested in 
only one of the topics discussed in this thesis can stick to the respective essay chapter without 
missing any required information. 
Even though this is a doctoral thesis consisting of individual essays, the whole book shall still 
be more valuable than the sum of the essays it consists of. Therefore, I enrich this thesis 
through four elements going beyond what is covered in the essays. The first element is a 
rather detailed descriptive analysis of the Microdatabase Direct Investment provided by the 
German central bank. This dataset has been used in four of the five essays and it is one of the 
best conceivable reference points for empirically analyzing tax questions. The descriptive 
section, covering investment, financing and structure trends, can be found right after this 
introduction. The second element comprises five systematic overviews of the empirical tax 
literature, following up on the topic of each single essay one by one. These systematic 
overviews outline the data, methodology and key results for each eminent empirical tax paper 
related to the respective preceding essay. Thus, separating the essays from each other, the 
systematic literature reviews cover the impact of corporate taxes on investment, the impact of 
source taxes on investment, the impact of tax loss treatment on investment, the impact of 
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corporate taxes on financing decisions, and finally the impact of corporate taxes on group 
structuring and location decisions. The third element is a compact overview showing the 
hypotheses and findings of all five papers one by one. This general review can be found at the 
end of this thesis’ main section. The fourth element is an additional overall appendix, showing 
the most important tax data I have researched for my essays. These are the corporate income 
tax rates of 190 countries from 1996 till 2010 and bilateral source taxes on dividends, as well 
as tax crediting relationships between 58 countries from 1996 till 2008. The electronic form 
of this data is available from the author upon request. 
All five essays of this doctoral thesis build on code programmed into the statistics software 
Stata. A considerable part of this work’s creativity has flown into writing and streamlining 
this code. More often than not, what is obvious in reality or understandable in the tax law 
requires some brain power to be translated into programming language. This refers to the 
identification of widely ramified group structures, the aggregation of tax characteristics on the 
group level, the merge of two 42,978 cell matrices with a vast firm-level micro dataset and 
several other methodological challenges. It is tempting to explicitly show how these technical 
hurdles have been cleared. The increase in size of this thesis by up to several hundred pages 
would only be a tolerable side effect. The reason why I refrain from it is that such an amount 
of programming code might be interesting only to a rather small group of readers, i.e. only 
those who somehow feel at home in taxes, economics and informatics. On request, the author 
gladly makes the code available to those who operate in that triangle and who might want to 
perform a re-estimation. 
Hard scientific work and great satisfaction can go hand in hand. It was a privilege and a great 
pleasure to contribute in extending the scientific frontier. I enjoyed conducting empirical tax 
research and I hope this feeling shines through all the five essays presented in the following. 
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2. General Descriptives 
This general descriptive section provides an overview of the economic environment all five 
essays refer to. While some of the papers build on specific years, sectors or countries, this 
section aims at building a bridge between all of them. It presents descriptive statistics on the 
tax rates and on variables from all three fields of interest concerning tax effects, i.e. 
investment, financing and group structuring. The time span in this section covers the years 
1996 till 2009, because all five essays use years from this period. 
The tax rates are based on information from tax handbooks and national tax codes. All firm 
information is based on the outbound side of the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) by 
the German central bank. For this section, the MiDi information has only been adjusted or 
limited where it was absolutely necessary in order to properly reflect the real development.  
Therefore, the common reporting threshold of total assets amounting to at least EUR 3 million 
is applied. Furthermore, no partnerships or sole practitioners are taken into account, only 
corporations. If there were double entries for a corporation in a business year, caused by stub 
periods or erroneous reporting, one of these entries was deleted. 
The business sectors of farming and mining are disregarded because they are subject to 
specific tax rules in certain countries. The balance sheet information of companies belonging 
to the financial industry is not directly comparable to such information from other industries. 
That is why the financial industry is also disregarded in this section’s figures. Additional 
information on trends if the financial industry were to be included is provided in the text or in 
footnotes. It shows that the graphs would remain qualitatively rather similar. 
Figure 2-1 shows the development of corporate income tax rates for 189 countries between 
1996 and 2009. The white lines show the corporate income tax rate development for each 
country. Table A-1 in the Appendix shows all tax rates used in this figure. The solid black 
line is the country average.  The dotted black line is the country average when leaving out the 
14 countries which always had a zero tax rate during the relevant time period.1 
As can be seen from Figure 2-1, the corporate income tax rates decreased between 1996 and 
2009 on average. Across all countries, the average corporate income tax rate decreased by 
7.15 percentage points from 31.00% in 1996 to 23.85% in 2009. Disregarding the zero tax 
rate countries leads to an upward translation with a development of the 175-country average 
tax rate from 33.48% to 25.76%, corresponding to a decrease of 7.72 percentage points. 
 
                                                            
1  The countries among the 189 analyzed here, which have a zero tax rate between 1996 and 2009 are Andorra, 
Anguilla, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, 
Palau, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. 
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Figure 2-1: Corporate income tax rates in 189 countries 
 Sources: IBFD Global Corporate Tax Handbooks, Tax Guides by big four audit companies, national tax laws. 
The key takeaway from Figure 2-1 is that during these 14 years the average corporate income 
tax rate decreased by more than seven percentage points. This result is taken up further below 
when reflecting on possible connections to corporate investment decisions. 
Figure 2-2 shows the mean of total assets and total liabilities in subsidiaries abroad, belonging 
to groups headquartered in Germany. Like the other figures presented below in this section, 
Figure 2-2 is based on the outbound side of the German central bank’s Microdatabase Direct 
Investment (MiDi). As can be seen, both the total assets and the total liabilities of the average 
subsidiary increased during the analyzed time span from 1996 to 2009. In 1996, the average 
subsidiary observable in the outbound MiDi dataset had total assets in the amount of EUR 
43.5 million. In 2009, the average subsidiary showed total assets of about EUR 89.6 million. 
Thus, in nominal values, the average subsidiary size has more than doubled during the 14 
years observed here. The temporary peak in the year 2000 reflects the boom right before and 
its correction right after the burst of the millennium bubble. The graph would show a similar 
upward trend if the financial industry were to be included; it would only be inflated with total 
assets increasing from EUR 145 million in 1996 to EUR 260 million in 2009. In addition to 
the size of the average subsidiary, the number of observed subsidiaries has also strongly 
increased from 12,323 in 1996 to 23,348 in 2009. This is illustrated further below in this 
section, when describing structural issues. 
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Figure 2-2: Mean of a subsidiary’s total assets and total liabilities [EUR ‘000] 
Source: Outbound side of the German central bank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). 
 
Figure 2-3: Mean and median liabilities/total assets 
 
Source: Outbound side of the German central bank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). 
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Figure 2-4: Mean of fixed and financial assets [EUR ‘000] 
Source: Outbound side of the German central bank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). 
Apart from a first insight into investment sizes, Figure 2-2 also illustrates a financing aspect. 
As can be seen, about one half of the total assets are debt-financed. The liabilities shown here 
in Figure 2-2 include both internal and external debt. The increasing spread between the two 
curves of Figure 2-2 indicates that there is a slight decrease in the leverage over time. This 
can be seen even clearer in Figure 2-3.2 
Figure 2-3 shows the leverage of the mean and the median firm on an annual basis. The 
leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Both the mean and the median leverage 
decreased over time. Thus, multinational subsidiaries seem to gradually finance their new 
investments to a larger extent than they used to through equity or by retained earnings. The 
mean (median) leverage was 56.91% (57.88%) in 1996 and it decreased to 52.50% (49.32%) 
in 2009.3  
Figure 2-4 provides additional details as to what can be seen in Figure 2-2 because it does not 
show the trend in total assets, but in two of its most important elements: fixed and intangible 
assets as well as financial assets. The remaining part of the total assets is covered by current 
assets and other elements, which are not analyzed here. Figure 2-4 shows a strong increase in  
 
                                                            
2 When including the financial industry in the analysis, the liabilities also move in parallel to the total assets with 
a starting average of EUR 117 million in 1996, two temporary peaks of EUR 226 million in 2000 and EUR 228 
million in 2008, and a value of EUR 188 million in 2009. 
3 Including the financial industry leads to slightly higher leverages with mean (median) values of 56.98% 
(58.35%) in 1996 decreasing to 52.87% (49.45%) in 2009. 
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Figure 2-5: Groups, subsidiaries and indirect participations  
Source: Outbound side of the German central bank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). 
 
both asset categories. The average amount of fixed and intangible assets in a foreign 
subsidiary increased from EUR 12.7 million in 1996 to about EUR 22.9 million in 2009. 
The average financial assets per corporation increased even steeper, from EUR 8.9 million in 
1996 to EUR 30.41 million in 2009.4 
Figures 2-5 and 2-6 focus on the size of the sample and the structure of the groups and 
corporation it consists of. As mentioned above, the number of observable subsidiaries 
increased strongly. Figure 2-5 shows that, in 1996, the carefully adjusted sample consisted of 
12,303 subsidiaries, whereas in 2009 there were 23,348 subsidiaries. This is an increase of 
more than 89%. The number of groups did not increase as strongly. With 5,309 groups, there 
were 36.7% more groups in the dataset as compared to the 3,884 groups in 1996. The trend of 
indirectly holding subsidiaries instead of creating direct relationships to the headquarters 
increased parallel to the trend concerning the overall number of subsidiaries. 1,726 
subsidiaries were held indirectly in 1996, whereas 3,283 subsidiaries were held indirectly in 
2009. This is an increase of 90.2%. These trends persist also when including the financial 
industry.  
 
                                                            
4 Including the financial industry in this analysis of asset categories leads to a similar trend with mean fixed and 
intangible assets per subsidiary increasing from EUR 12.4 million in 1996 to EUR 22.5 million in 2009 and 
mean financial assets increasing from EUR 21.2 million in 1996 to EUR 69.5 million in 2009. 
0
5.000
10.000
15.000
20.000
25.000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Groups Subsidiaries in Total Indirectly Held Subsidiaries
2. General Descriptives 
 
10 
 
Figure 2-6: Average number of subsidiaries per group  
 
Source: Outbound side of the German central bank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). 
 
Figure 2-6 shows that the average number of subsidiaries per group increased from 3.17 in 
1996 to 4.40 in 2009. Therefore, not only the individual subsidiaries became bigger in terms 
of total assets, as can be seen from Figure 2-2, but also the groups consisting of such 
subsidiaries grew.5 
In the introduction I stated that this doctoral thesis shall only be enriched by elements going 
beyond the five essays if these elements generate a clear additional value. What is the value 
added of this overall descriptive section? It shows the economic environment where tax 
effects shall be identified in and, even more importantly, it shows what tax effects actually 
look like. Figure 2-1 shows the general decrease in corporate income tax rates across 189 
countries. Figure 2-2 shows the increase in total assets in an average firm. Thus, the tax effect 
on investment is not whether or not there is investment or growth in investment at all, but 
rather that the investment projects increase more strongly when and where the tax conditions 
are favorable. The regressions performed in the essays take place in a dynamic environment. 
Tax rates seem to decrease in almost every country and foreign direct investments are 
generally on the rise. The speed and size of these effects, however, differ. They annually 
differ on a firm basis. The question to be answered regarding the tax impact on investment is 
to what extent low tax rates or other favorable tax regulations exert an effect on those firms 
                                                            
5 With 3.33 in 1996 and 4.64 in 2009, including the financial industry leads to slightly higher average numbers 
of subsidiaries per group.  
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which are subject to them, when controlling for other macro influencing factors as well as for 
firm-specific characteristics. 
A similar analytical setup can be observed concerning the financing decisions of firms. As 
can be seen from Figure 2-3, corporations tend to use less and less debt for financing their 
operations. This is already revealed by the descriptive output. The interesting question, 
however, is to what extent the firms subject to specific tax rules such as the interest barrier 
changed their financing differently from other firms. By scrutinizing what can and cannot be 
learned from the figures shown above, it becomes clearer what empirical tax research by 
means of regressions aims at analyzing. Proper, logical and clear identification of the 
treatment and control groups are of primary importance. 
What has been outlined for the tax effect on investment and on financing can also be put 
forward concerning the tax effect on group structuring. Figure 2-6 shows that the number of a 
group’s subsidiaries on average tends to increase over time. Nevertheless, the introduction of 
a group taxation rule might make groups split up their operations in a country into more new 
subsidiaries as compared to the scenario where such a rule had remained absent. The same 
applies in an analogous way to the identification of a change in withholding taxes on a 
group’s structuring choices. Besides other aspects, it is the identification of the treatment 
group and the control group which matters. 
The impact of taxes on corporation’s decisions in the fields of investment, financing and 
structuring is to be analyzed in the five essays to follow. I hope that this preceding descriptive 
section contributes to the awareness of what it takes to identify such effects. At the same time, 
it shall highlight that taxes are one parameter for decision-making in a world characterized by 
multiple influencing factors.   
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3. The Impact of Corporate Taxes on Investment 
- An explanatory empirical analysis for interested practitioners - 6 7 
 
 
 
Abstract: The scientific literature provides evidence for an impact of company taxes on 
investments. Practitioners, however, have a skeptical view on the meaning of this effect. This 
paper builds the bridge between research and the interested practice by providing detailed 
descriptives and clearly showing how the effects are derived. It analyzes the development of 
German multinationals’ direct investments abroad and of foreign multinationals’ investments 
in Germany from 1996 till 2008. A split along federal states is applied. Starting from the 
analysis of the basic tax effect, the paper also covers current research topics when analyzing 
the impact of existing loss carryforwards and when tracing holding structures. The descriptive 
statistics already show that cross-border investments have increased strongly. The 
development of Baden-Württemberg mainly corresponds to that of Germany. The impact of 
taxation on investments is negative. A ten percentage points higher corporate tax rate leads to 
about five percent lower investments, measured by fixed assets. This effect is smaller for 
those companies which show loss carryforwards. A lower tax rate at a specific location 
especially seems to attract holding companies, which are applied for tax efficient group 
structuring. 
 
 
 
Keywords:   Corporate Taxation, Foreign Direct Investment, Empirical Analysis, 
Multinational Firms 
 
 
JEL Classification: F23, H25, H32 
                                                            
6 In June 2012, the paper has been published as ZEW Discussion Paper 12-040. As of autumn 2012, it is under 
review for the journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. In 2011, the paper has been presented at ZEW’s 
Förderkreis für Wissenschaft und Praxis in Mannheim and in 2012 it has been presented at the ZEW 
Wirtschaftsforum in Mannheim.  
7 I thank Friedrich Heinemann for valuable suggestions. I also thank the Förderkreis für Wissenschaft und Praxis 
am Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung e.V. for their kind support. My thank-you also goes out to 
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft who sponsor the project „Unternehmensbesteuerung und 
Konzernstrukturen“, which provided the context within which this essay was written. I would like to thank the 
Deutsche Bundesbank for granting access to its research centre and subsequently the direct investment data, as 
well as for being an exceptional host. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Investment behavior is influenced by corporate taxation. High taxes hinder investment, 
whereas low tax rates favor it, especially within a context of cross-border direct investment. 
This claim is backed by a broad array of highly credible scientific literature.8 Nevertheless, in 
the public debate of tax practitioners, it can by no means be considered part of the common 
consensus. Time and time again other determinants of direct investment are highlighted. The 
latter may stem from a desire for market development, whereby any relevance of the taxation 
factor is denied. Should a car manufacturer identify China as an emerging market, the 
medium-sized company supplying it has no other option but to invest there. It has to do so 
regardless of China’s taxation policy. The great strength of the econometric discipline lies in 
its capacity to incorporate different effects such as the suspected ‘China Effect’ in its 
mathematical models.  
Within such a framework this paper seeks to identify the econometric and micro economical 
approaches best suited for verifying the effect of taxation on direct investment behavior. Such 
is without neglecting any other influencing factors and recognizing areas that continue to 
exemplify problematic results. An analysis of German inbound and outbound direct 
investment is added. Findings on Germany as a whole are observed in contrast with the data 
of the strongly export orientated federal state Baden-Württemberg. This comparison indicates 
the overall validity of the findings. The paper considers firm’s heterogeneity regarding their 
respective profit and loss histories and may therefore be considered part of the cutting edge of 
current research efforts. With its analysis of holding companies and associated corporate 
group structuring this paper enters into a field that requires further detailed research in coming 
years. 
The foundational data shows the direct investment development of German parent companies 
abroad and that of foreign parent companies in Germany. Only limited liability companies are 
considered. The paper is structured in a mirror image style: The first part examines outbound 
investment and the second inbound investment. Both start off with a presentation of 
descriptive nature. The timeline for direct investment is shown for Germany as one and for 
the individual federal states. Special attention will be paid to the foreign investment of Baden-
Württemberg firms and any investment of foreign firms within Baden-Württemberg. The 
timeline in question consists of 13 years and ranges from 1996 to 2008. This paper makes a 
                                                            
8 So called meta studies summarize results of past investigations into the effect of tax on direct investment. 
Hereby they calculate the average ‘to be expected effect’. See De Mooij und Ederveen (2003) and Feld und 
Heckemeyer (2011). 
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conscious effort not to formulate an economic analysis of the most recent economic crisis, but 
instead strives to highlight the overall trend of investment developments. The effect of 
taxation will be examined by means of a linear estimation method, which allows for the 
econometric function to be derived in a transparent way. The empirical section will firstly 
examine the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Then existing tax loss carryforwards and 
investment structure decisions will also be illuminated. 
 
3.2 Influence of Corporate Taxation on Investment Behavior 
3.2.1 Investment of German companies abroad  
This paper’s first analytical step will look at German parent corporations’ investment abroad. 
The analysis is based on micro data. Unlike with aggregated macro-economic data, micro data 
analyses bears the advantage that recognized characteristics of corporations can be taken into 
account. Investment is primarily a flow value. When looking at individual corporations’ 
investment abroad however, stock values will have to be used, since only these are observable 
on the balance sheets. The dynamic will at a later stage be developed by econometrical 
estimations using the difference in observed stock values between two successive years. The 
resulting descriptive evaluation shows the development of the stock value ‘fixed assets’ and 
hereby reveals the extent to which German parent corporations are invested abroad. Intangible 
assets are included only to the degree to which they are activated on the balance sheets.  
 
3.2.1.1 Investment development 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the basic trend from 1996 to 2008 for Germany and Baden-
Württemberg. The chart is based on the German Federal Bank’s microdatabase direct 
investment (MiDi). It is mandatory for investors to report any cross border activity if their 
involvement constitutes 10% or more and the balance sheet of the respective foreign 
subsidiary exceeds EUR 3 million. These foreign subsidiary balance sheets are made 
available in standardized form on an annual basis. The fixed asset values are taken from these 
balance sheets. As can be seen, fixed assets of German corporations abroad have increased by 
more than a threefold factor (3.25) from EUR 120 bn. in 1996 to EUR 390 bn. in 2008. 
Multinationals based in Baden-Württemberg have increased their assets abroad by an even 
higher factor of 3.4: from EUR 17 bn. to EUR 59 bn. in the last 13 years.    
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Figure 3-1: Outbound fixed assets in EUR billion 
 
The ascent of both curves can be explained by the increase in subsidiaries abroad and the 
increased amount of assets these subsidiaries have at their disposal. In 1996, the average 
foreign subsidiary had EUR 13.6 billion in fixed assets. By 2008, this figure had increased to 
EUR 21.5 billion. From 1996 to 2008, the number of counted foreign subsidiaries increased 
from 8,870 to 18,013. 
 
The number of foreign subsidiaries of Baden-Württemberg companies has increased from 
1,572 in 1996 to 3,641 in 2008. The average asset values of these subsidiaries has also seen an 
increase from EUR 10.9 billion in 1996 to EUR 16.1 billion in 2008. The average foreign 
subsidiary asset value of Baden-Württemberg’s corporations is lower than that of Germany as 
a whole; possibly because numerous medium or even small sized Baden-Württemberg 
corporations have foreign subsidiaries. 
Figure 3-1 shows that foreign investment has increased. It would be mere speculation to make 
the drop in corporate tax rates responsible for this increase in foreign direct investment. Other 
plausible reasons include the increased economic performance of foreign locations, increased 
inflation or currency effects. When analyzing tax effects, it is also unsuitable to differentiate 
between target countries, since their tax rates vary over time and between one another. If 
anything, only an average effect may be identified. 
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3.2.1.2 Comparing investment in the different German federal states  
Figure 3-2 shows in regular six year intervals 
which German federal states the investments into 
foreign subsidiaries stem from.9 Baden-
Württemberg’s share increases from 14% in 1996 
to 18% in 2002 and eventually comes to 15% in 
2008. Nordrhein-Westfalen based companies 
have the highest share of foreign subsidiary 
investment in all 3 years. Although Hessen’s 
share has decreased somewhat, one must keep in 
mind that banks are not included in the 
observations. 
As seen in Figure 3-1, the overall volume of 
investments has increased substantially. The 
volume of Figure 3-2’s first diagram corresponds 
to the EUR 120 billion. The same goes for Figure 
3-2’s third diagram and the EUR 390 billion from 
2008. In 2002, the overall assets held by foreign 
subsidiaries were some EUR 296 billion. 
Looking at Baden-Württemberg, the percentages 
translate to EUR 17.2 billion (=14%) in 1996, 
EUR 52.7 billion (=18%) in 2002 and EUR 58.7 
billion (=15%) in 2008. The volume of foreign 
investment by corporations in Bayern and Baden-
Württemberg are fairly similar. Niedersachsen 
comes 5th with regards to foreign investment 
followed by Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz and 
Berlin. 
                                                            
9 It is worth pointing out that the described increase in German assets abroad from 1996 to 2008 may be subject 
to the influence of exchange rate effects. Towards the end of 1996, most investment targets of German 
investors’ balance sheets were in foreign currency and had to be converted to D-Mark. As a result, some of the 
changes in investment may merely be due to fluctuating exchange rates rather than actual investment activity. 
The Bundesbank has converted D-Mark values into euro values for the years 1996 to 1998. 
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3.2.1.3 Corporate Tax development 
So far investments have only been looked at in terms of assets held by foreign subsidiaries. 
Considering the fact that ultimately the effect of corporate tax rates on investment is to be 
determined, the development of corporate tax rates has to be shown. Figure 3-3 illustrates the 
development of corporate tax rates some of those countries with the highest average stock of 
assets invested by German parent corporations. The investment development is also graphed 
for purposes of comparison. 
 
What can be seen in Figure 3-3 is that whilst investment is on the rise, the average corporate 
tax rate of all countries falls. As a result, the used average corporate tax rate is reduced to that 
of the most relevant countries only, since a changing corporate tax rate in a country that 
receives no German investment may otherwise distort the picture. The corporate tax rate used 
in the chart is calculated out of that of 10 different countries. Included are those that 
traditionally receive a lot of investment from German companies such as France, Great-
Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and the USA. The BRIC nations are represented by 
Brazil, China and Russia. Singapore completes the 10-country-list as a popular holding 
location. In 1999, the average of these countries’ corporate tax rates was 35.0%. By 2008 it 
had sunk to a level of 28.0%. Investment increased, whereas average corporate taxation rates 
fell. 
 
A credible effect may not yet be derived from this chart. One may for instance argue that 
should investment increase for reasons other than corporate tax rate changes, they would still 
have to be carried out somewhere. A parallel decrease in corporate tax rates may possibly be 
coincidental. On a descriptive level, a clearer picture may be obtained if both the development 
of outbound investments as well as tax rates are shown per target country. Such is realized in 
Figure 3-4. 
In Figure 3-4, the (prior to this point) hidden thought of competition between the countries 
has now been incorporated. Perhaps multinational corporations have already decided to 
increase their foreign activity. The second step may be concerned with the question of where 
such an expansion may take place. This expansion could mean the expansion of existing 
subsidiaries or the setting up of additional new ones. The potential target countries are 
therefore in competition over such investments. A low or decreasing tax rate may function as 
a beneficial argument in such a competition. 
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Figure 3-3: Outbound fixed assets in EUR billion – all export countries   
 
Figure 3-4 is made up of ten different diagrams, each of which show the development of 
investment and the corporate tax rate in a different country. In each of those countries the 
extent of investment by German corporations is larger in 2008 than it was in 1996. In nine out 
of these ten countries the corporate tax rate is lower in 2008 than it was in 1996. An overall 
trend exists. Brazil’s increased corporate tax rate marks an exception: From 25% in 1996 to 
34% in 2008. It is nevertheless apparent that the amount of change as well as the actual trail 
of the curves differs from country to country. Most countries show a consistent increase in 
incoming investment. Brazil, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA however also show 
temporary declines.  
In Austria, Spain and the USA, the corporate tax rate has been cut only once throughout the 
relevant time period. The other countries have cut their rate in several steps. Brazil, France 
and Russia’s rates have seen periods of temporary increase. With a drop of 18 percentage 
points from 43% in 1996 to 25% in 2008 China records the largest corporate tax rate cut. 
China is followed by the Netherlands who cut their rate by 9.5 percentage points. Countries 
with an also significant cut rate of 9 percentage points are Brazil, Austria, Russia and 
Singapore. One must not overlook, however, that both the initial 1996 rate and the 2008 rate 
of corporate taxation significantly differ between the respective countries. In France, Spain 
and the USA, the corporate tax rate remains between 34% and 41% throughout the entire time 
period, whereas Singapore for example decreased its rate from 27% in 1996 to 18% in 2008. 
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Figure 3-4: Outbound fixed assets on a per country basis in EUR billion 
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An effect of tax on investment may on the basis of these pictures be suspected, but not 
determined with absolute certainty. The strong 2005 increase in investment in Austria may 
well have been driven by the parallel cuts in corporate taxes. The tax cuts from 2004 onwards 
in the Netherlands could feasibly have been responsible for stopping the downwards trend of 
investment. Considering a certain time lag in corporations’ investment behavior, the increased 
investment in Russia may also be attributed to decreased tax rates. 
Much like before, the one point of critique regarding the charts’ credibility is the lack of 
attention directed towards other factors possibly influencing investment. In order to tackle this 
problem, econometric estimation methods need to be drawn upon.  
 
3.2.1.4 Empirical investigating into the effect of tax rates on investment 
The estimation’s merit depends on the extent and precision with which all the factors 
influencing investment are included. Two approaches allow several of these influencing 
factors to be covered without having to collect any data. First of all, it seems very likely that a 
foreign subsidiary with a large amount of assets in one year will also have such a high level of 
assets in the following year. Therefore, instead of using the absolute level of assets, the first 
differences between investments serve as the dependent variable. In order to formulate a valid 
statement, all explanatory (= independent) variables have to be applied in first differences as 
well. Therefore, it is the tax rate difference between two years and not the tax rate itself that is 
included in the estimation.10 
The second approach neutralizes business cycle fluctuations and other extraordinary temporal 
effects. This is accomplished with the help of so-called annual dummies. For every year a 
variable is created that is one for this exact year and zero for all others. The effect of 
unusually high investment in 1999 for example would be recorded by the annual dummy for 
1999. Usage of annual dummies would only prove to be problematic if all tax rate cuts were 
to occur in a single year. As can be seen from the above charts, this is not the case. 
Beyond these specification details, additional factors driving investment have to be thought 
of; for instance GDP, firm’s profitability and inflation. Country dummies may not be used 
here, as annual dummies and country dummies together would cover up any tax rate effects. 
The remaining option is to check for characteristics of the individual countries. This means 
                                                            
10 See Wooldridge (2009) S. 393 ff. for a more technical explanation of the estimation in first differences. 
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including individual influence factors in the estimation procedure. As outlined above, these 
are applied in first differences. 
GDP is supposed to be the most important control variable. The first difference detects GDP 
growth. It may represent a proxy for the size or development of the foreign target market. 
Controlled hereby is amongst others the talked about ‘China-Effect’. GDP per capita is also 
taken into account, which provides an insight into the extent to which domestic consumers 
can actually afford the given produce. At the same time it serves as a proxy for labor costs. 
The individual firm’s profitability of the currently considered period and the preceding period 
are also taken into account. One may assume a company that was profitable in the foregone 
period to invest more than an unprofitable company. As a standard controlling instance, the 
inflation rate is also included. Larger currency fluctuations may have an effect on the values 
of the fixed assets, as these have been converted into euro values. A currency variable is 
therefore created. It is standardized to the euro’s exchange rate deviation for the reference 
year of 1996. After all, different countries bear different levels of risk regarding investment. 
These investment risks are represented by the OECD’s country risk measure, which is also 
incorporated in the estimation procedure. Unlike in the first graph of Figure 3-4 where only 
ten counties are considered, now 51 countries are included in the estimation. The ten original 
ones from the earlier estimation are among these 51 countries. They comprise of the four 
BRIC countries, the 29 OECD member states of 2008, the 8 EU member states that are not 
part of the OECD as well as ten other countries.11 For each of these countries the annual tax 
rate and the annual investment level is recorded. To ensure that the estimation focuses on 
those corporate groups with a genuine influence regarding decisions, a parallel focus on direct 
participation of 100% or directly held majority participation is put in place. The following 
Table 3-1 shows a descriptive analysis based on the observations used in the estimations as 
well as a description of the variables. 
                                                            
11 The BRIC states are Brazil, China, India and Russia. The 2008 OECD members are Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Island, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Canada, Luxemburg, Mexico, 
New-Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South-Korea, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America. The added 
EU member states are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Rumania, and Cyprus. The 
additional ten countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Croatia, Serbia, Singapore, 
South-Africa, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. 
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The following contains three tables with regression results. They are thematically structured 
and build on one another in that the first investigates the overall effect of tax on investment 
and the two following it concentrate on more detailed and in depth questions. The overall way 
to read these tables is identical and briefly summarized in the following. The dependent 
variable is the volume of fixed assets (Table 3-2 and 3-3) or a measure that indicates whether 
a subsidiary is a holding company or not (Table 3-4). 
The tax rates used in the estimation are the statutory ones (nominal rates). The influence of 
special aspects on the tax base, such as a varying ways of tax loss recognition12, are 
deliberately not made part of a general and straight forward approximated solution.13 
 
                                                            
12 See Jacob, Pasedag und Wagner (2011) for a discussion of the relationship between the tax rate and loss carryforwards. 
13 See Devereux und Griffith (2003) for a detailed path to creating effective tax rates. Elschner, Heckemeyer und Spengel 
(2011) use this method to calculate effective tax rates for European Union member states from 1998 to 2009. Becker and 
Fuest (2006) show that the attractiveness of a location may vary based on the chosen level of effective tax.  
Table 3 ?1: Descriptive statistics   
Variable Definition Mean Std. Def. 
Fixed Assets Total assets reported in the financial statements; measured in EUR 
'000. 
11,430.38 61,491.70 
Tax Rate 
 
Statutory profit tax rate. 0.3118 0.0749 
Withholding Tax Withholding tax on dividends for the respective country/country 
pair. 
0.0208 0.0450 
Profitability Profit or loss for the financial year as reported by the balance sheet 
divided by total assets before current profits. 
0.0432 0.1260 
BaWü ?Dummy 
 
Binary Variable indicating whether a subsidiary is situated in Baden ?
Württemberg (1) or not (0).   
0.2280 0.4195 
Loss carryforward exists   Binary variable indicating whether a subsidiary has a loss 
carryfroward (1) or not (0).  
0.2929 0.4551 
GDP Gross Domestic Product measured in billion current USD. 1,761.30 3,083.17 
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product per home country national; measured in 
current USD '000. 
26,593.69 15,231.48 
Inflation Rate Inflation rate based on consumer prices (in %) 3.2160 4.7186 
OECD Country Risk OECD Country Risk Classification Method measures the country 
credit risk. Risk categories span from a low credit risk (0) to a high 
credit risk (7). 
0.7394 
 
 
 
1.3499 
Currency Fluctuation  Exchange rate deviation from the euro. 1996 is nominated to 1. 1.2552 1.3482 
The information is based on the 54,426 observations covered in the outbound estimations. The firm ?specific variables are from 
the direct investment databank of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The tax variables are taken from the International Tax Handbook 
of the IBFD as well as the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides of Ernst & Young. The Gross Domestic Product, the Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita and the Inflation Rate as well as the Currency Fluctuation are from the World Development Indicators 
Version 2011. The Country Risk rating is based on information from the OECD. 
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Table 3 ?2: Overall tax rate effect  
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8) 
Tax Rate    ?.532***    ?.460***   ?.520***   ?.453***   ?.657***   ?.629**    ?.482***    ?.428***
 (.120) (.134) (.103) (.116) (.245) (.260) (.132) (.148) 
BaWü ?Dummy        .025    ?.031 
       (.081) (.085) 
BaWü x Tax Rate          ?.242    ?.153 
       (.225) (.239) 
Fixed Assets previous period   .486***   .478***   .418***   .486*** 
  (.043)  (.037)  (.081)  (.043) 
ln (Gross Domestic Product)    ?.337  .648    ?.347  .501  .008  1.32***    ?.337  .647 
 (.267) (.540) (.246) (.503) (.218) (.430) (.269) (.543) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  1.10***    ?.274  1.08***    ?.121  .756***    ?.880*  1.10***    ?.273 
 (.265) (.538) (.245) (.499) (.240) (.474) (.267) (.541) 
Profitability    ?.053     ?.047     ?.060     ?.053  
 (.038)  (.034)  (.084)  (.038)  
Profitability previous period   .096***   .104***   .123**   .096***  
 (.029)  (.027)  (.063)  (.029)  
Inflation Rate    ?.071    ?.014    ?.028  .022    ?.154    ?.042    ?.071    ?.014 
 (.064) (.033) (.021) (.024) (.146) (.163) (.064) (.033) 
OECD Country Risk    ?.014    ?.007    ?.018*    ?.009    ?.021    ?.012    ?.014    ?.007 
 (.011) (.012) (.009) (.010) (.024) (.026) (.011) (.012) 
Currency Fluctuation .054*** .021** .050*** .023** .041 .019 .054*** .021** 
 (.012) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.032) (.031) (.012) (.011) 
Exclusively BaWü     9 9   
100% participation only  9 9   9 9 9 9 
Majority participation only   9 9     
Direct participation only 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Year Dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Observations 54,426 54,426 66,452 66,452 12,310 12,310 54,426 54,426 
AR(1) ?Test   .000  .000  .000  .000 
AR(2) ?Test   .470  .493   .232  .470 
Dependent variable: In (assets). The year dummies from 1997 to 2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** point to significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. The numbers assigned to autocorrelation 
for the AR(1) ? and AR(2) ?Tests are p ?values.  
The Baden-Württemberg-Dummy is 0, unless the parent corporation of the subsidiary in 
question is based in Baden-Württemberg. The year dummies are not reported, but are 
nevertheless part of every estimation. 
Panel estimation procedures are applied. In order to show the robustness of the results, the 
instrument variable estimations following Arellano and Bond (1991) (even columns in Table 
3-2) are run in addition to the standard OLS procedure (odd columns in Table 3-2). For the 
instrument variable estimation the assets of the foregone period serve as the explanatory 
variable of the assets for the current period.14 All estimations are in first differences. This 
means that for both the dependent variable and the independent variables the difference to the 
                                                            
14 See Cameron und Trivedi (2009) S. 287 ff. for a general explanation of the Arellano Bond estimator. 
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prior year is used. This procedure has the advantage that it causes the size heterogeneity of the 
different subsidiaries to play a minimal role only. The procedure also highlights any changes 
a country may experience, such as a falling tax rate or rapidly growing GDP. 
Looking at Table 3-2, it becomes apparent that taxes have in fact, as analytically expected a 
negative effect on investment.15 The tax rate effect on assets as a dependent variable is 
negative for all eight specifications as well as highly significant.16 The coefficients are semi-
elasticities, given that the assets enter the equation in logarithm form and the tax rate doesn’t. 
This means that a tax rate increase of one percentage point leads to a decrease in investment 
by half a percent. A by 10 percentage points higher (lower) corporate tax rate means a 
decrease (increase) of about 5 percent in investment. The extent of the observed effect is 
fairly constant and ranges from -.428 in column 8 to -.657 in column 5. In analogue terms: A 
by one percentage point higher corporate tax rate causes an investment reduction of between 
0.428% and 0.657%. The effects show no systematic differences between the statistical 
estimation method and the dynamic one or between the recognition of 100% participations 
and majority participations. 
The first four columns of Table 3-2 make all observations part of the estimation without 
differentiating between the different federal states. The estimations in columns (5) and (6) are 
based only on those subsidiaries, whose parent corporations are based in Baden-Württemberg. 
This explains the significantly smaller amount of observations included in the estimations of 
these two columns. Looking at the coefficient alone, columns (5) and (6) seem to indicate 
multinationals from Baden-Württemberg to be particularly tax sensitive. Columns (7) and (8) 
check whether such is actually the case on a statistically relevant level. The estimations in 
columns (7) and (8) therefore include all corporations and two additional variables. The 
BaWü-dummy marks those parent corporations that are situated in Baden-Württemberg. If it 
was positive and significant, it would mean that systematically more investment stems from 
Baden-Württemberg than is the case for the other federal states. The coefficient is 
insignificant, which renders any interpretation of its size or sign redundant. The second new 
independent variable is the interaction term. It is the product of the BaWü-dummy and the tax 
rate and is also not significant. A statistically significant deviation of the tax rate sensitivity of 
Baden-Württemberg based parent corporations in particular may therefore not be identified. 
                                                            
15 See e.g. Keuschnigg (2008) for an analytical derivation of the effect average tax rate and marginal effective 
tax rate on cross-border investment decision. 
16 The respective valid tax rate of the foreign subsidiary is applied. Becker, Fuest and Spengel (2006) show that 
investment calculations on the basis of the whole group’s average tax rate may lead to other decisions.  
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The numerically larger effect in columns (5) and (6) is thus predominantly a result of the 
changed assembly, and/or the reduced extent of the sample. Baden-Württemberg based 
international parent corporations do not systematically differ in the way they include the tax 
rate effect in their investment calculations to parent corporations from other federal states.  
Regarding the control variables, it becomes clear that profitability and assets of the foregone 
period have a significant and positive effect on investment in the current period. To be more 
precise, considerable increases in profitability and/or in assets of the prior period have a 
significant effect on the growth of assets in the current period because the estimation is in first 
differences. What is particularly interesting is the fact that profitability of the current period is 
insignificant, whilst that of the previous period is always highly significant. This seems 
intuitively sensible, since the money gained in the recent past may be used for new assets, 
whereas any gains from the current period have not yet been given the chance to be 
designated or decided upon. The temporal shift by one period can be explained by the fact 
that any signal indicating a certain subsidiary to be a lucrative investment opportunity will 
have to find its way to the parent corporation in Germany before any kind of investment can 
be authorized. For the effect of growing assets from the preceding period on current asset 
growth, the carried out aspects regarding profitability count as analogue.  
A higher GDP per capita causes higher investment in some estimations. This can be explained 
by the following. An increasingly wealthy state becomes ever more attractive as a target 
market and thus receives more investment. Looking at the currency variable, the significant 
coefficient implies that one ought to check for this effect, too. As expected, the OECD 
country risk rating is negative. This is because countries with a high risk rating receive rather 
little investment. The effect is, however, rarely of significance. The frequent insignificance 
may be traced back to the lack of third world high level risk countries within the 51 countries 
that the estimations are based on.  
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Table 3 ?3: Lower tax rate effect if loss carryforwards exist 
      (1)     (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Tax Rate    ?.637***    ?.553***    ?.612***    ?.523***    ?.636***    ?.608*** 
 (.124) (.140) (.107) (.120) (.124) (.107) 
Loss carryforward (LC) exists    ?.108***    ?.102**    ?.101***    ?.088**    ?.107***    ?.100*** 
 (.040) (.048) (.036) (.042) (.040) (.036) 
LC exists x Tax Rate  .310***  .299**  .281***  .240*  .304**  .259** 
 (.120) (.144) (.109) (.129) (.122) (.110) 
BaWü ?Dummy        ?.054    ?.052 
     (.035) (.040) 
BaWü x Tax Rate        ?.024    ?.084 
     (.064) (.059) 
Fixed Assets previous period   .485***   .478***   
  (.042)  (.037)   
ln (Gross Domestic Product 
GDP)    ?.332  .654    ?.342  .505    ?.333    ?.343 
 (.268) (.536) (.247) (.498) (.268) (.247) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  1.10***    ?.292  1.07***    ?.137  1.10***  1.07*** 
 (.266) (.534) (.245) (.494) (.266) (.245) 
Profitability    ?.050  .075*    ?.043  .072*    ?.050    ?.043 
 (.038) (.042) (.034) (.038) (.038) (.034) 
Profitability previous period  .093***  .191***  .099***  .187***  .093***  .099*** 
 (.029) (.034) (.027) (.031) (.029) (.027) 
Inflation Rate    ?.071    ?.013    ?.028    ?.021    ?.071    ?.028 
 (.064) (.032) (.021) (.024) (.064) (.021) 
OECD Country Risk    ?.013    ?.007    ?.018*    ?.009    ?.013    ?.018* 
 (.011) (.012) (.009) (.010) (.011) (.009) 
Currency Fluctuation .054*** .021* .050*** .023** .054*** .050*** 
 (.012) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.012) (.011) 
100% participation only 9 9   9  
Majority participation only   9 9  9 
Direct participation only 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Year Dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Observations 54.426 54.426 66.452 66.452 54.426 66.452 
AR(1) ?Test   .000  .000   
AR(2) ?Test   .540  .562    
Dependent variable: In (assets). The Year Dummies from 1997 to 2008 are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** point to significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. The numbers assigned to 
autocorrelation for the AR(1) ? and AR(2) ?Tests are p ?values.  
 
In Table 3-2 the overall tax rate effect is investigated. Firms’ heterogeneity has largely been 
considered, since micro-data of individual corporations and not investment numbers 
aggregated into country or annual level have been used for the estimations. When 
investigating the tax rate effect on investment, it would be rather helpful to be able to isolate 
corporations that are either very strongly or not at all affected by the tax rate. The latter kind 
could theoretically be foreign subsidiaries that are granted a period free of taxation, a so 
called ‘tax holiday’. The identification of such subsidiaries is difficult, since such incentives 
are currently mostly handled on an individual base. Such exemption from taxation should also 
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not be granted to too many subsidiaries. There is nonetheless another way through which 
corporations more or less affected by taxes can be identified. The tax rate is significantly less 
relevant for corporations with loss carryforwards. After all, they have the possibility to guard 
their profits from being taxed by using some or all losses carried forward from past periods.17 
Table 3-3 shows the results of estimations that follow such a distributive approach.  
The number of observations in Table 3-3 show that again all the subsidiaries are included in 
the estimations. The control variables match the ones in Table 3-2. The dependent variable is 
still represented by tangible and intangible assets. The newly added dummy variable loss 
carryforward exists is 1 if the subsidiary can transfer losses from the previous period. 
Otherwise it is zero. As anticipated, the effect is significantly negative, which means the 
subsidiaries with an existing loss carryforward invest around 10% more than those without. 
This could be because the parent corporation has reacted to its subsidiary’s recent failings and 
is subsequently making less means for investment available. It could also be down to the 
subsidiary’s internal financing’s lack of investment means.18 
The focus will now shift towards the newly introduced interaction term LC exists x Tax Rate. 
It records the extent to which the existence of a loss carryforward influences the tax elasticity 
of investment. It may be observed, at first glance, that as in Table 3-2 the single tax rate effect 
is negative and highly significant for all estimation procedures. The interaction term runs 
contrary to the tax rate effect. The coefficient of LC exists x Tax Rate is consistently positive 
and significant. The tax rate maintains its overall negative effect on firms with loss 
carryforwards. This effect, however, is significantly lower with such subsidiaries. About half 
of the negative tax rate effect is compensated in the presence of a loss carryforward. In 
column (1), the pure tax rate effect is -0.637 and the interaction term is 0.310. The sum of the 
effect hereby comes to merely -0.327. A by one percentage point increased tax rate will only 
lead to a 0.327% reduction of the parent corporation’s investment into a subsidiary. The 
results in columns (2), (3) and (4) and those in column (1) are qualitatively roughly 
equivalent. 
It is plausible for the existing loss carryforward to compensate the tax rate effect to a partial 
extent only. Firstly, the subsidiaries’ loss carryforwards will eventually be used up. Secondly, 
some countries enforce a minimum taxation regulation. Hereby only partial netting out is 
                                                            
17 The effect of losses in the context of taxation has long been researched on a theoretical and an analytical level. 
See Altshuler und Auerbach (1990), Niemann (2004). In recent times the topic has found its way into the 
empirical literature. See Edgerton (2010) as well as Dreßler und Overesch (2010). 
18 Since losses in the foreign subsidiary are isolated with regards to tax, those losses may generally not be 
accounted for by partners, nor with those partners in or outside the country. See Herzig (2005). 
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possible. Thirdly, loss carryforwards may expire due to temporal restrictions or any kind of 
restructuring. In columns (5) and (6) the BaWü dummy and its interaction with the tax rate is 
added. As seen in the first regression table, the manner in which Baden-Württemberg parent 
corporations invest in their subsidiaries does not systematically differ to that of the parent 
corporations in other federal states. The effort regarding the tax rate effect or the 
compensating impact of existing loss carryforwards are as a result also applicable to Baden-
Württemberg firms. Very high detected volumes of unused loss carryforwards of German and 
foreign corporations suggest that this aspect is by no means an exotic or peripheral topic.19 
The first two regression tables show the effect of corporate taxation on the level of 
investment, which is measured in fixed assets. Multinational corporations have the 
opportunity to decide on the amount of fixed assets as well as to structure their investments 
into different special forms. The amount invested is hereby of less importance. It is much 
more the way in which these investments are embedded in the corporation’s network that is 
relevant. The third section of this empirical part focuses on such analyses of corporations’ 
structures. An obvious example of such structures will be picked out and examined. 
The assets considered above are primarily found in producing subsidiaries. The production 
site choice may be subject to various non-tax related arguments. Despite the fact that the 
implemented control variables largely control for the influence of such aspects, it would be 
interesting to analyze those firms that are chiefly driven by tax factors, as opposed to any 
other kind of influencing factors. Holding companies can be viewed as such a form of 
subsidiary. When establishing such a holding company, a corporation will be swayed 
especially by tax related arguments. In comparison, tax related arguments will carry much 
less weight in an argument over where to actually produce. In locations that are favorable 
from a tax point of view, the number of holding companies in proportion to all observed 
subsidiaries should be high.20 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 In 2004 the German Ministry of Finance declared a loss allocation potential of over EUR 250 billion. See 
Müller-Gatermann (2004) p. 467. 
20 Heckemeyer and Spengel (2008) deliver an estimation of the extent of profit transfers of multinational 
corporations. Such transfer for tax reasons are sensible from production sites with a high tax rate to holding 
companies in a low tax rate location. 
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Table 3 ?4: Low tax rate countries as preferred locations for holding companies  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tax Rate   ?.037***    ?.031***   ?.055**    ?.071***   ?.037***   ?.031***    ?.055**    ?.070***
 (.013) (.011) (.023) (.021) (.013) (.011) (.023) (.021) 
Withholding Tax        ?.080***    ?.090***   .028   .007 
     (.013) (.012) (.031) (.027) 
ln (Gross Domestic Product 
GDP) .013***  .011***  .012***  .013***  .013***  .011***  .012***  .013*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
ln (GDP per Capita) .002  .006***    ?.002  .002  .002  .007***    ?.002**  .002 
 (.002) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.003) (.002) 
Profitability   ?.010    ?.011**    ?.018    ?.004    ?.010*    ?.011**    ?.017    ?.004 
 (.006) (.005) (.011) (.010) (.006) (.005) (.011) (.010) 
Inflation Rate .017  .013*  .056***  .048**  .019*  .016**  .054***  .047** 
 (.011) (.007) (.021) (.019) (.011) (.007) (.021) (.019) 
OECD Country Risk   ?.003**    ?.002***   ?.003    ?.002    ?.002**    ?.002**    ?.003    ?.002 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Currency Fluctuation   ?.003***   ?.002***   ?.002**   ?.002***   ?.002***   ?.001***   ?.002***   ?.002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) 
Exclusively BaWü   9 9   9 9 
100% participation only  9  9  9  9  
Majority participation only  9  9  9  9 
Direct participation only 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Year Dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Observations 82.063  101.484 17.953 21.682 81.917  101.292 17.931 21.652 
Dependent variable: Dummy for the existence (1) or non ?existence (0) of a holding company. The Year Dummies from 
1997 to 2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** point to significance of 
10%, 5% and 1%.      
A detailed analysis would answer such a question with a counter variable model.21 Here, the 
basic linear estimation should be sufficient to show that the effect exists. The estimations of 
Table 3-4 are thus based on the standard method OLS.22 Dynamic estimations with a past 
parameter and instrumentation are not appropriate here, as it is not a growing set (like with 
the investment) that is being examined. It is for the same reason, that the estimations here are 
not (like in the first two tables) in first differences. 
The dependent variable in Table 3-4 is a dummy which is one if the observed subsidiary is a 
holding company. It is zero if the subsidiary is a production company or a service company 
without a holding function. As can be seen from Table 3-4, the tax rate effect is negative and 
highly significant for all specifications. This means that in locations with a low tax rate the 
fraction of holding companies in relation to the number of subsidiaries is relatively high. The 
results confirm the hypothesis that when looking for a location for a holding company, low 
                                                            
21 See Winkelmann (2008) for a technical explanation of such counting variable models. 
22 See Angrist und Pischke (2009) p. 25 ff. for the suitability of the standard OLS procedure for an approximate 
solution for such a question or for a general execution see v. Auer (2007) p. 13 ff. 
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tax rates are particularly important. The coefficient of -0.031 in column (2) indicates that a 
corporate tax rate cut of one percentage point causes the share of holdings with all 
subsidiaries to increase by 0.031%. Across all estimations, a 10 percentage point tax rate drop 
brings about an increase in the share of holdings of about 0.5%. Despite being numerically 
small, this effect is nevertheless statistically significant. One must not forget that a corporate 
holding company can easily assemble dozens of production subsidiaries. This means that 
already one or a few holdings suffice for a group to set up a tax efficient structure. 
The corporate tax rate will play a big role in any holding company location decision. 
Additionally, further taxes might play an essential role, once profits are repatriated home to 
the German parent corporation. This so called withholding tax is thus added in columns (5) to 
(8). Columns (5) and (6) show that a low withholding tax attracts holdings. This effect is 
considerably stronger than that of the corporate tax rate. A one percent increase in holdings 
(relative to all recorded subsidiaries in that country and year) is caused by a reduction in the 
withholding tax by 10 percentage points. In columns (7) and (8) this effect is no longer 
detectable. As mentioned earlier, these results are based on the significantly smaller Baden-
Württemberg sample. As a result they are not particularly reliable. With regards to the overall 
tax rate effect, there is no systematic difference in the way companies from Baden-
Württemberg and those from other federal states calculate and plan their structures. This 
observation falls in line with the above analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Foreign corporations’ investment in Germany  
Section 2.1 looked at the tax rate effect on investments of German parent corporations in their 
foreign subsidiaries. This section will focus on the reverse. It will illuminate where and how 
foreign corporations are invested in Germany. Generally speaking, the effects taken from the 
earlier estimation results should also show up for investment into Germany – the so-called 
inbound investments. The descriptive structure is the mirror image of that of part 2.1. The 
estimations, however, will show that there is much less potential for identification with the 
inbound part. The reasons for this will be explained in that respective section. The 
econometric section of this part is less about gaining thematic results than demonstrating why 
empirical analyses under certain conditions may not be conclusive.  
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Figure 3-5: Inbound fixed assets in EUR billion 
 
3.2.2.1 Investment development 
The media likes to name and portray Germany as the ‘Export World Champion’. The 
products sold abroad measure is what is mostly to be meant with this. The comparison 
between Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-1 shows that the world champion title would also apply 
when looking at German companies’ assets. German companies are much more heavily 
invested abroad than foreign companies are invested in Germany. Figure 3-1 shows a range 
from EUR 120bn in 1996 to EUR 390 billion in 2008. Figure 3-5 shows that the foreign 
corporations’ assets in Germany have gone from only EUR 35.6 billion in 1996 to EUR 
66.5billion in 2008. The numbers have doubled in size for the whole of Germany. Baden-
Württemberg has seen an increase by a factor of 2.27, from EUR 4.1billion to EUR 9.3billion.  
The increased aggregated level of investment can be traced back to the enlarged average size 
and number of foreign companies’ subsidiaries in Germany. In 1996, there were 3,927 such 
subsidiaries in Germany. By 2008 that number had risen to 4,619. The average size of a 
subsidiary was EUR 9.1 billion in 1996 and EUR 14.4 billion by 2008. The number of 
subsidiaries has risen by only 17.7% compared to the 58% that they have increased in average 
size. The aggregated growth is therefore mainly caused by the latter effect.   
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3.2.2.2 Comparing investment in the different German federal states  
 
 
Analogous to Figure 3-2 from the outbound 
investment part 2.1, Figure 3-6 shows in regular 
intervals for the years 1996, 2002 and 2008 what 
share of the investment by foreign companies goes 
to which federal state. As before, it is the fixed 
assets which are analyzed. The four large federal 
states Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Württemberg, 
Hessen and Bayern share two thirds of the total 
amount of foreign assets between them. Figure 3-5 
shows that investment into Baden-Württemberg has 
increased by more than that into Germany as a 
whole. As a result, Baden-Württemberg’s share has 
increased from 12% in 1996 to 14% in 2008. The 
overall volume has gone from EUR 35.6 billion in 
1996 to EUR 48.1 billion in 2002 to EUR 66.5 
billion in 2008. Of this EUR 4.1 billion in 1996, 
EUR 5.4 billion in 2002 and EUR 9.3billion in 2008 
have gone to Baden-Württemberg. 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Corporate Tax development 
The German corporate tax rate has been lowered in several steps throughout the thirteen year 
observation period. The tax-induced attractiveness of investing in Germany is identical for all 
foreign corporations. Figure 3-7 shows the corporate tax rate development: A reduction from 
57.25% in 1996 to 30.95% in 2008. Solidarity surcharge as well as a uniform trade tax 
multiplier of 410% has been taken into account here. There is no differentiation according to 
trade tax, because putting federal city states and larger ones on the same level regarding 
average trade tax would result in misleading impressions. 
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Figure 3-7: Inbound fixed assets in EUR billion 
 
Figure 3-7 demonstrates that investment, as measured by assets held in Germany, has risen 
whilst the combined corporate tax rate has fallen. A tax rate effect on investment may not 
reliably be derived from this. If the tax rate in other countries has fallen by more than that in 
Germany, investors may have looked elsewhere out of tax concern. Investment may also have 
risen for completely tax-unrelated reasons. Analogous to the outbound observations aspects 
like GDP, firm profitability and inflation would have to be considered. 
As mentioned above, all foreign corporations see the German tax rate development in the 
same way. This is why the diagrams in Figure 3-8 all have an identical tax rate development. 
Figure 3-8 shows the reduction in the German corporate tax burden on the investment 
development for five chosen countries. 
Figure 3-8 shows that investment by foreign corporations has developed differently 
depending on in which foreign country the investing corporation is located. The Netherlands, 
Great Britain and Spain hold more assets in Germany in 2008 than they did in 1996. 
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Figure 3-8: Inbound fixed assets on a per country basis in EUR billion 
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German assets held by US and South-Korean corporations have, on the other hand been 
receding. The different scaling is something to watch out for here. In 2008, US corporations 
hold EUR 3.7billion in German assets, whereas companies from Spain only hold EUR 3.1 
billion. With EUR 6 billion, the investment coming from Great Britain exceeds that coming 
directly from the US. 
It is worth pointing out that US corporations for example may execute their investments in 
Germany via an intermediary company based in a different country. Since this would have an 
effect on the statistic, the single country trends must not be overrated. On aggregate (refer to 
Figure 3-7) this aspect will not be visible. 
The investment from the Netherlands, Great Britain and Spain suggest a possible positive 
correlation between a reduced tax rate and higher investment. Such, on the other hand, is not 
implied by the charts of the USA and South-Korea. 
The last illustration of Figure 3-8 is a summary of all the diagrams in Figure 3-8. It provides 
an overview on the basis of a standardized scale. The decreasing investment directly from the 
USA is particularly prominent. In contrast, investment coming from the Netherlands has been 
growing significantly. As pointed out above, this could be down to US-corporations’ 
increased tendency to use the Netherlands as a location for their intermediary companies as 
executors of their investment into Germany. If this is the case, then the two opposing effects 
would balance each other out. It is a well-known fact that the Netherlands are generally a 
popular holding company location (see Mintz und Weichenrieder, 2010). In order to hereby 
explain the trend, the attractiveness of such a structure would have to have increased 
dramatically over the years. 
The German corporate tax rate for the years 1996, 2002 and 2008 is on the X-axis. An upward 
sloping straight line would suggest the expected indirectly proportional relationship between 
tax rate and investment. A downward sloping straight line, as in the USA case, would suggest 
a counterintuitive proportional relationship. An actual effect may not be derived from such a 
chart, since not all tax-unrelated influences are included. 
  3.2.2.4 Empirical investigation into the effect of tax on investment 
The tax rate effect based on outbound investment has been proven in several estimations in 
section 2.1. This effect should also generally apply for inbound investment. Upon further 
deliberation it becomes clear, that a possibly existent tax rate effect on inbound investment 
cannot be proven via the estimation procedures outlined above. Becker, Fuest and 
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Hemmelgarn (2006) have attempted to prove this effect. They investigated the effect of the 
2000 corporate tax reform, by looking at average values before and after the reform. A 
negative effect of tax on inbound investment is detected. The authors themselves point out 
that the magnitude of the identified effect is surprisingly large. 
In the case of outbound investment, considerable variations are present. This is because 
during the same years the respective countries have different tax rates, which they change at 
different times and to varying extents. For the inbound case, only unitary features of Germany 
(e.g. the German tax rate) can be drawn upon. As a result, there is not such a large scope for 
explanation. When trying to evaluate the tax effect on investment, the inbound case lacks an 
alternative investment opportunity in one or more additional countries. The outbound case 
and its 51 possible destination countries provide such an investment opportunity. An 
evaluation of the effect using our model based on international variations is hardly possible 
for the inbound case, as it lacks comparable measures. An estimation for the inbound case 
promises little success, as insufficient variation regarding the tax rates and control variables 
persist. An estimation for the inbound part is for these reasons deliberately not presented here. 
 
3.3 Summary and outlook 
The paper shows empirically that corporate taxes have a negative effect on investment. It 
highlights particularly which conclusions can be drawn from what approaches. The 
descriptive charts on annual investment may serve as a first starting point only. Reliable proof 
concerning the sought-after tax effects may only be obtained by means of estimation 
procedures. Since estimations require a minimum amount of variation and different 
comparison groups, proving the tax rate effect on investment was only possible in the 
outbound case and not the inbound one. 
The development of direct investment by German parent corporations abroad and that of 
foreign corporations in Germany from 1996 to 2008 has been examined. Especially the 
descriptive analysis has segmented inbound and outbound investments for the different 
federal states. The descriptive analysis shows the rapid growth of international investment 
activity in the observed period from 1996 to 2008. The development of Baden-Württemberg 
corporations has largely been the same as that of Germany as a whole. The empirical level 
also shows that Baden-Württemberg corporations’ investment calculations do not 
significantly differ to those of corporations from the rest of Germany. 
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The empirics exclusively focus on the outbound case. The estimations proceed in three 
different steps. The first step shows that the effect of corporate tax on the investment volume 
is negative. A by 10 percentage points increased (reduced) corporate tax rate causes a 5.32 
percent reduction (increase) in investment, measured by fixed assets. 
The second step provides the analysis of empirical evidence for the fact that companies with 
an existing loss carryforward are less concerned with tax rates in their investment decisions. 
About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated for firms with an existing loss 
carryforward. If the pure tax rate effect is -0.553 and the interaction term of an existing loss 
carryforward and the tax rate is 0.299, the summated effect is merely -0.254. A tax rate 
increase of one percentage point therefore only leads to a reduction in investment by 0.254%. 
The third step extends the empirical analysis into the research field concerned with 
corporations’ structures. Especially holding companies are set up by multinational 
corporations in tax favorable destinations in order for investments to be able to be structured 
optimally regarding tax. Table 3-4 provides evidence for the idea that locations with a 
reasonably low corporate tax rate and low withholding taxes boast a relatively high number of 
holding companies. A decrease of ten percentage points in a country’s corporate tax rate 
causes an increase in the share of holding companies in all subsidiaries in that location by 
0.55%. The effect is even stronger regarding withholding taxes. A ten percentage point 
decrease in withholding taxes causes an increase of 0.80% of holding companies relative to 
all kinds of subsidiaries. The relationship between tax and corporations’ structures is a field 
containing lots of future research questions. A more detailed competency in this field is 
relevant for tax policy, as it uncovers dodging reactions that are hidden from view when only 
investment numbers are looked at. 
The inbound case looks at foreign parent corporations` investment into their subsidiaries in 
Germany. It shows why an analysis based on estimations would not deliver meaningful results 
in this subset. The reason for this is the lack of variation of the relevant variables necessary 
for such an approach. The detailed descriptive analysis already leads to the conclusion that 
cross border investment into Germany has increased throughout the observed time period.23 A 
clear conclusion about whether this is because of the fallen corporate tax rate or other factors 
may not be drawn. 
                                                            
23 Especially the 2008 corporate tax rate reform and its reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25% to 15% 
could have attracted investors. There are, however, critics who claim that this effect of the reform has only a 
small reductive effect on the tax burden. See Radulescu und Stimmelmayr (2008). 
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3.5 Survey 1: Empirical Studies on the Effect of Corporate Income Taxes on Investment 
Survey 24 Data Methodology Results 
An (2011) Firm-level panel 
data from the 
Chinese industrial 
enterprises 
database (2002 till 
2008). 
Difference-in-differences 
approach to determine 
whether multinational 
enterprises reducing their 
investment in China due to 
the new corporate income 
tax law, applicable since 
January 1st, 2008. This law 
removed tax privileges of 
foreign investment 
enterprises compared to 
local investors. 
Based on the tax law change, 
foreign investment enterprises 
indeed seem to relatively reduce 
their investment in China. The 
size effect is larger for Hong 
Kong-Macau-Taiwan 
investment enterprises than for 
other foreign investment 
enterprises, supporting the 
claim that some Chinese 
investors engaged in “round-
tripping” FDI. 
Azémar, 
Desbordes, 
Muchielli 
(2006) 
OECD panel 
dataset including 
26 developing 
countries for the 
period 1989–2000. 
The paper focuses 
on Japanese FDI 
flows. 
Generalized least squares 
estimations and Baltagi’s 
error component two-stage 
least squares procedure; 
dependent variable: 
Japanese FDI Flows; 
independent variable: 
effective statutory tax rate. 
There is a link between the 
Japanese tax sparing provision 
and FDI, suggesting that FDI 
flows in tax sparing countries 
are three times bigger than in 
non-tax sparing countries. The 
effective statutory tax rate and 
thus tax sparing provisions are a 
significant factor in the 
investors’ strategic location 
choice decisions. 
Barrios, 
Huizinga, 
Laeven, 
Nicodème 
(2008) 
Amadeus panel 
data on 
multinational firms 
operating in 33 
European countries 
covering the years 
1999 till 2003. The 
study builds on 
26,567 firm 
observations. 
OLS and conditional logit 
regressions. The dependent 
variable is the subsidiary 
location. Independent 
variables are the effective 
tax burden, the host country 
corporate tax, an 
international tax, the 
withholding tax, and the 
parent country corporate 
tax. 
Parent-country (double) 
corporate taxation has an 
independent, strongly negative 
effect on the probability of 
foreign subsidiary location in 
potential host countries. 
Becker, Egger, 
Merlo (2012) 
Compiled national 
database of more 
than 11,000 
municipalities in 
Germany from 
2001 to 2005. This 
jurisdictional 
dataset is merged 
to firm data in form 
of the inbound side 
of the German 
Federal Bank’s 
Midi dataset. 
Cross section model for 
count data, other cross 
section models and a fixed 
effects panel model. The 
dependent variables, 
applied one by one, are the 
number of foreign 
affiliates, the employees of 
foreign affiliates and the 
fixed assets of foreign 
affiliates. The important 
independent variables 
business tax and formula-
apportioned business tax 
are instrumented. 
Higher business tax rates have a 
negative effect on three 
alternative measures of 
multinational enterprises’ 
(MNE’s) activity, after 
controlling for other 
determinants of firm location 
decisions: the number of foreign 
MNEs, MNE employment, and 
MNE fixed assets. 
                                                            
24 Some of the methodologies’ and results’ summaries quote the respective papers literally. 
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Becker, Riedel 
(2012) 
Amadeus financials 
database covering 
the years 1995 till 
2005 and providing 
observations of 
firms located in 38 
different countries. 
Multinational firm 
activities at home and 
abroad might be positively 
correlated which may be 
due to the use of common 
inputs like marketing, 
patents, etc. Applying a 
general method of moments 
approach, the paper traces 
to what extent a cost shock 
at one location may lead to 
reduced activity in all other 
locations within the firm. 
Confirmation of the main 
hypothesis that corporate 
taxation at the parent location 
not only reduces the parent's 
capital stock, but also lowers 
capital stocks at affiliates 
abroad. A 10 percentage point 
increase in corporate tax rates is 
associated with a 5.6% decrease 
in the affiliate's capital stock. 
Bénassy-
Quéré, 
Fontagné, 
Lahrèche-
Révil (2005) 
Bilateral FDI flows 
among 11 OECD 
countries in the 
time span 1984 till 
2000 (Eurostat 
Cronos). Reference 
to Devereux and 
Griffith for 
explanatory 
variables. The 
paper builds on 
1,163 observations. 
A gravity model is applied, 
using FDI flows as the 
dependent variable and tax 
differentials as well as 
effective tax rates as the 
crucial independent 
variables. 
An asymmetry in the impact of 
tax differentials on FDI is 
identified. Lower tax rates in 
the recipient countries fail to 
significantly attract foreign 
investment while higher taxes 
tend to discourage new FDI 
inflows. Additionally, the 
impact of positive tax 
differentials varies with the 
double-taxation arrangement in 
operation in the capital-
exporting countries. Narrow tax 
differentials just slightly 
discourage inward FDI from 
crediting countries. Large tax 
differentials however, produce 
proportionately more important 
FDI outflows. Such an 
asymmetry does not exist for 
FDI stemming from exempting 
countries as it reacts linearly to 
tax differentials. 
Blonigen 
(2005) 
Analysis of several 
recent empirical 
papers on the tax 
effect on FDI, but 
no meta 
regressions. In 
addition, the US 
sales abroad are 
descriptively 
shown, 
differentiating by 
industry and by 
destination. 
Meta study on factors 
influencing FDI flows. 
Broad general hypotheses such 
as taxes generally discourage 
FDI are not universally 
confirmed. 
Blonigen, 
Davies, Head 
(2003) 
Panel Data 1986-
1994, taken from 
annual U.S. 
Department of 
Commerce 
statistics on sales 
of foreign affiliates 
Modification of the model 
by Carr, Markusen and 
Maskus into an absolute 
value model where skill 
difference and GDP 
difference are specified as 
absolute values. OLS and 
Regression yields highly 
significant coefficients for both 
variables having opposite signs 
to the CMM model outcomes. 
The effect of the absolute skill 
difference on the FDI stock is 
highly negative, while the 
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of American parent 
firms and on sales 
of U.S. affiliates of 
foreign parent 
firms. 
Tobit regressions. The real 
FDI stock serves as the 
dependent variable. The 
crucial independent 
variables are the absolute 
skill difference and its 
interaction with the 
absolute GDP difference. 
interaction term is positive. 
Buettner, Ruf 
(2007) 
Outbound set of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. The years 
1996 till 2003 are 
used. 
The binary dependent 
variable distinguishes if a 
firm holds an investment in 
a specific country or not. 
Crucial independent 
variables are the market 
size, labor costs, as well as 
effective, statutory, and 
marginal tax rates. 
Statutory tax rates, market size 
and labor costs have a 
significant impact on the 
location decision for German 
companies. The impact of 
marginal tax rates is not 
significant. 
Buettner, 
Wamser 
(2009) 
Outbound set of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. The years 
1996 till 2004 are 
used. 
Empirical analysis of the 
impact of taxes other than 
profit taxes on both 
investment and location 
decisions of multinationals. 
The results do not only refer to 
corporate income tax effects, 
but also to non-profit taxes such 
as property taxes, sales taxes 
and VAT, and import duties. All 
of these taxes show significant 
adverse effects on the level of 
FDI. However, most of the 
effects of non-profit taxes 
vanish once country-specific 
fixed effects are included. 
Carr, 
Markusen, 
Maskus (2001) 
Panel data set from 
1986 till 1994, 
taken from annual 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
statistics on sales 
of foreign affiliates 
of American parent 
firms and on sales 
of U.S. affiliates of 
foreign parent 
firms. 
Ordinary least squares, 
weighted least squares and 
Tobit estimations. The 
dependent variable is the 
U.S. outbound investment. 
Crucial independent 
variables are the GDP sum, 
GDP difference squared, 
skill difference, investment 
cost host, trade cost by the 
host, and trade cost by the 
parent. 
Tests of the Knowledge Capital 
Model result in the following 
conclusions: Outward 
investment from source country 
to affiliates in a host country is 
increasing in the sum of their 
economic sizes, their similarity 
in size, the relative skilled-labor 
abundance of the parent nation, 
and the interaction between size 
and relative endowment 
differences. 
De Mooij, 
Ederveen 
(2003) 
25 empirical 
studies from the 
years 1984 to 2001 
dealing with the tax 
impact on foreign 
direct investment.  
Meta study on the impact of 
corporate income taxes on 
foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
The study finds substantial 
variation among studies 
concerning the elasticity of 
foreign capital. Systematically 
lower absolute elasticities can 
be found in studies using data 
on the number of foreign 
locations as compared to studies 
using data on foreign capital. 
Studies using M&A data (as 
compared to aggregate FDI 
data) report smaller elasticities, 
while those using data on 
greenfield investments and 
expansions yield higher 
elasticities. Additionally, 
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effective or average tax rates 
seem to affect FDI more than 
statutory tax rates. The study 
cannot find support for the 
claim that investments from tax 
credit countries are less 
responsive to taxes than 
investments from tax exemption 
countries. 
Desai, Foley, 
Hines (2004) 
BEA panel data set 
for the years 1982, 
1989, 1994. Covers 
U.S. based foreign 
operations. 
Dependent variable: Log of 
assets,  Log of gross 
product, Employee 
compensation/assets, Net 
Income/owner's equity; 
Independent variables: 
Income Tax Rate, Indirect 
Tax Rate 
High direct and indirect taxes 
reduce FDI. High income taxes 
result in companies substituting 
labor by capital and reducing 
taxable income. 
Dharmapala, 
Foley, Forbes 
(2010) 
Confidential 
Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
panel data set on 
U.S. based 
multinational 
enterprises from 
1996-2005; BEA 
Survey of U.S. 
Direct Investment 
Abroad; Compustat 
and ExecuComp 
Two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable 
approach. The tested 
dependent variables are 
capital expenditures, 
domestic employment 
compensation, R&D 
expenditures, parent 
leverage, firm expansion, 
CEO compensation, 
dividends to shareholders, 
and share repurchases. 
Independent variables are 
generally applied as lagged 
values. Repatriations are 
instrumented for, in order 
to overcome endogeneity 
issues and a general 
omitted variable bias. 
U.S. companies were not 
financially constrained at the 
time of the Homeland 
Investment Act (HIA) that 
allowed for a repatriation of 
profits stored abroad at a 
reduced tax rate. The 
availability of cheaper internal 
financing after repatriation 
under HIA did not achieve its 
goal to boost investment, 
employment or R&D in the 
U.S.. Companies seem to have 
used the money for share 
repurchases. 
Dwenger, 
Steiner (2012) 
Construction of a 
pseudo panel for 
the years 1998-
2004 by using the 
corporate income 
tax statistics and 
micro data 
provided by the 
Federal and State 
Statistical Offices. 
Estimation of the average 
corporate tax rate's effect 
on corporate taxable 
income. The endogeneity of 
the tax rate is controlled for 
by applying an instrumental 
variables approach which 
calculates the 
microsimulation-based 
counterfactual average tax 
rate a corporation would 
have faced in a particular 
period had there been no 
endogenous change in 
corporate profits. The 
instrumental variables 
approach is reflected in 
2SLS estimations. 
The empirical results suggest 
that a reduction in the statutory 
corporate tax rate would reduce 
corporate tax receipts less than 
proportionally. The tax base 
elasticity of approximately  
–0.5, implies that a reduction of 
the statutory corporate tax rate 
by 10 percent would reduce 
corporate tax receipts by 
roughly 5 percent. 
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Edmiston, 
Mudd, Valev 
(2003): 
Transition Report, 
EBRD, for the 
years 1993-1998. 
Dependent variable: 
Annual inflows of FDI as 
percent of GDP; 
independent variables: 
Number of special tax rates, 
Number of lines in tax base 
description, Ambiguous 
language in tax law, 
Number of changes in tax 
parameters, Number of 
changes in opposing 
direction. 
Complexity of tax codes might 
have had a negative impact on 
business activity in the 
transition economies. However, 
complexity alone is not a 
sufficient enough explanation. 
The overall uncertainty as well 
as the uncertainty of how to 
interpret the tax law is also an 
important factor. 
Feld, 
Heckemeyer 
(2011) 
Meta study based 
on 704 estimates 
derived from 45 
studies altogether. 
29 of these 45 
studies have been 
covered in previous 
meta studies by De 
Mooij and 
Ederveen, whereas 
16 are regarded for 
the first time. 
Classical quantitative meta-
analysis applying pooled 
OLS regressions and two 
forms of pooled weighted 
least squares regressions, 
namely fixed effects meta 
regressions and mixed 
effects meta regressions.   
The results are presented 
with and without 
publication bias correction 
one by one. 
In absolute terms, the median 
tax semi-elasticity of FDI based 
on 704 primary estimates is 
2.49 and the precision weighted 
average of the full sample of 
semi-elasticities is 2.55. 
Furthermore, there seems to be 
a publication bias in the primary 
literature and studies based on 
aggregate data report 
systematically larger semi-
elasticities than firm-level 
analyses. 
Galindo, 
Pombo (2011) 
Firm level data 
from a set of 42 
developing 
countries taken 
from the World 
Bank business 
environment 
surveys, covering 
the years 2004 till 
2006. 
OLS estimations with the 
dependent variables firm 
level investment and total 
factor productivity applied 
one by one. 
Based on the results, investment 
and productivity respond 
negatively to an increase in the 
corporate tax rate. These effects 
are stronger in bigger firms. A 
one standard deviation increase 
in the corporate tax rate (0.10) 
would reduce investment for 
large firms in 0.0165, which is 
close to 15% of the sample 
average. A one standard 
deviation increase in the 
corporate tax rate would reduce 
the total factor productivity in 
0.8, which is equal to nearly 
35% of the sample average. 
Grubert, 
Altshuler 
(2006) 
U.S. Statistics of 
Income for 2002. 
Linked Forms 
1120, 1118, and 
5471 Treasury tax 
files. 752 
observations 
OLS regressions; 
Dependent Variable: CFC 
Dividends / Sales; 
independent variable: CFC 
Earnings / Sales; OLS 
Regression 
Dividend exemption offers an 
efficiency gain through 
eliminating the need to avoid 
repatriations and the costs they 
entail. Furthermore, it does not 
increase the attractiveness of 
low-tax locations compared to 
current law. Burden-neutral 
worldwide option (Credit 
method with a lower tax rate of 
28%) promises broader benefits. 
In particular, for most 
companies it will eliminate 
incentives for locating income 
in low-tax locations. 
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Hines (1994) Data on the 
aggregate behavior 
of all US firms in 
1984, as reported 
by Bradford (1990) 
Dependent variable: log 
interest/dividends; 
Independent variable: 
average foreign tax rate 
A credit system being 
implemented by the home 
country of the parent company 
encourages that company to 
finance new investments abroad 
with a considerable amount of 
debt and restricts their equity 
stakes in affiliates. This 
incentive even remains when 
effective transfer pricing 
regulations are in place. 
Hines (1996) Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
survey on U.S. 
Direct Investment 
Abroad 1987 
Dependent variables: state 
share of PPE, state share of 
total affiliates; Independent 
variable: state tax rate (state 
tax rate for countries 
exempting income and zero 
for countries crediting it) 
High state tax rates have a 
significantly negative effect on 
local investment. Investors who 
cannot claim credits for state tax 
payments reduce their 
investment shares relative to 
foreign tax-credit investors. 
Louie, 
Russlang 
(2007) 
U.S. Statistics of 
Income data on 
activities of U.S. 
companies for 
1992, 1994, 1996. 
Dependent variable: after-
tax rate of return from the 
foreign subsidiary; 
Independent variables: host 
country statutory tax rate, 
double tax treaty, 
corruption 
Poor host country governance 
increases the required pre-tax 
rate of return of U.S. companies 
on FDI. This added return 
reflects the cost of non-
deductible bribes as well as a 
premium for the increasing 
uncertainty. 
OECD (2008) The meta study is 
based on 427 tax 
elasticities taken 
from empirical 
papers of a twenty 
year period 
between 1985 and 
2005. 
Meta study building on a 
literature review of De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2005) 
and including the 
information from further 
empirical papers dealing 
with the tax effects on FDI. 
The meta study compares 
time-series data studies, 
panel data studies and 
discrete choice models. 
Overview and evaluation of 
existing literature by 2008. 
Calculated average and 
marginal effective tax rates for 
FDI under alternative financing 
structures and tax-planning 
strategies. The average semi-
elasticity of the tax effect on 
FDI for discrete choice models 
 (–3.43) is larger than that found 
for studies using panel data (–
2.73) and time-series data (–
2.61). 
Ruf, 
Weichenrieder 
(2011) 
Outbound set of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. 
Based on a rich panel data 
set of multinationals 
headquartered in Germany, 
the impact of an applicable 
German CFC legislation on 
the stock of passive assets 
held abroad is estimated. 
The paper provides empirical 
evidence for the effectiveness of 
CFC rules. While a lower local 
tax rate in general attracts 
German passive investment, this 
effect is lower for countries for 
which the German CFC rule is 
applicable, since their local rate 
is below the safe-haven rate. 
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Abstract: I analyze the impact of tax loss treatment on multinational investment. Basically, 
two effects of tax loss treatment can be expected. First, firms make their investment decisions 
considering potential future losses. Then, the various types of conceivable loss offset 
provisions affect investment decisions. Secondly, existing loss carryforwards resulting from 
losses in the past affect the tax rate elasticity of current investment decisions. My empirical 
analysis is based on data of German multinationals. I pay particular attention to industries 
having a high probability to make losses. My regression results suggest that a short 
carryforward time limit lowers investment in particular for firms with a high loss probability. 
I only find mixed evidence that group loss offsetting provisions foster investment. Concerning 
the effects of existing losses carried forward, I find a reduced tax rate elasticity of investment 
for companies shielded by loss carryforwards. 
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Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) in Uppsala, at an Empirical Tax Research 
conference in Mannheim, at a doctoral seminar in Karlsruhe, at the German Federal Bank’s MiDi workshop in 
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annual meeting in Kaiserslautern. 
26 I thank Dhammika Dharmapala, two anonymous referees, seminar participants at the University of Brescia and 
participants of the VHB conference 2011 in Kaiserslautern, the IIPF conference 2010 in Uppsala and the 
MiDi-Workshop 2010 in Frankfurt for helpful comments. I would like to thank the Deutsche Bundesbank for 
granting access to the MiDi database. Financial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Losses gain increased attention in times of economic crises. In such situations, countries 
support their banks and industrial enterprises. Grants are provided in the assumption that, in 
the middle and long run, the respective company will recover and be able to repay the 
support. This is public interference in the face of private losses. What appears to be new has 
in fact traditionally been embedded in the tax system of many states. By granting ample tax 
credits or reimbursing previously paid taxes for suffered losses, the state exerts an insurance 
function. Income taxation can therefore serve as a kind of automatic stabilizer (Devereux and 
Fuest, 2009; Buettner and Fuest, 2010). In this paper, I analyze the investment effects of tax 
loss treatment from the perspective of the potential beneficiary: the private company. 
While profits are taxed, no immediate tax refund is granted if a corporation suffers losses. 
Losses can only be used to offset profits generated in other periods or by affiliated companies. 
The tax loss offset rules, however, significantly differ between countries. Almost all countries 
offer the opportunity to carry losses forward to subsequent periods. Across countries, the time 
span for a loss carryforward varies between two years and indefinitely. Moreover, only a few 
countries grant a loss carryback. Besides offering the possibility to shift losses along the time 
dimension, some countries also allow the offset of profits and losses among companies 
belonging to the same group. 
Interestingly, there is an overall tendency of relaxing the loss offset provisions during the last 
decades although many countries cut their corporate tax and compensate revenue effects by 
base broadening. While in 1996 32 out of 41 considered countries restricted the loss 
carryforward, in 2008 only 25 countries did so. The same holds true for the group taxation 
regimes which were granted in only 19 out of the 41 countries in 1996 but in 24 countries in 
2008. Recently, the European Commission (2011) published its proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and named the netting of profits and losses 
between affiliated firms as one of the major goals to be reached. 
I aim to analyze whether multinational firms structure their investments based on tax loss 
treatment rules. The different loss offset provisions, different probabilities to suffer losses and 
profit histories provide considerable variation for an empirical study. Multinational 
companies face different tax loss offset rules. In this study I ask whether the tax loss treatment 
in the host country exerts an impact on investment decisions of subsidiaries. I analyze this 
question for two scenarios, regarding the investment impact of potential losses and of present 
loss carryforwards. First, I focus on investment decisions in the general perception of 
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potential future losses. Second, I analyze how subsidiaries react once they have already 
suffered losses and decide in the presence of loss carryforwards. The policy implications 
might differ depending on which of the two strands is covered. On the one hand, a favorable 
tax loss treatment is expected to encourage multinational firms to invest more in the 
respective country. On the other hand, the setup of loss treatment rules affects competition, 
given that firms are in different positions due to their respective loss history. 
The first part of the empirical analysis deals with investment aspects in sight of potential 
future losses. Analytical papers like Majd and Myers (1987) and Donnelly and Young (2002) 
suggest detrimental investment effects of partial tax loss refund regimes. My empirical 
analysis is based on a rich firm level dataset of German multinationals provided by the 
German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The data enables me to use cross-country and 
temporal variation of tax loss treatment rules of 41 host countries spanning from 1996 until 
2008. Moreover, the data provides additional firm variation and I make use of the fact that the 
likelihood of suffering losses differs across industries. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and 
Altshuler et al. (2008) reveal asymmetric distributions of losses across industries. Yet, I am 
the first to use the industry information as a proxy for the probability to make losses in the 
future and, at the same time, as an indicator for how much attention is devoted to the tax 
treatment of such potential future losses. 
I find some evidence indicating that in industries with a high probability to face losses firms 
indeed consider the tax loss treatment rules when making investment decisions. Regarding the 
loss offset among affiliated companies, my results are generally mixed. Only in some 
specifications, results suggest that the absence of a group taxation rule exerts a negative 
influence on investments for firms with a relatively high probability to face losses. Moreover, 
I consider the possibility of a loss carryback or the limitation of a loss carryforward. While I 
am unable to find significant effects of a loss carryback, in most specifications I find a 
significant influence of a strict loss carryforward limit if I consider the variation in probability 
to suffer losses among different industries. 
Previous empirical evidence on the investment effects of tax loss treatment is still scarce. 
However, my analysis is related to a study by Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994), who 
trace the effects of restrictions on intertemporal loss offsetting using a panel of UK 
companies. They conclude from their empirical results that including tax law asymmetries 
does not improve the predictive power of a model to explain investment decisions. Unlike 
Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994), I find some investment effects of tax loss treatment 
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rules. My results might differ because I consider multinational firms which can reallocate 
investment funds as a response to tax loss treatment rules. Moreover, I can make use of 
additional variation due to the international variation in tax loss treatment rules and the 
industry variation in loss probabilities. 
In the second part of my analysis, I provide evidence on the impact of a present loss 
carryforward. As shown by Auerbach (1986), tax effects oppose the negative liquidity and 
signaling effects of an existing loss carryforward. Taking into account that future profits could 
effectively remain free of tax, existing losses should reduce the tax elasticity of investment. 
Based on a small panel of UK firms, Devereux (1989) shows a negative investment effect of a 
refined measure for the cost of capital which considers losses carried forward. I provide direct 
evidence that an existing loss carryforward reduces investment. Moreover, my results suggest 
that the tax rate elasticity of investment is significantly reduced if a subsidiary can offset 
current taxable profits with losses carried forward from previous periods. 
My analysis relates to a recent study by Edgerton (2010) who provides empirical insights into 
the interaction between a firm’s taxable status and its response to tax incentives. Considering 
Compustat data of US and Canadian firms, he finds no significant cut in the response to taxes 
when he also controls variation in cash flow stocks. Interestingly, my results for subsidiaries 
of multinational firms suggest that the positive effect of an existing loss carryforward on the 
tax elasticity of investment prevails even if I include measures approximating cash flows such 
as sales or profitability. However, the firms considered by the two studies are very distinct 
which might explain the different findings regarding the impact of tax statuses. While 
Edgerton (2010) uses a sample of mainly domestic US and Canadian firms excluding almost 
all subsidiaries, I focus exclusively on subsidiaries of multinational firms. Investment 
decisions of subsidiaries might be less constrained by cash flow because they can benefit from 
the internal capital market of the multinational firm. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section I discuss the effects of 
tax loss treatment on investments and derive empirically testable hypotheses. In Section 3, the 
empirical approach is presented. In Section 4, I describe my data. Section 5 provides 
regression results concerning the impact of tax loss treatment on investment behavior of firms 
which will potentially face losses. Section 6 presents empirical results on the effects of 
existing loss carryforwards. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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4.2 Investment Impact of Tax Loss Treatment  
Basically, two effects of tax loss treatment can be distinguished. On the one hand, firms make 
their investment decisions facing potential future losses. Then, the various types of 
conceivable loss offset provisions should affect investment decisions. On the other hand, 
existing loss carryforwards resulting from losses in the past should affect the tax rate elasticity 
of current investment decisions. 
4.2.1 Potential Losses 
If a company expects losses in the future, the loss treatment for tax purposes should affect the 
investment decision. Thus, it is not the subsidiary’s tax status that matters at the point of the 
investment decision, but the country’s tax regulations applicable to all companies and the 
firm’s expectations to suffer losses at some point. Whenever a general full loss offset is 
denied, profits and losses are treated asymmetrically from a tax point of view. Theoretical 
implications of such asymmetries in tax loss treatment have been shown by Majd and Myers 
(1987) and Niemann (2008) for intertemporal loss offsets and by Donnelly and Young (2002) 
regarding the netting of losses within groups. All these studies find a detrimental effect on 
investment caused by unfavorable tax loss treatment; only the degree of the impact varies 
depending on which particular rule is regarded. Cooper and Knittel (2006, 2010) show a 
significant decline in the real value of tax losses of US firms due to the penalty from partial 
loss refund regimes. 
The aspect of risk plays an important role when considering the relationship between taxation 
and investment. Early analytical literature on risk-taking, such as Mossin (1968) or Mintz 
(1981), found fairly clear predictions in a full loss offset scenario. In such a scenario, the 
corporate tax might either leave investment choices unchanged or even encourage investment 
into risky projects. In the real world, however, I observe partial loss offsets with different 
degrees of tightness. This is also looked at in some more contemporary analytical models: 
MacKie-Mason (1990) stresses the potential benefits of nonlinear elements in the tax system, 
while Eeckhoudt et al. (1997) point at supposed detrimental aspects. 
The tax loss treatment differs between countries. While in almost all countries losses can be 
carried forward to subsequent fiscal years, only a few countries allow a loss carryback. While 
the fundamental paper by Domar and Musgrave (1944) discusses the loss offset provision in a 
rather general way, Barlev and Levy (1975) distinguish between the carryforward and the 
carryback provision. They show that the expiration of a loss carryforward essentially depends 
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as much on the size of the loss suffered as on the sequence of consecutive profits and losses. 
They conclude from their analysis that a loss carryback provision is very valuable for 
increasing the probability of a successful offset whereas the difference in effect between a 
limited and an unlimited loss carryforward is negligible. 
A loss carryback results in an immediate tax refund. Moreover, the past company results are 
well known. Therefore, a loss carryback option should have an even stronger influence on the 
investment decision than an option to net profits and losses sometime in the future. Still, a 
carryback option effectively leads to tax refunds only if the subsidiary has been profitable in 
the past. It seems reasonable to suppose that the relevance of tax loss treatment differs among 
firms. I assume materialized losses to indicate that in the respective industry the general 
possibility of suffering losses is considered more strongly. Tax loss offsetting rules might be 
particularly important for firms having a high probability to suffer losses in some years. 
Taking into account the reasoning and findings by Auerbach and Poterba (1987), Altshuler et 
al. (2008) and Cooper and Knittel (2010), I expect especially negative investment effects of 
restrictive tax loss treatment rules on firms engaged in very cyclical industries. Based on these 
considerations, I set up the following hypothesis: 
H4-1: The absence of a loss carryback option should hinder investment because the 
tax refund serves as an insurance against part of the losses that are potentially 
to be suffered. The denied carryback option should particularly lower 
investment of firms that have a high probability to make losses. 
As mentioned above, only a few countries offer a loss carryback, but all analyzed countries 
allow a carryforward of losses. Some countries, however, limit the maximum time span 
within which losses can be carried forward. The shorter the maximum time span which is 
provided for such intertemporal shifts, the higher is the probability of a limitation to offset the 
losses. It can be expected that companies invest less in countries where the time span that 
potential losses can be carried forward for is limited. Once again, this consideration should 
particularly prevail for companies anticipating a high probability of suffering losses. 
Concerning the limitations of a loss carryforward, I set up the following hypothesis: 
H4-2: A smaller maximum number of years until the expiry of a loss carryforward 
should exert a detrimental effect on investment. The impact of limitations of a 
loss carryforward should be more pronounced for firms having a high 
probability of making losses. 
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Loss offsetting along the time dimension is relevant when a single subsidiary is analyzed in 
isolation. If, however, a parent company has more than one subsidiary, an offset among these 
different tax subjects might be attainable. The major requirement for such an offset is a group 
taxation regime that allows for consolidation of profits and losses between affiliated 
companies. Different kinds of group taxation regimes, such as group consolidation, group loss 
transfer or consortium relief, can be observed.27 Despite differences in the respective setup, all 
these group taxation regimes enable the netting of profits and losses among group members. 
Donnelly and Young (2002) explain how the intragroup transfer of corporate business losses 
works and how strongly it affects groups’ tax bases. If a group taxation regime is in place, the 
probability of a loss forfeit is considered to be lower. This mitigates the need for profits 
earned by the loss making subsidiary itself to offset the loss. A group taxation regime offers 
an additional opportunity to offset the loss and reduce the overall tax bill. Compared to a loss 
carryforward option, the group taxation regime offers the possibility to offset losses 
immediately. Moreover, since Cooper and Knittel (2006, 2010) find that in some industries 
losses carried forward can be very persistent, the absence of a group tax regime should hinder 
investment. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis: 
H4-3: The absence of a group tax regime should hinder investment. The negative 
investment effect of an absent group taxation regime should be more pronounced 
for firms with a high probability of making losses. 
4.2.2 Existing Loss Carryforwards 
The tax treatment of losses should also affect investment decisions if a firm already has 
suffered losses and thus has a loss carryforward. Auerbach (1986) analyzes the effects of tax 
law asymmetries and derives two opposing effects of a loss carryforward on investment. On 
the one hand, a company showing a loss carryforward has suffered losses in the past. This fact 
could have a detrimental effect on investment levels because the subsidiary might lack 
internal financing. Moreover, in the case of multinational firms, local managers have 
difficulties to run for capital provided by the parent company because losses signal that the 
business model of the subsidiary is not very successful. 
                                                            
27 In a consolidation system, the financial statements of companies belonging to the same group are either made 
up together or merged at the end of the fiscal year. When there is a system of group contribution, the profitable 
subsidiary is allowed to contribute a part or all of its profits to the subsidiary which suffered a loss. 
Correspondingly, losses are transferred among subsidiaries in a group relief system. In effect, all of these three 
systems enable the netting of profits and losses of different tax subjects.  
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H4-4: The effect of a loss carryforward on the investment level should be negative if 
liquidity or signaling effects prevail. 
On the other hand, Auerbach (1986) also derives a tax effect of an existing loss carryforward. 
If a firm has a loss carryforward, returns on investment can be credited against the losses 
carried forward. Thus, a firm with a loss carryforward is supposed to be tax exempt to a 
certain extent. If I only consider the present and possible future status of a company and 
disregard the past, then the firm with a loss carryforward is supposed to invest more than a 
firm without the opportunity to reduce its future tax base. Given that there are sufficient funds 
to invest, this should result in an investment exceeding the one in a world without taxation or 
with a perfect loss offset. 
The tax benefit of a loss carryforward is, of course, related to the level of the corporate tax 
rate. If a company has a loss carryforward, it simply does not have to pay the entire profit tax. 
While previous studies find negative effects of the corporate tax rate on investment decisions 
of multinational firms (for a survey, see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003), this general 
relationship should be alleviated once losses are present. In the presence of a loss 
carryforward, the tax rate elasticity of investment should be lower in absolute value due to the 
fact that the company can net its carryforward against future profits, which then effectively 
stay untaxed (Creedy and Gemmel, 2008). 
Cooper and Knittel (2006) state that, in the case of a persistent loss carryforward, a firm faces 
a decline in the marginal tax rate to zero. While a loss carryforward is often associated with a 
reduction of marginal tax rates, this is not always the case. The tax shield of a loss 
carryforward can also offset accelerated depreciation or interest deductions. Then, for some 
firms, the adverse effect of a loss carryforward on marginal tax rates might be less 
pronounced.28 Still, I generally expect an adverse impact on the tax rate elasticity of 
investment. Therefore, I set up the following testable hypothesis: 
H4-5: An existing loss carryforward should reduce the tax rate elasticity of investment 
decisions. 
 
 
                                                            
28 I can also suppose very specific cases where a loss carryforward is associated with less investment. If, for 
example, the accelerated depreciation is offset by a loss carryforward and losses or depreciation cannot be 
carried forward to subsequent periods, the attractiveness of investment in fixed assets might be lost. 
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4.3 Empirical Approach 
For the empirical analysis of the hypotheses set up in Section 2, I use firm level data of 
multinational subsidiaries. As the dependent variable, I consider the balance sheet item fixed 
assets of subsidiary i in year t. Moreover, I consider the statutory tax rate, a vector of non-tax 
controls X, a subsidiary-specific effect įi and a year effect Ȗt. Then, I estimate equations of the 
following type: 
ln(Fixed Assets)i,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1 TaxRatet + Xi,t  ȕ2 + į i + Ȗ t + İi,t 
I eliminate subsidiary-specific heterogeneity by taking first differences. Thus, subsidiary fixed 
effects are purged out by subtracting the lagged value of each variable (cf. Wooldridge, 2002). 
Then, the transformed equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
In additional regressions, I take into account the persistence of the fixed assets by using a 
dynamic model which captures adjustment costs (Chirinko, 1993). In this sense, the approach 
reflects the marginal decision of the firm in terms of the scale of investment conditional on 
the chosen location. In the dynamic setup, I estimate equations of the following type: 
    ln(Fixed Assets)i,t = ȕ0+ ȕ1 ln(Fixed Assets)i,t-1 + ȕ2 TaxRatet + Xi,t  ȕ3 + į i + Ȗ t + İi,t 
Again, subsidiary-specific heterogeneity is removed by taking first differences. Yet, such a 
specification requires considering that my time-series information is not sufficient to avoid 
what is called a dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). I use an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and apply simple two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimations where the second lagged level of the dependent variable yi,t-2 is used as the 
additional instrumental variable excluded from the second stage regression. 
In order to analyse the impact of tax loss treatment rules, I include dummy variables which 
indicate whether no group taxation regime or no loss carryback option is available or if the 
loss carryforward is limited in the respective host country. Additionally, I consider 
information on the relevance of these tax loss treatment rules. Yet, a firm-specific measure of 
the probability to face a loss might be endogenous because current investment activities of a 
subsidiary can impact future profitability. Therefore, I refer to industry-specific information 
to proxy the loss probability. I consider the loss probability measured by the ratio of loss 
making companies per year in industry k. Interaction terms between the loss ratio of the 
industry and the indicator variables for the tax loss provisions are key to the identification. 
The coefficients of these interaction terms show whether the effects of the tax loss treatment 
(4-1) 
(4-2) 
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rules are more pronounced for subsidiaries which are supposed to have a higher probability of 
suffering losses. Thus, negative signs are expected for the interaction effects. 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I focus on the impact of existing losses carried 
forward. I consider a binary variable indicating whether a subsidiary has an existing loss 
carryforward. Moreover, I construct interaction terms between this indicator variable and the 
corporate tax rate. While the general effect of the statutory tax rate is expected to be negative, 
an adverse effect is expected for the interaction term because a loss carryforward can be used 
to shield future profits from taxation. 
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals which is provided by the 
German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The micro database covers information on 
both direct investment positions held in Germany by foreign companies and direct investment 
positions of German enterprises held abroad. The data allows me to trace multinantionals and 
their subsidiaries over time. Panel data is currently available for the period from 1996 to 
2008. In this study, I only analyze subsidiaries which are located outside Germany and are 
owned by a group with its headquarters in Germany.29 Subsidiaries from the financial industry 
are excluded. I consider a sample of German subsidiaries located in 41 countries. This 
consists of the four BRIC countries, 29 countries which were members of the OECD in 2008, 
and the eight EU member states which were not OECD countries.30 My sample consists of 
59,917 observations of 11,727 subsidiaries belonging to 4,455 German parent companies. 
The data collection is imposed by German law which requires reporting for certain 
international transactions and positions.31 This aspect of MiDi is worth emphasizing as I am 
thus able to observe virtually all major German outbound investments. Well-known multi-
country datasets like Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus or Standard & Poor’s Compustat Global 
                                                            
29 I exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special tax 
regimes may be available. Furthermore, I exclude observations of companies whose German parent is not an 
incorporated and legally independent entity as well as subsidiaries which are not legally independent. 
30 The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India and China. The covered OECD countries in 2007 are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. The 
additional EU countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Romania. 
31 Sec. 26 of Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection with Foreign Trade and 
Payments Regulation (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Since 2002, FDI has to be reported if the participation is 
10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the respective foreign investment in Germany exceeds EUR 3 
million. For details, see Lipponer (2008). Although previous years showed lower threshold levels, I apply this 
one uniformly for all years in the panel. For general interpretations of the dataset from a tax and finance 
perspective, see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010). 
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show leaks, especially for unconsolidated financial statements of small or middle-sized 
subsidiaries due to poor public disclosure requirements.  
In all my regressions, I consider majority-owned and directly-held subsidiaries. I restrict my 
basic sample to directly-held subsidiaries because more complex ownership structures might 
be associated with enhanced tax planning opportunities. Mintz (2004) describes how 
intermediate entities provide internal loans to indirectly-held foreign affiliates and shows that 
tax incentives differ in this constellation. Wamser (2011) shows that the tax elasticity of 
investment decisions is different for indirectly-held subsidiaries. 
As my dependent variable, I particularly consider the investment level in Fixed Assets of each 
subsidiary. Moreover, I consider a dummy variable Former Profit as a measure of the 
profitability in the past. This variable indicates whether there was a profit in the previous 
period. Furthermore, the firm-level data provides information on the existence of current 
losses and losses carried forward. I construct a variable which indicates the probability to 
make losses for subsidiaries engaged in the same industry. This variable LRI is the loss ratio 
per industry measured as the ratio of observable loss situations in a certain industry in a year 
divided by all subsidiaries regarding that industry in that certain year. A higher value may 
serve as a proxy of a higher probability of making losses. In doing so, I identify firms which 
are likely to suffer more from a more severe tax treatment of losses.32 A closer look shows 
cyclical changes of LRI. Across the time dimension of my sample, the overall mean value of 
LRI rises from 0.264 in 1998 to its maximum of 0.291 in 2001. Then it continuously declines 
to 0.219 in 2007, followed by a jump to 0.263 in 2008. Cyclical effects are stronger in some 
industries, while in other industries the probability to suffer a loss is less affected by changes 
in the overall economy. The food industry is an example for an industry which is almost 
unaffected by cyclical changes. Its value of LRI is about 0.285 for all years. By contrast, the 
industry of data processing shows significant fluctuation in LRI of, for example, 0.219 in 
1998, 0.473 in 2001 and 0.289 in 2008.33 
Moreover, I use information on the existence of a loss carryforward taken from financial 
accounting as a proxy for the existence of a tax loss carryforward. Because my firm-level data 
solely provides financial accounting data, I only distinguish between the existence and non-
                                                            
32  Alvarez and Koskela (2008) use volatility measures when analyzing the readiness to take risks. I apply this 
method in categorizing industries ex post on the basis of their volatility in terms of positive and negative 
business outcomes.   
33 The subsidiaries showing the highest values of LRI in particular years operate in the tourism industry (0.412), 
the housing industry (0.385) and the restaurant industry (0.396). Low values can be observed in the industries 
of advertising (0.148), market and opinion research (0.140) and the pharmaceutical industry (0.207). 
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existence of a loss carryforward. I construct a dummy variable LCF Exists indicating whether 
the respective subsidiary has accumulated losses in the past that can be used for an 
intertemporal offset. Notably, almost one third of all observations show a loss carryforward.  
Furthermore, my study rests on the application of tax variables. First of all, I consider the 
statutory corporate tax rates for each host country in each year. Moreover, in my case, the tax 
loss treatment regulations are of major importance. Firstly, I consider whether a loss 
carryback is applicable. Table 4-7 in the Annex shows the countries where it is generally 
possible to carry back losses. A tax refund will only arise from a recalculation of the tax bill 
of the period to which the loss is carried back if the firm had taxable profits in the previous 
period. I form a dummy variable No Carryback Option which equals one if the respective 
subsidiary is not able to carry back a loss because the host country does not provide for a 
carryback rule or the respective subsidiary had no profit in the previous period. 
Secondly, I take into account whether a loss carryforward is restricted. While all countries 
offer some form of loss carryforward, the carryforward is limited in time in a number of 
countries. Table 4-8 in the Annex provides an overview of loss carryforward provisions. I 
construct a dummy LCF limited, which is one if there is a limit on the maximum time a loss 
can be carried forward for. 
Nine countries, including Bulgaria, China, Italy, Poland and South Korea, strictly limit loss 
carryforwards to five or less years during the whole considered period from 1996 till 2008. In 
twelve countries, the loss carryforward period is five or less years in 1996 but is relaxed to six 
or more years by 2008. Among them are Cyprus, France, Hungary and Japan. Accordingly, 
there does not seem to be a clear link between the tax treatment of loss carryforwards and 
other country characteristics like size or economic growth path. In 2008, 15 of those 25 
countries which restrict the loss carryforward grant a limit of at least 6 years. Ten countries 
set their barriers at only five years. The simple dummy variable LCF limited does not 
distinguish between the different stages of severity of the loss carryforward limitation. I 
suppose, however, that it does matter how long losses can be used for. Especially a very tight 
limit might have a negative investment impact. Therefore, I split up the variable indicating 
whether the loss carryforward is limited. The dummy variable LCF limited ൑ 5 is one if a loss 
carryforward is limited up to 5 years while the dummy LCF limited >5 indicates if a loss 
carryforward is limited, but does not expire during a time span shorter than 6 years. 
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Table 4 ?1: Descriptive statistics   
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Fixed Assets Fixed and intangible assets reported in the financial 
statements; measured in EUR '000. 
13,182 80,507
Total Assets Total assets reported in the financial statements; in EUR '000. 41,096 189,363
Sales Annual sales, measured in EUR '000. 60,847 278,498
Profitability Current profit divided by total assets. .041 .229
Former Profit Dummy variable showing if the company had (1) or did not 
have (0) a profit in the previous period.  
.740 .438
Loss Ratio per Industry 
(LRI) 
The loss ratio of the industry, i.e. observed losses in a certain 
industry during a year divided by all observations of this 
industry in this year.  
.257 .056
Loss Ratio per Country 
(LRC) 
Observed losses in a certain country during a year divided by 
all firm observations of this country in this year. 
.256 .072
PRI Sister Companies Product of the profit ratios of the industry and year for all 
sister companies located in the same host country. 
.183 .348
LCF  Exists Dummy variable showing if the subsidiary has (1) or does not 
have (0) a loss carryforward. 
.289 .453
Tax Rate Statutory profit tax rate. .318 .072
No Carryback Option Dummy variable showing if the subsidiary has (0) or has not 
(1) the opportunity to carry back a loss of the current period. 
.840 .367
No Group Taxation Dummy variable showing if the country of the subsidiary 
does not provide (1) or provides (0) for the netting of profits 
and losses of different legal entities. 
.342 .474
LCF limited Dummy variable showing if a country limits (1) or does not 
limit (0) the maximum time a loss can be carried forward. 
.643 .479
LCF limited ч 5   Dummy variable showing if there has been a maximum loss 
carryforward period of five or less years (1) or if the barrier 
was broader or even nonexistent (0).  
.329 .470
LCF limited > 5 Dummy variable if there has been a limited maximum loss 
carryforward period of six or more years (1) or not (0). 
 
.315 .464
GDP Gross Domestic Product measured in billion current USD. 1,790 3,055
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product per home country national; 
measured in current USD '000. 
25.948 15.450
Inflation Rate Inflation rate based on consumer prices. .034 .048
Country Risk OECD Country Risk Classification Method measures the 
country credit risk. Risk categories span from a low credit risk 
(0) to a high credit risk (7).  
.758 1.375
59,917 observations. Firm ?specific variables are derived from the MiDi database of the German Central Bank. 
The tax variables are derived from information taken from the IBFD Tax Handbooks and the Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. GDP, GDP per Capita and Inflation Rate stem from the World 
Development Indicators, edition 2009. Country Risk is based on information provided by the OECD. 
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Moreover, I consider restrictions to consolidate losses within a group of firms. While cross-
border loss offset is hardly ever allowed, some host countries offer a loss consolidation 
between affiliated companies located in that respective country. Yet, 17 of the 41 considered 
countries do not offer the possibility of national group taxation in 2008. Among them are, 
again, rather distinct economies like, for example, Brazil, Canada, China, Hungary, or 
Switzerland. Countries like Cyprus, Japan, and Poland introduced group taxation regimes 
between 1996 and 2008. Table 4-9 in the Annex provides further insights in group taxation 
rules of the analyzed countries. The variable No Group Taxation indicates that such a rule 
does not exist in the respective country. 
Finally, I consider additional country-level control variables from various sources. I use host 
country GDP, GDP per Capita and the Inflation Rate, all taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. The Country Risk scaling from 0 to 7 with higher values 
corresponding to higher risk is derived from the OECD. Table 4-1 summarizes all variables 
and Table 4-10 in the Appendix provides a correlation matrix. 
4.5. The Impact of Tax Treatment of Potential Future Losses 
4.5.1 Main Results 
In this section, I present the regression results for the investment impact of tax loss treatment 
rules. I start with an analysis of data aggregated at the host country level. Table 4-2 shows the 
results. As found in previous studies, I can confirm a negative effect of the tax rate. All tax 
loss treatment variables are, however, insignificant. Thus, I do not identify any significant 
impact of a denial of a group tax regime, a loss carryback or a limitation of a loss 
carryforward on investments. 
I proceed with an analysis of firm-level micro data. This approach allows a proxy for the 
different relevance of tax loss treatment rules across firms to be taken into account.  
Nevertheless, some of the variables which are important for my identification only vary 
within country-year cells. Moulton (1990) and Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the presence 
of a common random effect at the country-year level has to be taken into account. Thus, I use 
a variance-covariance matrix allowing for random group effects by clustering in country-year 
cells.34 
                                                            
34 In unreported regressions I also cluster standard errors at the country level. Then standard errors are slightly 
higher but my general propositions remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table 4 ?2: Investment effects of tax loss treatment on aggregated fixed assets 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) 
Tax Rate    ?.902*    .918*    ?.925*    ?.918* 
(.517) (.518) (.515) (.516) 
No Group Taxation      ?.137    ?.137    ?.127 
  (.181) (.181) (.186) 
No Carryback Option    .027  .027 
  (.083) (.083) 
LCF limited    .051 
  (.068) 
ln (GDP)    ?3.03*    ?2.58    ?2.55    ?2.50 
(1.54) (1.81) (1.82) (1.81) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  3.49**  3.04*  3.01*  2.96* 
(1.53) (1.79) (1.79) (1.78) 
Inflation Rate  .052***  .052***  .052***  .052*** 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Country Risk    ?.081**    ?.085**    ?.085**    ?.085** 
(.35) (.035) (.035) (.035) 
Observations 473 473 473 473 
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets), aggregated at the host country level. Year dummies 
for 1997 ?2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered in country 
cells, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.  
The results in Table 4-3 confirm that the tax rate has a negative impact on investment levels. 
The point estimator of column (1) suggests that a tax rate which is one percentage point 
higher is associated with 0.515% less investment in fixed assets. The regression results 
presented in columns (3), (6) and (8) follow a dynamic IV estimation approach. In the 
dynamic estimation, the point estimator concerning the tax rate presented in column (3) 
suggests that a tax rate which is one percentage point higher is associated with 0.425% less 
investment in fixed assets; however, this is only a short-run effect. Taking the results 
presented in column (3), the long run effect amounts to -1.380.35 
In accordance with the results found in aggregated data, the plain variables indicating tax loss 
treatments are insignificant. Therefore, I take into account a proxy for the expectation to make 
losses. I consider the probability of facing losses in the industry (LRI). The positive sign of 
the plain LRI variable, which is not always significant, indicates that investments tend to be 
higher where losses are reasonably anticipated. The LRI variable allows me to build 
interaction terms providing information on how firms with a high loss probability react to 
certain tax loss treatment rules. 
 
                                                            
35 By assuming that ln(Fixed Assetsi,t) = ln( Fixed Assetsi,t-1)  in the long-run equilibrium, the long-run effect can 
be calculated as ȕ2/(1-ȕ1). Using the point estimators of column (1) in Table 4-3, the long run effect is -0.425 / 
(1-0.692) = -1.380. 
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Table 4 ?3: Investment effects of tax loss treatment rules 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) 
Tax Rate    ?.515***    ?.522***   ?.425*    ?.517***   ?.525***   ?.433*    ?.532***    ?.439* 
(.196) (.199) (.251) (.197) (.198) (.252) (.191) (.253) 
LRI    .223***  .147 .387*** .428*** .284*  .355***  .219 
  (.079) (.095) (.137) (.143) (.164) (.137) (.154) 
No Group Taxation     .024  .045  .015  .010  .034  .009  .032 
  (.056) (.052) (.057) (.057) (.055) (.059) (.055) 
(No Group Taxation) x LRI      ?.286**    ?.299*    ?.248*    ?.234    ?.261    ?.229*    ?.253 
  (.140) (.180) (.142) (.146) (.188) (.140) (.186) 
No Carryback Option    .055  .053  .021  .030  .001 
  (.042) (.043) (.052) (.042) (.049) 
(No Carryback Option) x LRI      ?.208    ?.197    ?.077    ?.190  .001 
  (.143) (.147) (.183) (.141) (.173) 
LCF limited    .014  .025 
  (.039) (.057) 
(LCFlimited) x LRI      ?.084    ?.129 
  (.140) (.174) 
LCF limited <=5   .077  .083 
  (.057) (.080) 
LCF limited >5      ?.024    ?.012 
  (.040) (.055) 
(LCF limited <=5) x LRI      ?.344**    ?.361* 
  (.175) (.218) 
(LCF limited >5) x LRI    .145    ?.073 
  (.149) (.193) 
ln (Fixed Assetst ?1)   .692*** .692*** .691*** 
  (.056) (.056) (.056) 
Former Profit .011** .011** .026*** .012** .011** .027*** .012** .027*** 
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
ln (GDP)    ?.997    ?.900 .066    ?.916    ?.903 .077    ?.891 .083 
(.766) (.775) (1.00) (.774) (.775) (.999) (.765) (.993) 
ln (GDP per Capita)  1.74**  1.65** .174  1.67**  1.66** .166  1.65** .164 
(.760) (.768) (.991) (.766) (.767) (.989) (.756) (.983) 
Inflation Rate    ?.010    ?.010 .062**    ?.009    ?.009 .063**    ?.007 .064** 
(.022) (.021) (.030) (.021) (.022) (.030) (.021) (.031) 
Country Risk    ?.019    ?.019    ?.004    ?.020    ?.020    ?.004    ?.019    ?.004 
(.016) (.016) (.021) (.016) (.016) (.021) (.015) (.021) 
Observations 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 
Subsidiaries 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 
AR(1) ?Test   .000 .000 .000 
AR(2) ?Test   .459 .458 .457 
First ?Stage F ?Statistic     723.87     723.75   723.36 
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets). Year dummies for 1997 ?2008 are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors, clustered on a country ?year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show 
significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Numbers reported for the Hansen J ?test of 
overidentification restrictions and for the test of second order auto ?correlation (AR(2)) are p ?values. 
 
In columns (2) and (3), I insert the interaction between LRI and the dummy variable 
indicating that a group taxation regime does not exist. The negative coefficients for the 
interaction suggest that the denial of group taxation is relevant for subsidiaries facing a 
relatively high probability of suffering losses. The effect of an absent group taxation rule can 
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be calculated by inserting different values of LRI to the interaction term. Evaluating at mean 
values, the results presented in column (2) suggest that an absent group taxation regime 
impacts investment by about -7.3% (-0.286 x 0.257). While some results support the 
hypothesis H4-3, the effects are not robust across the specifications in Table 4-3. 
I proceed with an analysis of the intertemporal tax loss treatment. Hypothesis H4-1 states that 
a company which does not have the opportunity to carry back potential losses is supposed to 
invest less because no immediate tax refund occurs. As can be seen from columns (4) to (8), 
neither the effect of the denied carryback nor the effect of the interaction term with LRI is 
significant. Thus, I cannot provide evidence that the carryback option influences investment 
decisions - not even for those firms having a high loss probability. Basically, this outcome is 
surprising because analytical considerations suggest a positive investment impact. Yet, only 
seven of the considered countries allow a loss carryback and the variation across time is 
limited regarding this aspect (see Table 4-7 in the Annex). Still, there might be another reason 
for the unexpected insignificance. I analyze multinational subsidiaries and not standalone 
firms. Thus, the tax effects of losses on investment might be less pronounced compared to 
standalone firms. Multinational subsidiaries might benefit from transfer pricing or internal 
capital markets via shifts between equity and debt financing. Nonetheless, my results suggest 
that some tax loss treatment rules still matter. 
In particular, I analyze whether a general limitation of the time span a loss can be carried 
forward for exerts a negative effect on investment decisions. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4-3 
show insignificant effects of such a general barrier to investment. Effects are also 
insignificant once I differentiate between firms which are rather unlikely to suffer losses and 
firms operating in industries associated with a high probability of making losses. Therefore in 
columns (7) and (8), I distinguish between a shorter time span (൑ 	 ? years) and a longer time 
span (> 5 years) until a loss carryforward expires. The benchmark case is still no limitation of 
the loss carryforward. 
When distinguishing between the severities of loss carryforward limitations, the results 
confirm my expectations expressed in hypothesis H4-2. The results suggest that a very short 
carryforward period affects investment. Here, I find a statistically significant effect for the 
interaction term with the industry-level loss probability. A tight limit on the maximum loss 
carryforward period exerts a negative impact on investment of firms operating in industries 
where the probability to suffer losses is relatively high. By contrast, it hardly seems to affect 
investment decisions if the loss carryforward is unlimited or if it forfeits after a rather long 
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time span. The different impact of the loss carryforward restriction depending on its severity 
reflects the expectations expressed in the previous literature. While the considerable effect of 
a severe carryforward limitation confirms the expectations by Eeckhoudt et al. (1997), the 
insignificance of limitations in longer time spans is in accordance with Barlev and Levy 
(1975) and MacKie-Mason (1990). 
The respective significant coefficient of -0.344 for the interaction term in column (7) suggests 
that a severe loss carryforward limitation of only up to 5 years has a detrimental effect on 
investment. Evaluated at the mean value of LRI, my result suggests a negative investment 
impact of about 9% (-0.344 x 0.257). The span of considerable effects can be illustrated by 
the application of the highest and lowest values of LRI which were observed for particular 
industries in particular years. In the housing industry (LRI of 0.385), the negative investment 
effect amounts to 13.2%. For the low LRI in the pharmaceuticals industry (LRI of 0.207), the 
effect is only -7.1%. Consequently, the limitation of a loss carryforward is not universally 
important, but is taken into account by companies with high loss expectations. 
Let us briefly discuss the effects of the control variables. A profit in the former period leads to 
higher investment, which can be attributed to increased liquidity as well as to positive 
signaling effects if local managers run for investment funds provided by the CEO. I do not 
find significant effects for the size of the host country’s local market indicated by the GDP. 
This seems to come as a surprise; but it should, however, be taken into account that I estimate 
in first differences. Therefore, my approach removes time-invariant cross-country variations 
from the regressions. The GDP per capita, which can be interpreted as a proxy for labor costs, 
shows a positive coefficient in some specifications. This positive coefficient can be explained 
by a substitution effect between labor and capital in the production process. Regarding 
country risk, the negative sign indicates that a higher country risk is associated with less 
investment by subsidiaries of German multinationals; this effect, however, is not significant. 
Finally, the inflation rate shows a significant impact only in the dynamic setup. The positive 
effect can be explained by advantages of intra-group exchanges and an increased incentive for 
real investment. 
4.5.2 Robustness Checks 
Table 4-4 shows results of additional regressions. Column (1) mainly replicates my base 
specification but here I focus on the impact of group taxation rules and limitations of a loss 
carryforward. Column (2) considers an adjusted sample. I exclude the 138 cells where the loss 
ratio of the industry (LRI) is based on observations of only one or two firms. In doing so, I 
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come across potential endogeneity concerns. My general findings are robust against this 
sample adjustment. 
Regressions in columns (3) and (4) are intended to provide robustness of the approximation of 
the different loss probabilities across firms. My general setup of LRI assumes that firms judge 
their risk of suffering losses based on the current situation of their industry. But firms might 
take several periods into account. In column (3), LRI is based on the ratio between losses and 
all observations in the industry in both the current and the previous year. The LRI variable of 
column (4) even regards information from the current year and the two preceding years. The 
initial results concerning the impact of tax loss treatment provisions are confirmed when I 
calculate the loss ratio of the industry as a biannual or triannual average. The interaction term 
between the denied group taxation and the respective LRIs presented in columns (3) and (4) is 
negative but only statistically significant when assuming a loss ratio calculated on the basis of 
two years. Yet, the interaction between the tight carryforward limitation and the respective 
LRIs is always negative and significant. These findings support the view that firms 
particularly consider information on the loss probability from recent years. 
In my base specifications I have approximated to the expected loss probability of a firm by 
means of the loss ratio per industry. In column (5) of Table 4-4 I also consider a country 
dimension of loss probability. I include a variable LRC which is the annual number of loss 
observations in a country divided by all annual observations in this country. The plain LRC 
shows a negative sign but is insignificant. Moreover, the interaction terms of LRC with most 
of the indicators for the tax loss treatment are also insignificant. Only the interaction between 
LRC and the dummy indicating a less strict loss carryforward limitation is weakly significant. 
At the same time, the significant interaction terms with the LRI prevail. I argue that these 
results suggest that an industry-specific loss ratio does approximate a firm’s expectation of 
making losses better than a host-country specific loss ratio does. 
The results for the impact of group taxation are rather mixed. Columns (6) and (7) should 
provide additional insight in the impact of group taxation. In column (6), I estimate separate 
effects for the response to a higher loss probability for subsidiaries that can benefit from a 
group tax regime and for subsidiaries that do not benefit. The response to a higher loss 
expectation is highly significant if a group taxation regime is available whilst completely 
insignificant if no group taxation regime can be applied. 
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Table 4 ?4: Investment effects of tax loss treatment rules – robustness 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7)      (8) .(9) .    (10) .             (11) 
 
Base 
Case 
Adjusted 
Sample 
Alternative                  
LRI Specifications   
Country      
Loss Ratio 
Group Taxation Country ?Year  
Dummies 
Additional 
Interactions 
Alternative                
Dependent Variables 
No Group Taxation  .013  .015  .081  .044  .007  .013  .015     ?.044    ?.024  .013 
(.058) (.058) (.074) (.097) (.075) (.058) (.059)  (.065) (.041) (.060) 
(No Group Taxation) x LRI    ?.244*    ?.251*    ?.483**    ?.381    ?.240*  .030  .028    ?.103    ?.021    ?.008    ?.021 
(.140) (.142) (.223) (.330) (.128) (.154) (.155) (.133) (.169) (.095) (.103) 
(No Group Taxation) x LRC      .014       
     (.198)       
(Group Taxation) x LRI       .274***  .264***     
      (.101) (.102)     
(Group Taxation) x LRI x (PRI Sister Companies)         .043     
       (.126)     
LCF limited <=5  .082  .086  .166**  .135  .102  .082 .084    .060  .050  .136*** 
(.056) (.056) (.082) (.105) (.073)  (.056)  (.056)  (.053) (.031) (.032) 
LCF limited >5    ?.024    ?.021  .046  .060    ?.081    ?.024    ?.022     ?.007    ?.041*  .011 
(.041) (.041) (.053) (.080) (.054)  (.041)  (.041)  (.039) (.025) (.031) 
(LCF limited<=5) x LRI    ?.363**    ?.380**    ?.677***    ?.583*    ?.323**    ?.363**    ?.376**    ?.104    ?.290*    ?.178*    ?.459*** 
(.172) (.174) (.263) (.339) (.156)  (.172)  (.173) (.176) (.160) (.108) (.112) 
(LCF limited >5) x LRI  .145  .132    ?.141    ?.254  .053  .145  .135    ?.026  .072  .165*    ?.152 
(.150) (.151) (.219) (.318) (.145)  (.150)  (.151) (.151) (.143) (.094) (.094) 
(LCF limited <=5) x LRC        ?.098       
     (.225)       
(LCF limited >5) x LRC      .437*       
     (.232)       
LRI  .274***  .296***  .809***  .868***  .298***   .189*    ?.049  .009  .119* 
(.101) (.104) (.170) (.260) (.100)   (.111) (.407) (.056) (.071) 
LRC         ?.246       
     (.235)       
PRI Sister Companies          ?.118***     
       (.031)     
Control Variables 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Country ?Year Dummies         9    
Interactions with  Country Controls         9   
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets) in all columns except (10) and (11); ln (Total Assets) in column (10); ln (Sales) in column (11). Column (1) corresponds to the specification (7) in Table 4 ?4 ?
3, leaving out the insignificant carryback aspect. In column (2), I leave out 138 observations where the LRI is based on only one or two firms. In column (3), the loss ratio per industry is 
calculated based on the current and the previous year, in column (4) it is based on the current and the previous two years. The LRC variable in column (5) is the loss ratio per country and year. 
In column (7) PRI Sister Companies is the probability that at least one sister company in the country makes a profit. In column (8), country ?year dummies are included. In column (9), 
unreported interaction terms of LRI with ln(GDP), tax rate, inflation rate and country risk are included. The control variables include the tax rate, ln(GDP), ln(GDP per capita), inflation rate, and 
country risk. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country ?year level, are shown in parentheses. Year dummies for 1997 ?2008 are included but not reported.  *, ** and *** show significance 
at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Group taxation, however, might only matter if affiliated companies do not lose money at the 
same time. In these cases, losses reduce taxable profits directly. In order to scrutinize this 
aspect, I introduce the variable PRI Sister Companies. This variable considers the profit ratios 
per industry of the sister companies and approximates the probability that at least one sister 
company in the respective country makes a profit. The probability is determined as one minus 
the product of the national sisters’ LRIs. Referring to this measure rather than to the actual 
profits of the sister companies avoid endogeneity concerns.36 I expect a positive effect for the 
interaction of PRI Sister Companies with the group taxation dummy and my loss probability 
measure LRI. The effect shows the expected positive sign but it is not statistically significant. 
By contrast, the effect for my simple interaction between the group taxation dummy and the 
LRI remains rather unaffected in size and significance. Thus, I cannot confirm that a firm’s 
appreciation of the group taxation regime depends on the expected or current performance of 
its affiliated companies. 
Column (7) reveals a negative and significant effect for the plain variable PRI Sister 
Companies. Group resources might rather be allocated to affiliated subsidiaries if profits of 
these affiliates become more likely. This finding relates to another possible explanation for 
my mixed results for the group taxation effect. A multinational can react to the denial of a 
group taxation regime by investing less but also by choosing an appropriate organizational 
structure. If multinationals tend to have more subsidiaries in host countries offering a group 
taxation regime, they may set up new subsidiaries, rather than increase the investment stock 
of an existing one. Consequently, I may underestimate the total effect of group taxation on 
marginal investment by a multinational per host country. 
Since the indicators for tax loss treatment provisions vary in the country-year cells, one might 
be concerned by spurious correlations with unobserved country characteristics. In column (8), 
I include country-year dummies for all combinations of the 41 countries and 13 years. As a 
consequence, all those variables which only vary on a country-year basis cannot be identified. 
In this setup, however, I am unable to find significant effects concerning the impact of the tax 
loss treatment on investment. This suggests that the remaining variation after including about 
five hundred country-year dummies does not suffice for the identification of the supposed 
effects. 
                                                            
36 In unreported additional regressions I also refer to a binary variable indicating if affiliated companies report 
actual profits. The results are however very similar to those reported in column (7) of Table 4-4. 
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In column (9) I do not control for country-year effects, but I include additional interaction 
terms of the loss ratio variable with country characteristics. For reasons of brevity, I do not 
report the detailed coefficients for each included interaction term. The additional interaction 
terms prove to be insignificant but only the one between country risk and LRI is statistically 
significant. The effect suggests that investments are particularly small in industries with a 
high probability to make losses once the regarded firm is at the same time located in a risky 
country. Interestingly, the interaction term between LRI and the host country tax rate is also 
insignificant. This finding confirms that firms with higher loss probabilities have a more 
pronounced response to tax loss treatment rules but not to the general tax rate. Column (9) 
shows that the crucial interaction terms based on the severity of the loss carryforward 
limitation remain qualitatively the same as in my base result. The interaction term dealing 
with the absence of a group taxation regime shows the expected direction, but loses its 
significance once the additional interaction terms are included. 
Finally, in columns (10) and (11), I use alternative dependent variables and measure 
investment by total assets and sales. The interaction term between No Group Taxation and 
LRI turns out to be insignificant when investment is measured based on total assets or sales. 
The strong time limit of the loss carryforward, however, still exerts a negative and significant 
investment impact on firms facing a relatively high probability of suffering losses.37 
4.6 Effects of Existing Losses Carried Forward 
4.6.1 Main Results 
In this section, I trace hypotheses H4-4 and H4-5 dealing with the effect of an existing loss 
carryforward on investment decisions. I use empirical settings which are very similar to the 
one presented in Section 5 and pay particular attention to the existence of a loss carryforward. 
The basic results are shown in Table 4-5. First of all, I take into account the existence of a loss 
carryforward and insert the dummy variable LCF Exists, indicating if the respective 
subsidiary has accumulated losses in the past. Columns (1) and (2) show an overall negative 
investment effect of an existing loss carryforward. Yet, hypotheses H4-4 and H4-5 stated in 
Section 2.2 suggest opposing effects of a loss carryforward. Therefore, from column (3) 
                                                            
37 The counterintuitive positive effect of LCF limited ൑5 in column (11) only measures a hypothetical fraction of 
the overall effect. This can be seen by calculating the overall effect. The 1%-percentile of LRI shows a value 
of 0.167. Therefore, the overall effect is small for this lower boundary of LRI (0.167 x (-0.459) + 1 x 0.136 = 
0.06) and negative for industries with a higher probability to suffer losses. The same applies to column (3). 
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onwards I consider an interaction term between LCF Exists and the tax rate to separate the 
impact of an existing loss carryforward on the tax rate elasticity from the non-tax effects. 
Concerning hypothesis H4-4, my empirical results suggest that an existing tax loss 
carryforward results in lower investment in the following periods. This conclusion can be 
drawn from the results of columns (3) to (8). The investment impact of an existing loss 
carryforward is always negative. Even the size of the measured effect hardly differs across my 
estimation setups. The significant coefficient for an existing loss carryforward of about -0.117 
in column (3), for example, suggests that investment measured by the stock of fixed assets is 
by about 11.7% lower if a loss carryforward is present as compared to a situation in which it 
was not present. The result can be attributed to liquidity and signaling effects if the business 
activities generated losses in the past. One might argue that a subsidiary of a multinational 
group should not fall short of liquidity given its ability to demand funds from the parent 
company. Still, in this case the negative signal of a loss persists and might have a detrimental 
effect on the readiness of the CEO to continue investing in the respective subsidiary. 
While I find a negative effect of taxes on investment decisions in general, columns (3) to (8) 
show that the net tax effect is significantly smaller in absolute values if a subsidiary is still 
carrying forward losses. The interaction term between the statutory corporate income tax rate 
and a dummy variable indicating an existing loss carryforward is positive. This confirms my 
theoretical expectations outlined in Hypothesis H4-5. The statutory tax rate should become 
less important if losses carried forward can be used to offset profits from new investments. 
Once a loss carryforward exists, future profits remain effectively untaxed as long as this loss 
carryforward can be used. In the estimation presented in column (3), the point estimator for 
the tax rate amounts to -0.614 and the point estimator for the interaction term between tax rate 
and the dummy indicating an existing loss carryforward is 0.305. This means that the 
presence of losses absorbs about half of the negative tax rate effect. This result confirms what, 
for instance, Creedy and Gemmel (2008) have worked out analytically. 
It appears reasonable that the tax rate effect is not entirely counterbalanced because the size of 
the loss carryforward might not suffice to absorb all future profits. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, in many countries loss carryforwards expire after several years. Moreover, I may 
underestimate the adverse tax effects of a loss carryforward. Some firms in my sample may 
not benefit from offsetting future profits with the existing loss carryforward because the tax 
shield of a loss carryforward offsets accelerated depreciation or interest deductions. 
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Table 4 ?5: Existing losses carried forward and tax rate elasticity of investment 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) 
Tax Rate    ?.514***    ?.418*    ?.614***   ?.527**    ?.645***   ?.551** 
(.197) (.248) (.203) (.254) (.201) (.260) 
LCF Exists    ?.018**    ?.017*    ?.117***   ?.125***   ?.120***   ?.126***    ?.125***    ?.132***
(.008) (.009) (.037) (.042) (.037) (.042) (.038) (.042) 
(Tax Rate) x (LCF Exists)    .305***  .330***  .288***  .325***  .331***  .350*** 
  (.109) (.125) (.109) (.127) (.113) (.128) 
ln (Fixed Assetst ?1)    .690*** .690*** .690*** .664*** 
  (.056) (.056) (.056) (.051) 
Former Profit  .008* .024***  .009*  .024***  .009*  .024***  .010**  .027*** 
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
ln (GDP)    ?.979  .008    ?.973  .014    ?.863  .103 
(.767) (.986) (.768) (.985) (.766) (.994) 
ln (GDPperCapita)  1.73**  .229  1.72**  .222  1.62**  .143 
(.761) (.978) (.762) (.978) (.758) (.984) 
Inflation Rate    ?.011 .061**    ?.011  .061**    ?.008  .063** 
(.022) (.030) (.022) (.030) (.021) (.030) 
Country Risk    ?.019    ?.004    ?.019    ?.004    ?.019    ?.004 
(.016) (.021) (.016) (.021) (.015) (.021) 
Loss Treatment Rules   9 9 
Country ?Year Dummies           9 9 
Observations 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 59,917 
Subsidiaries 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 
AR(1) ?Test   .000 .000 .000 .000 
AR(2) ?Test   .4378 .4354 .4437 .5246 
First ?Stage F ?Statistic   718.74   718.85   722.22   347.09 
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets). Year dummies for 1997 ?2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors, clustered on a country ?year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. Numbers reported for the Hansen J ?test of overidentification restrictions and for the test of 2nd 
order auto ?correlation (AR(2)) are p ?values. 
My analysis builds on the analytics of Auerbach (1986), who identified both the general 
negative aspect and the tax-driven positive investment aspect of an existent loss carryforward. 
My empirical results show that the two effects are significant. Which of these two effects 
dominates depends on the tax rate. This result is intuitively clear because the value of the loss 
carryforward is directly linked to the tax rate. Based on the coefficients of the existent loss 
carryforward (-0.117) and the interaction term (0.305) presented in column (3), the overall 
investment impact of an existing loss carryforward is negative if the tax rate is below 38.4% 
and  positive if the tax rate exceeds this threshold. 
4.6.2 Robustness Checks 
In Section 5, I have presented evidence that tax loss treatment rules matter for companies’ 
general investment behavior. Therefore, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4-5, I also include the 
tax loss treatment variables which were proven to be important, namely the different 
carryforward limitations and the group taxation. As can be seen from the results, the reduced 
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tax rate elasticity in the presence of a loss carryforward remains unaffected. While tax loss 
treatment provisions generally affect the investment behavior of all firms, a loss carryforward 
affects the tax rate elasticity of investment of the subgroup of firms that already have suffered 
from losses in the past. 
As a further robustness check, in columns (7) and (8) of Table 4-5, I add country year 
dummies for all combinations of the 41 countries and 13 years. Again, all those variables 
which only vary on a country-year basis cannot be identified. The results of this setup support 
my general findings. I find a negative investment effect and a lower tax rate elasticity of 
investment if a firm carries forward a loss. 
Recently, Edgerton (2010) finds that the interaction of the tax rate and the carryforward 
variable is no longer important when including interactions of the tax rate with other firm 
characteristics, such as cash flows. Since there is no information on cash flows in my data set, 
I include sales and profitability in additional robustness checks in Table 4-6. Moreover, in 
columns (2) - (4), I also use interaction terms with the tax rate. The positive and significant 
interaction term between the tax rate and the existence of a loss carryforward is unaffected. 
However, as compared to the values of the interaction terms in Table 4-5, the size effect is a 
little lower once the additional controls are included. Concerning the additional control 
variables, sales have a positive and significant impact on investment while the impact of 
profitability is either negative or insignificant. 
Nevertheless, there are important differences between my analysis and the study by Edgerton 
(2010) which may explain the different findings. Apart from several differences regarding 
empirical frameworks and dependent variables, the studies consider very different types of 
firms. While Edgerton (2010) uses a sample of mainly domestic US and Canadian firms 
excluding almost all subsidiaries, I exclusively consider subsidiaries of multinational firms. 
Investment decisions of subsidiaries are less constrained by cash flow because they can 
benefit from the internal capital market of the multinational firm. This fact may explain why I 
identify effects of a loss carryforward on the tax response of investment decisions. 
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 Table 4 ?6: Existing losses carried forward  ? additional robustness 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) 
Including further controls Alternative dependent variables 
Tax Rate    ?.542***    ?1.57*    ?.628***   ?1.56*    ?.295***   ?.342***    ?.185    ?.197* 
(.191) (.906) (.203) (.906) (.136) (.136) (.120) (.118) 
LCF Exists    ?.099***    ?.101***   ?.120***   ?.102***   ?.031***   ?.077***  .005    ?.007 
(.035) (.036) (.037) (.035) (.004) (.021) (.005) (.026) 
(Tax Rate) x (LCF Exists)  .239**  .243**  .299***  .243**  .141**    .035 
(.105) (.106) (.110) (.106) (.063)   (.075) 
Sales  .184***  .152***  .152***   
(.012) (.032) (.033)   
(Tax Rate) x (Sales)    .104  .102   
  (.088) (.088)   
Profitability  .006    ?.067**    ?.004   
(.012) (.033) (.024)   
(Tax Rate) x (Profitability)    .519***  .052   
  (.206) (.145)   
Former Profit  .007  .007  .012**  .007  .001  .001  .003  .003 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
Country Control Variables 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Observations 58,560 58,560 59,917 58,560 59,917 59,917 58,560 58,560 
Subsidiaries 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,727 11,447 11,447 11,727 11,727 
Dependent Variable: ln (Fixed Assets) in columns (1) to (4), ln (Total Assets) in columns (5) and (6) and ln (Sales) in 
columns (7) and (8). Year dummies for 1997 ?2008 are included but not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a 
country ?year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
In an additional set of robustness checks presented in columns (5) to (8) of Table 4-6, I 
change the dependent variable serving as my proxy for investment. I test the impact of an 
existing loss carryforward on sales and on total assets. When total assets are used in columns 
(5) and (6), both the general negative investment impact of the existing loss carryforward and 
the reduced tax rate elasticity of investment measured by the interaction term can be 
identified. Based on the positive interaction term between the tax rate and the existence of a 
loss carryforward amounting to 0.141 in column (6), almost half of the negative tax effect is 
compensated once loss carryforwards are present. However, the effects on total assets are a 
little weaker than on fixed assets. As columns (7) and (8) show, sales are not affected by 
existing loss carryforwards and hardly seem to be affected by profit taxes at all. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
I have analyzed the investment impact of tax loss treatment using data of subsidiaries of 
multinational firms. First, I have focused on the treatment of potential losses. I find significant 
effects of the intertemporal loss offset provision when paying particular attention to the 
probability of making losses. Based on my estimation results, a limitation of the maximum 
loss carryforward to five or less years has a detrimental effect on investments of a subsidiary 
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which faces a high loss probability. I am, however, unable to identify statistically significant 
effects of the possibility to carry back a loss to previous periods. While some of my results 
suggest that investment decisions of subsidiaries facing a high loss probability are affected by 
the existence of a group taxation regime, the results for the impact of group taxation regime is 
not robust across specifications. 
Secondly, I have analyzed the impact of existing loss carryforwards on investment. Due to 
liquidity and signaling effects, lower investment occurs in the presence of a loss carryforward. 
Additionally, I find a reduced tax elasticity of investment for companies actually shielded by 
existing losses. Thus, the negative impact of a high corporate tax rate is lowered if a firm has 
a loss carryforward. 
As can be seen from Tables 4-7 to 4-9 in the Annex, tax treatment of losses tends to have 
become more generous between 1996 and 2007. Given that many countries have changed 
their tax loss offset rules during the last decades, my results are generally interesting for 
policy-makers. The basic question that arises is whether host countries should offer more 
favorable or less favorable rules to carry forward losses. My results suggest that a time limit 
until a loss carryforward expires should not be too short. 
If some subsidiaries, however, already had losses in the past, these firms make their 
investment decisions based on existing loss carryforwards. Then the policy implication is not 
so straight forward. On the one hand, the existence of a loss carryforward is favorable, 
particularly in high-tax countries, as the reduced tax rate elasticity of investment can channel 
additional foreign direct investment to the respective subsidiary. For example, if I suppose a 
tax rate of about 30%, the estimates of column (3) in Table 4-5 suggest that the negative 
investment effect in the presence of a loss carryforward is largely offset by the significantly 
smaller detrimental effect of the tax rate.38 On the other hand, a generous recognition of losses 
for tax purposes can distort competition between those companies with and those without a 
loss carryforward because the former benefit from windfall profits, which are paradoxically 
caused by their failure in the past. Therefore, restricting the maximum number of years until 
losses carried forward expire may be a good idea not only from a fiscal perspective. Based on 
my results, a moderate restriction of the maximum time losses can be carried forward does not 
exert significant negative effects on investment. 
                                                            
38 Considering estimates of column (3) in Table 4-5, a loss carryforward exerts a negative effect of about -0.117 
but also an offsetting effect of about 0.0915 if I suppose a tax rate of about 30%. 
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4.8 Appendix 
 
Table 4 ?7: Maximum loss carryback 
Country Loss Carryback 1996          Change         to Loss Carryback 2008 
Canada 3 3 
Ireland 1 1 
Netherlands 3           2007               1 1 
Norway 0           2008               2 2 
Sweden 0           1999               6 6 
United Kingdom 3           1998               1 1 
USA 3           1998               2                    2 
The table presents an overview of those countries which grant resident companies to carry back a loss. 
The columns show the maximum number of years losses could be carried back. Changes are reported in 
column (2). All countries not shown here do not provide for a loss carryback throughout the entire time 
span of 1996 ?2008. 
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Table 4 ?8: Maximum loss carryforward 
Country Loss CF 1996   Change to Change to Change to Loss CF 2008
Australia                      
Austria 7 1998        
Belgium 4 1997        
Brazil        
Bulgaria 5        5 
Canada 7 2005 10 2007 20    20 
China 5        5 
Cyprus 5 2003        
Czech Republic 7 2004 5      5 
Denmark 5 2002        
Estonia 5 2000 7      7 
Finland 10        10 
France 5 2004        
Greece 5      5 
Hungary 5 2004        
Iceland 8 2004 9 2005 10    10 
India 8        8 
Ireland        
Italy 5        5 
Japan 5 2002 7    7 
Latvia 5 2008 6       6 
Lithuania 0 1998 3 1999 5 2008 25 25 
Luxembourg          
Malta          
Mexico 10        10 
Netherlands  2007 9      9 
New Zealand          
Norway 10 2006        
Poland 3 1999 5      5 
Portugal 6        6 
Romania 2 1997 3 1998 5    5 
Russia 5 2002 10      10 
Slovak Republic 5        5 
Slovenia 5 2006 7 2007      
South Korea 5        5 
Spain 5 1997 7 1999 10 2002 15 15 
Sweden          
Switzerland 7        7 
Turkey 5        5 
United Kingdom          
USA 15 1998 20              20 
The table shows the number of years an unused loss carryforward can persist. The symbol ь means that loss 
carryforwards do not expire at all. The second and the sixth column show the regulation in the respective 
country for the years 1996 and 2008, while the columns in between reveal when the changes took place. In 
Austria, for example, unused loss carryforwards forfeited after seven years in 1996. This limit has been 
abolished in 1998. 
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Table 4 ?9: Method of group taxation 
Country 1996 Method in 1996 Change to 2008 
Australia yes Group Contribution 2002  Consolidation yes 
Austria yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Belgium no    no 
Brazil no      no 
Bulgaria no      no 
Canada no      no 
China no      no 
Cyprus no   2003 Group Relief yes 
Czech Republic no      no 
Denmark yes Consolidation    yes 
Estonia no      no 
Finland yes Group Contribution    yes 
France yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Greece no      no 
Hungary no      no 
Iceland no   1999 Consolidation yes 
India no      no 
Ireland yes Group Relief    yes 
Italy yes TaxCredit Exchange 2000 Group 
     2004 Consolidation yes 
Japan no   2003 Consolidation yes 
Latvia no   1998 Group Relief yes 
Lithuania no   2004 Group yes 
Luxembourg yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Malta yes Group Relief    yes 
Mexico yes Consolidation    yes 
Netherlands yes Consolidation    yes 
New Zealand yes Group Relief    yes 
Norway yes Group Contribution    yes 
Poland no   1997 Fiscal Unity yes 
Portugal yes Consolidation    yes 
Romania no      no 
Russian Federation no      no 
Slovak Republic no      no 
Slovenia yes Consolidation 2007 no no 
South Korea no      no 
Spain yes Consolidation    yes 
Sweden yes Group Contribution    yes 
Switzerland no      no 
Turkey no      no 
United Kingdom yes Group Relief    yes 
USA yes Consolidation     yes 
In a consolidation or fiscal unity system, the financial statements of companies belonging to the same group 
are either made up together or merged at the end of the fiscal year. When there is a system of group 
contribution, the profitable subsidiary is enabled to contribute a part or all of its profits to the subsidiary 
which suffered a loss. Correspondingly, losses are transferred among subsidiaries in a group relief system. 
In effect, all of these systems enable the netting of profits and losses of different tax subjects. Therefore, I 
apply a dummy variable indicating if some kind of group taxation is available or not. 
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4.10 Survey 2: Empirical studies on tax loss treatment effects 
Survey 39 Data Methodology Results 
Aarbu, 
MacKie-
Mason 
(2003) 
Tax data of about six 
thousand Norwegian 
corporations from the 
years 1988, 1991, 
1992 and 1993. 
Two-tailed Tobit 
estimator. Dependent 
variable: unutilized 
(accelerated) depreciation. 
The independent variable 
"TAXP" is 1 if the 
corporation has to pay 
taxes and it is 0, if it is in 
a tax-exempt position due 
to an existent tax loss 
carryforward. 
Corporations deliberately abstain 
from using accelerated 
depreciations if they suffer losses 
or show loss carryforwards in a 
year. They first seem to aim at 
netting out the losses or loss 
carryforwards. 
Albring, 
Dhaliwal, 
Khurana, 
Pereira 
(2010) 
US corporations 
from the Compustat 
database, observed in 
the time span 
January 1, 1995 till 
July 31, 1998. Firm-
level panel dataset. 
Additional 
institutional brokers 
estimation systems 
(I/B/E/S) data with 
one year analyst 
forecasts is used for a 
supplementary 
hypothesis test. 
The dependent variables 
are accruals and deferrals 
in four different forms. 
The most important, 
binary, independent 
variable distinguishes 
whether a firm's fiscal 
year ended between 
August 31, 1997 and July 
31, 2008 (1) or not (0). 
The paper shows the effect of a 
change in the loss carryback on 
earnings management. The US 
"Taxpayer Relief Act" of 1997 
lowered the tax loss carryback 
period from three years to two 
years. Therefore, the opportunity 
costs of not showing a tax loss in 
the year 1997 increased. By 
applying earnings management, 
firms show tax losses especially in 
the final year of the three year loss 
carryback period. In the two years 
preceding this year, the 
corporations tend to show profits. 
Altshuler, 
Auerbach 
(1990) 
Tax data provided by 
the Internal Revenue 
Service, tracing US 
corporations from 
1971 till 1982. 
The main form of the 
output is descriptive 
statistics. Additionally, 
there are calculations of 
marginal tax rates taking 
into account potentially 
existing tax loss 
carryforwards. 
The descriptive insights refer to the 
amount of existing tax loss 
carryforwards and still utilizable 
saving amortizations. Based on 
book values, about 50% of all 
observed firms have a tax loss 
carryforward or a saving 
amortization. Statistics are also 
presented on an industry basis. 
Altshuler, 
Auerbach, 
Cooper, 
Knittel 
(2008) 
Tax data of US 
corporations from the 
years 1982 till 2005. 
The information 
stems from the IRS 
Statistics of Income 
(SOI) corporate tax 
return files, 
comprising 100,000 
to 140,000 firm 
observations per 
year. 
The overall trend of the 
aggregated micro data for 
all years 1982 till 2005 is 
presented in descriptive 
figures. Among others, 
these figures cover the 
fraction of losses relative 
to positive incomes, the 
losses per industry, losses 
of multinationals as 
compared to local 
corporations, losses by 
firm year, and a section 
on S-corporations. 
Descriptive analysis dealing with 
the question why relatively more 
corporations showed tax losses in 
the economic crisis of 2001 than in 
previous crises. The two central 
provided explanations are the 
following: there was a strongly 
declined average rentability of C-
corporations. Furthermore, in the 
years directly preceding the crisis 
many healthy firms opted for the 
transparent S-corporation and are 
therefore no longer included in the 
statistics as of 2001. 
                                                            
39 Some of the methodologies’ and results’ summaries quote the respective papers literally. 
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Auerbach 
(1986) 
First there is an 
analytical part which 
is then 
complemented by a 
simulation. 
The paper is not empirical 
in a strict sense. 
The results are all derived from 
analytics and/or the simulation: 
Tax loss carryforwards have the 
risk to expire before they can be 
utilized and they automatically 
bring a timing disadvantage based 
on interest. A limited recognition 
of losses is supposed to have 
negative effects on investments. 
Existing tax loss carryforwards 
bring firms a situation of partial tax 
exemption. 
Auerbach, 
Poterba 
(1987) 
1,425 US 
corporations from the 
years 1981 till 1984. 
Some tables and 
figures refer to the 
year 1974. The paper 
is generally based on 
the Compustat 
database, but 
additional 
adjustments 
regarding tax loss 
carryforwards, 
annual reports, and 
10-K-statements 
have been made. 
Probabilities of transition 
from a tax loss status to a 
profitable status are 
analyzed. Detailed 
descriptive tables and 
figures are presented. The 
main aspect analyzed in 
this paper is the 
persistence of tax loss 
carryforwards. 
The tax loss carryforward status is 
rather persistent. For each year, the 
probabilities of transforming from 
a company with/without a loss 
carryforward in t-1 to a company 
without/with a loss carryforward in 
t are shown. The average 
probability based on the years 1981 
till 1984 that a loss caryforward of 
t-1 is still observable in t amounts 
to 90.9%. The paper shows for 
each year how long loss 
carryforwards persist. Regarding 
the losses from 1974, the 
probability that they persist one 
year is 80.1%, 43.2% that they 
persist three years, 22.6% that they 
persist five years, 15.2% that they 
persist seven years, and 10.5% that 
they persist ten years. 
Barlev, 
Levy 
(1975) 
The paper is not 
based on firm data, 
but focuses on tax 
loss treatment rules. 
It shows the tax loss 
treatment rules of 
several countries and 
calculates the 
probabilities of loss 
utilization and 
resulting tax savings 
once the loss 
carryforward period 
is limited. 
The study is not strictly 
empirical. The 
identification builds on 
the simple truth that a loss 
carryforward can only be 
utilized for tax purposes 
once there is a profit in 
the following period. The 
probability of such a 
profit's occurrence differs. 
The later the loss 
carryforward is utilized 
the lower is its value. 
Analysis of the difference between 
the loss carryback's and the loss 
carryforward's advantage. The 
expected tax savings, calculated as 
net present values, is shown as 
depending on the respective 
probability of loss carryforward 
utilizations. The three-year loss 
carryback in the USA causes the 
expected probability of tax savings 
there to be at a value of 95.99%, 
whereas in the UK and in Israel 
(both grant no carryback and an 
unlimited carryforward) it amounts 
to only 80%. 
Buettner, 
Fuest 
(2010) 
Exclusively 
composed IFO 
dataset covering 
German companies 
from the 
manufacturing 
sector. The data 
covers ten monthly 
Descriptive figures and 
tables showing the share 
of firms reporting losses 
or profits in the respective 
months. The linear 
regressions use the 
weighted tax rate of all 
firms which show profits 
The tax-induced stabilization effect 
is smaller with limited loss-
offsetting as compared to if full 
loss-offsetting was granted. In the 
presence of full loss-offsetting, all 
credit-constrained firms benefit 
from the immediate offset. The 
value of the stabilization measure 
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waves with financial 
statement 
information and the 
financing restrictions 
as perceived by the 
respective firms. 
and also have credit 
constraints. This is the so-
called stability measure. 
is 7.8% at limited loss-offsetting. If 
there was full loss-offsetting, it 
would amount to 11.5%. 
Cooper, 
Boynton 
(2004) 
Tax data of the 
Internal Revenue 
Service covering 
27,000 US 
corporations. 
Descriptive analysis 
concerning the loss 
carrybacks’ liquidity 
effect. 
The loss carryback has strong 
liquidity effects. The replication of 
this study by Graham and Kim 
(2009), which is based on 
Compustat data, leads to similar 
conclusions. 
Cooper, 
Knittel 
(2006) 
US companies 
observed in the years 
1993 till 2003. Two 
datasets by the 
Internal Revenue 
Service are 
combined: annual 
balance sheet 
information with 
80,000 to 140,000 
firm observations per 
year and "CORTAX" 
data, covering 
information of loss 
carryback and 
insolvency 
applications. 
Mainly descriptive: 
utilization/existence/ 
expiration of tax loss 
carryforwards per year. 
About 50% to 60% of all tax losses 
are used within a ten-year time 
window by means of a loss 
carryforward or a loss carryback. 
10% to 20% are used outside this 
time window. 25% to 30% of all 
tax losses are never used. 
Cooper, 
Knittel 
(2010) 
US companies 
observed in the years 
1993 till 2004. Two 
datasets by the 
Internal Revenue 
Service are 
combined: annual 
balance sheet 
information and 
"CORTAX" data, 
covering information 
of loss carryback and 
insolvency 
applications. 
The first part of the paper 
is similar to Cooper, 
Knittel (2006), i.e. it is 
mainly descriptive: 
utilization/existence/ 
expiration of tax loss 
carryforwards per year. 
The paper also shows the 
loss utilization per 
industry and the time until 
loss carryforwards are 
reduced. Moreover, firm-
specific effective 
marginal tax rates are 
calculated. 
Loss-offset restrictions reduce the 
value of loss carryforwards by 
about a half. It is especially young 
firms from the information industry 
and the professional services 
industry which are affected by the 
loss-offset restrictions. The 
effective tax rates differ strongly 
only if the firm is debt financed 
and/or receives investment grants. 
Cummins, 
Hassett and 
Hubbard 
(1995) 
US firm-level data 
based on Compustat, 
covering industrial 
enterprises in the 
years 1953 till 1988. 
Linear regressions with 
fixed assets serving as the 
dependent variable and 
cost of capital serving as 
the independent variable. 
Additional figures show 
the overall trends in 
aggregates. 
Concerning their investments in 
fixed assets, companies without a 
tax loss carryforward are more 
sensitive to tax rate reductions and 
investment incentives than those 
who do. The aggregate figures 
show that there is a negative 
relationship between the cost of 
capital and investments. 
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Devereux 
(1989) 
Panel consisting of 
187 UK companies 
from the 
manufacturing 
sector, covering the 
years 1975 till 1984. 
The Datastream 
International 
database provides the 
annual financial 
statement 
information, the 
London Share Price 
Database provides 
the market value. 
Dynamic GMM 
estimation approach 
following Arellano and 
Bond. The regressions are 
in first differences. 
Dependent variable: 
investment in t; most 
important independent 
variable: cost of capital 
following King/Fullerton. 
The cost of capital 
regarding tax rates and 
existing tax loss 
carryforwards ("tax 
exhaustion"). Independent 
control variables: 
investment in t-1, 
turnover in t and in t-1, 
market value. 
The paper shows the results of only 
three regression setups. In two of 
them, the cost of capital negatively 
influences investment. The 
investment impact of corporate 
taxes or even of present loss 
carryforwards is not isolated. 
Devereux, 
Fuest 
(2009) 
Selection of the UK 
companies listed in 
the Datastream 
database. 10,239 
observations 
stemming from 537 
firms and starting in 
1980. Furthermore, 
there is quarterly 
data since 1980 from 
the "CIB Industrial 
Trends Survey". In 
this survey, firms 
state to what extent 
they expect financing 
constraints in the 
upcoming 12 
months. 
The stability measure 
differs according to the 
difficulty of refinancing 
and by the profit or loss 
situation. Descriptive 
figures and tables show 
the size of the stability 
measure of firms with 
positive or negative tax 
payments and its size for 
the hypothetical case that 
losses could always be 
offset immediately. The 
paper presents several 
further descriptive 
statistics. 
Most of the firms facing problems 
of refinancing are in a loss 
situation. For such firms, the 
corporate income tax cannot exert a 
stabilizing effect, because they do 
not receive any financing means 
from the state. A more generous, 
i.e. faster, loss offsetting would 
significantly increase the 
stabilization effect. 
Devereux, 
Keen, 
Schiantarel
li (1994) 
Panel data of 591 UK 
firms from the 
manufacturing 
industry, observed in 
the years 1973 till 
1986. The 
estimations are based 
on 4,778 firm 
observations. 
Dynamic GMM panel 
estimations following 
Arellano and Bond. 
Regressions are in first 
differences. Two different 
models are applied, 
namely an Euler-equation 
and a Q-equation. The 
paper traces the influence 
of cost of capital on 
investments. In doing so, 
it builds on four models, 
which one by one cover 
the asymmetric tax 
recognition of profits and 
losses, not at all at first 
and then on a more and 
more detailed level. 
Other than theoretically expected, 
the careful consideration of 
asymmetric taxation does not 
increase the quality in investment 
forecasts. This means that the 
specific tax rules would be 
irrelevant. Possible explanations 
listed in the paper are the 
following: UK microdata do not 
show enough variation, there might 
be an omitted variable bias, tax 
regulations and investment might 
be endogenous, and/or there are 
arbitrage opportunities (e.g. via 
leasing).   
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Devereux, 
Loretz 
(2008) 
ORBIS database by 
Bureau van Dijk. 
Unbalanced panel of 
worldwide 
subsidiaries 
belonging to groups 
of companies, 
covering the years 
2001 till 2005. 
The effective tax rates by 
Devereux/Griffith (1999) 
are advanced in such a 
way that they also 
consider losses and their 
offset in an international 
group. First, the group 
structure is identified in 
the dataset. Then, firm-
specific effective average 
tax rates are computed. 
Additional descriptive 
figures and statistics show 
the EATR distribution per 
country and tax system. 
For each country, the firm-specific 
EATR is compared between the 
current system, a system of 
international consolidation/loss-
offsetting, and a formula-
apportionment-system. Due to new 
tax planning opportunities, 
international consolidation is 
supposed to even further 
deteriorate capital export neutrality 
and ownership neutrality. 
Donnelly, 
Young 
(2002) 
Tax loss-offsetting 
rules in OECD 
countries in the year 
2011. Very detailed 
comparative tax law 
analysis between 
USA, Canada and 
Australia. 
The paper is not strictly 
empirical. 
Demand for a group taxation 
regime in Canada. As of 2012, 
Canada has not yet introduced such 
a regime for the netting of profits 
and losses between subsidiaries of 
the same group. 
Dwenger 
(2008) 
Corporate income tax 
statistics of the 
German Federal 
Statistical Office. 
A microsimulation model 
is applied to increase the 
loss offset prognosis. The 
majority of the paper, 
however, remains 
descriptive. 
As of 2001, the average loss 
carryforward per firm amounted to 
about EUR 500,000. On the 
aggregate across all firms, this 
meant a total of loss carryforwards 
of EUR 388 billion in 2001. Losses 
are by far more often offset by 
means of a loss carryforward than 
by means of a loss carryback. Since 
1992, the utilization of tax losses 
has strongly increased. About one 
quarter (EUR 100 billion) of such 
carryforwards can be found in the 
private service sector and one 
eighth each (EUR 50 billion) can 
be found in the real estate industry, 
in the consumer goods industry, 
and in the manufacturing industry. 
Dwenger, 
Walch 
(2011) 
Two data sets are 
merged. First, the 
investment and cost 
structure surveys of 
the years 1995 till 
2004 by the Research 
Data Center of the 
Statistical Offices of 
the Federation and 
the German federal 
states. Second, the 
corporate income tax 
statistics of the years 
2001 and 2004. 
Investigation of the tax 
impact on investment. 
The usage of tax data and 
especially the recognition 
of the tax status, i.e. the 
profit and loss situation, 
are emphasized. After 
some descriptive 
statistics, the paper 
presents the results of 
distributed lag models 
based on OLS and system 
GMM estimations. 
Accounting for tax losses is 
supposed to yield a more precise 
point-estimate for the user cost 
elasticity of investment. The 
elasticity of capital with respect to 
its user cost, estimated with System 
GMM yields -0.52. That is, an 
increase in the user cost of capital 
of 1% reduces corporate 
investment by 0.52%. 
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Edgerton 
(2010) 
Panel data of US 
firms from the 
Compustat North 
America database, 
covering the years 
1967 till 2005. 
Ordinary least squares 
estimations with 
investments/capital stock 
serving as the dependent 
variable. The most 
important independent 
variable is the interaction 
term between the loss 
carryforward dummy 
("nontaxable"=1, 
"taxable"=0) and the 
effective tax rate. The 
interaction term is 
negative, but loses its 
significance once 
additional cash flow 
variables are included in 
the estimation. 
Accelerated bonus depreciations 
offered by the US government 
could not be used by firms with 
existing loss carryforwards. As a 
consequence, the measure was 4% 
less effective as compared to the 
case where all firms had been 
subject to tax. Low cash flows at 
times of economic crises further 
decrease the effect of bonus 
depreciations by 24% as compared 
to the hypothetical case that the all-
time average cash flow would 
apply. When simultaneously 
analyzing the cash flow effect and 
the effect of an existing loss 
carryforward, the latter is 
insignificant. 
Fochmann, 
Kiesewette
r, Sadrieh 
(2012) 
Laboratory 
experiment with 91 
student participants. 
First, the investment 
behavior in the no-tax 
baseline case is compared 
to a setting where the 
income resulting from 
investments is taxed. In a 
second step, the baseline 
investment choices are 
compared to choices 
under three types of 
income taxation. In three, 
the after-tax outcomes of 
prospects are identical. 
First, investors significantly reduce 
their risk-taking as predicted by 
theory. Second, investors seem to 
have a positively biased perception 
of loss-deduction provisions. This 
second conclusion is derived from 
the observation that while partial 
and capped loss-deduction increase 
risk-taking significantly, a tax 
system without loss-deduction does 
not significantly alter risk-taking. 
Gendron, 
Anderson, 
Mintz 
(2003) 
Balanced panel 
originating from the 
Compustat database 
and tracing 50 
Canadian firms of 
the manufacturing 
sector. These firms 
are traced over a time 
span of 19 years, 
from 1976 till 1994. 
At first, a Poisson count 
variable estimator is 
applied. The dependent 
variable is the number of 
years a firm has a loss 
carryforward available. 
The most important 
independent variable is 
the capital cost allowance. 
In the second half of the 
paper, there is a switching 
model analyzing the 
firms’ long term demand 
for capital. 
The existence of a loss 
carryforward has an effect on the 
taking up of capital. The paper, 
however, does not clearly point out 
the size of this effect and it also 
does not put forward what is 
expected. 
Gordon, 
MacKie-
Mason 
(1997) 
Tax data of the 
Internal Revenue 
Service tracing US 
companies from 
1959 till 1986. 
Three estimation 
approaches: OLS, IV and 
IV with a lagged variable. 
The dependent variable is 
the share of assets held in 
form of C-corporations in 
all assets. The most 
important independent 
variable is the tax price, 
i.e. the amount by which a 
The major focus lies on the choice 
of the organizational form (C-
corporation vs. S-corporation). 
Firms with losses tend to opt for a 
C-corporation, whereas firms with 
profits tend to opt for an S-
corporation. Following the line of 
argumentation of this paper, loss-
making firms favor the higher 
taxation of the C-corporation's 
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C-corporation is taxed 
higher than an S-
corporation. 
organizational form. 
Graham, 
Kim 
(2009) 
Compustat quarterly 
data of US 
companies, covering 
the years 2008 and 
2009. 
Detailed descriptive 
analyses showing the 
following aspects: the 
amount of loss carrybacks 
and the number of 
previous years they are 
applied to (table 1), 
liquidity effects from the 
switch from a two-year to 
a five-year carryback, 
differencing by industry 
(table 5), and the effect on 
effective marginal tax 
rates (table 7) 
The actual two-year loss carryback 
is contrasted with a hypothetical 
five-year carryback. The extension 
to five years would have brought 
US firms additional liquidity in the 
amount of USD 19 billion in 2008 
and USD 34 billion in 2009. The 
extension would have been 
particularly beneficial to the real 
estate, the automobile and the 
financial industry. 
Jacob, 
Pasedag, 
Wagner 
(2011) 
Tax loss treatment 
rules and tax rates of 
the year 2010. 
Descriptive: Tax loss 
treatment rules and tax 
rates. Additionally, there 
are some linear 
regressions. There, the 
dependent variable is the 
respective present value 
of the tax loss, which 
differs depending on the 
offsetting rule. The most 
important independent 
variable is the tax rate. 
Correlation tables provide 
further insights into the 
general trends and 
relationships. 
Those countries with the lowest 
overall tax rates, based on 
withholding taxes on dividends, the 
corporate income tax and the 
business tax, seem to have the most 
restrictive loss-offsetting 
regulations. Thus, the tax rate 
effect on the loss' net present value 
is positive and significant. When 
only focusing on the corporate 
income tax rates, this impact 
cannot be identified clearly. 
Mintz 
(1988) 
Data of Canadian 
companies, 
aggregated on the 
industry level, 
covering the years 
1979 till 1981. 
Tax loss-offset limitations 
are translated into 
respectively implemented 
effective tax rates. 
Differentiation by 
industry (7 categories) 
and by three company 
types (subject to tax, tax-
free, startup). 
The required adjustments of the 
effective tax rates show that it is 
especially startup companies which 
suffer from the tax loss-offset 
restrictions. They face the problem 
that beneficial accelerated bonus 
depreciations and deductions 
cannot be taken advantage of High 
tax-loss carryforwards reduce the 
effective tax rate on current profits. 
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tax base. As of 2008, Germany has severely changed its thin capitalization rule by targeting 
interest payments instead of debt to equity ratios. The new rule has primarily been introduced 
to prohibit tax avoidance by multinationals. For reasons of non-discrimination, the rule is, 
however, equally attributable on the national level and it is applicable to both internal and 
external financing. The theoretical and analytical literature has brought forward many 
arguments stating that the new interest barrier is harmful to firms, distorting their financing 
decisions. Four years after its introduction, the time has come to empirically evaluate the 
interest barrier. The DAFNE database serves as my source of reference. I differentiate by firm 
characteristics, by industry and by kind of debt. I find that the interest barrier drove firms to 
lower their debt to assets ratios and their net interest payments. Opposing its original 
intention, it was, however, also the national firms which adjusted their capital structure, and it 
was external rather than internal debt which was reduced. Thus, the interest barrier does 
indeed affect financing decisions, but predominantly not in the intended way and not of the 
intended firms. In sensitivity analyses I examine highly leveraged and low profitable firms, 
which are likely to be subject to the interest barrier. The results suggest a debt-reducing 
interest barrier effect for these companies as well. 
Keywords:  Capital Structure, Corporate Taxation, Interest Barrier, Empirical 
Analysis, Firm-Level Data 
JEL-Classification:  F23, H25, H32 
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5.1 Introduction 
Not without a lack of irony, Homburg (2007) calls the interest barrier an unprecedented tax 
innovation. Even before its introduction in 2008, the German interest barrier had a very poor 
scientific reputation. Based on analytical considerations, it is supposed to distort financing 
decisions, thus harming production efficiency. It is said to drive into bankruptcy even those 
firms which have no intentions of abusive tax evasion whatsoever. According to Homburg 
(2007), the German interest barrier combines maximal economic damage with minimal fiscal 
utility. The numerous critical articles on the German regulation did, however, not prevent 
Italy from introducing a very similar rule in the same year 2008. 
Thin capitalization rules prevent firms from deducting interest from their tax base if certain 
conditions are met. Before 2008, the amount of (non-)deductible interest was determined by a 
firm's debt to equity ratio. The interest on internal debt going beyond 1.5 times the equity of 
the respective shareholder was not deductible. As of 2008, the deductibility of interest no 
longer depended on the ratio, but on interest payments. Generally speaking, interest payments 
exceeding the interest earnings are only deductible at the amount of 30% of EBITDA once the 
exemption limit of an initial EUR 1 million is exceeded. The new interest barrier rule covers 
all sources of interest and, unlike the previous rule, not only internal but also external debt. It 
has primarily been introduced to prohibit tax avoidance by multinationals. For reasons of non-
discrimination, the rule is equally attributable on the national level. Non-deductible interest is 
recorded in an interest carryforward. Figure 5-1 below illustrates the functioning of the new 
interest barrier. 
Homburg (2007) is not the only - convincing - analytical paper which severely criticizes the 
interest barrier. Blaufus and Lorenz (2009), Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010), Eilers 
(2007), Endres (2007), Herzig and Bohn (2007), Hey (2007), Musil and Volmering (2008), 
Stangl and Rödder (2007), Töben (2007), and Welling (2007) draw similarly negative 
conclusions. German politicians have reacted to this critique by slightly relaxing the interest 
barrier in 2009, when they retroactively increased the exemption amount from EUR 1 million 
to EUR 3 million and also enlarged the tolerance range of the so-called escape clause, 
comparing the firm's leverage to the group's leverage. 
Four years after its introduction, the time has come to empirically evaluate the interest barrier. 
Affected firms might either be struck by the interest barrier or might have taken evasive 
actions. My empirical estimations are based on Bureau van Dijk's DAFNE database, which is  
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Figure 5-1: Interest barrier - legal scheme 
 
Cf. Winkeljohann and Fuhrmann (2007). As of 2009, the tax allowance was increased to EUR 3 million and the 
company leverage could exceed the group leverage by 2%. 
 
a detailed subgroup of the Amadeus database covering German companies. I differentiate by 
firm characteristics, by industry and by different kinds of debt. I find that the interest barrier 
made firms lower their debt to assets ratios. Opposing its original intention, it was, however, 
also the national firms which adjusted their capital structure. In robustness checks, I find 
interest barrier effects for highly leveraged firms and for companies with a low profitability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present a literature 
review. Thereafter, the effects of the thin capitalization legislation are worked out analytically 
in Section 3. This serves as the basis for my development of hypotheses in Section 4. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Section 5, followed by the empirical approach in Section 
6 and results in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) published their theory of the capital structure 
of a firm, the tax advantage of debt financing in contrast to equity financing has been widely 
discussed in the literature. Modigliani and Miller argue that debt financing is more 
advantageous than equity financing since interest expenses are tax deductible. However, they 
also highlight that there are a lot of non-tax reasons influencing the optimal financing 
decision. As a result, they reject the idea that 100% debt financing is usually the best choice. 
Further analytical research strengthened this position and revealed that it might not always be 
beneficial to finance corporate undertakings with debt. Myers (1977) for example, argues that 
an already existing asset stock should rather be financed with a higher percentage of debt 
compared to new growth opportunities. 
Following the analytical approaches, multiple authors tried to show these effects empirically. 
MacKie-Mason (1990) as well as Graham (1999) find positive effects of corporate tax rates 
on leverage by focusing on data about primary seasoned offerings. Gordon and Lee (2001 and 
2007) reveal a much larger effect that is particularly strong for small and for very large firms 
but not for medium-sized firms. Additionally, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) can show that 
the effect varies with the source of debt. Their study on U.S. firms yields a higher 
responsiveness to tax-rate differences of internal debt compared to external debt. Huizinga, 
Laeven and Nicodème (2008) also provide support for the international debt and profit 
shifting of multinationals. The corporate tax rate effect on financing decisions has been 
summarized in a literature review by Graham (2003) and in a meta study by Feld, 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2011). 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1999), Alworth and Arachi (2001) and Overesch and 
Voeller (2010) do not only focus on the positive effect of corporate tax rates on the debt level, 
but also try to identify a proposed negative effect of high personal taxes on interest.42 Each of 
these studies is based on a different dataset and covers an international context. All of them 
clearly identify the proposed negative effect. 
However, there are also studies that fail to identify either of the above mentioned effects or 
that stress other effects as relatively more important. Taub (1975) for example, finds a 
                                                            
42 Miller (1977) argues that, at the margin, a negative effect of personal taxation might negate the corporate tax 
advantage of debt financing, because most tax systems favor dividend income to interest income. De Angelo 
and Masulis (1980) implement an interior leverage equilibrium model considering the interaction of corporate 
and personal taxes. 
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counterintuitive negative effect of higher corporate tax rates on debt financing. Myers (1984) 
postulates that the past literature provided no convincing evidence on corporate taxes 
increasing the leverage. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) find that firm-specific leverage 
remains constant over a very long period of time, i.e. more than 20 years, concluding that the 
majority of variation in capital structure is time-invariant and that much of this variation is 
unaccounted for by existing empirical specifications. 
When it comes to the financial effects of tax policy, one may wonder whether the meas\-ures 
to counter the effects described above were successful. Haufler and Runkel (2008), 
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) as well as Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber and 
Wamser (2008) all focus on the question of whether thin capitalization rules result in a 
reduction of internal debt and whether this increases fiscal revenues. Wamser (2008) focuses 
on the introduction of the German thin capitalization rule in 1994 and its amendments in 2001 
and 2004. All of these empirical studies find evidence on a significant reduction of internal 
debt following the introduction of a thin capitalization rule. However, they do not show that 
this reduction also resulted in a reduction of overall debt. They rather suggest that internal 
debt was substituted with external debt resulting in no increase in tax revenues. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the emergence of the German interest barrier rule in 2007 
was predominantly criticized in the German tax literature for being too far-reaching. Three 
elements of the interest barrier rule are heavily criticized. First of all, the rule is said to 
overshoot the mark because not only internal but also external debt financing is limited (cf. 
Hey (2007), Homburg (2007)). Second, the interest barrier rule is seen as being harmful, 
especially to companies in financial distress. It is argued that the interest barrier rule can 
result in high taxation for highly leveraged companies having low earnings. It might force 
companies which are in a loss situation before consideration of the rule into paying taxes, thus 
making their situations even worse. The interest barrier is therefore seen as reinforcing a crisis 
(cf. Endres (2007), Grotherr (2008), Herzig and Bohn (2007), Hey (2007), Köhler (2007), 
Schwarz (2008)). Third, the so-called escape-clause is heavily criticized. It allows companies 
to escape the interest barrier rule if they can prove that the German company does not deviate 
from the equity-quota of the group, i.e. that the German business is not highly leveraged 
compared to the overall group. Dörfler and Vogl (2007), Endres (2007), Ganssauge and 
Mattern (2008), Grotherr (2008), Thiel (2007) and Welling (2007), however, see this equity 
test as highly complex and as bearing high administrative costs. Focusing on legal aspects, 
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Führich (2007), Hornig (2007) and Musil and Volmering (2008) argue that the interest barrier 
rule does not comply with EU-law and the German constitution. 
Empirical enquiries of the interest barrier rule in Germany have, so far, mainly focused on 
two aspects. Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) as well as Herzig, Lochmann and 
Liekenbrock (2008) asked companies about their perception of the interest barrier rule and 
whether they are being harmed by it. Bolik, Fuest and Ortmann-Babel (2010) show that most 
companies conceptually reject the rule and the newly-introduced loss carryforward 
restrictions, and that companies expect a higher tax burden as a result of the new interest 
barrier rule. Herzig, Lochmann and Liekenbrock (2008) show that 43% of the companies 
expect to be harmed by the rule. The second aspect that has been traced empirically is which 
companies will be harmed by the rule. Though the expected numbers differ between 150 and 
1511 companies, Bach and Buslei (2009) as well as Blaufus and Lorenz (2009) expect the 
rule to be particularly harmful to large companies. 
Even when the rule was adjusted in 2009, criticism continued. Rödding (2009) and Lenz, 
Doerfler and Adrian (2010) argue that the equity-quota computation is still problematic and 
demand the conversion of the newly increased exemption limit of EUR 3 million into a tax 
allowance. Additionally, Herzig and Liekenbrock (2010) stress problems with the EBITDA-
carryover. 
 
5.3 General Analytics 
Firms might lower their debt to assets ratios if the advantage of debt financing decreases. I 
illustrate this by comparing the net present value of a debt financed and an equity financed 
investment.  
If the investor provides equity to the firm, the net present value of the investment is given by 
ܰܲ ாܸ ൌ ܧܺ଴ ൅ ሺܫ௧ െ ܧܺ௧ െ ܦܧ ௧ܲሻሺ	? െ ௖߬ሻሺ	? െ ௦߬ሻሾ	 ? ൅ ሺ݅	 ? െ ௜߬ሻሿ௧ ǡ (5-1)
 
where EX0 is the amount of investment, It and EXt are the income and expenses in period t, 
DEPt is the amount of depreciation, i is the interest rate, and Ĳc and Ĳs are the tax rates for 
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corporate profits on the firm and shareholder level. Ĳi is the tax rate on interest earnings. If the 
investor instead chooses to provide capital in the form of debt, the net present value is 
ܰܲ ஽ܸ ൌ ܰܲ ாܸ ൅ ෍ሺߛ ܫܰ ௧ܶሻሺ	 ? െ ௦߬ሻ߬௖ ൅ ܫܰ ௧ܶሺ߬௦ െ ߬௜ሻሾ	 ? ൅ ሺ݅	 ? െ ௜߬ሻሿ௧௡௧ୀଵ ǡ (5-2)
 
where INTt are interest expenses for debt provided by the investor and 0 < Ȗ < 1 is the fraction 
of interest payments that is deductible from the corporate tax base.43 Ȗ equals 1 if no thin 
capitalization rules exist, but is <1 if the company is affected by the interest barrier, for 
example. As the deductiblity of interest payments leads to a lower taxation than in the equity 
financed investment where dividends are not tax-deductible, I see in equation (2) that the net 
present value of a debt financed investment is always greater than the net present value of an 
equity financed investment as long as some interest expenses are deductible from the 
corporate tax base, in particular as long as Ȗ > [Ĳi - Ĳs]/[(1-Ĳs)Ĳc]. This means that firms 
generally have a tax-induced incentive to use debt rather than equity as a means of financing. 
This result was first developed by Modigliani and Miller (1963). Opposing this tax advantage 
of debt financing, there are other determinants of the capital structure choice like legal 
constraints, risk considerations and the availability of debt, leading to the fact that I do not 
exclusively observe debt financed investments. The optimal fraction of debt, however, is 
supposed to be positively affected by the tax advantage. I am particularly interested in the 
effect of Ȗ. Equation (5-2) shows that the tax advantage of debt increases in Ȗ. Thus, assuming 
that the introduction of the interest barrier in Germany in 2008 leads to a decrease of Ȗ, the 
relative advantage of debt financing over equity financing decreases and therefore the 
application of debt in the years after the reform is generally supposed to decrease. 
To find out for which firms the new interest barrier is more restrictive than the old debt to 
assets rule with its 1.5 internal debt to equity safe haven, I compare the interest expenses that 
are non-deductible under both rules on a company level. I first take a look at the old rule. The 
non-deductible interest expenses (NDI) are given by 
                                                            
43 This result comes from ܰܲ ஽ܸ ൌ ܧܺ଴ ൅ 	? ሾሺூ೟ିா௑೟ି஽ா௉೟ିఊூே ೟்ሻሺଵିఛ೎ሻିሺଵିఊሻூே ೟்ሿሺଵିఛೞሻାூே ೟்ሺଵିఛ೔ሻሾଵା௜ሺଵିఛ೔ሻሿ೟௡௧ୀଵ ǡ 
where only ߛ ڄ ܫܰ ௧ܶ are deductible from the corporate tax base and ሺ	 ? െ ߛሻ ܫܰ ௧ܶ, the part that is not deductible, 
is only deducted from the personal tax base. In addition, the interest payments received by the investor are fully 
taxed on the personal level. 
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ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ ؔ ቐ൬	 ? െ 	?Ǥ	?ߣܦ ܧ	? ൰ ݅ ߣܦǡ ݂݅ ൐ 	 ?ሻ	?ǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ǡ (5-3)
 
where i is the interest rate payable for debt, E is the equity of the considered company and Ȝ is 
the fraction of total debt that is labeled as internal debt. As a result, the term in parantheses is 
the fraction of internal debt for which interest expenses are non-deductible under the old rule. 
Under the new rule, the amount of non-deductible interest is 
ܰܦܫ௡௘௪ ؔ ൜݅ ሺܦ െ ܸሻ െ 	 ?Ǥ	 ? ڄ ܧܤܫܶܦܣǡ ݂݅ ൐ 	 ?	?ǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ǡ (5-4)
 
Here, V are the lendings of the company given to other parties and EBITDA are the earnings 
before interest and depreciation which is the sum of earnings before interest, EBIT, and the 
amount of depreciation in the considered period, DEP.44 In Figure 5-2 I show the non-
deductible interest expenses as a percentage of total assets under the old (dashed lines) and 
the new rule (solid lines) as a function of the debt to assets ratio D/A.45 I see that the slope of 
NDIold is higher than the one of NDInew. 
Figure 5-2: NDIold and NDInew as functions of D/A for different Ȝs and rs 
 
Dashed lines are non-deductible interest payments (NDI) in per cent of total assets under the old rule and solid 
lines are non-deductible interest payments in per cent of total assets under the new rule. 
                                                            
44 I do not mention the exemptions of the new rule in this analytical part for the sake of simplicity. In addition, I 
assume that the interest rate is the same for both borrowing and lending. 
45 V=0 and the ratio of depreciation to total assets DEP/A= 0.05 in this example. 
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For given values of the profitability r, which is defined as EBIT divided by total assets and 
determines NDInew and for Ȝ, determining NDIold, I sometimes find an intersection of both 
lines. From this critical value for the debt to assets ratio onwards, the old rule leads to a higher 
amount of non-deductible expenses than the new rule. This is the case where r and Ȝ are 
relatively high, meaning profitable firms with lots of internal debt. For firms with a lower 
profitability which mainly have external debt in their balance sheet, NDInew is likely to be 
higher than NDIold. The analytical form for this critical value of the debt to assets ratio for 
which both rules lead to the same amount of non-deductible interest expenses is given by                                  ܰܦܫ௡௘௪ ൒ ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ 
֞       ܦܣ ۖەۖ۔
ۓ൑ 	?Ǥ	? െ  ܸܣ ൅ 	 ?Ǥ	 ? ቀ߬݅ ൅ ܦܧܲܣ ڄ ݅ ቁߣ ൅ 	 ?Ǥ	 ? െ 	 ? ǡ ݂݅ ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ ൐ 	 ?൑             ܸܣ ൅ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?൬݅ݎ ൅ ܦܧܲܣ ڄ ݅ ൰ ǡ ݂݅ ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ ൌ 	 ?  
(5-5)
 
If all interest expenses are deductible under the old rule, the debt to assets ratio, from which 
NDInew > 0, increases in profitability, the lending-fraction and the depreciation-fraction of 
assets. In addition, it decreases in the interest rate. If the old rule also restricts interest 
deductibility, the new rule is stricter than the old one if the debt to assets ratio is below a 
critical value depending on the same variables and, in addition, on Ȝ. Solving for r leads to         ܰܦܫ௡௘௪ ൒ ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ 
֞           ݎ ൑  ൞ ݅	?Ǥ	?൤ሺ	 ? െ ߣ െ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?ሻܦܣ െ ܸܣ ൅ 	 ?Ǥ	 ?൨ െܦܧܲܣ ǡ ݂݅ ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ ൐ 	 ?                              ݅	?Ǥ	?൤ܦܣ െ ܸܣ൨ െ ܦܧܲܣ ǡ ݂݅ ܰܦܫ௢௟ௗ ൌ  	 ?  
(5-6)
 
If the old rule does not restrict interest deductibility, the critical value for r increases in the 
debt to assets ratio and the interest rate. In addition, it decreases in the lending-fraction and 
depreciation-fraction of assets. This is because the interest barrier rule looks at net interest 
expenses and compares them to earnings before depreciation. If some interest expenses are 
non-deductible under the old rule, the critical value for r also depends on the fraction of 
internal debt Ȝ. Then, it decreases in D/A if Ȝ is fixed. Figure 5-3 shows the run of the critical-
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r-curve as a function of D/A for different Ȝs.46 If Ȝ = 0, all interest expenses are deductible 
under the old rule because it only triggered internal debt. The result is a strictly increasing 
critical value of r in D/A. If Ȝ > 0, the curve forms a kink. For Ȝ = 0.3, for example, the 
critical value for r is the same for D/A = 0.7 and D/A = 1.0 and equals 0.067. This means the 
difference of NDInew and NDIold is the same for the two debt to assets ratios and r = 0.067. The 
difference between these two points is that NDInew = NDIold = 0 if D/A = 0.7 and NDInew = 
NDIold  > 0 if D/A = 1.0. I can summarize by saying that, in my example, the new rule denies 
more interest expenses to be deductible than the old rule if D/A is between 0.7 and 1.0 and the 
profitability is lower than 6.7%, i.e. if the company is located in the grey area under the r-
curve. Descriptive statistics for D/A, r, Ȝ and DEP/A are shown in Table 5-3 of Section 5. 
 
Figure 5-3: Critical rentability as function of D/A for different Ȝs 
 
 
I can conclude that only specific firms are supposed to suffer more from the new interest 
barrier than from the old debt to equity rule. As I can see in Figures 2 and 3 the interest 
barrier is especially harmful for firms with a low profitability whereas firms with an average 
profitability are likely to remain unaffected by the reform or even benefit from the new rule. 
This corresponds to findings of Blaufus and Lorenz (2009). In addition, the old rule was more 
harmful for firms having a high fraction of internal debt to total debt. Therefore, in my 
empirical analysis, I divide the dataset into different groups of firms comparing their 
respective reactions after the reform. 
  
                                                            
46 V/A=0 and AFA/A= 0.05 in this example. 
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5.4 Development of Hypotheses 
When the new interest barrier was introduced in 2008, the German legislator first and 
foremost aimed at one specific goal: putting an end to the tax-induced abusive internal cross-
border lending of multinational companies.47 In order to avoid conflicts with the European 
Court of Justice, however, the new anti-avoidance rule could not specifically target 
multinationals, but had to treat cross-border lending and purely national lending in the same 
way. As shown above, the interest barrier differentiates neither by the number of countries 
involved, nor whether internal or external debt is at hand. Thus, companies can neither avoid 
the rule by expanding or concentrating their business nor by switching between external and 
internal lending. 
The actions which can actually be taken by companies in order to avoid unfavorable 
consequences of the interest barrier lead to results very much in line with the intention of the 
legislator. A company can cut the leverage in the high tax country, it can grant more loans in 
order to increase its interest earnings or it can aim at achieving a higher EBITDA without 
adjusting its leverage. All of these measures taken by a company generate and secure the tax 
base in the high tax country applying the interest barrier. In this paper I aim at analyzing 
whether the companies affected by the new interest barrier in Germany lowered their 
leverage. Even though I carry out an empirical analysis on the micro level, my approach also 
allows for conclusions regarding to what extent the legislator reached its goals and to what 
extent it caused collateral damage by influencing and punishing companies he did not 
genuinely aim at. 
The basic technical idea behind my identification method is the following: I identify firms 
which would have been affected by the new interest barrier if it had already been in place in 
the years 2005 to 2007, i.e. before its actual coming into force in 2008. Then I analyze 
empirically how these firms adjusted their debt to assets ratios as compared to the control 
group. It is a necessity to split the treatment group from the control group based on their 
characteristics before the introduction of the interest barrier, because the information after it 
already comprehends the firms' reactions. 
My very first hypothesis is very general. It builds on the assumption that firms try to avoid 
non-deductible interest. Even though non-deductible interest is recorded in an interest 
carryforward, its existence does not decisively influence the hypothesis. As compared to an 
                                                            
47 Cf. the official justification for the interest barrier, BR-Drucks. 220/07 (2007), p. 53. 
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immediate deduction, the carryforward brings a net present value disadvantage and its 
applicability is uncertain, especially for struggling firms. Once the interest barrier has come 
into force, companies can calculate to what extent they are negatively affected by the 
legislation and adjust their capital structure accordingly. Firms arriving at the conclusion that 
they are not affected by the interest barrier, by contrast, have no particular reason to adjust 
their leverage. These firms serve as the control group. Of course, there are other effects 
influencing the optimal leverage such as the decline of the corporate tax rate or 
macroeconomic criteria influencing the interest rate.48 Given that such effects are the same to 
both of the analyzed groups, they do not prevent the sound identification of an interest barrier 
effect. Thus, I state hypothesis H5-1: 
H5-1: After the introduction of the new interest barrier, the hypothetically ex ante hit firms 
lowered their leverage. This holds especially true concerning firms which are more 
severely affected by the new interest barrier than by the previous rule. 
The interest barrier was set up to prohibit legal but unpleasant tax avoidance by multinational 
firms. The provision of loans from subsidiaries in low-tax countries such as Ireland to 
company units in high-tax countries such as Germany should be prevented. Interest is taxed 
where it is received but reduces the tax base in the high-tax country. If multinationals actually 
set up such financial structures with the primary intention of saving taxes, they should easily 
be able to adjust them if necessary. Based on this rationale, even though the interest barrier 
does not explicitly distinguish between multinational and national lending, the cross-border 
constructions can be expected to be more elastic. Put differently, stronger adjustments of the 
capital structure can be expected by multinational firms because the - repealed - tax advantage 
was one of their primary reasons for the high leverage. National firms, by contrast, might very 
well have other predominant reasons for using debt such as the sheer absence of alternatives 
to external financing. Regardless of their desire to lower their leverage once the interest 
barrier is in place, these national firms might not, or at least only to a lower extent, be able to 
do so. Therefore, my second hypothesis is the following: 
H5-2: After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies belonging to multinational 
groups lowered their leverage more strongly. 
When companies decide to apply debt financing, they still have a choice between internal debt 
and external debt. While internal debt stems from shareholders or other members of the 
                                                            
48 As of 2008, for example, the German corporate income tax rate was lowered from 25% to 15%. 
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group, external debt is provided by banks or similar lenders. The effect of the interest barrier 
introduction might very well differ between these two kinds of debt financing. The interest 
barrier first and foremost targets tax-abusive internal debt financing. In order to prevent 
evasive constructions it does, however, not distinguish between interest from internal or 
external debt. Before the new interest barrier came into force in 2008, only internal debt was 
relevant for the calculation of the debt to equity ratio. Therefore, external debt has become 
less attractive with the introduction of the new interest barrier. Given that external debt was 
previously hardly relevant, in the course of the interest barrier introduction I should see a 
relatively stronger reduction in external rather than in internal debt. Thus, I state my third 
hypothesis: 
H5-3: After the introduction of the new interest barrier, companies reduced more strongly 
their external debt than their internal debt. 
Some debt financing is permissible. The new interest barrier accounts for this by granting a 
basic tax allowance and by admitting the deductibility of interest expenses to the amount of 
interest earned plus 30% of EBITDA. By introducing the interest barrier, the legislator did not 
aim at generally prohibiting debt financing, but at preventing excessive tax-induced 
leveraging. With my fourth hypothesis, I investigate to what extent especially those firms 
targeted by the new interest barrier actually reduced their debt to assets ratio. The logic 
behind my hypothesis is not that such highly leveraged firms reduce their debt because they 
are eager to fulfill the wish of the legislator; rather they are supposed to adjust it because they 
are the ones which are most severely hit by the new interest barrier. Given that I refer to the 
total leverage in this hypothesis and given that most of the debt in my data is external debt, 
the treatment group is generally more negatively affected by the new interest barrier than by 
the previous thin capitalization rule. It is therefore likely to adjust its financial structure. Thus, 
I suppose in my fourth hypothesis: 
H5-4: After the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% most highly 
leveraged companies reduced their debt to assets ratios. 
In Section 3, I have analytically worked out that firms with a rather low profitability are more 
likely to be affected by the new interest barrier than profitable firms. As could be seen above, 
the lower a firm's profitability, the more adverse is the new interest barrier as compared to the 
previous thin capitalization rule. Those firms facing a more severe rule than in the past, i.e. 
for which debt has become less attractive than before, are the ones which are most likely 
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supposed to lower their leverage. In line with Blaufus and Lorenz (2009), companies with 
average or even above-average profitability, however, are not negatively affected by the 
interest barrier rule. When focusing solely on the effect of the new legislation in the form of 
the interest barrier, I can state the following hypothesis: 
H5-5: After the introduction of the new interest barrier, especially the 5% least profitable 
companies reduced their debt to assets ratios. 
 
5.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I look at the development of the debt to assets ratios and the net interest payments to assets 
ratios of 25,751 German corporations between 2005 and 2010 in an unbalanced panel. My 
analysis considers all debt, internal debt and external debt one by one. In order to analyze the 
effects of the introduction of the interest barrier I put firms into different groups according to 
their non-deductible interest payments concerning the old and the new rule, according to their 
leverage and according to their profitability. I further control for the firms' tangibility, 
profitability, former losses and the number of employees. All these data are provided by the 
DAFNE-database by Bureau van Dijk, a subsample of the AMADEUS-database containing 
detailed information of German companies needed to compute the non-deductible expenses. I 
use information from unconsolidated statements for all corporations with total assets of more 
than EUR 1 million, hence concentrating on medium-sized and large firms. I drop firms with 
implausible values for equity, total assets, tangible assets, EBIT, EBITDA, liabilities, 
profitability, tangibility and interest payments. For the purpose of my analysis, I exclude firms 
operating in the agricultural, mining and finance sector. In addition, I use statutory corporate 
tax rates to control for tax rate effects on the companies' leverage. Table 5-1 defines all 
variables used in my regression analysis. Table 5-2 shows frequencies and absolute numbers 
of firms in different groups. In my sample, 487 companies, i.e. 1.89% of all companies, would 
have been treated by the new interest barrier in all three years before the introduction if it had 
been applicable since 2005. For 345 firms, i.e. 4.38% of the applicable companies, the new 
rule would have been more harmful than the old rule.49 In addition, Table 5-3 provides 
summary statistics of the applied variables. 
                                                            
49 The sample for computing if the new rule is more harmful than the old one is a bit smaller because I need 
additional information about the internal leverage. 4.38% = 345/7,878, cf. Table 5-4 for the sample size. 
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Table 5 ?1: Variable definitions 
debt to assets total debt divided by total assets, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 = 
one percent) 
internal debt to assets internal debt divided by total assets, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 = 
one percent) 
external debt to assets external debt divided by total assets, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 = 
one percent) 
net interest payments to assets total net interest payments divided by total assets, measured in 
percentage ?points (0.01 = one percent) 
internal net interest payments 
to assets 
internal net interest payments divided by total assets, measured in 
percentage ?points (0.01 = one percent) 
external net interest payments 
to assets 
external net interest payments divided by total assets, measured in 
percentage ?points (0.01 = one percent) 
reform dummy variable, 1 if observation is made in the years 2008   ? 2010, zero if 
observation is made in years 2005  ? 2007 
treated dummy variable, 1 if company would have had non ?deductible interest 
expenses according to the new interest barrier in all three years before the 
reform 
dependent dummy variable, 1 if company has no shareholder and no subsidiary with a 
participation rate of at least 25% 
Stricter dummy variable, 1 if company would have had more non ?deductible 
interest expenses according to the new interest barrier compared to the old 
thin capitalization rule in all three years before the reform 
high lev dummy variable, 1 if company was in the group of firms with the 5% highest 
average leverage in the three years before the reform 
low prof dummy variable, 1 if company was in the group of firms with the 5% lowest 
average profitability in the three years before the reform 
tangibility tangible assets divided by total assets, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 
= one percent) 
profitability EBITDA divided by total assets, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 = one 
percent) 
loss carryforward dummy variable, 1 if the profit before taxes was negative in the year before 
the observation 
str statutory tax rate, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 = one percent)
str * loss carryfwd interaction between str and loss carryforward
ln employees logarithm of number of employees
DEP/A amount of depreciation divided by total assets, measured in percentage ?
points (0.01 = one percent) 
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i interest rate computed by dividing interest paid by total debt, measured in 
percentage ?points (0.01 = one percent) 
r profitability defined as EBIT divided by total assets, measured in 
percentage ?points (0.01 = one percent) 
ʄ fraction of internal debt to total debt, measured in percentage ?points (0.01 
= one percent) 
The general source of the variables is the DAFNE-database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Some variables are 
built by own computations using the information from DAFNE. Variables with names combining the above 
variables by * are interactions of the repective variables. The statutory tax rates are derived from the IBFD 
Global Corporate Tax Handbooks. 
 
Table 5 ?2: Relative frequencies and numbers of firms in different groups 
group all firms nationals multinationals
treated 1.89 (487) 1.43 (334) 6.58 (153)
stricter 4.38 (345) 3.30 (214) 9.39 (131)
high leveraged 3.86 (1077) 3.98 (1018) 2.56 (59)
high  leveraged dependent 3.56 (913) 3.68 (854) n.a.
high leveraged  independent 0.04 (11) 0.05 (11) n.a.
low  profitable 4.69 (1262) 4.53 (1115) 6.54 (147)
low profitable dependent 4.39 (1077) 4.18 (932) n.a.
low profitable independent 0.06 (13) 0.06 (13) n.a.
The table contains relative frequencies of firms in different groups in the regression samples in per cent. 
Absolute numbers are depicted in parentheses. Treated means that the company would have had non-deductible 
interest expenses triggering the new interest barrier in all three years before the reform. Independent means that 
the company has no 25% shareholder or subsidiary. Stricter means that the company would have had more non-
deductible interest expenses based on the new interest barrier compared to the old rule in all three years before 
the reform. High leveraged means that the firm had one of the 5% highest average debt to assets ratios before the 
reform. Low profitable means that the firm had one of the 5% lowest average profitabilities before the reform.
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Table 5 ?3: Summaries 
all companies 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
debt to assets 88,451 0.6204 0.2402 0.0002 1 
internal debt to assets 65,802 0.1613 0.2017 0 0.9985 
external debt to assets  65,802 0.4711 0.2399 0 0.9994 
net interest payments to assets 88,333 0.0074 0.0267   ?2.8348 1.2843 
internal net interest payments to assets 29,225 0.0065 0.0139   ?0.0119 1.2064 
external net interest payments to assets 29,225   ?0.0024 0.0265   ?1.2019 0.3309 
reform 88,451 0.5788 0.4938 0 1 
treated 88,451 0.0204 0.1414 0 1 
treated * reform 88,451 0.0117 0.1074 0 1 
dependent  88,451 0.989 0.1041 0 1 
dependent * reform  88,451 0.5724 0.4947 0 1 
stricter 29,649 0.0451 0.2074 0 1 
stricter * reform 29,649 0.025 0.1561 0 1 
high lev 94,320 0.0323 0.1767 0 1 
high lev * reform  94,320 0.0187 0.1354 0 1 
high lev * dependent 87,519 0.0303 0.1713 0 1 
high lev * reform * dep 87,519 0.0179 0.1326 0 1 
low prof 92,938 0.0428 0.2024 0 1 
low prof * reform 92,938 0.0234 0.1513 0 1 
low prof * dependent 86,247 0.0406 0.1973 0 1 
low prof * reform * dep 86,247 0.0227 0.149 0 1 
tangibility 88,451 0.2581 0.2538 0 0.9984 
profitability 88,451 0.1285 0.1374   ?0.295 0.6358 
loss carryforward 88,451 0.1617 0.3682 0 1 
str 88,451 0.345 0.0417 0.3095 0.3943 
str * loss carryfwd 88,451 0.0557 0.1278 0 0.3943 
str * tangibility 88,451 0.0891 0.089 0 0.3931 
ln employees 88,451 4.5997 1.295 0 12.2138 
DEP/A    88,451 0.0472 0.3457   ?0.0071 84.3892 
i 84,333 0.0233 0.0374 0 7 
r 88,451 0.0824 0.1732   ?6.6173 4.5382 
ʄ 65,802 0.2405 0.2595 0 1 
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5.6 Empirical Approach 
In order to test my hypotheses I run regressions using a panel approach. I rely on the variation 
over time to analyze if and how firms altered their leverage after the introduction of the 
interest barrier. I apply a difference-in-difference approach in order to capture different 
reactions for different kinds of firms. My baseline regression equation is   ൌ Ⱦ	?ڄ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ ȗ ൅ Ⱦ ൅ Ɂ൅ Ɂ൅ Ɂ൅ Ɂ൅ Ԗ  
 
(7)
where debt to assetsit is total debt divided by total assets. The variable treatedi is a dummy 
that equals one if the considered firm would have been affected by the new interest barrier in 
all three years before its introduction.50 Reformit is a dummy indicating by the value of one if 
the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier. Treatedi * reformit is the 
interaction of these two variables. X is the matrix of time-varying firm-specific control 
variables. Subscripts i, j and t denote the company, the industry and the year. Therefore, įi, įj 
and įt are company-, industry- and time-fixed effects, įjt is an industry-time-fixed effect 
capturing industry-specific developments of the leverage. Treatedi and reformit are captured 
by the fixed effects; hence ȕ1 and ȕ2 are not reported. The coefficient of treatedi * reformit 
shows if treated firms changed their debt to assets ratios in a different way than other firms. 
For the effects on firms which are more severe hit by the new interest barrier than by the old 
rule, I replace treatedi by stricteri. This variable equals one if treatedi is one and non-
deductible interest expenses according to the new rule were higher than those according to the 
old rule in all three years before the reform.51 This approach can be used to test H5-1. 
Considering H5-2, I split the sample into national companies and multinational companies. 
H5-3 is tested with the same equation replacing the dependent variable by internal and 
external debt to assets. 
To test H5-4, I replace the treatment dummy by the variable high levi indicating if a company 
had an average debt to assets ratio before the reform that was higher than the 95 percent 
quantile of all considered firms. In addition, I introduce a three-way interaction to examine if 
highly leveraged firms which might be affected by the new interest barrier reacted differently 
                                                            
50 For the labeling if a company is treated or not, I generally use the scheme of Figure 5-1. The escape clause, 
comparing the firm's leverage to the group's leverage is, however, disregarded. Concerning the group 
membership, I distinguish by the existence or non-existence of a 25% subsidiary and/or a 25% shareholder. 
51 The non-deductible amount according to the old rule is calculated by comparing the firm's internal debt to the 
firm's equity. All interest expenses for such debt exceeding 1.5 times the equity are labeled as non-deductible. 
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from firms which do not have to worry about non-deductible expenses because they are 
independent and thus not affected by the new rule. Therefore the equation changes to            ൌ Ⱦ	?ڄ ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ                                        ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ ȗ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ ȗ                                       ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄȗ ൅ Ⱦ	?ڄ ȗȗ                                       ൅ Ⱦ൅ Ɂ൅ Ɂ൅ Ɂ൅ Ɂ൅ ԖǤ 
(8)
 
A positive ȕ4 means that independent highly leveraged firms have increased their leverage 
after the reform compared to other firms with lower debt to assets ratios. This coefficient is 
generally not expected to be significant because independent firms are never affected by the 
new interest barrier. For dependent firms, ȕ4 and ȕ7 must be added to see the whole effect. In 
addition, ȕ6 plus ȕ7 is the difference in reaction between highly leveraged dependent and 
independent firms. If these two coefficients are jointly significant, there is a specific interest 
barrier effect for potentially affected firms. I use this three-way interaction approach to 
capture the fact that highly leveraged firms might generally reduce their debt to assets ratios 
over time to return to their individually aspired ratio.52 The same kind of analysis is used to 
test H5-5 replacing the dummies for highly leveraged firms by a binary variable which is one 
if a company belongs to those firms with the 5 percent lowest average profitablities before the 
reform. 
 
5.7 Regression Results 
My regressions deal one by one with the hypotheses derived in Section 4. The first three 
result tables, Tables 5-4 to 5-6, cover the issues outlined in hypotheses H5-1 to H5-3, while 
Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 trace H5-4 and H5-5. Table 5-4 is based on all firms, whereas Table 
5-5 focuses on national firms and Table 5-6 focuses on multinationals. The same 
differentiation is maintained in Tables 5-7 and 5-8. The structure within the tables is always 
the same: The columns to the left of a table analyze the effects on total debt to assets, the 
columns in the middle focus on the  
 
                                                            
52 Cf. Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008). 
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Table 5 ?4: Baseline regressions, all firms 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated * reform  ?0.0122**   ?0.0016  ?0.0119 
 (0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0079) 
stricter * reform    ?0.0144* 0.0114    ?0.0259***
  (0.0077) (0.0081)  (0.0092)
tangibility 0.0396** 0.0363  ?0.0189 0.0188 0.0397 0.0086
 (0.0195) (0.0350) (0.0237) (0.0409) (0.0252) (0.0393)
profitability  ?0.1892***   ?0.1848***  ?0.0838***  ?0.1089***  ?0.1048***   ?0.0801***
 (0.0071) (0.0116) (0.0088) (0.0134) (0.0085) (0.0119)
loss carryforward 0.1585*** 0.1246*** 0.0293** 0.0566*** 0.1064*** 0.0616***
 (0.0093) (0.0148) (0.0116) (0.0176) (0.0115) (0.0162)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.3822***   ?0.2883***  ?0.0606*  ?0.1306**  ?0.2569***   ?0.1391***
 (0.0270) (0.0430) (0.0336) (0.0508) (0.0334) (0.0466)
str * tangibility  ?0.1485***   ?0.1049  ?0.1044*  ?0.1677*  ?0.0528 0.0673
 (0.0446) (0.0825) (0.0577) (0.0993) (0.0588) (0.0922)
ln employees 0.0192*** 0.0212***  ?0.0083***  ?0.0081* 0.0278*** 0.0285***
 (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0037)
observations 88451 29649 65802 27665 65802 27665
companies 25751 7878 20892 7661 20892 7661
R
2 
0.1011 0.0971 0.0199 0.0347 0.0533 0.0533
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Treated * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the 
observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been treated by the new 
rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference 
between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to companies not treated by 
the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction stricter * reform to analyze if firms, for which the 
new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their 
debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described 
in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent 
variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed 
effects. Observations of German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level. 
 
effects on internal debt to assets and the columns to the right present the effects on external 
debt to assets. All regressions are difference-in-difference approaches showing the effects of 
the interest barrier introduction on financing decisions of different kinds of companies. I use a 
fixed effects estimator in order to capture unobserved firm, industry and time specific effects. 
The Annex shows additional results. 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5-4, the ratio of total debt to assets serves as the dependent 
variable. The variable treated is a dummy that equals one for those firms which would have 
been affected by the new interest barrier in 2005, 2006 and in 2007 if it had been in place not 
only from 2008 onwards but already in the three previous years. This variable is captured by 
the firm-fixed effects. Being affected means that the interest barrier prevents the immediate 
deductibility of at least some interest expenses. The variable reform is a dummy that equals 
one for those observations that occur after the introduction of the interest barrier. This 
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variable is captured by the year-fixed effects. The interaction of these two variables, treated * 
reform, shows if the difference between the leverage before and after the reform is lower or 
higher for affected firms compared to unaffected companies. The negative and significant 
coefficient of treated * reform, amounting to -0.0122, means that after the introduction of the 
interest barrier, those hypothetically affected firms lowered their debt to assets ratios more 
strongly or increased it less strongly than the control group. When interpreting the result, one 
has to keep in mind that I control for firm and industry-year-fixed effects. For example, if the 
control group lowered its debt to assets ratio after the reform by ten percentage points, the 
treatment group would have lowered it by 12.2 percentage points. Given that I focus on the 
size of the change, it can, however, not be seen from the coefficient if the decrease was bigger 
or the increase was smaller. In either way, the negative coefficient confirms my hypothesis 
H5-1, because firms concerned with the interest barrier chose, on average, a relatively lower 
debt to assets ratio after its introduction compared to other firms.  
In the second sentence of hypothesis H5-1, I suppose that the lowered leverage should be 
observable especially concerning firms which are more severely affected by the new interest 
barrier than by the previous rule. The binary variable stricter equals one for firms for which in 
all three years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the hypothetically applied interest barrier would have led 
to more non-deductible interest than the previous rule which was in place at that time. The 
significant coefficient of the interaction effect stricter * reform -0.0144 indicates that firms 
which could expect to suffer more from the interest barrier than from the ratio-based thin 
capitalization rule supposedly lowered their debt to assets ratios more strongly than the 
control group. This confirms the second sentence in hypothesis H5-1. 
As can be seen by looking at Table 5-4 as a whole, columns (3) and (4) show the results for 
the approaches outlined above using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable and 
columns (5) and (6) do so using external debt to assets as the dependent variable. Based on 
these general regressions, there is no significant impact of the interest barrier on the ratio of 
internal debt to assets. This can be seen from the fact that none of the crucial coefficients 
treated * reform and stricter * reform in columns (3) and (4) is significant. 
Turning to the effect on external debt to assets, the results presented in columns (5) and (6) 
show a different picture. It seems that firms reacted to the introduction of the interest barrier 
predominantly with their external debt. The coefficient of treated * reform in column (5) 
shows the expected sign but fails to be significant. The crucial coefficient stricter * reform in 
column (6), however, clearly confirms hypothesis H5-3: After the introduction of the new 
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interest barrier, companies reduced their external debt more strongly than their internal debt. 
By comparing the results in columns (5) and (6) to those in columns (3) and (4), I see that the 
affected companies did not significantly differ in adjusting their internal debt to assets ratios 
compared to non-affected firms. Their external debt to assets ratio adjustment, however, 
clearly differs from the one of the control group if the new interest barrier rule is more severe 
than the previous thin capitalization rule for the considered company. Those firms 
significantly reduced their external leverage after the reform compared to the control group. 
This result corresponds to the effects on all debt presented in column (2). 
The control variables generally show the expected effects. The positive and sometimes also 
significant coefficient of tangibility can be explained by the fact that companies having lots of 
collateral can more easily and cheaply get loans and thus increase their leverage. Profitability 
shows a negative and significant coefficient, which means that profitable companies can 
reduce their leverage due to their ability of internally financing by means of retained earnings. 
The positive and significant coefficient of loss carryforward indicates that companies which 
made losses in the past need to raise debt to pay their dues and to keep their businesses 
running. The number of employees negatively impacts internal debt but positively affects the 
use of external debt. This is plausible, because, while some kind of debt is required by all kind 
of firms, a certain firm size may boost the ability to tap external sources. Overesch and 
Voeller (2010) use the interactions between loss carryforward and str and, in addition, str and 
tangibility in order to show that the positive tax effect on the debt to assets ratio decreases for 
firms with high non-debt tax shields. I find the same expected negative effects of both of 
these interactions on the total, internal and external leverage.53 All of the control variables 
presented here are included in all of the regressions shown in the tables to follow. As they 
remain qualitatively unchanged, these control variables are not always explicitly reported. 
Table 5-9 in the Appendix is very similar to Table 5-4 presented above. It differs, however, 
concerning the requirement of being treated before the interest barrier introduction. While in 
the above regressions the binary variable was one only if the firm was hypothetically affected 
in all three years 2005, 2006 and 2007, in the regressions shown in Table 5-9 it suffices if the 
company was hypothetically affected in at least one of the three years. The results of this 
sensivity analysis in Table 5-9 are qualitatively generally the same as those from Table 5-4 
                                                            
53 The result tables do not show coefficients for str, because the variation of this variable is the same for all 
considered companies and thus captured by the time-fixed effects. 
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discussed above. Tables 5-10 and 5-11 in the Appendix are analogue robustness checks for 
the results discussed below. 
Table 5-4 shows results of regressions including all firms. In my second hypothesis H5-2, 
however, I suppose that multinationals and national firms showed different debt to assets 
reactions in face of the new interest barrier. In order to be able to evaluate this hypothesis, I 
split my sample into those firms which are purely national (cf. Table 5-5) and those belonging 
to a multinational group (cf. Table 5-6). Depending on the regression setup, only about 10% 
to 20% of the firms in my sample are multinationals, whereas 80% to 90% are national firms. 
The results presented in Table 5-5 refer to national companies. They are qualitatively 
comparable to those of all firms presented and discussed above. In some cases, the 
significance or the size effects are higher than in the overall analysis, which indicates that it 
was mainly the national firms which reacted to the new interest barrier rule. For reasons of 
brevity, I do not discuss the results of Table 5-5 one by one, but only provide an overview. 
More detailed explanations of the coefficients can be achieved by referring to the discussion 
of Table 5-4. All in all, the results indicate that those national firms which are affected by the 
new interest barrier more strongly reduced their total debt to assets ratios than the control 
group. The specific reactions do not refer to the ratio of internal debt to assets, but they can be 
traced to the ratio of external debt to assets. This can be seen from the insignificant 
coefficient in column (4) as compared to the significant coefficients in column (6) of Table 5-
5. Table 5-10 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check of Table 5-5 by reducing the 
requirement of being considered a treated national firm if it was hypothetically affected by the 
interest barrier at least once instead of three consecutive times between 2005 and 2007. The 
results presented in Table 5-10 are qualitatively very similar to those presented in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-6 deals exclusively with multinational companies. As outlined above, there are not 
too many multinationals available in my sample. A look at the whole Table 5-6 shows that in 
only one case a crucial variable is (at the 10 percent level) significant, whereas all other 
coefficients are insignificant. The weakly significant coefficient of stricter * reform does not 
show the expected negative sign and does not prove to stay significant in robustness checks. I 
conclude from Table 5-6 that, contrary to the expectations expressed in hypothesis H5-2, 
multinationals did not show particularly strong reactions. My results rather indicate that 
multinationals did not significantly change their debt to assets ratios, whereas the national  
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Table 5 ?5: Baseline regressions, nationals 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated * reform  ?0.0153**   ?0.0051  ?0.0150 
 (0.0068) (0.0083) (0.0093) 
stricter * reform    ?0.0240*** 0.0018    ?0.0280***
  (0.0090) (0.0100)  (0.0104)
tangibility 0.0407** 0.0468  ?0.0111 0.0379 0.0316   ?0.0039
 (0.0200) (0.0367) (0.0244) (0.0443) (0.0263) (0.0427)
profitability  ?0.1903***   ?0.1756***  ?0.0808***  ?0.1054***  ?0.1069***   ?0.0740***
 (0.0074) (0.0123) (0.0095) (0.0147) (0.0092) (0.0131)
loss carryforward 0.1525*** 0.1281*** 0.0247* 0.0604*** 0.1059*** 0.0610***
 (0.0097) (0.0163) (0.0126) (0.0203) (0.0126) (0.0183)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.3641***   ?0.2957***  ?0.0545  ?0.1513***  ?0.2479***   ?0.1252**
 (0.0281) (0.0473) (0.0365) (0.0586) (0.0364) (0.0527)
str * tangibility  ?0.1788***   ?0.1706**  ?0.1279**  ?0.2244**  ?0.0624 0.0656
 (0.0453) (0.0865) (0.0596) (0.1077) (0.0607) (0.0995)
ln employees 0.0163*** 0.0168***  ?0.0100***  ?0.0102** 0.0259*** 0.0267***
 (0.0029) (0.0044) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0041)
observations 79278 23905 57340 22098 57340 22098
companies 23427 6483 18655 6276 18655 6276
R
2 
0.1095 0.1092 0.0224 0.0427 0.0566 0.0577
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Treated * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the 
observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been treated by the new 
rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference 
between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to companies not treated by 
the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction stricter * reform to analyze if firms, for which the 
new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their 
debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described 
in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent 
variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed 
effects. Observations of German corporations not being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 
2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level. 
 
companies did show such interest barrier-induced adjustments. When interpreting Tables 5-5 
and 5-6, one has to bear in mind, however, that the difference in significance levels might be 
attributable to the different sample sizes of national as compared to multinational companies. 
Table 5-11 in the Appendix serves as a robustness check for the regression results dealing 
with multinationals. Table 5-11 defines the treated and stricter variable like Tables 5-9 and 5-
10. There, these variables already change to one if the company is affected in at least one of 
the three years before the reform. In Table 5-11 I find negative effects on all debt and external 
debt. These results differ from the ones presented in Table 5-6. However, the conclusion 
concerning H5-3 remains unchanged. Multinationals did not significantly reduce their 
internal leverage, although such a reduction was intended by the new interest barrier. In 
contrast to Tables 5-5 and 5-6, the consideration of Table 5-10 and Table 5-11 indicates that 
both national and multinational firms adjusted their leverage after the reform.   
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Table 5 ?6: Baseline regressions, multinationals 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated * reform  ?0.0133 0.0033  ?0.0107 
 (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0142) 
stricter * reform    ?0.0035 0.0234*    ?0.0235
  (0.0135) (0.0129)  (0.0170)
tangibility 0.1284 0.0271  ?0.0198  ?0.0742 0.1111 0.1011
 (0.0858) (0.1166) (0.0945) (0.1221) (0.0858) (0.1082)
profitability  ?0.1755***   ?0.2214***  ?0.0967***  ?0.1233***  ?0.0920***   ?0.1042***
 (0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0229) (0.0313) (0.0214) (0.0276)
loss carryforward 0.1666*** 0.0997*** 0.0361 0.0221 0.1004*** 0.0734**
 (0.0307) (0.0360) (0.0293) (0.0345) (0.0294) (0.0354)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.4119***   ?0.2310**  ?0.0436  ?0.0011  ?0.2810***   ?0.2152**
 (0.0891) (0.1039) (0.0847) (0.0999) (0.0856) (0.1029)
str * tangibility  ?0.0898 0.1361  ?0.1272 0.0117 0.0596 0.0937
 (0.2189) (0.2846) (0.2383) (0.3026) (0.2213) (0.2669)
ln employees 0.0337*** 0.0357***  ?0.0031  ?0.0018 0.0366*** 0.0348***
 (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0072) (0.0082)
observations 9173 5744 8462 5567 8462 5567
companies 2324 1395 2237 1385 2237 1385
R
2 
0.1123 0.1380 0.0604 0.0803 0.0852 0.1024
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Treated * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the 
observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been treated by the new 
rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference 
between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to companies not treated by 
the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction stricter * reform to analyze if firms, for which the 
new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years before the reform, reduced their 
debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are described 
in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent 
variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed 
effects. Observations of German corporations being a member of a multinational group between 2005 and 2010 
stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level. 
 
Based on these robustness checks I cannot reject H5-2. The treatment group in Table 5-11 
consists of firms which are not necessarily affected by the new interest barrier after the reform 
given that it suffices to be hypothetically affected only once to be a member of the treatment 
group. Therefore, on the one hand, based on what I find in Table 5-6, one cannot expect to 
find any significant effects for this group. On the other hand, such firms might be able to 
adjust their financing structure more appropriately than those serving as the treatment group 
in Table 5-6. This second aspect might explain why I find reactions for multinational 
companies only in Table 5-11. 
In sum, the first three result tables yield three conclusions. First, confirming H5-1, after the 
introduction of the new interest barrier, the hypothetically ex ante hit firms, and especially 
those which are more severely affected by the new interest barrier, lowered their leverage. 
Second, concerning H5-2, my results in the robustness checks differ from the baseline results. 
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Thus, I can neither reject nor confirm this hypothesis. Third, confirming H5-3, the decreased 
attractiveness of external debt made companies lower their external rather than their internal 
debt. The third conclusion, based on the evidence presented above, indicates that the new 
interest barrier has possibly caused more damage than good. It intended to influence 
multinationals in such a way that they would reduce their internal debt to assets ratios. The 
analysis above, however, indicates that first and foremost national companies reacted by 
adjusting their external debt to assets ratio. In defending the interest barrier, one could put 
forward the argument that the multinationals are affected by the rule by no longer being able 
to deduct their interest expenses. Given that such firms are very likely to do tax planning, 
however, such an argument is rather unlikely to hold. 
Table 5-12 in the Appendix presents an additional analysis which splits up the binary variable 
treated into some of its components. By differencing whether a company is part of a group or 
has at least one 25% shareholder, whether it has positive net interest payments, whether it 
exceeds the general interest allowance and whether its net interest payments exceed 30% of 
EBITDA, I can derive which aspects actually drive the firms to adjust their debt to assets 
ratios facing the new interest barrier. Table 5-12 in the Annex shows negative and significant 
coefficients of net int > 0 * reform and net int once > 0 * reform, meaning that especially 
firms with more interest expenses than interest earnings reduced their debt to assets ratios 
after the reform. The negative and significant interaction in column (7) suggests that it also 
matters for firms' reactions whether the net interest payments exceed the 30% EBITDA 
threshold. 
Table 5-13 in the Appendix serves as a general sensitivity analysis of the results presented in 
Table 5-4. In Table 5-13, the dependent variable is not the debt to assets ratio, but the net 
interest payments to assets. This accounts for the firms' possibility to align themselves with 
the new interest barrier by lowering their charged internal interest rates instead of reducing 
the debt to assets ratio. As can be seen, the conclusions to be drawn from Table 5-13 are the 
same as those from Table 5-4. Treated firms did not lower their internal net interest payments 
after the interest barrier introduction. I rather see a reduction of external net interest payments. 
The positive and significant coefficient of treated * reform for internal debt indicates that 
treated firms exhibit an increased ratio compared to non-treated firms. This might be due to 
the fact that treated firms have a low profitability and need more debt to survive. See the 
discussion of Table 5-8 for details. 
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In tracing hypotheses H5-1 to H5-3, I only made the difference whether a company is 
hypothetically treated by the interest barrier or not or if it is treated more severely than by the 
old one. I did not distinguish to what degree such a company may be affected. It is probable 
that those firms which are denied only a minor amount of interest deductibility, might not 
consider changing, i.e. lowering, their leverage. As a robustness check, and in order to test 
hypotheses H5-4 and H5-5, I run additional regressions. In these regressions, I focus on 
highly leveraged companies and on companies with a low profitability. Analytical reasons for 
concentrating on these groups have been outlined in Section 3 above. 
Table 5-7 aims at testing hypothesis H5-4, stating that after the introduction of the new 
interest barrier, especially the 5% previously most highly leveraged companies reduced their 
debt to assets ratios. The newly introduced variable high lev distinguishes, whether a firm is 
among the 5% most highly leveraged firms in terms of the mean debt to assets ratio in the 
three years before the reform. The dummy dependent is zero for firms which are independent, 
i.e. do not belong to a group and have no shareholder holding at least 25% of the shares. The 
new interest barrier does not apply to such independent firms. I suppose that the dependent 
highly leveraged and therefore concerned firms relatively reduced their debt to assets ratios 
compared to the never affected independent firms. 
Table 5-7 is split into three horizontal sections with results for all companies in the first, 
national companies in the second and multinationals in the third section. All the control 
variables of the previous three tables are included in the regressions, but not reported in Table 
5-7. They remained qualitatively very similar to the previous estimations in terms of size, sign 
and significance. Concentrating on all companies in the upper section of Table 5-7, I see that 
the most highly leveraged firms indeed reduced their overall leverage after the reform. This 
can be seen from the significant coefficient high lev * reform in column (1), amounting to -
0.0078 and from the results presented in column (2). The coefficient of the three-way 
interaction high lev * reform * dep is negative and highly significant, indicating that the 
reaction to the reform differs not only between highly leveraged companies and firms with a 
lower debt to assets ratio, but that the difference between these two groups especially depends 
on the fact if the company is independent and therefore potentially affected by the interest 
barrier or not. Dependent * reform and high lev * reform * dep are jointly significant, which 
can be seen from the value of F1 in Table 5-7. This means that dependent highly leveraged 
firms relatively decreased their debt to assets ratios after the reform compared to highly 
leveraged but independent firms. These results confirm hypothesis H5-4.  
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Table 5 ?7: Comparing highly leveraged companies with other companies 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
 all companies
dependent * reform  0.0109 0.0147  0.0093
  (0.0073) (0.0096)  (0.0101)
high lev * reform  ?0.0078** 0.0340***  ?0.0316*** 0.0183 0.0222*** 0.0280**
 (0.0035) (0.0099) (0.0078) (0.0125) (0.0075) (0.0137)
high lev * reform * dep    ?0.0393***  ?0.0502***    ?0.0034
  (0.0105) (0.0150)  (0.0159)
observations 94320 87519 70339 65097 70339 65097
companies 27910 25466 22617 20614 22617 20614
R
2 0.0955 0.0998 0.0193 0.0206 0.0520 0.0539
F1  8.23*** 5.89***  0.54
F2  7.09*** 8.13***  6.57***
 
 nationals
dependent * reform  0.0090 0.0133  0.0093
  (0.0073) (0.0095)  (0.0102)
high lev * reform  ?0.0052 0.0337***  ?0.0307*** 0.0168 0.0244*** 0.0304**
 (0.0036) (0.0100) (0.0082) (0.0126) (0.0079) (0.0142)
high lev * reform * dep    ?0.0361***  ?0.0480***    ?0.0032
  (0.0105) (0.0154)  (0.0165)
observations 85156 78505 61876 56779 61876 56779
companies 25608 23204 20398 18435 20398 18435
R
2 0.1027 0.1083 0.0215 0.0231 0.0545 0.0573
F1  7.10*** 5.09***  0.52
F2  5.96*** 6.84***  7.09***
 
 multinationals
high lev * reform  ?0.040*** n.a.  ?0.0363 n.a.  ?0.0033 n.a.
 (0.0139) n.a. (0.0243) n.a. (0.0233) n.a.
observations 9164 n.a. 8463 n.a. 8463 n.a.
companies 2302 n.a. 2219 n.a. 2219 n.a.
R
2 0.1090 n.a. 0.0618 n.a. 0.0893 n.a.
The dependent variable is debt to assets.  High lev * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the 
observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm is among the 5% highest leveraged 
firms defined by the mean of the three years before the reform. Regression 2 compares the effect for independent 
and dependent firms. A negative sign of the three-way interaction high lev * reform * dep means that the 
difference between debt to assets before and after the reform is lower for highly leveraged companies than for 
firms with lower debt, especially if they are dependent and therefore potentially affected by the interest barrier. 
The list of control variables is the same as in the other tables, the respective results are not reported. Regressions 
3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use 
external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations for German 
corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. In the first panel I show results for all 
firms, in the second and third panel I distinguish between national and multinational firms. For multinationals, 
there is no distinction between independent and dependent firms, as here all multinationals are dependent per 
definition. F1 is the test-statistic for a test of joint significance of dependent * reform and high lev * reform * 
dep, F2 is the test-statistic for a test of joint significance of high lev * reform and high lev * reform * dep. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level. 
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The results presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5-7 show that the most highly leveraged 
firms indeed reduced their internal debt to assets ratio. Thus, by contrast to the general result 
drawn from Tables 5-4 to 5-6, the most highly leveraged firms seem to show the reaction 
intended by the interest barrier. The reaction can be identified, however, only for the national 
firms, as can be seen from the significant coefficients -0.0307 and -0.0480 at the center of 
Table 5-7. For multinationals, by contrast, the effect on the internal debt to assets ratio is 
insignificant. Only the coefficient dealing with the total debt to assets ratio is negative and 
significant. For such multinational companies, there is no distinction between independent 
and dependent firms, as here all multinationals are dependent by definition. With regard to 
external debt, columns (5) and (6) of Table 5-7 show only positive significant coefficients for 
the crucial variables. These findings suggest that the most highly leveraged firms increased 
their external debt after the reform compared to companies with lower debt to assets ratios. 
This result opposes to H5-3 and H5-4. Given that I, however, observe a reduction in internal 
leverage, the increase of external debt might in some sense just compensate this development. 
Testing the same hypotheses based on the 10% instead of the 5% most highly leveraged firms 
led to qualitatively very similar results. 
The weak evidence in Table 5-7 suggests that at least some highly leveraged firms cut their 
internal debt to assets ratios, which is in line with the goals of the new interest barrier. 
However, these results cannot be identified for multinational firms. Based on my findings in 
Tables 5-4 to 5-6 I therefore rely on my previous conclusion that the interest barrier is 
harmful especially for firms and kinds of leverage that were not targeted by this new rule. 
In Table 5-8, I aim at testing hypothesis H5-5, stating that after the introduction of the new 
interest barrier, especially the least profitable companies reduced their debt to assets ratio. The 
rationale behind this hypothesis has been outlined in Section 3 and 4. The overall structure of 
Table 5-8 is similar to the previous table. The newly introduced binary variable low prof 
equals one if the considered firm is among the group of firms with the 5% lowest profitability 
in terms of the mean profitability in the three years before the reform. Column (1) shows the 
overall effect. The positive and significant coefficients run in opposition against hypothesis 
H5-5. The least profitable firms have increased their debt to assets ratios. This can be 
observed both for national firms and for multinationals. If the firms were supposed to make 
their leverage decisions solely based on the interest barrier, their behavior is counter-intuitive. 
From a general point of view, however, the increase in the debt to assets ratio for the least 
profitable firms is well understandable. Firms with extremely low profitability seem to have  
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Table 5 ?8: Comparing firms with lowest profitability with other companies 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
 all companies
dependent * reform  0.0126* 0.0192***  0.0077
  (0.0069) (0.0073)  (0.0100)
   
low prof * reform 0.0175*** 0.1487**  ?0.0061 0.4059*** 0.0229***   ?0.0061
 (0.0057) (0.0630) (0.0066) (0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0119)
   
low prof * reform * dep    ?0.129**  ?0.4134***  0.0314**
  (0.0633) (0.0121)  (0.0134)
observations 92938 86247 69481 64306 69481 64306
Companies 26880 24521 21962 20010 21962 20010
R
2 0.0961 0.1007 0.0183 0.0203 0.0522 0.0542
F1  3.41*** 8832.72***  10.03***
F2  7.49*** 767.71***  6.71***
 
 nationals
dependent * reform  0.0110 0.0179**  0.0079
  (0.0069) (0.0073)  (0.0101)
low prof * reform 0.0144** 0.1508**  ?0.0081 0.4047*** 0.0232*** 0.0028
 (0.0060) (0.0636) (0.0072) (0.0111) (0.0073) (0.0125)
low prof * reform * dep    ?0.1343**  ?0.4141***  0.0237*
  (0.0638) (0.0130)  (0.0142)
observations 83847 77306 61079 56049 61079 56049
companies 24631 22312 19787 17875 19787 17875
R
2 0.1033 0.1092 0.0206 0.0229 0.0546 0.0575
F1  3.15*** 684.37***  5.34***
F2  5.97*** 675.58***  5.77***
 
 multinationals
low prof * reform 0.0322* n.a. 0.0089 n.a. 0.0147 n.a.
 (0.0168) n.a. (0.0155) n.a. (0.0166) n.a.
observations 9091 n.a. 8402 n.a. 8402 n.a.
companies 2249 n.a. 2175 n.a. 2175 n.a.
R
2 0.1097 n.a. 0.0611 n.a. 0.0899 n.a.
The dependent variable is debt to assets.  Low prof * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the 
observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm is among the group of firms with 
the 5% lowest profitability defined by the mean of the three years before the reform. Regression 2 compares the 
effect for independent and dependent firms. A negative sign of the three-way interaction low prof * reform * dep 
means that the difference between debt to assets before and after the reform is lower for companies with the 
lowest profitability than for firms with a higher profitability, especially if they are dependent and therefore 
potentially affected by the interest barrier. The list of control variables is the same as in the other tables, the 
respective results are not reported. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as 
the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and 
industry-year-fixed effects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the 
DAFNE-database. In the first panel I show results for all firms, in the second and third panel I distinguish 
between national and multinational firms. For multinationals, there is no distinction between independent and 
dependent firms, as here all multinationals are dependent per definition. F1 is the test-statistic for a test of joint 
significance of dependent * reform and low prof * reform * dep, F2 is the test-statistic for a test of joint 
significance of low prof * reform and low prof * reform * dep. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary 
level, are shown in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-
level. 
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other concerns than their interest deductibility. They are in need of financing to keep their 
business running. Due to a lack of internal funds and a decent attractiveness to equity 
investors, they necessarily increase their debt. This result is in line with the negative 
coefficient of the control variable profitability, meaning that more profitable companies have 
lower debt to assets ratios than low profitable firms. 
The results from column (2) of Table 5-8 reveal an interesting additional aspect. The general 
positive effect of low prof * reform persists, but the three-way interaction low prof * reform * 
dep shows negative and significant coefficients of -0.1299 and -0.1343 respectively. As it is 
also jointly significant with dependent * reform, I can conclude that, among the group of low 
profitable firms, the dependent firms relatively decreased their debt to assets ratios compared 
to the independent firms. Therefore, even though the interest barrier does not play the most 
important role for the low profitable firms overall, it still seems to be considered in the way 
supposed in hypothesis H5-5. This cannot be shown for multinational firms, however, 
because all multinationals are dependent firms. As can be seen from column (4) of Table 5-8, 
the positive general effect and the negative interest barrier effect prevail when focusing on the 
internal debt to assets ratio. The results in columns (5) and (6), indicating an increased 
external debt to assets ratio for national firms with the lowest profitability, oppose the general 
hypothesis H5-3 for these kinds of firms. Concerning external debt, hypothesis H5-5 is not 
confirmed by low profitability firms either. Testing hypothesis H5-5 based on the 10% instead 
of the 5% least profitable firms led to qualitatively very similar results. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
I have analyzed the impact of the new interest barrier on firms' financing structures. I 
distinguish between national firms and multinationals and between the effects on internal debt 
to assets and external debt to assets. The interest barrier has been introduced as of 2008 with 
the primary purpose of preventing multinationals from abusive tax avoidance by means of 
cross-border internal loans. 
In my general regressions, I find that the interest barrier made firms lower their debt to assets 
ratios and their net interest payments. Opposing its original intention, it seems to be, however, 
the national rather than the multinational firms which adjusted their capital structure and it is 
external rather than internal debt which is reduced. Therefore, at large I conclude that the 
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interest barrier does indeed affect financing decisions, but predominantly not in the intended 
way and not of the intended firms. 
In a robustness check, I find that highly leveraged firms reduce their internal debt to assets 
ratios. This reaction can, however, only be reliably identified for national firms. It is unclear 
if, at least, the most likely targeted multinationals were influenced by the new interest barrier 
in the way intended. 
A further robustness check reveals that, as expected, firms which are likely to be subject to 
the interest barrier because they have a very low profitability tackle the threat of non-
deductible interest by relatively reducing their debt to assets ratios. This interest barrier effect, 
however, is overcompensated by such firms' basic need for debt financing to keep their 
business running. Therefore, in total, low profitable firms relatively increased their leverage 
after the reform. 
All in all, my empirical evidence does not give a positive reference to the new interest barrier 
rule. The legislator might have focused too much on the, albeit, justified and comprehensible 
task to counteract excessive and abusive internal lending by a few multinationals. Based on 
the evidence found in this study, the end may hardly justify the means. Significantly 
influencing i.e. distorting the financing decisions of companies which were not even aimed at 
is considerable collateral damage. At the same time, from an empirical point of view, it 
remains unclear if the unbeloved multinational financing structures could be prevented 
effectively.  
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5.9 Appendix 
Table 5 ?9: Baseline regressions, all firms, at least once treated 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
once treated * reform  ?0.0074* 0.0008  ?0.0111** 
 (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
once stricter * reform    ?0.0077 0.0100    ?0.0195***
  (0.0058) (0.0064)  (0.0065)
tangibility 0.0323* 0.0370  ?0.0185 0.0190 0.0378 0.0086
 (0.0189) (0.0350) (0.0228) (0.0409) (0.0243) (0.0392)
profitability  ?0.1873***   ?0.1848***  ?0.0748***  ?0.1091***  ?0.1099***   ?0.0799***
 (0.0069) (0.0116) (0.0085) (0.0134) (0.0081) (0.0119)
loss carryforward 0.1595*** 0.1238*** 0.0281** 0.0558*** 0.1077*** 0.0623***
 (0.0090) (0.0150) (0.0112) (0.0177) (0.0111) (0.0162)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.3836***   ?0.2859***  ?0.0546*  ?0.1284**  ?0.2628***   ?0.1409***
 (0.0261) (0.0434) (0.0322) (0.0510) (0.0322) (0.0467)
str * tangibility  ?0.1471***   ?0.1061  ?0.1107**  ?0.1691*  ?0.0564 0.0688
 (0.0430) (0.0825) (0.0559) (0.0992) (0.0567) (0.0921)
ln employees 0.0192*** 0.0211***  ?0.0085***  ?0.0081* 0.0274*** 0.0285***
 (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0037)
observations 95211 29649 70987 27665 70987 27665
companies 28213 7878 22897 7661 22897 7661
R2 0.0969 0.0969 0.0184 0.0348 0.0517 0.0533
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Once treated * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if 
the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been treated by the 
new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference 
between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to companies not treated by 
the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction once stricter * reform to analyze if firms, for which 
the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced 
their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are 
described in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the 
dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-
year-fixed effects. Observations of German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-
database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level. 
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Table 5 ?10: Baseline regressions, nationals, at least once treated 
 all debt internal debt external debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
once treated * reform  ?0.0071   ?0.0021  ?0.0079 
 (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0062) 
once stricter * reform    ?0.0140** 0.0029    ?0.0184**
  (0.0070) (0.0079)  (0.0078)
tangibility 0.0330* 0.0475  ?0.0111 0.0379 0.0299   ?0.0032
 (0.0193) (0.0367) (0.0235) (0.0443) (0.0254) (0.0427)
profitability  ?0.1877***   ?0.1755***  ?0.0708***  ?0.1055***  ?0.1120***   ?0.0737***
 (0.0072) (0.0123) (0.0091) (0.0147) (0.0087) (0.0131)
loss carryforward 0.1534*** 0.1272*** 0.0246** 0.0599*** 0.1048*** 0.0607***
 (0.0094) (0.0164) (0.0121) (0.0204) (0.0121) (0.0183)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.3659***   ?0.2932***  ?0.0512  ?0.1498**  ?0.2477***   ?0.1244**
 (0.0271) (0.0476) (0.0348) (0.0588) (0.0348) (0.0527)
str * tangibility  ?0.1763***   ?0.1711**  ?0.1351**  ?0.2246**  ?0.0647 0.0657
 (0.0437) (0.0866) (0.0578) (0.1077) (0.0586) (0.0994)
ln employees 0.0167*** 0.0167***  ?0.0098***  ?0.0102** 0.0254*** 0.0266***
 (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0030) (0.0041)
observations 85889 23905 62381 22098 62381 22098
companies 25851 6483 20622 6276 20622 6276
R
2 0.1042 0.1089 0.0206 0.0427 0.0540 0.0575
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Once treated * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if 
the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been treated by the 
new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference 
between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to companies not treated by 
the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction once stricter * reform to analyze if firms, for which 
the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced 
their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are 
described in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the 
dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-
year-fixed effects. Observations of German corporations not being a member of a multinational group between 
2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are 
shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level. 
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Table 5 ?11: Baseline regressions, multinationals, at least once treated 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
once treated * reform  ?0.0213** 0.0027  ?0.0249*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0093) 
once stricter * reform    ?0.0062 0.0161    ?0.0242**
  (0.0102) (0.0107)  (0.0113)
tangibility 0.1182 0.0251  ?0.0199  ?0.0757 0.1022 0.0982
 (0.0852) (0.1169) (0.0945) (0.1219) (0.0846) (0.1079)
profitability  ?0.1799***   ?0.2210***  ?0.0965***  ?0.1236***  ?0.0966***   ?0.1033***
 (0.0229) (0.0311) (0.0230) (0.0313) (0.0213) (0.0275)
loss carryforward 0.1789*** 0.1016*** 0.0362 0.0220 0.1174*** 0.0775**
 (0.0310) (0.0363) (0.0294) (0.0347) (0.0293) (0.0355)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.4443***   ?0.2366**  ?0.0407  ?0.0015  ?0.3312***   ?0.2266**
 (0.0901) (0.1048) (0.0853) (0.1006) (0.0857) (0.1035)
str * tangibility  ?0.0608 0.1422  ?0.1221 0.0160 0.0791 0.1029
 (0.2173) (0.2853) (0.2387) (0.3024) (0.2170) (0.2659)
ln employees 0.0324*** 0.0356***  ?0.0045  ?0.0018 0.0368*** 0.0346***
 (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0083)
observations 9322 5744 8606 5567 8606 5567
companies 2362 1395 2275 1385 2275 1385
R
2 0.1110 0.1382 0.0597 0.0800 0.0901 0.1035
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Once treated * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if 
the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been treated by the 
new rule at least in one year before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference 
between the leverage before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to companies not treated by 
the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction once stricter * reform to analyze if firms, for which 
the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule at least in one year before the reform, reduced 
their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extent than other firms. Other variables are 
described in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 2 using internal debt to assets as the 
dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. Regressions include company and industry-
year-fixed effects. Observations of German corporations being a member of a multinational group between 2005 
and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
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Table 5 ?12: Regressions for single interest barrier steps, all firms, all debt 
 treatment all years before reform treatment at least one year before the reform
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dependent * reform 0.0097
 (0.0070)
net int > 0 * reform  ?0.0176***
 (0.0017)
high net int * reform 0.0002
 (0.0032)
high EBITDA * reform   ?0.0028
 (0.0027)
net int once > 0 * reform  ?0.0215***
 (0.0019)
once high net int * reform 0.0021
 (0.0027)
once high EBITDA * reform  ?0.0046**
 (0.0020)
tangibility 0.0367* 0.0837*** 0.0315* 0.0320* 0.0828*** 0.0306 0.0321*
 (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0188)
profitability  ?0.1886***  ?0.1867***  ?0.1875***  ?0.1872***  ?0.1871***  ?0.1875***  ?0.1865***
 (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
loss carryforward 0.1559*** 0.1648*** 0.1570*** 0.1593*** 0.1665*** 0.1565*** 0.1648***
 (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0092)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.3745***  ?0.3990***  ?0.3764***  ?0.3830***  ?0.4044***  ?0.3749***  ?0.3995***
 (0.0268) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0263) (0.0257) (0.0259) (0.0268)
str * tangibility  ?0.1439***  ?0.3028***  ?0.1446***  ?0.1462***  ?0.2990***  ?0.1415***  ?0.1462***
 (0.0445) (0.0454) (0.0432) (0.0430) (0.0451) (0.0432) (0.0430)
ln employees 0.0194*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 0.0191*** 0.0193*** 0.0192*** 0.0191***
 (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
observations 90854 95334 95334 95329 95334 95334 95334
companies 27487 28236 28236 28234 28236 28236 28236
R
2 0.1004 0.0995 0.0968 0.0968 0.1002 0.0968 0.0969
The dependent variable is debt to assets. Dependent * reform is an interaction of dummies which equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the 
interest barrier and the firm is a member of a group or has at least one 25% shareholder. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the difference between leverage 
before and after the reform is lower for dependent firms compared to companies not captured by the new interest barrier. Regression 2 compares companies with 
positive net interest payments to other firms. In regression 3 I use the interaction high net int * reform to analyze if firms with net interest payments exceeding EUR 1 
million reduced their debt to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower extend than other firms. Regression 4 compares companies with net interest 
payments exceeding 30% of EBITDA. While regressions 2 to 4 define the treatment dummies by requiring the condition in all three years before the reform, 
regressions 5 to 7 use a treatment dummy defined by fullfilling the condition at least in one year before the reform, respectively. Other variables are described in 
Table 5-1. Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations for German corporations between 2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-
database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level.
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Table 5 ?13: Baseline regressions on net interest payments per assets as, all firms 
 all debt internal debt external debt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated * reform  ?0.0068*** 0.0014**  ?0.0084*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0016) 
stricter * reform    ?0.0049*** 0.0012    ?0.0072***
  (0.0011) (0.0008)  (0.0017)
tangibility 0.0148*** 0.0150*** 0.0062 0.0103 0.0069 0.0037
 (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0085) (0.0077) (0.0101)
profitability  ?0.0007   ?0.0045***  ?0.0012  ?0.0019  ?0.0003   ?0.0004
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0035)
loss carryforward 0.0031** 0.0004 0.0019 0.0012  ?0.0026   ?0.0014
 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0037)
str * loss carryfwd  ?0.0026 0.0060  ?0.0042  ?0.0027 0.0117 0.0098
 (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0103)
str * tangibility 0.0148*** 0.0102  ?0.0275*  ?0.0316 0.0526*** 0.0534**
 (0.0051) (0.0079) (0.0141) (0.0199) (0.0181) (0.0240)
ln employees 0.0006** 0.0003  ?0.0007**  ?0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0009
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
observations 88333 29631 29225 17829 29225 17829
companies 25746 7877 10077 5653 10077 5653
R
2 0.0594 0.0497 0.0385 0.0315 0.0777 0.0525
The dependent variable is net interest payments to assets.  Treated * reform is an interaction  of dummies which 
equals 1 if the observation is made after the introduction of the interest barrier and the firm would have been 
treated by the new rule in all three years before the introduction. A negative sign of the coefficient means that the 
difference between the net interest payments before and after the reform is lower for treated firms compared to 
companies not affected by the new interest barrier. In regression 2 I use the interaction stricter * reform to 
analyze if firms, for which the new interest barrier would have been stricter than the old rule in all three years 
before the reform, reduced their net interest payments to assets ratios more strongly or increased it to a lower 
extend than other firms.  Other variables are described in Table 5-1. Regressions 3 and 4 repeat regressions 1 and 
2 using internal debt to assets as the dependent variable, regressions 5 and 6 use external debt to assets. 
Regressions include company and industry-year-fixed effects. Observations for German corporations between 
2005 and 2010 stem from the DAFNE-database. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subsidiary level, are 
shown in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level.
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5.11 Survey 3: Empirical evidence on the tax impact on financing decisions 
Survey 54 Data Methodology Results 
Aggarwal, 
Kyaw (2008) 
Data from US 
multinational 
company affiliates 
in 62 countries 
taken from the 
1989, 1994, and 
1999 Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
benchmark surveys. 
The paper traces the impact 
of tax characteristics and 
other drivers on the overall 
leverage of an affiliate and 
on the kind of debt used. 
Thus, the dependent 
variables are capital structure 
variables such as the total 
debt ratio, the external debt 
ratio, the net parent debt 
ratio, and the different 
interest rates. Important 
independent variables: excess 
tax, host tax, private credit, 
political risk, and corruption 
index. The paper also 
provides correlation 
coefficients between these 
variables. 
Multinationals' affiliates, 
located in countries with low 
credit availability, poor creditor 
protection, high political risk, 
and high inflation are found to 
bear high interest costs and 
multinational affiliate debt 
ratios are high in high tax 
countries. All in all, the findings 
suggest that affiliates substitute 
external debt with parent debt 
using internal capital markets to 
overcome weak external 
financial markets and 
institutional environments. 
Altshuler, 
Grubert 
(2003) 
Cross-sectional 
firm-level 
observations of 
foreign subsidiaries 
belonging to groups 
headquartered in 
the US. Tax return 
data provided by 
the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
The international variation of 
local corporate income tax 
rates is used for 
identification. 
A 10 percentage point increase 
in the local tax rate makes the 
debt ratio increase by 3.93 
percentage points. The same tax 
rate increase by 10 percentage 
points causes the share of 
internal debt owed to the mother 
company to increase by 0.65 
percentage points. 
Alworth, 
Arachi 
(2001) 
The Italian Centrale 
dei Bilanci 
database provides a 
panel of 1,054 
Italian companies 
covering the years 
1982 till 1994. The 
sample consists of 
operative 
manufacturing 
companies with 
sales exceeding 
Italian lira 10 
billion. 
Graham-Shevlin 
methodology for the 
calculation of company-
specific marginal tax rates, 
considering the asymmetric 
taxation of profits and losses. 
Incremental financing 
decisions are analyzed in 
order to test whether taxes 
encourage the use of debt. 
The paper also traces to what 
extent personal taxes affect 
corporate financing 
decisions. The marginal tax 
rates’ endogeneity is 
regarded one by one by using 
a lagged value of the 
simulated marginal tax rate 
and by the application of a 
before-financing marginal 
tax rate. 
The cross-sectional analysis 
provides strong evidence for the 
impact of both corporate and 
personal taxes on companies' 
financing decisions. The time-
series analysis weakly confirms 
these results. At the mean, a 100 
basis point increase in the 
marginal corporate tax rate 
increases the ratio of growth of 
debt to total assets by about 
eight basis points. The also 
significant impact of personal 
taxes amounts to three basis 
points. 
                                                            
54 Some of the methodologies’ and results’ summaries quote the respective papers literally. 
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An (2012) Chinese Industrial 
Enterprises 
Database from 
2002 to 2008 
providing firm-
level information of 
companies with 
annual sales 
revenue above 
RMB 5 million. As 
of 2008, the 
database included 
412,212 industrial 
enterprises, which 
accounts for about 
95% of the total 
industrial output 
value of China. 
Difference-in-differences 
approach in order to 
determine whether foreign 
investment enterprises 
responded to the major 
Chinese tax law change in 
2008 by raising debt ratios. 
The tax law change 
terminated the dual corporate 
income tax regime by 
removing the preferential tax 
treatments offered to foreign 
investment enterprises and 
unified the profit tax rate for 
all companies. 
Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, foreign investment 
enterprises have responded to 
the detrimental tax law change 
by raising their debt ratios. 
Especially the Hong Kong–
Macau–Taiwan investment 
enterprises showed to be very 
sensitive to the removal of the 
preferential tax treatments. 
Furthermore, the reactions were 
stronger when including 
privately-owned enterprises into 
the control group as compared 
to only focusing on state-owned 
enterprises, given that the latter 
might benefit from 
governmental support. 
Antoniou, 
Guney, 
Paudya 
(2008) 
Pooled and 
individual data of 
4,854 firms with 
57,134 firm-year 
observations in the 
years 1987 till 
2000; companies in 
capital market-
oriented economies 
(the U.K. and the 
U.S.) and bank-
oriented economies 
(France, Germany, 
and Japan). Most 
firm-level data is 
taken from 
DataStream. M&A 
activity in each 
country stems from 
SDC platinum 
(Thomson 
Financial). 
Two-step system-
Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) procedure. 
Dependent variable: market 
leverage. Differentiation by 
firm size, growth 
opportunities, industry and 
sample year. General focus 
on financial markets with 
taxes as one of many 
influencing factors. 
Independent tax variables: 
effective tax rate, non-debt 
tax-shield. 
The leverage ratio is positively 
affected by the tangibility of 
assets and the firm size, but 
declines with an increase in firm 
profitability, growth 
opportunities, and share price 
performance. The leverage ratio 
is also affected by the market 
conditions in which the firm 
operates, the economic 
environment and its institutions, 
corporate governance practices, 
tax systems, the borrower-
lender relation, exposure to 
capital markets, and the level of 
investor protection. 
Ayers, 
Cloyd, 
Robinson 
(2001) 
Firm observations 
of US small- and 
medium-sized 
companies. The 
cross-section 
focuses on the year 
1993. 
The identification is based on 
the differing tax treatment of 
different legal forms and 
differing firm-specific 
marginal tax rates before 
interest deduction. 
Irrespective of the firm's legal 
form, the interest expense for 
bank loans increases due to an 
increased tax rate; the interest 
expense for shareholder loans is 
influenced by a rising tax rate 
only regarding corporations, but 
not regarding partnerships. 
Barclay, 
Heitzman, 
Smith Jr. 
(2012) 
Firm data from the 
real estate industry 
in the years 1987 
till 2010 based on 
CRSP/Ziman Real 
Estate Data Series. 
1,025 (2,891) firm-
year observations 
Comparison between the 
leverage decisions across 
taxable and non-taxable real 
estate firms. Thus, the tax 
benefit of debt can be 
identified with little error. 
Dependent variables are 
several debt measures 
Confirming the tax hypothesis, 
based on firms with similar 
asset portfolios, taxable firms 
have more debt than their non-
taxable counterparts. Leverage 
ratios of taxable real estate 
firms relative to the control 
group are about 5% higher. 
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for taxable and 
2,891 observations 
of non-taxable real 
estate firms. 
relative to the market value 
of assets, independent 
variables are the taxable 
dummy, industry 
characteristics and 
(inter)nationalization. 
Barion, 
Miniaci, 
Panteghini, 
Parisi (2010) 
European firm-
level data of 
limited companies 
and limited liability 
companies taken 
from the 
AMADEUS dataset 
by Bureau van 
Dijk. The 
unbalanced panel 
covers 12,301 
subsidiaries 
observed in a time 
window of 14 
years. 
Ordinary least squares and 
fixed-effect estimations with 
two different samples 
(overall vs. only linked 
subsidiaries). Dependent 
variable: leverage ratio of the 
respective subsidiary. 
Independent variables: 
Ultimate owner tax rate, 
subsidiary tax rate, 
company's liability, losses in 
previous periods, and return 
on assets in previous periods. 
Subsidiaries’ leverage increases 
with the statutory tax rate, 
levied in the country where it 
operates. The higher the parent 
company tax rate, the lower this 
positive effect. Furthermore, an 
increase in the parent 
company’s tax rate is estimated 
to raise its subsidiaries’ 
leverage. 
Bartholdy, 
Mateus 
(2008) 
Samples of up to 
155,401 
observations of 
19,752 unlisted 
small and medium 
enterprises in 38 
European countries 
for the period 1994 
till 2004 stemming 
from the 
AMADEUS dataset 
by Bureau van 
Dijk. 
Examination of to what 
extent characteristics and 
institutional factors affect 
corporate debt policy in 
small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 
Dependent variable: debt 
level of the firm. 
Instrumental variable 
estimation with the second 
lag of the dependent variable 
in order to regard its 
endogeneity. Major 
independent variables: tax 
dummy, effective tax rate, 
tangibility, firm age, macro 
controls. 
The results demonstrate that the 
traditional financing theories, 
developed to apply to large 
listed firms, appear to hold for 
SMEs in an international 
setting. As expected, the impact 
in debt levels of firm’s negative 
earnings is negative. If a firm 
has negative earnings this 
results in a 3.72 percent 
decrease in the firm’s average 
debt level. Firm size is 
positively related to debt levels 
and statistically significant at 
the one percent level. A ten 
percent increase in depreciation 
per total assets brings a 5.50 
percent decrease in a firm’s debt 
level. 
Bernasconi, 
Marenzi, 
Pagani 
(2005) 
Firm observations 
of Italian firms 
covering the years 
1993 till 2000. 
Small panels based 
on each tax reform 
are applied. 
Italian tax reforms are used 
as natural experiments. Being 
affected by a reform depends 
on company characteristics 
such as tax credits or low tax 
rates on interest from equity. 
If tax credits are available, less 
debt is applied. The same 
applies if the relative advantage 
of debt as compared to equity is 
reduced. 
Blaufus, 
Lorenz 
(2009) 
77,464 German 
corporations from 
the Dafne database 
by Bureau van 
Dijk, covering the 
years 2004 till 
2007. 
Identification of how many 
and what kinds of firms are 
potentially affected by the 
German interest barrier, 
which has been introduced as 
of 2009. Insightful and ample 
descriptive section followed 
by regressions. Dependent 
variable: potentially affected 
561 to 1,511 of the analyzed 
77,464 companies might be 
affected by the new interest 
barrier. This corresponds to 
0.7% to 1.9% of all firms. The 
probability of being affected by 
the interest barrier increases 
with the following aspects: 
being a holding, being 
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by the interest barrier or not. 
Independent variables: 
characteristics relevant for 
the interest barrier, such as 
rentability, balance sheet 
total and financial leverage. 
unprofitable, having a higher 
systematic debt risk, having a 
higher tax advantage of debt, 
firm size, collateral, having a 
smaller operative risk and a 
smaller internal financing. 
Blouin, 
Core, Guay 
(2010) 
157,513 firm-year 
observations of 
North American 
companies 
stemming from the 
Compustat 
database, covering 
the years 1980 till 
2007. 
An ample and insightful 
section of descriptive graphs 
and statistics is followed by 
ordinary least squares 
regressions which apply 
effective marginal tax rates 
following Graham (2000). 
Dependent variable: positive 
net benefits from doubling 
debt. Independent variables: 
book leverage, debt/value, 
return on assets, firm age, 
volatilities, non-debt tax 
shields. 
The paper opposes the claim 
that many corporations are 
underleveraged in that they fail 
to take full advantage of debt 
tax shields. It shows that 
additional debt would provide 
firms with much smaller tax 
benefits than previously 
thought. When expected, 
distress costs and difficult-to-
measure non-debt tax shields 
are also considered, it appears 
plausible that most firms have 
tax-efficient capital structures. 
Buettner, 
Overesch, 
Schreiber, 
Wamser 
(2009) 
German Federal 
Bank's 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) providing 
40,300 
observations of 
4,115 firms in the 
years 1996 till 
2003. 
Analysis of the tax influence 
on the capital structure of 
foreign affiliates. Dependent 
variables, applied one by 
one: share of external debt 
and share of internal debt. 
Independent variables: 
statutory tax rate, lending 
rate, loss carryforward, 
turnover, industry fixed-
effects. 
While taxes are found to 
encourage debt financing in 
general, adverse local credit 
market conditions result in 
lower external borrowing but 
higher internal debt indicating 
that the two channels of debt 
financing are substitutes. 
Buettner, 
Overesch, 
Schreiber, 
Wamser 
(2012) 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) outbound 
side providing 
42,950 firm 
observations from 
36 countries in the 
years 1996 till 
2004. 
Innovative measure in form 
of a specific safe haven debt-
to-equity variable to make 
the thin capitalizations of 
several countries 
comparable. Dependent 
variables, applied one by 
one: parent debt ratio, 
internal debt ratio, external 
debt ratio. Independent 
variables: existence of thin 
cap rule, tightness of the thin 
cap rule, tax rate, interaction 
terms of the aforementioned 
variables, loss carryforward, 
and tangibility. 
Thin-capitalization rules 
effectively reduce the incentive 
to use internal loans for tax 
planning but result in higher 
external debt. If a host country 
with a tax rate equal to the 
sample average of 34% 
implements a tight thin-
capitalization rule, denying 
interest deductions for debt 
exceeding a debt-to-equity ratio 
of 2:1, the ratio of internal debt 
declines by almost 12% or 24%, 
depending on how the thin-
capitalization rule is denied. 
Buettner, 
Wamser 
(2009) 
Outbound side of 
the German Federal 
Bank's 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) providing 
128,892 firm 
observations from 
174 countries in the 
The identification is based on 
bilateral tax rate differences. 
Dependent variable: internal-
debt ratio related to loans 
from other non-German 
affiliates. Major independent 
variables: tax rate 
differential, statutory tax 
rate, loss carryforward, sales, 
The empirical results confirm a 
robust impact of tax rate 
differences within the 
multinational group on the use 
of internal debt, supporting the 
view that internal debt is used to 
shift profits to low-tax 
countries. Based on the small 
size of the tax effect, however, 
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years 1996 till 
2005. 
and tangibility. other strategies to shift income 
to low-tax countries seem to be 
relatively more important. 
Byoun 
(2008) 
The samples used 
in the paper consist 
of up to 100,339 
firm-year 
observations with 
data stemming 
from Compustat 
and covering the 
years 1972 till 
2003. 
Broad descriptive section 
followed by regressions 
using ordinary least squares 
estimations, an IV approach 
and a mixed-effects model. 
The dependent variable is the 
total (long-term) debt divided 
by book (market) value of 
assets. Independent 
variables: industry median 
debt ratio based on the two-
digit SIC, marginal tax rate, 
operating income divided by 
total assets, market-to-book 
ratio of assets, and log of 
book value of total assets. 
The main question traced in the 
paper is how and when firms 
align their capital structures 
towards the targets when 
acquiring other firms. Most 
adjustments seem to occur when 
firms have above-target (below-
target) debt with a financial 
surplus (deficit). The tax effect 
is tested as well. It turns out that 
the marginal tax rate has a 
negative effect on leverage. 
De Jong, 
Kabir, 
Nguyen 
(2008) 
The Compustat 
Global database 
provides 
observations of 
nearly 12,000 firms 
from 42 countries 
around the world 
covering the years 
1997 till 2001. 
Cross-country summary 
statistics show the general 
trends. The estimations 
section presents the results of 
firm-level ordinary least 
squares regressions with 
leverage as the dependent 
variable and country’s firm-
specific factors as 
explanatory variables for 
each of the 42 countries. 
Some of the most important 
independent variables are 
tangibility, firm risk, firm 
size, and the average tax rate. 
First, firm-specific determinants 
of leverage differ across 
countries, while prior studies 
implicitly assume equal impact 
of these determinants. Second, 
there is still an indirect impact 
because country-specific factors 
also influence the roles of firm-
specific determinants of 
leverage. 
Desai, Foley, 
Hines (2004) 
Confidential firm-
level data of about 
30,000 affiliates 
belonging to 3,700 
U.S. multinational 
companies. The 
data stems from the 
International 
Investment 
Division, Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis, U.S. 
Department of 
Commerce and it 
covers the three 
year waves 1982, 
1989 and 1994. 
Analysis of the capital 
structures of foreign affiliates 
and internal capital markets 
of multinational 
corporations. Dependent 
variables, applied one by 
one: interest rate on non-
trade account borrowing; 
ratio of affiliate current 
liabilities and long-term debt 
to total affiliate assets; ratio 
of affiliate current liabilities 
and long-term debt less trade 
accounts and trade notes 
payable to total affiliate 
assets. Central independent 
variables: country tax rate, 
creditor rights, 
EBITDA/assets, sales, 
Ten percent higher local tax 
rates are associated with 2.8% 
higher debt/asset ratios, with 
internal borrowing being 
particularly sensitive to taxes. 
Multinational affiliates are 
financed with less external debt 
in countries with poor capital 
markets or weak creditor rights. 
Instrumental variable analysis 
indicates that greater borrowing 
from parent companies 
substitutes for three-quarters of 
reduced external borrowing 
induced by capital market 
conditions. Multinationals seem 
to employ internal capital 
markets opportunistically to 
overcome imperfections in 
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political risk. external capital markets. 
Desai, Foley, 
Hines (2008) 
Panel firm-level 
data on US 
multinational 
companies, 
provided by the 
International 
Investment 
Division, Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis, US 
Department of 
Commerce. The 
years 1982 through 
1999 are covered. 
Analysis of multinationals' 
exposure to political risk and 
their resulting incentives to 
adjust the capital structure. 
Dependent variable: the 
standard deviation of a 
foreign affiliate’s annual 
return on assets for periods 
between benchmark surveys. 
Central independent 
variables: political risk, 
leverage, and basic country 
characteristics. 
Returns on investment in 
politically risky countries are 
more volatile than returns 
elsewhere. Multinational firms 
reduce their leverage in 
response to these political risks: 
a one standard deviation 
increase in foreign political risk 
is associated with a by 3.5% 
reduced leverage. The effect is 
most pronounced for firms 
which are very exposed to 
political risk. 
Dischinger, 
Glogowski, 
Strobel 
(2010) 
AMADEUS 
database by Bureau 
van Dijk with 
248,859 
observations of 
44,875 affiliates 
from 30 European 
countries in the 
years 1998 till 
2006. 
Endogeneity concerns on 
firm-specific risk proxies 
with a sector analysis 
comparing high-risk with 
low-risk industries based on 
exogenous information. 
Dependent variable: 
debt/assets; central 
independent variables: tax 
rate, tax differential, affiliate 
and country controls. 
First, the debt-to-assets ratio is 
positively affected by the 
statutory corporate tax rate. 
Second, multinational 
subsidiaries use debt shifting 
with the parent and external 
debt to benefit from 
depreciation tax shields. Third, 
subsidiaries with a high firm-
specific risk are more involved 
in debt shifting than low-risk 
subsidiaries. Vice-versa, low-
risk affiliates use external debt 
more intensively. 
Dwenger, 
Steiner 
(2009) 
Pseudo-panel 
constructed from 
the corporate 
income tax return 
statistics and 
provided by the 
German Federal 
Statistical Office 
for the period 
1998-2001. 
Descriptives are 
based on 701,971 
(for 1998) and 
809,641 (for 2001) 
observations, the 
pooled regressions 
build either on 
1,029 or on 515 
observations. 
Estimation of the impact of 
effective profit taxation on 
the financial leverage of 
corporations. Dependent 
variable: financial leverage, 
measured by the ratio of 
long-term debt to total 
capital. IV approach, to 
regard endogeneity of the 
effective corporate tax rate as 
the most important 
independent variable. The 
micro-simulated 
counterfactual tax rate a 
corporation would face in a 
particular period had there 
been no endogenous change 
of its financial structure 
serves as the instrument. 
Positive effect of the tax rate on 
corporate leverage: on average, 
an increase of the tax rate by 10 
percent would increase the 
financial leverage by about 5 
percent. The debt ratio is less 
responsive for small 
corporations and for 
corporations that benefit from 
various other forms of tax 
shields, in particular 
depreciation allowances and tax 
loss carry-forward. 
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Egger, 
Eggert 
(2010) 
Data from 32,067 
European firms 
derived from 
Bureau van Dijk's 
AMADEUS 
database and 
covering the years 
1996 and 2004. 
Comparison of domestically 
and foreign-owned plants 
with respect to their debt-to-
assets ratio. Analysis of to 
which extent the difference is 
systematically affected by 
corporate taxation. 
Foreign-owned firms on 
average exhibit a significantly 
higher debt ratio than their 
domestically-owned 
counterparts in the host country. 
The average difference in the 
debt-to-assets ratio between 
foreign-and domestically-owned 
firms amounts to about 1.7 
percentage points. An increase 
in the statutory corporate tax 
rate by 1 percentage point leads 
to an increase in the debt ratio 
of about 0.7 percentage points. 
Feld, 
Heckemeyer, 
Overesch 
(2011) 
Evidence from 46 
previous studies on 
taxes and capital 
structure choice. 
The evaluated and 
analyzed primary 
studies stem from 
the years 1994 till 
2010 and are based 
on 20 different 
databases. 
Meta study, i.e. a quantitative 
synthesis of previous primary 
research on the topic. The 
basic sample builds on 1,012 
semi-elasticities. Ordinary 
least squares and weighted 
least squares estimation 
approaches are applied in a 
parallel manner. 
The meta study concludes that 
measures like the simulated 
marginal tax rate following 
Graham avoid a downward bias 
in estimates for the debt 
response to tax. Moreover, debt 
characteristics, econometric 
specifications, and the set of 
control variables affect tax 
effects. Accounting for 
misspecification biases by 
means of meta-regressions, the 
predicted marginal tax effect on 
the debt ratio is 0.3. 
Gentry 
(1994) 
Firm-level data of 
US corporations, 
covering the years 
1987 till 1988. 
Taxation of the interest on 
equity differs, depending on 
the respective firm's legal 
form, especially when also 
regarding the shareholder 
level. 
Corporations, whose interest on 
equity is taxed both on the firm 
level and on the shareholder 
level, show a higher leverage 
than partnerships. This results 
from partnerships being 
transparent from a tax point of 
view and thus being taxed lower 
on the interest on equity. 
Gordon, Lee 
(2007) 
Corporate and 
personal tax return 
data from the U.S. 
Statistics of Income 
(SOI) as well as an 
individual model 
file. The latter is a 
stratified sample of 
individual tax 
returns in the 
United States, 
made available for 
research purposes 
by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
The Consolidated 
sample covers 42 
years from 1954 
through 2000, 
Analysis of the combined 
effect of nominal interest 
rates and taxes on the use and 
maturity structure of 
corporate debt. Year 
dummies are deliberately 
excluded in order to identify 
more clearly the role of 
interest rates. OLS 
estimations. Dependent 
variable: the average debt per 
firm of a given maturity over 
average capital per firm 
among all firms in a given 
size category. Key 
independent variables: 
interaction terms covering 
tax rates, interest rates and 
quartile dummies. 
Behavioral responses regarding 
the leverage are larger when 
interest rates are higher. This 
can be explained by the 
proportionality of the tax gain 
from use of corporate debt to 
nominal interest rates. For 
similar reasons, firms shift 
towards more long–term debt as 
long–term rates rise relative to 
short–term rates. 
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excluding 1962 and 
1966–1969. With 
12 asset categories 
on average per 
year, the paper ends 
up with 489 usable 
observations. 
Graham 
(1996) 
US firm 
observations 
stemming from the 
Compustat 
database and 
covering the years 
1980 till 1992. 
Elaboration on the 
differences in company-
specific tax burdens 
influenced by tax credits, 
losses and a progressive tax 
scale; the changes in capital 
income taxation over time 
are also analyzed. 
If the company-specific 
marginal tax rate increases by 
ten percentage points, the 
leverage increases by 0.69 
percentage points. 
Graham 
(1999) 
Compustat sample 
with 65,429 US 
firm observations 
over the years 1980 
till 1994. The mean 
(median) debt-to-
value ratio in this 
sample is 21.3% 
(17.7%) over the 
sample period. 
Investigation of the degree to 
which personal taxes affect 
corporate financing decisions 
and therefore counterweigh 
the impact of the corporate 
income tax. Cross-sectional 
regressions which control for 
personal taxes. 
Debt usage is positively 
correlated with tax rates in each 
year 1980–1994, with 
significant coefficients in 
almost every year. A 
specification that adjusts tax 
benefits for the personal tax 
penalty statistically dominates a 
specification that does not. The 
positive (negative) effect of 
corporate (personal) taxes on 
debt usage is distinctly 
identified. 
Graham 
(2003) 
Overall analysis of 
the general findings 
in 51 papers which 
mainly stem from 
the four decades 
between about 
1960 and 2010. 
A review of tax research 
related to domestic and 
multinational capital 
structure, payout policy, 
compensation policy, risk 
management, and 
organizational form. The 
related empirical evidence is 
summarized and discussed, 
but there is no quantitative 
meta-analysis applying 
regressions. 
There is a general support of the 
hypothesis that high tax rate 
firms pursue policies that 
provide tax benefits. Despite a 
careful review of the literature 
(up to 2003), many issues are 
considered unresolved. 
Examples include 
understanding whether tax 
effects are of first-order 
importance, why firms do not 
pursue tax benefits more 
aggressively, and whether 
corporate actions are affected 
by investor-level taxes. 
Graham, 
Lemmon, 
Schallheim 
(1998) 
The Compustat 
database provides 
US firm 
observations 
covering the years 
1981 till 1992. 
Elaboration on the 
differences in company-
specific tax burdens 
influenced by tax credits, 
losses, and a progressive tax 
scale; different utilization of 
leasing options. 
If the company-specific 
marginal tax rate increases by 
ten percentage points, the 
leverage ratio increases by 0.74 
percentage points. The relative 
share of operating leases 
decreases as a consequence of 
an increasing company-specific 
tax rate. 
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Green, 
Murinde 
(2008) 
Balanced panel 
consisting of the 
published accounts 
of 97 unquoted 
Indian companies, 
which reported 
continuously 
during 1989 till 
1999. 
Empirical analysis of the 
impact of tax policy on the 
financial decisions of a 
sample of unquoted 
companies in India during 
the period 1989 till 1999. 
The model is estimated using 
Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM). 
A conventional model seems to 
work well in explaining the 
leverage ratios of unquoted non-
financial Indian companies. 
Effective tax rates and non-debt 
tax shields have a significant 
and plausible impact on 
financing decisions. The 1990’s 
Indian tax reforms seem to have 
had a substantial impact in 
reducing outstanding unquoted 
company debt. 
Huang, 
Ritter (2009) 
Firm-level data 
derived from the 
Center for Research 
in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and 
Compustat. The 
years 1963 till 2011 
are covered, with 
129 US firm 
observations in 
1963 and 4,160 US 
firm observations 
in 2001. The 
estimations are 
based on between 
44,630 and up to 
111,413 
observations. 
Broad descriptive graphs and 
statistics showing the 
aggregated trends across the 
four decades. They are 
followed by thorough 
regressions. Besides general 
OLS estimations with and 
without firm-fixed effects, 
there is a nested logit model 
approach for joint decisions. 
The paper generally traces 
capital structure choices and 
especially estimates the speed 
of adjustment. Taxes are just 
one of many influencing factors. 
Clearly, the statutory corporate 
tax rate and is negatively 
correlated with the real interest 
rate. Inconsistent with the static 
trade-off theory that views the 
tax rate as a major factor in the 
decision to issue debt, the tax 
rate has only a secondary effect 
on the propensity to issue debt 
or equity. 
Huizinga, 
Laeven, 
Nicodème 
(2008) 
AMADEUS 
ownership database 
provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk, applied 
to match European 
firms with their 
domestic 
subsidiaries and 
subsidiaries located 
in other European 
countries. The 
sample consists of 
13,307 affiliates 
belonging to 5,791 
parent companies 
and traced from 
1994 till 2003. This 
results in 38,736 
parent-year 
observations and 
90,599 subsidiary-
year observations.  
Rich section of descriptive 
tax input data presentation, 
showing for 32 European 
countries the profit tax rates, 
the bilateral withholding tax 
rates on interest and on 
dividends, and the respective 
bilateral credit methods. OLS 
regressions with parent-, 
industry-, and year-fixed 
effects. Dependent variable: 
subsidiary's simple and 
adjusted financial leverage; 
central independent 
variables: effective marginal 
tax rate, tax incentive for 
debt shifting, tangibility, and 
country controls.  
A foreign subsidiary’s capital 
structure reflects local corporate 
tax rates as well as tax rate 
differences relative to the parent 
firm and other foreign 
subsidiaries. The overall 
economic effect of taxes on 
leverage, however, appears to 
be small. An increase of the 
effective tax rate by 0.06 in the 
subsidiary country has a 
positive ‘international’ effect on 
leverage in the subsidiary 
country of 0.7%. Ignoring the 
international debt shifting 
arising from differences in 
national tax rates would 
understate the impact of 
national taxes on debt policies 
by about 25%. 
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Kesternich, 
Schnitzer 
(2010) 
Outbound side of 
the Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. The 
limited sample 
applied for the 
estimations is based 
on 186,952 
subsidiary 
observations from 
the years 1996 till 
2006. 
Analysis of how 
multinational firms choose 
the capital structure of their 
foreign affiliates in response 
to political risk. Variables of 
choice are the leverage and 
the ownership structure of 
the foreign affiliate. Political 
risk is assumed to consist of 
expropriation, unreliable 
intellectual property rights 
and confiscatory taxation. 
OLS regressions including 
parent-, year- and industry-
fixed effects. Dependent 
variables applied one by one: 
leverage, ownership. Central 
independent variables: 
political risk, statutory tax 
rate, and country controls. 
As political risk increases, the 
ownership share tends to 
decrease, whereas leverage can 
both increase or decrease, 
depending on the type of 
political risk. Any form of 
political risk negatively affects 
the profitability of an MNE as a 
whole. The effects are, 
however, less straightforward 
for debt holders because they 
adjust their interest rates if 
expecting the debt service to 
become less likely. 
Klapper, 
Tzioumis 
(2012) 
All private, 
unconsolidated, 
non-financial, non-
state-owned 
Croatian firms that 
are available in 
Bureau van Dijk's 
AMADEUS 
dataset. The 
unbalanced panel 
consists of 58,752 
observations from 
14,431 firms during 
the years 1998 till 
2003. 
Analysis of tax effects on 
financing policy using the 
corporate tax reform in 2001 
in Croatia as a quasi-natural 
experiment. OLS regressions, 
system GMM estimators and 
differences-in-differences 
estimations. Dependent 
variable: transformed equity-
to-asset ratio; central 
independent variables: 
EATR, sales, current ratio, 
and tangibility. 
Consistent with the trade-off 
theory of capital structure, 
lower taxes have affected the 
capital structure of Croatian 
firms, resulting in increased 
equity levels. The 11.4 percent 
EATR reduction from the 
corporate tax reform is 
associated with an average 1.7 
percent increase in the equity 
portion of private firms’ capital 
structure. 
Lemmon, 
Roberts, 
Zender 
(2008) 
Non-financial firm-
year observations 
taken from the 
annual Compustat 
database covering 
the years 1965 and 
2003. There is a so-
called survivor 
subsample of firms 
having at least 20 
years of non-
missing data on 
book leverage. The 
(sub)sample 
consists of (92,306) 
225,839 
observations of US 
firms. Variances 
are explicitly 
decomposed. 
Panel OLS regressions with 
several different 
specifications. Dependent 
variables, applied one by 
one: book leverage, market 
leverage. Central 
independent variables: initial 
leverage, sales, profitability, 
and tangibility. 
The majority of variation in 
leverage ratios seems to be 
driven by an unobserved time-
invariant effect that generates 
surprisingly stable capital 
structures: High (low) leveraged 
firms tend to remain as such for 
over two decades. This 
previously disregarded feature 
of leverage, which is robust to 
firm exit, and is present prior to 
the IPO, suggests that variations 
in capital structures is primarily 
determined by factors that 
remain stable for long periods 
of time. 
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MacKie-
Mason 
(1990) 
Firm-level data of 
US corporations, 
covering the years 
1977 till 1987. 
The financing decision of 
one additional investment 
project is analyzed. Special 
attention is devoted to the 
fact that marginal tax rates 
are strongly influenced by 
tax loss carryforwards and 
tax credits. 
The higher an existent tax loss 
carryforward of a firm, the 
lower is its probability to take 
up debt for the financing of a 
new investment project. The 
probability of debt financing 
also decreases once there is a 
threat that tax credits could not 
be used. 
Mills, 
Newberry 
(2004) 
Tax data provided 
by the Internal 
Revenue Service, 
presenting US 
subsidiaries of 
groups based in 16 
different countries. 
The years 1987 till 
1996 are 
considered. 
The international tax rate 
variation of the investor 
countries is used for 
identification. 
A ten percentage point increase 
in the difference between the 
US tax rate and the tax rate of 
the group's home country causes 
the debt ratio to increase by 4.9 
percentage points. 
Newberry, 
Dhaliwal 
(2001) 
Firm observations 
of US American 
companies having 
carried out bond 
issues. The 
subsidiaries 
observed in the 
time span 1987 till 
1997 are located in 
the G7 states. 
The difference in the US 
mother company's tax status 
(loss carryforward, excess 
tax credit) is used for 
identification. The key binary 
independent variable 
distinguishes if the tax rate in 
the subsidiary's country is 
higher or lower than the one 
in the USA. 
The probability of issuing a 
bond abroad amounts to 47% if 
the US parent company does not 
have a loss carryforward; in the 
other case it is 94%. An 
increase in the excess tax credit 
by 10 percentage points 
increases the probability of 
bond issuance abroad to 54%. 
The higher the tax rate abroad 
relative to the US profit tax rate, 
the higher the probability of a 
bond issuance abroad. 
Overesch, 
Voeller 
(2010) 
Unbalanced panel 
of European firm-
level data taken 
from the 
AMADEUS 
database provided 
by Bureau van 
Dijk. Regressions 
are based on 
3,155,765 firm 
observations, 
spreading across 23 
European countries 
and covering the 
period 2000 to 
2005. 
Analysis of to what extent 
personal and corporate 
taxation has an influence on 
companies’ capital structure 
decisions. Hypotheses are 
primarily based on the 
different tax treatment of 
debt and equity. Dependent 
variable is the debt-to-capital 
ratio. Central independent 
variables are the tax rate, 
tangibility and a loss 
carryforward dummy. 
A higher tax benefit of debt has 
the expected significant positive 
effect on a company’s financial 
leverage. The capital structures 
of smaller companies respond 
more heavily to changes in the 
tax benefit of debt. Variations in 
capital income tax rates at the 
shareholder level imply 
significant capital structure 
adjustments. Finally, there 
seems to be a substitutive 
relationship between non-debt 
tax shields and the effect of the 
corporate tax rate on capital 
structure. 
Overesch, 
Wamser 
(2010) 
Inbound side of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) by the 
German Federal 
Bank, covering the 
years 1996 till 
2004. The 
Analysis of tax-planning 
behavior by means of inter-
company finance and the 
effectiveness of government 
countermeasures via thin-
capitalization rules. Legal 
amendments are used as 
natural experiments for 
Significant impact of tax-rate 
differentials on the use of inter-
company debt. Thin-
capitalization rules induce 
significantly lower internal 
borrowing. Thus, tax planning 
via internal financing is 
effectively limited by thin-
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regressions are 
based on up to 
19,379 subsidiary 
observations. 
evaluating the effectiveness 
of the German thin-
capitalization rule. 
Dependent variable: share of 
inter-company loans 
borrowed from the foreign 
parent company; central 
independent variables: tax 
rate differential, group's tax 
rate, turnover, and a loss 
carryforward dummy. 
capitalization rules. 
Pfaffermayr, 
Stoeckl, 
Winner 
(2009) 
Cross-section of 
some 405,000 firms 
from 35 European 
countries and 126 
NACE 3-digit 
industries, 
stemming from 
Bureau van Dijk’s 
AMADEUS 
database and 
covering the years 
1999 till 2004. 
Analysis of causal 
relationships between 
corporate taxation, firm age 
and debt. Dependent 
variable: debt to asset ratio; 
Central independent 
variables: statutory corporate 
tax rate, firm age and an 
interaction of firm size, 
tangibility, and profitability. 
A firm’s debt ratio increases 
with the corporate tax rate. 
Moreover, older firms exhibit 
smaller debt ratios than their 
younger counterparts. Finally, 
there seems to be a positive 
interaction between corporate 
taxation and firm age, indicating 
that the impact of corporate 
taxation on debt is increasing 
over a firm’s life-time. 
Ruf (2010) Regressions are 
based on 137,697 
subsidiary 
observations 
stemming from the 
MiDi-Database 
provided by 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank and 
covering the years 
1996 till 2007. 
OLS estimations including 
parent- and year-fixed 
effects. Dependent variable: 
total debt divided by total 
assets, Central independent 
variables: profitability, 
subsidiary size, tangibility, 
and country macro controls. 
Only one third of the standard 
increase in subsidiary leverage 
with the tax rate is due to a 
trade-off behavior of 
multinationals between the tax 
benefits and the cost of using 
debt. The remaining two thirds 
are due to the pecking order. In 
total, a ten percentage point 
increase in the tax rate causes a 
4.45 percentage point increase 
in subsidiary leverage. 
Ruf (2011) Inbound case of the 
MiDi database 
provided by the 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank. The 
regressions build 
on up to 72,558 
observations of 
multinationals' 
German 
subsidiaries, 
covering the years 
1996 till 2006. 
OLS estimations including 
year dummies, industry 
dummies, and subsidiary 
fixed-effects. The dependent 
variable is the leverage, 
defined as total liabilities 
divided by the balance sheet 
total. Key independent 
variables are the tax rate, a 
firm-size dummy variable, an 
interaction term of these two 
variables, tangibility, and 
country controls. 
Elaboration of possible 
explanations for why empirical 
studies have found a quite 
moderate response of 
multinationals’ capital structure 
to tax incentives. Firstly, 
previous studies may have 
overlooked the importance of 
holding companies. Secondly, 
international transfer pricing 
guidelines may reduce the tax 
incentives for debt financing. 
No evidence, however, that debt 
as a tax planning tool might be 
used especially by large 
multinationals. 
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Trezevant 
(1992) 
US American firm-
level data from the 
years 1979 till 
1982. 
Natural experiment based on 
the US tax reform of 1981, 
which provided more 
generous depreciation 
allowances. Analysis of to 
what extent the accelerated 
depreciation is used to lower 
the tax payment. 
Only at firms already showing a 
decent average tax burden 
beforehand could the new 
accelerated depreciation 
effectively further reduce tax 
expenses. 
Wamser 
(2008) 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
Specific focus on 
the year 2001 in 
both the descriptive 
section and in the 
estimations. 
Analysis of how 
multinational enterprises 
respond to a restriction on 
interest deductions incurred 
for internal borrowing. 
Propensity score matching 
techniques. The 2001 reform 
of the German thin 
capitalization rule is used to 
solve endogeneity problems. 
Restrictions on internal debt are 
associated with expansions in 
external debt finance, indicating 
a substitution relationship. A 
treated subsidiary increases its 
external-debt-to-capital ratio by 
about 2.5 percentage points 
relative to the counterfactual 
outcome. In terms of the stock 
of external borrowing, treatment 
is associated with around 8% 
more external debt. 
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Abstract: I revisit the effects of double tax treaties on foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Previous empirical studies provide somewhat counterintuitive results suggesting insignificant 
or even negative effects of tax treaties. Using firm-level data provided by the German Central 
Bank I analyze the investment impact of double tax treaties and repatriation taxes between 58 
countries throughout a 13-year period from 1996 till 2008. While a simple binary variable 
indicating a treaty reform is not sufficient for identification, a closer look at the size of the 
change in repatriation taxes reveals a negative impact on investments in fixed assets. 
Considering that tax treaties can significantly cut repatriation taxes, my results suggest that 
the puzzle can be explained in line with theoretical predictions regarding the influence of 
dividend taxes on investment decisions. Further inspection reveals that repatriation taxes have 
a positive impact on financial assets. The significant opposing effects net out and leave an 
insignificant total effect. Regarding capital structures, I find that nominal capital shrinks but 
revenue reserves increase with higher repatriation taxes. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Multinational companies invest in their subsidiaries all over the world. There are several 
reasons for the increase of foreign direct investments (FDI) over the last decades. Most of 
them come down to the argument of lower transaction costs. In this paper, I work out how the 
improved coordination concerning taxation affects FDI. In particular, I revisit the impact of 
tax treaties and, in particular, repatriation taxes on FDI. 
In a lack of coordination, cross-border profit distribution of a subsidiary can be taxed twice. 
Distributed profits are taxed by the country hosting the subsidiary and, thereafter, by the 
country of the parent company when they are repatriated. In order to release companies from 
double taxation, states enter into bilateral double tax treaties. Double tax treaties translate the 
aspect of international coordination to the area of taxes.57 Besides other aspects, a tax treaty 
allocates the claims to tax the same income, limits the tax rates imposed by source countries 
and defines a method to avoid double taxation. In particular, tax treaties define what 
percentage of distributed dividends the host country is allowed to keep as a withholding tax 
and how the dividends are taxed at home. 
During the last decades, hundreds of double tax treaties have been concluded or amended and 
many of them lowered the permissible tax imposed on transactions between the respective 
countries. I combine this extensive institutional variation with a rich micro-level data set of 
German multinationals active in more than 50 host countries. In particular, I have detailed 
information on the chains of ownership. Moreover, I can use the fact that Germany has one of 
the most extensive tax treaty networks all over the world and always stipulates the exemption 
of foreign dividends from home country taxes. This data allows me to identify double tax 
treaties, withholding tax rates and the effective tax on repatriations between more than 3,000 
country pairs over a period from 1996 till 2008. 
I provide evidence suggesting that repatriation taxes indeed significantly affect investments of 
multinational subsidiaries. My results oppose to the finding of earlier and more general 
studies stating a negative impact of tax treaties on investment. While double tax treaties are 
expected to increase FDI, surprisingly, this general effect does not appear in several previous 
empirical studies. Blonigen and Davies (2004) find mostly insignificant and even some 
negative effects of the existence of a double tax treaty in aggregated data on US inward and 
                                                            
57 In this paper, I focus on double taxation treaties and do not regard effects of bilateral investment treaties on 
FDI. For a discussion of bilateral investment treaty effects see Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), Neumayer and 
Spess (2005) and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004). 
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outward FDI. Davies (2003) considers US FDI data from 1960s and 1970s and also finds a 
negative response to tax treaties and mixed results for tax treaty amendments. Louie and 
Rousslang (2008) make another attempt to identify effects of US tax treaties but also fail to 
find statistically significant effects. Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr and Winner (2006) consider 
outward FDI stocks of OECD countries. Yet, their results again suggest a significant negative 
impact of newly implemented tax treaties on FDI stocks. 
The insignificant or even negative effects are usually explained by a supposed treaty-induced 
reduction of tax evasion practices (see, e.g., Blonigen and Davies, 2004). Despite ongoing 
empirical analyses of tax evasion, this argument is not fully convincing in the tax treaty 
context. Regarding the rules to monitor transfer prices, national tax legislation of OECD 
countries and many other countries already refer to the arm’s length principle to assess 
transfer prices irrespective of any double tax treaty. Concerning the effects of enhanced 
information exchange, it is also not entirely clear whether this fact really is to be associated 
with significant additional tax payments in the particular case of FDI. While information 
exchanges clearly help to identify taxable transactions in the case of portfolio investment and 
capital investment by individuals, FDI is usually not completely invisible for tax authorities 
because investors have significant control in the investment projects and both the parent 
company and the subsidiary have to disclose financial accounts. 
I, however, suppose that positive effects of tax treaties on FDI should outweigh any negative 
treaty effects. There already is evidence that withholding taxes and the method to avoid 
double taxation of foreign income significantly affect FDI. Hines (1996) finds that low tax US 
states are particularly attractive to investors from home countries which exempt foreign 
income compared to investors from credit countries. Similarly, a study by Egger, Loretz, 
Pfaffermayr and Winner (2009) finds a significant effect of host country taxes on bilateral 
FDI among OECD countries if the home country applies an exemption system. In any case, 
both find a significant negative effect of withholding taxes on aggregated FDI stocks. 
Huizinga and Voget (2009) employ micro-data of M&A cases and find striking effects of 
repatriation taxes on both the direction of acquisitions and the number of acquired firms per 
country. Furthermore, Overesch and Wamser (2009) find negative effects of withholding 
taxes on location decisions of German multinationals.  
Therefore, I test whether the puzzling results found in the literature correspond with 
theoretical predictions about the role of repatriation taxes on investment of subsidiaries. The 
early literature argues that investment is negatively affected by dividend taxes. Whereas 
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proponents of what is called the “New View” on corporate taxation show that repatriation 
taxes do not affect FDI if a corporation uses a reduction of its distributions as their marginal 
source of finance (King, 1974a, 1974b; Sinn, 1984; Hartman, 1985). In accordance with these 
models, repatriation taxes exert a negative effect only if new equity injection is the marginal 
source of finance, e.g., when a new subsidiary is founded (Sinn, 1993). Interestingly, some 
studies finding positive treaty effects analyze the external margin of FDI (Di Giovanni, 2005; 
Davies, Norbaeck and Tekin-Koru, 2009). Di Giovanni (2005) considers aggregated data on 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and finds a significant positive effect of a tax treaty. For 
Swedish firms, Davies et al. (2009) find a positive effect of new tax treaties on the probability 
to have a subsidiary in a certain host country while, conditional on the location choice, they 
are unable to identify any statistically significant tax treaty effect on sales.  
I, however, contribute to the discussion of tax treaty effects and repatriation taxes by 
analyzing the internal margin of FDI. Moreover, my paper contributes to the literature by 
combining both the big picture approach and an analysis of many individual effects tax 
treaties and repatriation taxes are supposed to exert. 
First, I analyze whether renegotiations of tax treaties exert significant effects on total 
investment of subsidiaries, but I am unable to find statistically significant results. Further 
inspection, however, reveals that the tax treaty puzzle can be well explained by effects of 
repatriation taxes on different investment decisions of multinational subsidiaries. I disentangle 
different kinds of investment and financing and execute detailed tests of the predictions 
brought forward in the previous literature. In doing so, I find that repatriation taxes negatively 
affect investment in fixed assets leading to the conclusion that retained earnings are not the 
marginal sources of finance. Apart from the significant effects of repatriation taxes, a new or 
renegotiated tax treaty does not seem to exert an additional significant effect on real 
investment. 
If repatriation taxes vary over time, additional effects of repatriation taxes have to be 
considered. Blouin and Krull (2009) provide a simple model and empirical evidence 
regarding the response to the 2004 US tax holiday on repatriated dividends. Generally, it is 
very reasonable that multinationals expect falling repatriation taxes when taking into account 
the striking trend of cutting withholding tax rates if tax treaties are conducted or renegotiated.  
If subsidiaries expect a cut in repatriation tax rates, they should postpone repatriation. Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2007) and Bellak and Leibrecht (2010) find a negative tax impact on 
repatriations of US or German multinationals, respectively. Moreover, Foley, Hartzell, 
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Titman and Twite (2007) show that US multinationals hold extensive amounts of cash in 
foreign subsidiaries because repatriation will be taxed. Weichenrieder (1996) shows that 
capital market investments can be used to defer profit distributions. Altshuler and Grubert 
(2003) note that, in particular, buying shares of affiliates is a means to avoid repatriation 
taxes. While profitable local investment opportunities of the subsidiary are limited, 
investment in the capital market or in shares of other affiliated firms is independent from local 
investment opportunities. Consequently, the positive effect of repatriation taxes on retention 
should particularly appear in higher financial investments. 
If FDI data does not allow differentiation between physical and financial investment, the 
effect of repatriation taxes on financial assets might dominate estimated effects, which in turn 
leads to the wrong conclusion that tax treaties generally exert a negative effect on FDI. One 
exception is the analysis by Millimet and Kumas (2007). They find some positive effects of 
tax treaties on FDI measures. In particular, the effect is more pronounced for observations 
succeeding the conclusion of a new double tax treaty by many years leading to the conclusion 
that negative effects of a new tax treaty might reflect repatriation of retained earnings. 
In fact, I find a positive effect of repatriation taxes on financial investments. Moreover, I find 
corresponding evidence regarding the structure of equity finance. Higher repatriation taxes are 
associated with a significantly higher share of revenue reserves. This finding again supports 
the view that firms postpone repatriation because they have the general expectation that - 
owed to new tax treaties - high repatriation taxes will decrease in the future. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss effects of the 
institutional details of the international tax system and derive empirically testable hypotheses. 
Thereafter, the investigation approach is presented in Section 3. The data is presented in 
Section 4 and Section 5 presents empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
6.2 Development of Hypotheses 
International business taxation significantly affects FDI. In particular, it is well known that 
the host country’s corporate taxes negatively affect FDI (for an overview see DeMooij and 
Ederveen, 2003; Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011). Moreover, intercompany transactions are 
subject to source taxes in the host country and are considered as foreign income at the level of 
the parent company. Consequently, the taxation of these transactions is also expected to 
influence FDI. 
6. The Impact of Tax Treaties and Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited 
146 
6.2.1 Double Tax Treaties and FDI 
A double tax treaty is an agreement between two countries on the taxation of income which 
has some taxable nexus with both treaty partners. Yet, a piece of national tax legislation 
determines a fiscal position, whereas a double tax treaty may only limit these claims. 
Consequently, the double tax treaty helps to coordinate the claims of each of the two involved 
national tax legislations. Moreover, double tax treaties coordinate the definition of terms and 
determine mutual agreement procedures. 
Considering these functions, double tax treaties are expected to affect FDI of multinational 
firms. It is, however, unclear if double tax treaties increase or decrease FDI. On the one hand, 
double tax treaties are expected to be associated with additional FDI for the following 
reasons: elimination of double taxation, reduction of withholding taxes, standardization of 
terms and definitions, enhanced certainty about the tax environment, and elimination of 
double taxation of expatriates. On the other hand, the previous literature has argued that tax 
treaties might also negatively influence FDI because treaties refer to the arm’s length 
principle to asses transfer prices, eliminate loopholes by enhancing the information exchange 
between the treaty partners, provoke additional repatriations by reducing withholding taxes, 
and prevent firms from setting up holding structures which aggressively exploit the 
international treaty network (see, e.g., Blonigen and Davies, 2004). 
I argue that the rationales suggesting an adverse effect of tax treaties on FDI are not very 
convincing.58 First, OECD countries as well as other countries already apply the arm’s length 
principle to assess transfer prices on the basis of national tax legislation. Consequently, a tax 
treaty usually does not change the assessment of transfer prices.59 Nevertheless, some tax 
treaties include specific rules on mutual agreement procedures in transfer pricing disputes. 
These rules, however, tend to avoid double taxation risk and might therefore be associated 
with more rather than less FDI. Second, information exchange does only contribute to closing 
loopholes if transactions are invisible to tax authorities. Yet, FDI is associated with significant 
control by investors. Parent companies and subsidiaries have to disclose many details in their 
financial accounts. Therefore, the effects of enhanced information exchanges are expected to 
                                                            
58The explanation that tax treaties predominantly exert significant negative effects on FDI owing to transfer 
pricing rules and enhanced information exchange is also contradicted by evidence dealing with tax treaty 
effects on FDI in developing countries. While national tax legislation of developing countries might often lack 
sophisticated transfer pricing rules and clear definitions of terms, a study by Neumayer (2007) finds significant 
positive treaty effects on FDI in developing countries. 
59 Details of arm’s length transfer prices are defined by OECD transfer pricing guidelines (OECD, 2010). These 
guidelines came into force by national tax legislation and should not be mistaken as the OECD model 
convention. 
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be rather limited in the particular case of FDI. Third, rules to prevent firms from what is 
called treaty shopping only eliminate incentives which just arise from the fact that a treaty has 
been concluded.60 
In a nutshell, it seems to be a very reasonable conclusion that positive effects of tax treaties on 
FDI outweigh negative treaty effects. A total positive effect is also expected after a 
renegotiation of a tax treaty, because renegotiations are often associated with significant cuts 
in repatriation taxes. This leads to my first testable hypothesis: 
 
H6-1:  A new or a renegotiated tax treaty exerts a non-negative total effect on FDI. 
6.2.2 Tax Treaties and the Effective Tax on Repatriation 
I argue that the consequences of tax treaties for the taxation of FDI boil down to changes in 
repatriation taxes. In the following, let us consider the standard case of FDI in an incorporated 
subsidiary. Profits generated by an incorporated subsidiary are not subject to tax at the level 
of the parent firm as long as they are not distributed (deferral system). Sooner or later, 
however, a multinational firm will repatriate foreign profits and bring them to the sphere of 
disposability. A multinational firm has different means to repatriate profits,61 either by paying 
interest on previously provided intercompany loans, by paying royalties or by paying 
intercompany dividends. The latter can be considered the most important one in terms of 
volume and also in the potential sensitivity to tax treaty regulations.62 That is why I focus on 
repatriation via dividends in this paper.63 Cross-border intercompany dividends can be subject 
to tax in the host country of the subsidiary paying the dividends (source country) as well as in 
the residence country of the firm receiving the dividends (home country). Without an 
effective treaty, double taxation is very likely. Either way, the taxes imposed on intercompany 
dividends reduce funds available for distribution to the shareholders. 
Among the various aspects associated with a tax treaty, two issues directly affect the effective 
tax on repatriation. First, tax treaties limit the withholding rate imposed on intercompany 
dividends (Article 10 OECD Model Tax Convention). However, the tax treaty only affects the 
                                                            
60 Anti-avoidance rules to prevent firms from treaty shopping might have an effect if these rules are introduced 
in the course of a renegotiation of an existing tax treaty. Then, FDI measures might be affected by some 
reorganizations of holding structures. 
61 Altshuler and Grubert (2003) provide an overview of the repatriation strategies available to multinationals. 
62 Tax treaties also limit the tax withhold if intercompany interest or royalities are paid. Tax savings by these 
means are, however, very unlikely because these types of income tax treaties or national tax legislation usually 
consider a credit system. 
63 Additional repatriation methods include inter-company interest payments or disposal of the subsidiary. Yet, 
the use of intercompany debt and disposal of share is rather limited, e.g. due to earnings stripping rules in the 
former case and the obvious end of the foreign activity in the latter case. 
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treatment of intercompany dividends if national tax legislation already claims a fiscal position 
in intercompany dividends. In this case, withholding taxes are only changed by a tax treaty if 
the cap imposed by the treaty is below the withholding tax rate already effective in the source 
country. Suppose, for example, a tax treaty which limits the withholding tax at a rate of 10 
percent - the tax treaty would change the effectively imposed tax rate if the ordinary 
withholding tax rate defined by the national tax code was 15 percent. In contrast, the 
withholding tax would remain completely unaffected by the tax treaty if the withholding tax 
rate determined by the national legislation was only 5 percent. Moreover, tax treaties between 
member states of the European Union (EU) are very likely to have no material effect on 
withholding tax rates because the EU Parent-Subsidiary-Directive has already eliminated any 
withholding taxes imposed on intercompany dividends. 
Second, tax treaties include an agreement on either the credit method or the exemption 
method to avoid double taxation of intercompany dividends at the level of the parent company 
(Article 23 OECD Model Tax Convention). However, national tax legislations also take into 
account that the repatriated profits have already been subject to withholding taxes and also to 
corporate taxes at the level of the subsidiary. If the exemption method is applied, repatriated 
intercompany dividends are tax exempt at the level of the firm which receives the dividends. 
Germany is one of the countries exempting intercompany dividends from taxation. In the case 
of a credit system, intercompany dividends are subject to tax but taxes paid abroad reduce the 
tax liability. The US are a prominent country applying a credit system.64 If the tax rate of the 
residence country exceeds the tax credit, a reduction of withholding tax, e.g., caused by a new 
tax treaty, has no material effect. The interplay of a declining withholding tax and the credit 
system may also help to explain why the previous literature has often failed to find positive 
treaty effects.65 
Moreover, I have to consider the interplay between the tax treaty and the national tax 
legislation. A double tax treaty changing the method to avoid double taxation can 
significantly cut the effectively imposed repatriation tax. Yet, there are many cases where the 
method introduced by a tax treaty effectively leaves the repatriation taxes unchanged. The 
first case is an excess credit position. An excess credit arises if foreign taxes exceed the tax 
liability of the residence country on foreign income. If the excess credit cannot be used, e.g., 
                                                            
64 If a direct credit is applied, the foreign tax credit includes the withholding taxes imposed on intercompany 
dividends. An indirect credit also includes foreign corporate taxes paid by the subsidiary. 
65In additional robustness checks, the study by Blonigen und Davies (2004), for example, comes up with several 
positive treaty effects on US inbound FDI, while no robust effects are found in the case of US outbound FDI. 
The latter results may hint at an offsetting effect of the US credit system and changes of withholding tax rates.  
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in subsequent periods, a credit system effectively equals the exemption system. In this case, 
introducing the exemption method does not effectively change repatriation taxes. 
Secondly, if, for example, the tax code of the residence country already determines the 
exemption of intercompany dividends, the taxation of repatriated profits is effectively 
unchanged by a tax treaty referring to the indirect credit method. This is also true if the treaty 
refers to the same method which is already in force. 
The discussion has shown that in conceivable cases tax treaties do not effectively change 
repatriation taxes. Please refer to the Appendix for a detailed description how the effective 
repatriation tax is calculated. I set up the following hypothesis: 
H6-2: A new or renegotiated tax treaty exerts a positive effect on FDI if it has 
effectively changed the repatriation tax imposed on intercompany dividends. 
6.2.3 Investment Effects of Repatriation Taxes 
Concerning the effect on FDI I consider a change in repatriation taxes the most important 
aspect of double tax treaties. Therefore, I derive testable hypotheses for additional empirical 
analyses about the impact of repatriation taxes on FDI. 
The traditional view on dividend taxes is deduced from the fact that taxes on dividend 
payments are an excess burden on corporate investment. Since investors anticipate this 
additional tax, cost of equity capital rises with the dividend tax (Harberger, 1962). If marginal 
rates of return on capital are declining, the optimal investment size is negatively affected by 
dividend taxes. The repatriation taxes imposed on intercompany dividends are a particular 
type of dividend tax. Consequently, this “old” view on corporate taxation predicts negative 
effects of repatriation taxes on FDI. 
Yet, another strand of literature, dealing with the so-called “new” view on corporate taxation, 
predicts insignificant effects of repatriation taxes and, thus, of tax treaties. Starting with the 
seminal works by King (1974a, 1974b) and Auerbach, (1979, 1983), this literature suggests 
that dividend taxes do not affect investment if a corporation can use retained earnings as their 
marginal source of finance. Unlike the Old View, these models consider the fact that dividend 
taxes can be deferred by retaining and reinvesting earnings within the corporation. As 
repatriation taxes, like withholding taxes or home country taxes on foreign income, are 
usually imposed on distributed income rather than on accruals, Hartman (1985) and Sinn 
(1984) apply these arguments to repatriation taxes on international intercompany dividends. 
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Proponents of the New View assume that dividend taxes only have a negative impact on 
investment if new equity injection is the marginal source of finance.  I set up the following 
hypothesis: 
H6-3:  Repatriation taxes exert a significant negative effect on FDI if new equity is the 
marginal source of finance. If subsidiaries use retained earnings as their 
marginal source of finance, repatriation taxes do not significantly affect FDI. 
6.2.4 Repatriation Taxes and Retentions 
Applying the logic of the New View to repatriation strategies of the multinational firm 
suggests that repatriation taxes do not affect the timing of repatriations if current tax 
conditions are not expected to change over time. The rationale for this result is the following: 
Repatriation taxes do not affect the marginal investment decision because the subsidiary has 
to pay these taxes irrespective of whether it reinvests the profits or distributes them right 
away. 
Empirical studies show that firms smooth their repatriation payments over time (Desai, Foley 
and Hines, 2007; Bellak and Leibrecht, 2010). Desai et al. (2007) argue that intercompany 
dividends can be quite well explained by agency conflicts between local managers and the 
central management of the firm, financial constraints of the multinational group and last but 
not least by the incentive that, in turn, the multinational firm has to pay smooth dividends to 
its external shareholders. 
Previous results also suggest that repatriation taxes affect repatriations (Desai et al. 2007; 
Bellak and Leibrecht, 2011). The most convincing explanation for an impact of repatriation 
taxes is the expectation that withholding taxes and home country taxes on foreign income 
vary over time. Then, repatriation taxes are, of course, no longer irrelevant for the decision 
whether to retain or to repatriate foreign income. The expectation of varying repatriation taxes 
was, for example, fulfilled for US multinationals in 2004 and 2005, when the US government 
offered a temporary reduction in US taxes on repatriated foreign income. Several empirical 
studies provide striking evidence that US firms jumped at the chance and repatriated billions 
of dollars (Albring, Mills and Newberry, 2010; Blouin and Krull, 2009; Clemons and Kinney, 
2008; Dharmapala , Foley and Forbes, 2011; Redmiles, 2008). 
It is however very likely that multinationals all over the world expect some variation in 
repatriation taxes. More precisely, it is very likely that they will expect falling repatriation 
taxes. The extension of the EU parent-subsidiary directive, changes in national legislations, 
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newly set up double tax treaties as well as treaty renegotiations show a clear overall trend of 
declining withholding taxes. I collected data on dividend taxation of a 58x57 country and 13 
year matrix. Based on this data, there are 1,701 cases of declining withholding taxes. In 689 
of these cases, it even shrunk to zero. By contrast, there are only 350 cases where the 
withholding tax increased, e.g. due to the expiration or cancellation of double tax treaties or 
changes in the national legislation. Figure 6-1 shows a striking negative trend in the average 
taxes withhold from cross-border intercompany dividends. 
If the firm expects a cut in repatriation taxes in subsequent years and internal funds is the 
marginal source of finance, the expected change in repatriation taxes indeed affects 
investment decisions. The higher the repatriation tax rate, the higher is the probability and the 
benefit of a tax cut in the future. In this case, it becomes rational to defer distributions and 
reinvest profits until the expected tax cut will come into force. More precisely, the marginal 
cost of capital rises with the expected tax rate cut. 
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Figure 6 ?1: Average withholding tax on intercompany dividends 
 
Average withholding tax rate on dividends in all combinations in a sample of 57 countries, in percent. The 
values denoted above are the annual means of the added up 57 country-specific average withholding-taxes. 
Moreover, tax treaties are often negotiated for years and often become effective one or two 
years after they were being finalized and published.66 Thus, multinationals can be expected to 
see the legal amendments in advance. This anticipation causes higher investment by the 
subsidiary right before the change. If repatriation taxes are significantly reduced or abolished, 
the incentive to retain profits and to invest in assets declines. Therefore, the growth path or 
even the stock of assets is expected to significantly decline just after a cut in repatriation 
taxes. 
Consequently, high repatriation taxes can be associated with additional investment due to 
retention. If marginal returns are decreasing, local investment opportunities, for example in 
fixed assets, are however limited. At some day repatriation of free cash flow becomes 
rational. However, Weichenrieder (1996) points at investment in the capital market as another 
opportunity to reduce the excess burden repatriation taxes exerted on equity endowment. 
Investment in the capital market or in shares of other affiliated firms is independent from 
investment opportunities within the subsidiary. Consequently, the available interest rate in the 
                                                            
66 For example, the revision of the treaty between Germany and Switzerland has been signed on March 12, 2002, 
has come into force at March 24, 2003 and is effective from January 1, 2004. For the treaty between Italy and 
Russia, the corresponding dates are April 9, 1996, November 30, 1998 and January 1, 1999. The treaty 
between the United States and Luxembourg was signed on April 3, 1996, came into force on December 20, 
2000 and was effective January 1, 2001.  
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world capital market is the lower boundary for the investment of retained earnings. Moreover, 
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) note that, in particular, buying shares is a means to funnel funds 
to other affiliates but at the same time, to avoid repatriation taxes. Put it differently, investing 
in shares of affiliated firms is an alternative means to funnel equity to other investment 
opportunities of the multinational group without paying repatriation taxes. Therefore, 
excessive retention owed to high repatriation taxes are expected to affect financial investment, 
but not in additional (local) investment in fixed assets. 
In a nutshell, the effects of repatriation taxes on financial assets and on real investments (cf. 
H-3) are expected to have opposing signs. If FDI data does not allow disentangling physical 
investment from financial investment, the positive effect of high repatriation taxes on 
financial assets might dominate the opposing effect on real capital. Based on these 
considerations, I set up the following hypothesis: 
 
H6-4: Higher repatriation taxes positively affect financial investment in the 
capital market whereas repatriation taxes exert negative or even 
insignificant effects on real investments. 
6.2.5 Repatriation Taxes and Financial Structures 
In addition to the investment effects of repatriation taxes corresponding effects on capital 
structures has to be expected. Combining the arguments of the Old and New View on 
corporate taxation leads to the conclusion that a negative investment effect is expected if the 
source of finance is new equity. Sinn (1993) shows in a dynamic framework that repatriation 
taxes therefore initially lead to a nucleus of investment abroad. Then, however, the firm 
grows to maturity through retained earnings only. According to his model, the size of a 
mature subsidiary is unaffected by repatriation taxes. Nevertheless, the proportions of 
endowed equity capital (subscribed capital) and retained earnings (revenue reserves) are 
indeed affected by repatriation taxes because initial equity injection is negatively affected by 
repatriation taxes. 
Moreover, the discussion in subsection 2.4 suggests additional retention if repatriation taxes 
are still high and are expected to decline someday. Then, the share of retained earnings but 
also the total share of equity capital should be positively affected by high repatriation taxes. 
Thus, I formulate the following hypothesis regarding the structure of equity finance: 
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H-5: Repatriation taxes negatively affect the share of subscribed capital while 
they positively affect the share of revenue reserves in total capital.  
Hines (1994) uses a similar framework like Sinn (1993) but adds the possibility of debt 
financing. He also finds that the maturity size of the subsidiary is unaffected by repatriation 
taxes. Yet, the initially established nucleus is bigger. The affiliate just uses debt financing and 
subsequently, substitutes debt by retained profits during its growth to maturity. According to 
Hines’ modeling, repatriation taxes positively affect the share of debt in an immature 
subsidiary because initial equity injections are negatively affected. Regarding a mature firm 
whose marginal source of finance is cutting distribution, repatriation taxes do not matter for 
the share of debt financing. 
If, however, a firm expect falling repatriation taxes in the future, transitory retention is very 
reasonable. Corresponding to a positive effect of repatriation taxes on equity, an adverse 
effect on debt financing is expected. Thus, the expectation regarding debt financing is rather 
case sensitive. I set up the following hypothesis: 
H6-6:   Repatriation taxes positively affect the share of debt financing if the subsidiary 
is still immature. Yet, repatriation taxes exert no significant effect on the debt 
share if the subsidiary’s marginal source of finance is reducing distributions. If 
firms postpone repatriation, a negative effect of repatriation taxes is expected. 
6.3 Investigation Approach  
In order to analyze how tax treaties and repatriation taxes affect investments and financial 
structures of multinational subsidiaries, I use firm-level data taken from the MiDi database.  
First, in accordance with previous literature dealing with effects of tax treaties, I take total 
investment stocks as the starting point of my analysis. Consequently, I consider total assets as 
my dependent variable. Then, I run simple regressions of the following type: 
titititi
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The subsidiary is denoted by the subscript i and the respective year by t. I consider a time-
specific effect ߛ௧. Moreover, I control for subsidiary-specific heterogeneity ߟ௜. I remove the 
unobserved subsidiary-specific effect by estimating equation (6-1) in first differences (see 
Wooldridge, 2002). The vector X includes tax variables but also a set of firm-level 
information and host-country characteristics. Concerning tax variables, I basically consider 
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the host-country statutory tax rate. Moreover, I consider the aforementioned variables 
indicating either if a new tax treaty is enforced or has effectively changed the repatriation 
taxes on intercompany dividends. Furthermore, I consider measures of withholding and 
repatriation taxes. 
The total asset stock is supposed to be rather persistent if adjustment is associated with 
significant costs (Chirinko, 1993). In additional regressions I take the persistence in the 
amount of total assets into account by including lags of total assets thereby capturing 
adjustment costs of investment levels. Since my time-series information is not sufficient to 
avoid what is called the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981), I follow the idea by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) of an instrumental variable (IV) regression. I apply simple two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimations where the second lagged levels of the dependent variable ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଶ is used as 
the additional instrumental variable excluded from the second stage regression. 
Total assets include all types of investment. In order to test my hypotheses, I distinguish 
between different investment types in additional sets of regressions. Moreover, I also test my 
hypotheses on the impact of repatriation taxes on the financial structures. 
6.4 Data 
The empirical analysis uses firm-level data taken from the MiDi database for multinationals, 
which is provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The comprehensive 
micro database covers information on both direct investment positions held in Germany by 
foreign companies and direct investment positions of German enterprises held abroad. In this 
study, I only analyze subsidiaries which are located outside Germany and are owned by a 
group having its headquarters in Germany.67 Moreover, I exclude subsidiaries from the 
financial industry. The data allows me to trace groups and their affiliates as well as the 
detailed ownership chains over time from 1996 to 2008. The data collection is imposed by 
German law, which requires reporting for certain international transactions and positions.68 
This aspect of MiDi is worth emphasizing as I am thus able to observe virtually all major 
German outbound investments. 
                                                            
67 I exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special tax 
regimes may be available there. Furthermore, I exclude observations whose German parent is not an 
incorporated and legally independent entity, as well as subsidiaries which are not legally independent. 
68 Sec. 26 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection with the Foreign 
Trade and Payments Regulation (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Since 2002, FDI has to be reported if the 
participation is 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the respective foreign investment in Germany 
exceeds EUR 3 million. For details see Lipponer (2008). Though previous years showed lower threshold 
levels, I apply this one uniformly for all years in the panel. For general interpretations of the dataset from a tax 
and finance perspective see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010). 
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I consider a sample of subsidiaries located in 57 countries with Germany serving as the home 
country of the parent company. My sample consists of the fmy BRIC countries, 29 countries 
which were members of the OECD in 2008, and the eight EU member states which were not 
OECD countries in 2008.69 In order to complete the picture of major investment flows, I 
additionally include tax havens and those larger economies showing substantial investment 
stocks of German multinationals.70 I include the tax havens into my analysis despite their 
general lack of double tax treaties during the covered period. They play a noticeable role in 
FDI and can thus serve as a valid control group. While the headquarters of the multinational 
groups covered in my dataset are always located in Germany, I consider the investments in 
directly and indirectly held subsidiaries which are wholly-owned by a German firm. The total 
sample applied here consists of 85,030 observations of 18,266 subsidiaries. Most of these 
multinational subsidiaries from my dataset are located in the United States, representing 12% 
of the total observations. The US is followed by larger European economies with France and 
the UK representing about 9% and the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Switzerland and Italy 
representing about 5% each. Still, my sample comprises several further observations from 
subsidiaries located in countries all over the world accounting for 45% of my sample. About 
two thirds of the subsidiaries are directly held. One third is held indirectly by a holding 
company abroad. Subsidiaries in countries like Russia, Korea or Poland are mainly held 
directly whereas subsidiaries in New Zealand, the United States or the United Kingdom are 
often held by at least one interposed holding. European and US subsidiaries are most often 
held by holding companies in the Netherlands or in Switzerland whereas Asian subsidiaries 
tend to be held via Singapore or Hong Kong. 
In big economies, the majority of observable holding companies are domestic holdings. In 
this paper, however, I focus on cross border structures in order to analyze the influence of 
repatriation taxes and double tax treaties. Domestic holdings are not a problem for my 
estimation strategy for I keep the withholding tax constant at zero for the domestic case of a 
country holding. Given the size of my sample, I still have thousands of cross border 
connections which can be used for identification purposes. 
                                                            
69  The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India and China. The covered OECD countries are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the US. Moreover, I consider 
subsidiaries located in the EU countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and 
Romania. 
70 Included tax havens are the Bermuda Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, 
Liechtenstein and Singapore Moreover, I consider subsidiaries in Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay. 
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As my dependent variable, I particularly consider the investment level in total assets of each 
subsidiary. Moreover, in the further estimations I focus on different investment types and 
consider fixed assets, financial assets and current assets as dependent variables. Concerning 
the financial structures, I also run additional regressions using the share of either revenue 
reserves or subscribed capital or liabilities in total capital as dependent variables. 
Furthermore, I refer to the subsidiary-level profitability as a control variable. 
As regards tax variables, I consider the statutory tax rate of the host-country corporate income 
tax. Concerning double tax treaty reforms, I consider two binary variables indicating whether 
an observation is from a year after a tax treaty reform is enforced. The dummy variable Treaty 
Reform 1 turns to one if a new double tax treaty for the respective home and host country pair 
has been introduced or if there has been a reform of the existing treaty. The dummy variable 
is zero for years before a reform has taken place. The variable Treaty Reform 2 indicates only 
tax treaty amendments which have effectively changed withholding taxes. Since companies 
cannot rely on a treaty before it is in force, I have used the latter point in time between the 
treaty’s becoming effective and its enforcement as my year of change.71 Of course, I have also 
considered such amendments which change only particular aspects, such as the withholding 
tax, instead of the whole text of a treaty. Table 6-6 in the Appendix provides an overview of 
the tax treaty changes between 1996 and 2008 which have been used to set up the two binary 
variables. 
My basic dataset covers the period from 1996 till 2008 and recognizes both directly and 
indirectly held subsidiaries. I only regard 100 percent participations. As indirectly held 
subsidiaries of German multinationals are included, I can monitor effects of changes in the 
withholding tax rates between each single pair of the 58 countries. I combine my firm-level 
data with detailed data on taxation of cross-border inter-company dividends. Altogether, my 
matrix of withholding tax relationships shows 58 x 57 combinations each for 13 years 
resulting in 42,978 cells. Concerning the methods of how incoming dividends are treated by 
the parent company or the holding location, I gathered information for the same number of 
combinations. I browsed all tax treaties of the relevant country pairs and considered when 
they came into force or were terminated. I also considered that the tax treaty information may 
be overridden by a more favorable national rule or by multilateral legislation like the parent-
subsidiary directive. Please refer to Tables 6-7 and 6-8 in the Appendix for excerpts of these 
two matrices. 
                                                            
71 For example, a treaty becoming in force in 2007 with regulations effective retroactively to 2005 will still be 
considered as a change in 2007. 
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From all the 42,978 conceivable withholding tax combinations, I see 1,701 cases (4.0%) 
where the withholding tax is lower as compared to the previous year and 350 cases (0.8%) 
where it is higher as compared to the previous year. The rare cases where the withholding tax 
is higher than in the past mainly stems from situations where there is no double tax treaty 
between two countries and then, the subsidiary country starts levying a withholding tax for 
the first time. Some country combinations do not appear at all in the sample used for the 
regressions, while others are frequently observable. The comprehensive information on 
bilateral withholding taxes and methods to avoid double taxation is used to construct two 
additional variables. First, I consider the nominal withholding tax effectively imposed on 
intercompany dividends (Withholding Tax). Second, the variable Repatriation Tax also takes 
into account the treatment of intercompany dividends in the home country of the receiving 
entity of the multinational firm. 
As additional control variables I consider host country GDP, GDP per Capita and the 
Inflation Rate taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Moreover, a 
variable Country Risk scaling from 0 to 7 with higher values corresponding to higher risk is 
derived from the OECD. Table 6-1 provides an overview of the definition, mean values and 
standard deviations of the variables employed in this study. 
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Table 6 ?1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets Total assets reported in the financial statements; 
measured in EUR '000. 
222,728 
 
2,844,082
 
Fixed Assets Fixed and intangible assets reported in the financial 
statements; measured in EUR '000. 
20,045 282,546
 
Financial Assets Long ?term financial assets reported in the financial 
statements; measured in EUR '000. 
83,187  2,128,662
 
Shares of Affiliates Financial assets in the form of shares of affiliated 
enterprises reported in the financial statements; 
measured in EUR '000. 
25,569 564,777
 
Current Assets Current assets reported in the financial statements; 
measured in EUR '000. 
113,993 
 
1,533,017
 
Nominal Capital Subscribed or called ?up capital, endowment capital 
and contributions by partners reported in the financial 
statements divided by total assets. 
.300 .341
 
Liabilities Liabilities reported in the financial statements divided 
by total assets. 
.538 .290
 
Revenue Reserves Revenue reserves plus profit/loss carried forward as 
reported in the financial statements divided by total 
assets. 
.161 
 
.336
 
Tax Rate Statutory profit tax rate. .317 .076
Treaty Reform 1 A tax treaty has been newly introduced or changed. .185 .389
Treaty Reform 2 A tax treaty has effectively lowered withholding taxes. .043 .204
Withholding Tax 
 
Withholding tax on dividends for the respective 
country/country pair. It is the smaller of the domestic 
rate and the rate of an effective tax treaty. 
.0158 
 
.041
 
Repatriation Tax The additional tax that needs to be paid effectively on 
repatriation. Differs from Withholding Tax due to 
recognition of the credit system and the company tax. 
(cf. the first page of the Appendix for further details)  
.0305 
 
.0478
 
Profitability Profit or loss for the previous financial year as 
reported by the balance sheet divided by total assets. 
.0632 
 
.139
 
GDP Gross Domestic Product measured in billion USD. 2.218 3.615
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product per home country national; 
measured in current USD '000. 
29.363 15.372
Inflation Rate Inflation  rate. .0297 .038
Country Risk OECD Country Risk Classification Method measures 
the country credit risk. Risk categories span from a low 
credit risk (0) to a high credit risk (7).  
.556 1.212
Firm-specific variables are derived from the MiDi database of the German Central Bank. The tax variables are 
derived from information taken from the IBFD Tax Handbooks and the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by 
Ernst & Young. GDP, GDP per Capita and Inflation Rate stem from the World Development Indicators, edition 
2009. Country Risk is based on information provided by the OECD. 
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6.5 Regression Results 
6.5.1 Total Investment 
In this section, I present my empirical results. First, I test my hypotheses regarding the effects 
of tax treaty reforms and repatriation taxes on total investment. The respective results are 
presented in Table 6-2. I start my analysis by considering simple binary variables which 
indicate that a new tax treaty is enforced. In columns (1) and (2) I consider if a new double 
tax treaty has been introduced or if there has been a reform of the formerly existing double tax 
treaty between 1997 and 2008 (Treaty Reform 1). In columns (3) and (4), I focus only on 
those treaty reforms that have effectively lowered withholding taxes on intercompany 
dividends (Treaty Reform 2). 
In columns (2) and (4) – (7) of Table 6-2 I also control for the lagged dependent variable. As 
can be seen from the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, the assets stocks are quite 
sticky over time, i.e. they are strongly influenced by the situation of the previous period. The 
respective results are from 2SLS. I use the second lag of the dependent variable as an 
instrumental variable for the lagged dependent variable. Concerning the performance of the 
instruments, I obtain F-statistics for the instruments used in the first-stage regression 
suggesting that instruments are strong and valid. 
As can be seen from my results in Table 6-2, I hardly find significant effects exerted by the 
introduction or modification of a double tax treaty. In line with the existing literature, the 
effect on total assets is either insignificant or negative with a weak significance. In particular, 
once I control for the asset stock in a previous period, the effect of a treaty reform on total 
assets is insignificant. Therefore, the results on the binary variable do not confirm hypothesis 
H-1 of a general non-negative tax treaty effect on FDI. Furthermore, even the results 
presented in columns (3) and (4) do not confirm my hypothesis H6-2, which assumed a 
positive investment impact of tax treaties effectively lowering the withholding tax. My results 
are therefore in accordance with findings of the tax treaty literature. 
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Table 6 ?2: Panel estimation on general effects of tax treaty changes 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) 
 
Total  
Assets 
Total  
Assets 
Total  
Assets 
Total  
Assets 
Total  
Assets 
Total  
Assets 
Total  
Assets 
Dependent Variable t ?1   .804*** .803*** .804*** .803*** .803*** 
  (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) 
Treaty Reform1   ?.009*    ?.002    ?.001    ?.003 
(.006) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Treaty Reform2     ?.008 .002 
  (.013) (.017) 
Withholding Tax   .129 
  (.135) 
Repatriation Tax     ?.050    ?.045 
  (.102) (.101) 
Tax Rate   ?.363***    ?.150*    ?.360***    ?.149*    ?.146*    ?.152*    ?.151* 
(.060) (.080) (.060) (.080) (.080) (.080) (.080) 
Profitability .061***    ?.005 .061***    ?.005    ?.005    ?.005    ?.002 
(.011) (.020) (.011) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
(ln)GDP .128* .015 .128* .015 .013 .014 .015 
(.073) (.046) (.073) (.046) (.047) (.046) (.046) 
(ln)GDP per Capita .605*** .199*** .604*** .199*** .198*** .200*** .200*** 
(.082) (.053) (.082) (.053) (.053) (.053) (.053) 
Inflation   ?.040 .046*    ?.040 .046* .047* .046* .046* 
(.047) (.026) (.048) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
Country Risk   ?.010* .010    ?.011* .010 .009 .010 .010 
(.006) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Observations  85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 
First Stage Results:   
Instrument Coefficient     ?.022***    ?.022***    .022***    ?.022***    ?.022*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
F ?Test   441.70   441.56 440.36 439.83 439.61 
The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the 
subsidiary level. Year dummies for 1997-2008 are included but not reported. The results in columns (2) and 
(4) to (7) are from 2SLS. There, the instrument variable is the second lag of the dependent variable. *, ** and 
*** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 %. 
 
Still, I suppose that repatriation taxes exert a significant impact on investments and their 
financing. Therefore, in columns (5), (6) and (7), I enrich my regressions by variables 
covering the aspect of withholding taxes on dividends. In specifications (6) and (7), I consider 
the variable Repatriation Tax. This variable stems from the withholding tax rates on 
dividends, but takes further aspects into consideration, such as if there is a credit or exemption 
method in the country of the parent company. I expect that the more refined consideration of 
the variation in the effective repatriation taxes may improve identification. Nevertheless, in 
columns (5) to (7), Table 6-2 shows that withholding taxes or repatriation taxes also yield 
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insignificant effects on total assets. Consequently, I am unable to find any significant effects 
of either tax treaty reforms or more detailed measures of repatriation taxes if total asset stocks 
are considered. 
Concerning the control variables, the coefficients in Table 6-2 show the expected signs and 
effects. The general corporate income tax effect exerts a negative impact on total investment. 
A higher profitability is associated with more total investment. The variable GDP is often 
insignificant because I control for subsidiary specific effects, which also nest country 
effects.72 The positive impact of GDP per capita on assets can be explained by the tradeoff 
between labor intensive and capital intensive production since GDP per capita can be seen as 
a proxy for labor costs. 
6.5.2 Real Investments 
Taking into account the discussion in Section 2.4, opposing effects of repatriation taxes are 
expected if different investment types are considered. The insignificant effects of repatriation 
taxes on total assets might be a consequence of opposing responses to repatriation effects of 
different investment types. If these elements are differently affected, they might net out 
leading to a total effect which is insignificant. Therefore, I decompose the total tax response 
by separately considering different asset categories. In Table 6-3 I regress fixed assets on 
repatriation taxes and the variables indicating whether a tax treaty amendment took place. 
In my hypothesis H6-3 I suppose a negative impact of repatriation taxes on FDI if new equity 
is the source of finance. The results shown in Table 6-3 suggest that fixed assets are 
negatively affected by repatriation taxes.73 The size effects between the application of 
Withholding Tax and Repatriation Tax do not differ too much. In interpreting the results and 
in my further estimations I stick to Repatriation Tax, because, as described in Section 2, it is 
the more exact, sophisticated and relevant variable. The coefficient of -0.433 in column (5) of 
Table 6-3 indicates that a ten percentage point increase in the repatriation tax results in a stock 
of fixed assets which is 4.33 percent smaller. 
                                                            
72 As country fixed effects are therefore filtered out, the GDP cannot exert an influence as long as it fluctuates in 
line with the GDPs of other countries. 
73 Regarding the results presented in column (4) of Table 6-3 and in columns (1), (2), (4) and (6) of Table 6-4, I 
point out that the AR-2 test of autocorrelation is significant. This can be overcome by using an additional 
previous lag in the IV approach. Implementing this is reserved for a future version of this paper.  
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Table 6 ?3: Effects of repatriation taxes on fixed assets 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) 
Fixed 
Assets 
Fixed  
Assets 
Fixed  
Assets 
Fixed  
Assets 
Fixed  
Assets 
Fixed  
Assets 
Dependent Variable t ?1 .600*** .600*** .600*** .600*** .600*** .600*** 
(.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) 
Treaty Reform1   ?.008     ?.014      ?.014 
(.022)  (.022)   (.022) 
Treaty Reform2     ?.018     
 (.051)     
Withholding Tax      ?.486*   ?.446*   
  (.274) (.275)   
Repatriation Tax         ?.433*    ?.455* 
    (.264) (.267) 
Tax Rate   ?.439**    ?.436**    ?.453**    ?.447**    ?.453*    ?.459** 
(.214) (.214) (.215) (.215) (.215) (.215) 
Profitability .261*** .261*** .261*** .210*** .261*** .261*** 
(.053) (.053) (.053) (.044) (.053) (.053) 
(ln)GDP .169** .168** .174** .174** .166** .165** 
(.077) (.077) (.077) (.076) (.078) (.078) 
(ln)GDP per Capita .132 .129 .135 .137* .143* .144* 
(.085) (.085) (.084) (.084) (.086) (.086) 
Inflation .232 .232 .231 .231 .230 .230 
(.173) (.173) (.173) (.173) (.173) (.173) 
Country Risk .007 .007 .010 .010 .010 .010 
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Observations  85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 
First Stage Results:      
Instrument Coefficient   ?.047***    ?.047***   ?.047***   ?.047***    ?.047***    ?.047*** 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
F ?Test 677.76 678.09 678.46 700.81 678.57 678.01 
The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on 
the subsidiary level. Year dummies for 1997-2008 are included but not reported All results are from 2SLS. 
The instrument variable is the second lag of the dependent variable. *, ** and *** show significance at the 
level of 10%, 5% and 1 %. 
The significant effect supports my assumption that a closer look at repatriation taxes is 
advisable. While both domestic and multilateral regulations play a role concerning 
withholding taxes, they are still strongly driven by double tax treaties. Moreover, in column 
(6) I also consider the variable indicating if a tax treaty amendment took place. The effect of a 
tax treaty reform proves to be insignificant. This finding supports the view that the effective 
changes of repatriation taxes affect FDI whereas the various issues also concluded in a tax 
treaty do not really matter. At least, they do not exert a negative impact on FDI. 
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6.5.3 Financial Investments 
I suppose that higher repatriation taxes cause firms to increase their financial asset stock if 
firms expect falling repatriation taxes in the future. Then, in the presence of high repatriation 
taxes, companies act rationally when they reinvest their profits instead of distributing them. 
Investing in financial assets grant access to investment opportunities not limited to the host 
country of the respective subsidiary. The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6-4 only 
weakly confirm a positive impact of repatriation taxes on financial assets. 
Financial assets also include portfolio investments. Portfolio investments are however not 
very attractive if the firm has investment opportunities within the multinational firm. In 
columns (3) and (4) I therefore focus on shares of affiliated firms because investing in shares 
of other affiliated firms is an alternative means to funnel equity to investment opportunities of 
the multinational firm – without paying repatriation taxes. In fact, the results show a positive 
and highly significant effect of repatriation taxes on shares in affiliated firms. The coefficient 
of 0.873 in column (3) means that a one percentage point increase in the repatriation tax 
results in a 0.873 percent increase in the subsidiary’s financial asset stock. Again, the material 
outcome does not depend on the inclusion of the tax treaty dummy. 
As regards control variables, the effects are generally similar to those found for total assets 
and fixed assets. Interestingly, the host-country tax rate proves to be insignificant for 
investments in financial assets. This finding is very reasonable because when it comes to 
shares in affiliated firms, dividends are the most important income source. Most countries 
apply the exemption system or a foreign tax credit and therefore the relevance of host-country 
taxes is expected to be small. 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6-4 show the effect of a treaty reform and of repatriation taxes 
on current assets. While the coefficient of the binary variable is negative and significant, the 
repatriation taxes themselves seem to exert no significant influence. In any case, these results 
are not robust. Since the dependent variable includes several sub-items like inventories, short-
term financial assets and cash holding, the previously identified opposing effects may once 
again both play a role here. While inventories might respond in accordance with investment in 
fixed assets, short-term financial assets and cash holding might be adversely affected by 
repatriation taxes. Foley et al. (2007), for example, show that repatriation taxes can explain 
extensive cash holding by foreign subsidiaries of US multinationals. Unfortunately, my data 
does not allow demerging the current assets and identifying effects on its sub-items. 
6. The Impact of Tax Treaties and Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited 
165 
Table 6 ?4: Effects of repatriation taxes on financial assets and on current assets 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) 
 Financial 
Assets 
Financial 
Assets 
Internal 
Financial 
Assets 
Internal 
Financial 
Assets 
Current  
Assets 
Current  
Assets 
Dependent Variable t ?1 .595*** .594*** .579*** .579*** .486*** .486*** 
(.016) (.026) (.020) (.020) (.027) (.027) 
Treaty Reform1 .034    ?.040    ?.052** 
(.042) (.038) (.019) 
Repatriation Tax .931* .880* .873** .937**    ?.099    ?.015 
(.536) (.541) (.459) (.447) (.054) (.162) 
Tax Rate  .536  .521    ?.348    ?.331    ?.282*    ?.260* 
(.441) (.445) (.338) (.338) (.159) (.158) 
Profitability .224*** .223*** .151** .153**    ?.158***    ?.159*** 
(.073) (.073) (.066) (.066) (.053) (.053) 
(ln)GDP   ?.298    ?.295    ?.323    ?.323 .048 .049 
(.336) (.338) (.332) (.332) (.048) (.048) 
(ln)GDP per Capita .443 .444 .249 .247 .408*** .405*** 
(.321) (.324) (.311) (.311) (.063) (.063) 
Inflation   ?.195***    ?.194***    ?.145*    ?.146* .145*** .145*** 
(.067) (.067) (.079) (.079) (.051) (.051) 
Country Risk   ?.108***    ?.108***    ?.024    ?.024    ?.003    ?.003 
(.017) (.036) (.026) (.026) (.015) (.014) 
Observations  85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 
First Stage Results:       
Instrument Coefficient   ?.093***    ?.092***    ?.076***    ?.075***    ?.136***    ?.136*** 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.005) (.005) 
F ?Test 2,184.88  2,157.70 1,251.75 1,250.11 836.78 836.63 
The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered 
on the subsidiary level. Year dummies for 1997-2008 are included but not reported All results are from 
2SLS. The instrument variable is the second lag of the dependent variable. *, ** and *** show 
significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 %. 
The coefficients of the control variables are as expected. The negative coefficients of 
profitability in columns (5) and (6) suggest a reduction of finished goods on stock when a 
company’s products are strongly demanded and an incentive to reinvest profits into fixed 
assets instead of holding cash. 
6.5.4 Capital Structures 
In a final step I also analyze whether the structure of liabilities and shareholder’s equity is 
affected by tax treaty reforms and, in particular, repatriation taxes. Since the impact of 
repatriation taxes on total capital, which corresponds to total assets, is insignificant, I 
decompose the effect into the effects on its elements nominal capital, revenue reserves and 
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liabilities. For each of these elements I run separate estimations. Table 6-5 shows the effect of 
repatriation taxes on the financial structures of multinational subsidiaries. 
First, in columns (2) and (3) I focus on the effect of the repatriation taxes on the nominal 
capital of a subsidiary. My results suggest that a higher repatriation tax leads to a lower 
amount of subscribed or called-up capital. The coefficient of -0.088 in column (3) means that 
a ten percentage point higher repatriation tax leads to a 0.88 percent smaller share of new 
equity injection. This relationship corresponds to my finding of a negative effect of 
repatriation taxes on real investment in fixed assets. While the latter finding suggest that new 
equity is – at least to some extend - the marginal source of finance, new equity shrinks if 
repatriation taxes are high. 
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 6-5 show that revenue reserves, by contrast, are positively 
affected by repatriation taxes on dividends. This result was also expected (cf. H-5) and 
corresponds well to my findings regarding investment in financial assets. If firms expect a 
decline of withholding taxes in the future, they act rationally when retaining profits and, in 
doing so, increasing their revenue reserves. The coefficient of 0.094 in column (5) can be 
interpreted as follows: A ten percentage point higher repatriation tax results in 0.94% higher 
revenue reserves. 
Repatriation taxes have opposing effects on the different elements of equity. Higher 
repatriation taxes lead to a significantly higher share of revenue reserves and at the same time 
to significantly smaller new equity injections. The results are also in accordance with the 
equity nucleus proposition (Sinn, 1993). The opposing effects of repatriation taxes on new 
equity capital and revenue reserves confirm my hypothesis H6-5. 
As can be seen in columns (6) and (7) of Table 6-5, the effect of repatriation taxes on 
liabilities is not significant. However, the discussion in Section 2.5 and H-6 do not lead to an 
unambiguous prediction on the effect of repatriation taxes on the share of debt financing. 
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Table 6 ?5: Effects of repatriation taxes on shareholder equity and liabilities 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) 
 Total  
Capital 
Nominal 
Capital 
Nominal 
Capital 
Revenue 
Reserves 
Revenue  
Reserves Liabilities Liabilities 
Dependent Variable t ?1 .803*** .594*** .594*** .569*** .569*** .595*** .595*** 
(.041) (.039) (.039) (.037) (.037) (.018) (.018) 
Treaty Reform1      ?.003    ?.001  .005* 
   (.002)  (.003)  (.003) 
Repatriation Tax   ?.045    ?.083**    ?.088** .096** .094**   ?.009   ?.002 
(.101) (.039) (.039) (.043) (.045) (.056) (.056) 
Tax Rate   ?.151*    ?.070*    ?.071*    ?.062*    ?.062* .136*** .138*** 
(.080) (.038) (.039) (.033) (.033) (.049) (.049) 
Profitability   ?.002    ?.290***    ?.290*** .429*** .429***    ?.147***    ?.147*** 
(.020) (.015) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.008) (.008) 
(ln)GDP .015    ?.021    ?.021 .000 .000 .021 .022 
(.046) (.019) (.019) (.029) (.029) (.028) (.027) 
(ln)GDP per Capita .200*** .008 .008 .027 .027    ?.033    ?.033 
(.053) (.019) (.019) (.029) (.029) (.028) (.027) 
Inflation .046* .020** .020** .028*** .028***    ?.050***    ?.050*** 
(.026) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.007) 
Country Risk .010   ?.001   ?.001 .001 .001  .001  .001 
(.007) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) 
Observations  85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 85,030 
First Stage Results:         
Instrument Coefficient   ?.022***   ?.096***    ?.096***   ?.096***   ?.096***    ?.121***    ?.121*** 
(.001) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) 
F ?Test 439.61 499,48 500.29 685.45 684.49 2,962.94 2,986.48 
The dependent variables are in logs. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the 
subsidiary level. Year dummies for 1997-2008 are included but not reported. All results are from 2SLS. The 
instrument variable is the second lag of the dependent variable.  *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 
10%, 5% and 1 %. 
 
As to control variables, let us only briefly discuss some selected effects. The host-country tax 
rate negatively affects both nominal capital and revenue reserves while the impact on debt is 
positive. These relationships confirm previous findings on taxes and capital structure choices 
(Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). The positive impact of 
profitability on revenue reserves does not come as a surprise. Then, the negative impact of 
profitability on the other financial shares can be explained by the simple fact that they 
represent the remaining parts of total capital. As the revenue reserves increase, the relative 
share of nominal capital and liabilities automatically decline even though their absolute values 
might remain constant. 
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6.6 Concluding Remarks 
I have analyzed how tax treaties and repatriation taxes affect investment and capital structures 
of multinational subsidiaries. If I follow the approach taken by previous studies and consider 
simple binary variables indicating the enforcement of a new tax treaty, I find insignificant 
effects on total asset stocks. Then, I have particularly tested whether changes of repatriation 
taxes affect total investment of multinational subsidiaries. Yet, I am also unable to find any 
statistically significant effects of repatriation taxes on total investment. 
In additional analyses, however, I have taken into account that different types of investment 
might be adversely affected by changes of repatriation taxes. Indeed, my results suggest that 
fixed assets are negatively affected by higher repatriation taxes while, at the same time, 
passive investment in financial assets declines. My findings are in accordance with 
expectations on the effect of repatriation taxes. Investment in fixed assets is negatively 
affected by repatriation taxes leading to the conclusion that new equity is the marginal source 
of finance. Moreover, my results suggest that firms postpone repatriation because they have 
the general expectation that - due to new tax treaties - high repatriation taxes will decrease in 
the future. In a lack of local investment opportunities, the respective funds are then invested 
in the capital market and in particular in shares of affiliated firms. Accordingly, I find a 
positive effect of repatriation taxes on financial investments. 
The behavioral response to repatriation taxes is also confirmed by corresponding effects of 
repatriation taxes on financial structures of the subsidiaries. My results suggest significant 
effects on the structure of equity finance. Higher repatriation taxes are associated with a 
significantly higher share of revenue reserves and at the same time with significantly smaller 
new equity injections. 
The results suggest that the aspect of repatriation taxes on dividends is worth analyzing. They 
seem to exert a significant impact on specific kinds of investments. The opposing effects, e.g., 
on investment in fixed and financial assets lead to an overall insignificant effect on total 
investment. These opposing effects might explain previous findings of an insignificant effect 
of tax treaties on aggregated FDI. My results suggest that changes of the repatriation taxes 
exert statistically significant effects on both investment and the structure of equity financing. 
Therefore, tax treaties seem to be strongly considered by multinational companies if the treaty 
effectively affects repatriation taxes. By contrast, the general observation if a tax treaty exists 
or was rephrased does not exert a significant effect on investment. 
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6.7 Appendix 
 
Methods to Avoid Double Taxation and Repatriation Taxes 
If the exemption method is applied, repatriated intercompany dividends are tax exempt at the 
level of the firm receiving the dividends. Yet, in a few countries like France, Germany or 
Belgium a share ߙ is still subject to tax, whereas in most countries applying the exemption 
method,  ߙ ൌ 	 ?. Then, the tax ݉  imposed on one dollar of intercompany dividends amounts 
to:  ݉ ൌ  ߙ ߬ோ ൅ ߱ௌ 
Where ߬ோ is the corporate tax rate of the residence country and ߱ௌ is the withholding tax rate 
imposed on intercompany dividends by the source country. 
In the case of a credit system, intercompany dividends are subject to tax but taxes paid abroad 
reduce the tax liability. If a direct credit is applied, the foreign tax credit includes the 
withholding taxes imposed on intercompany dividends.  Then, the additional tax imposed on 
one dollar of intercompany dividend amounts to:  ݉ ൌ  ߬ோ െ ሼ߬ோǢ ߱ௌሽ ൅ ߱ௌ 
An indirect credit also includes foreign corporate taxes ߬ௌ paid by the subsidiary. The 
additional tax imposed on intercompany dividends is computed in accordance with the 
following expression:   ݉ ൌ ఛೃሺଵିఛೄሻെ ൜ ఛೃ൫ଵିఛೄ൯ Ǣ  ఛೄ൫ଵିఛೄ൯൅ ߱ௌൠ ൅ ߱ௌ 
Expressions (6-3) and (6-4) show that the repatriation tax is determined by the tax rate of the 
residence country. It can be deducted from the formulas that there is a conceivable situation 
where a decrease in the withholding tax ߱ௌ is just subsidized by a proportional increase in ߬ோ. 
This is the case if the tax rate of the residence country exceeds the tax credit. Then, a 
reduction of withholding tax, e.g., caused by a new tax treaty, has no material effect. 
 
 
(6-2) 
(6-3) 
(6-4) 
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Table 6 ?6: Selected tax treaty changes between 1996 and 2008 
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Table 6-7: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2008 
 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .05 .3 .15 .3 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .1 0 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .05 0 0 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 .05 .05 0 .07 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .05 0 .05 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 .05 .05
Canada CAN .05 .05 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .05 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .05 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .15 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .05 .35 .15 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .05 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35
China CHN .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1
Columbia COL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .28 .1 0 .05 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 0 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .211 0 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .05 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 0 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .1 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 0 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .1 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 0 0 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .25 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .05 .05 .15 0 0 .15
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15
New Zealand NZL .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR 0 0 0 .25 .25 0 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .25 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 0 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .2 0 0 .2 .1 0 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .2 .1 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 .1 .2 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 0 .1 .2
Romania ROM .05 0 0 .16 .16 0 .05 .16 .16 .1 .16 .05 0 0 0 .16 0 0 0 0 0 .16 0 0 .15 .125 0 0 .1 .07 0 .16 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .16 0 .16 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .15 .15 .03 0 .1 .16
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .15 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .18 .15 0 .15 .18 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .18 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .18 0 0 0 .1 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .18
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 0 .05 .3 .05 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .3 0 0 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 0 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 0 0 0 .35 0 0 0 0 0 .35 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .35 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .35 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 0 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 0 .3 .05 0 .05 0 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .1 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table 6 ?8: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2008 
  
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC EX EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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6.9 Survey 4: Empirical studies on the effect of withholding taxes and related aspects 
Survey 74 Data Methodology Results 
Altshuler, 
Grubert 
(2003) 
Firm level data of 
about 7,500 U.S.-
controlled foreign 
companies provided 
by the IRS. The 1996 
corporate tax files 
compiled by the 
Statistics of Income 
(SOI) Division of the 
Internal Revenue 
Service cover 
balance sheet 
information as well 
as profit and loss 
account information. 
OLS estimations of the 
effects of different kinds 
of taxes (statutory 
corporate income tax, 
withholding tax) on 
financial assets with 
different maturities. 
Additional OLS 
regressions concerning 
the tax effect on CFC 
debt. 
The investment into internal 
financial assets comes as a third 
option for a subsidiary besides 
repatriating direct dividends to 
the parent or investing in its own 
real operations. Controlled 
foreign corporations facing high 
repatriation taxes make greater 
investments in related affiliates 
and send a greater share of their 
dividends to other foreign 
affiliates. 
Auerbach, 
Hasset (2003) 
Unbalanced firm-
level panel data set 
derived from the 
Compustat industrial, 
full-coverage, and 
research files, for the 
eighteen-year period 
period 1981-1998 
Tobit estimations with 
the dividend/assets ratio 
serving as the dependent 
variable. The 
independent variables 
are investment, value, 
cash and debt. 
Additional bivariate 
Tobit regressions with 
new shares/repurchases 
as the dependent 
variable and the 
previously described 
independent variables. 
Strong support for the 
hypothesis that dividends do 
respond to investment as well as 
to cash flow (new view). 
Furthermore, new share issues 
are quite responsive to 
investment and equally 
responsive to increases in cash 
flow. This contradicts one of the 
key elements of the traditional 
view, namely that dividend taxes 
raise the cost of capital. 
Bellak, 
Leibrecht 
(2010) 
Outbound set of the 
Microdatabase Direct 
Investment (MiDi) 
provided by the 
German Federal 
Bank. The years 
1999 till 2005 are 
used. 
Application of the 
Lintner Model. The 
dependent variable is the 
dividend payments to 
the German mother. The 
crucial independent 
variable is the dividend 
tax on repatriation per 
country. 
The regression yields semi-
elasticities of about -3.5 
(evaluated at the overall mean) 
and -1.6 (evaluated at the mean 
of positive dividends), 
respectively, implying that a one 
percentage point change in the 
dividend tax rate will change 
dividends repatriated by 3.5 
(1.6) percent.  
Blonigen, 
Davies (2004) 
FDI activity data 
reported by the 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA); 
outbound FDI flows 
since 1966, inbound 
FDI flows over the 
period 1980-1999. 
The FDI stock serves as 
the dependent variable. 
The crucial binary 
independent variable 
differentiates between 
an old and a new tax 
treaty. 
No systematic evidence can be 
found that bilateral tax treaties 
affect FDI activity. Instead, the 
results suggest either that the 
provisions of a treaty have no 
effect or that the positive and 
negative aspects of treaty 
formation largely cancel out one 
another. 
                                                            
74 Some of the methodologies’ and results’ summaries quote the respective papers literally. 
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Chisik, Davies 
(2004a) 
Two 1992 data sets. 
One containing US 
and its bilateral tax 
treaty partners, with 
two subsamples 
(affiliate sales and 
FDI stock). The 
second data set uses 
the FDI stock 
between OECD 
member countries.  
OLS, Instrumental 
variables, Tobit, gravity 
and probit estimations. 
The dependent variable 
is a measure of FDI 
activity from a parent 
country to a host 
country. The crucial 
independent variables 
are the stock of home 
FDI, the stock of foreign 
FDI, the home non-
treaty tax, foreign non-
treaty taxes, and the 
home share of GDP. 
The paper models the bargaining 
process behind bilateral tax 
treaty development and yields 
three main outcomes: There are 
conflicting interests in treaty 
formation. The terms of tax 
treaties vary systematically 
across countries. Asymmetries 
in FDI levels affect the threat 
point in the bargaining problem. 
As asymmetries increase, the 
scope of possible cooperative 
outcomes diminishes. 
Chisik, Davies 
(2004b) 
Withholding tax rates 
on dividends and 
interest for the US 
non-treaty case, for 7 
bilateral cases 
including the US, 
and for 3 country 
combinations where 
the US is not 
involved. 
Model with two-way 
irreversible FDI flows. 
Analytical focus with 
data serving as 
supporting evidence. 
Bilateral tax treaties may 
increase FDI and improve the 
global allocation of capital 
relative to non-treaty outcomes. 
FDI will be largest between 
rather similar countries. 
Clark (2000) Analysis of several 
recent empirical 
papers on the tax 
effect on FDI, but no 
meta regressions. 
Meta study on 
sensitivity of FDI to CIT 
rates. 
Sensitivity of both real and 
financial businesses towards 
CIT rate increases over time. A 
lot of tax planning is focusing 
on statutory corporate tax rate 
differences between countries. 
Empirical results suggest that 
bilateral WHT reductions can 
increase FDI activity. 
Davies 
(2003a) 
FDI activity data 
reported by the 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; outbound 
FDI flows since 
1966, inbound FDI 
flows since 1980. 
CMM model as 
modified by Blonigen, 
Davies, Head Dependent 
variable: FDI; the most 
important (binary) 
independent variable is 
whether there has been a 
revision of a bilateral 
tax treaty (1) or not (0). 
There is no empirical evidence 
that renegotiations of treaties 
have a positive effect on FDI. 
Davies (2004) Review of seminal 
empirical tax treaty 
literature, but no 
quantitative analysis 
of the respective 
outcomes. 
Mainly qualitative 
description of the 
differences between 
theoretical and empirical 
effects of bilateral tax 
treaties. 
The main finding is that 
theoretical and empirical papers 
study different topics. Theorists 
see treaties as a way to 
coordinate tax policies across 
countries and thus to increase 
FDI. Empirical papers, however, 
focus on the effects of tax 
treaties already in place and 
their impact on FDI. 
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Davies, 
Norbäck, 
Tekin-Koru 
(2009) 
Firm-level data on 
Swedish firms for the 
years 1965-1998. 
First, there are probit 
estimates of treaty 
effects on having an 
affiliate in the host 
country; Dependent 
variable: Entry versus 
no entry; Independent 
variable: Treaty (yes or 
no). Second, there are 
OLS estimates of treaty 
effects on the level of 
sales, exports and 
imports of Swedish 
affiliates: Dependent 
variables: Sales, 
Exports, Imports; 
Independent binary 
Variable: treaty yes/no. 
Tax treaties have little effect on 
the level of FDI activity. 
However, a tax treaty increases 
the probability of having an 
affiliate in a given country. 
Furthermore, an impact of 
treaties on MNE’s marginal 
trade decisions is identified, 
meaning that a treaty leads to 
lower reported profits of the 
firm in the host country. This 
should be achieved by 
manipulating intra-firm trade. 
Desai, Foley, 
Hines (2006) 
BEA panel data set 
for the years 1982-
2002. Covers U.S.-
based foreign 
operations. 
OLS and Tobit 
Regressions; Dependent 
variable: Dividend 
payments by affiliates; 
Independent variables: 
Net income, lagged 
dividend payments. 
Foreign affiliates of U.S. 
companies follow well-defined 
repatriation patterns. Though 
taxes do have an impact, they 
cannot alone explain these 
patterns as those patterns are 
similar across entities with 
distinctive tax treatments. For 
instance, highly-leveraged 
parent companies are associated 
with higher dividends from their 
affiliates. Additionally, higher 
dividend payments to the parent 
company's shareholders also 
result in higher dividends being 
received from its affiliates. Last 
but not least, split-ownership 
contributes to stable dividend 
policies. 
Di Giovanni 
(2005) 
Thomson Financial 
Securities Data panel 
data set on M&A 
activity for the years 
1990 till 1999. 
Tobit; dependent 
variable: gross M&A 
investment flows; 
Independent variables: 
stock market 
capitalization, credit 
provided to the public 
sector, customs union, 
service agreement, free-
trade agreement, 
average corporate tax 
rate, Capital Tax Treaty 
A 1% increase of the stock 
market to GDP ratio is 
associated with a 0.955% 
increase in cross-border M&A 
activity. Firms invest more 
money in countries they trade 
with. A common language also 
encourages M&A activity. 
Furthermore, custom unions and 
free trade agreements negatively 
influence cross-border M&A 
activity, whereas service 
agreements have a positive 
effect. Last but not least, high 
taxes in the target country 
decrease acquisitions, while 
capital tax treaties increase 
M&A activity. 
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Egger, Merlo, 
Ruf, Wamser 
(2012) 
Amadeus ownership 
micro data set of the 
year 2008, covering 
information on 
61,737 foreign 
owners located in 29 
different European 
countries. 
The paper uses the UK's 
switch in dividend 
treatment as of 2009 for 
identification. As of 
2009, the UK switched 
from the worldwide 
taxation system to the 
exemption system with 
regards to dividends. 
The reform's impact on 
the repatriation pattern 
and other outcomes of 
UK-owned affiliates is 
estimated. 
The results imply that, due to 
the switch from the worldwide 
tax system to tax exemption, 
foreign affiliates of UK owners 
responded to the reform by 
repatriating more foreign 
dividends than without the 
reform. Furthermore, other 
economic measures besides 
dividend repatriation also seem 
to be affected by the reform: 
affiliate-level investment was 
negatively affected and the 
affiliate level sales-to-fixed-
assets ratio was positively 
affected. 
Egger, Larch, 
Pfaffermayr, 
Winner (2006) 
OECD panel dataset 
of outward FDI for 
the years 1985-2000. 
Difference-in-
differences propensity 
score-matching 
approach based on a 
numerically solvable 
general equilibrium 
model. The dependent 
variable is the respective 
change in bilateral 
stocks of outward FDI. 
The central independent 
variable is the existence 
of a new double tax 
treaty in the respective 
bilateral relationship. 
Newly implemented double 
taxation treaties have a 
significant negative impact on 
the bilateral stocks of outward 
foreign direct investment. 
Egger, Larch, 
Pfaffermayr, 
Winner (2009) 
2361 observations of 
bilateral foreign 
direct investment 
(FDI) outbound 
stocks among OECD 
countries between 
1991 and 2002. 
Computed effective tax 
rates are used to trace 
the tax impact on FDI. 
The results are supposed 
to be less biased as to 
the application of 
unilateral tax rates. 
These bilateral effective 
tax rates serve as a basis 
to estimate the impact of 
corporate taxation on 
outbound stocks of 
bilateral foreign direct 
investment (FDI) among 
OECD countries 
between 1991 and 2002. 
Based on the regression results, 
outbound FDI seem to be 
positively related to the parent 
and host country tax burden and 
negatively associated with 
bilateral effective tax rates. 
Egger, Loretz, 
Pfaffermayr, 
Winner (2004) 
Panel data set of 
bilateral outward 
FDI, 1991-2004, 
from UNCTAD’s 
Major FDI Indicators 
(2007) 
Dependent variable: log 
stocks of bilateral FDI; 
Independent variables: 
Corporate Tax Rates 
(Host & Parent country), 
Depreciation Allowance 
(Host & Parent country), 
and host country WHT. 
The analysis focuses on three 
instruments of tax law; statutory 
corporate tax rates, the 
deductibility of fixed costs from 
the tax base, and withholding 
tax rates on dividends in order to 
examine their impact on FDI. 
Different combinations of the 
tax instruments may lead to an 
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identical level or change of the 
effective tax rate for the average 
MNE. However, the resulting 
impact on FDI or other modes of 
MNE activity may differ due to 
heterogeneous indirect effects 
on other firms. 
Egger, Merlo 
(2011) 
MiDi panel data set 
for 1996-2005. 
Two-step approach, first 
binary (is there an 
affiliate yes or no) and 
then in a second step 
estimation with the 
Poisson QMLE method. 
Higher statutory tax rates in a 
country reduce the probability of 
a German MNE setting up an 
affiliate in this country and also 
reduce the number of affiliates, 
number of employees as well as 
the value of FDI stocks and 
foreign assets in that country. 
Double Taxation Treaties have a 
positive impact on the first 
investment and also on FDI and 
foreign assets. However, their 
impact is much smaller than that 
of statutory tax rates. 
Foley, 
Hartzell, 
Titman, Twite 
(2007) 
Compustat 1982-
2004; Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
survey on U.S. direct 
investment abroad 
Dependent variable: 
natural logarithm of the 
ratio of cash to net 
assets; Independent 
variable: effective 
repatriation tax rate (net 
PPE or employment 
weighted) 
U.S. companies whose 
repatriation of profits would 
trigger high taxes have higher 
consolidated cash holdings 
abroad than those whose 
repatriation taxes are low. A one 
standard deviation increase in 
the tax burden from repatriating 
foreign income is associated 
with a 7.9% increase in the ratio 
of cash to net assets. Secondly, 
affiliates in low tax countries 
hold more cash than affiliates of 
the same parent in high-tax 
countries. Thirdly, firms which 
are less financially constrained 
domestically and which are 
more technology intensive, 
exhibit a higher sensitivity of 
affiliate cash holdings to 
repatriation tax burdens. 
Grubert, 
Altshuler 
(2000) 
1996 corporate tax 
files compiled by the 
Statistics of Income; 
6,000 CFCs, 
approximately 4,000 
of which are non-
financial. 
(a) Dependent variable: 
specific asset items / 
total CFC assets; 
Independent Variables: 
asset age, withholding 
tax, corporate income 
tax, tax haven status, log 
of GDP, log of GDP per 
capita. (b) Dependent 
variable: dividends paid 
to foreign affiliates/total 
dividends; independent 
variables: see (a) 
The availability of alternative 
repatriation strategies can affect 
real investment in the low-tax 
subsidiary and throughout the 
worldwide corporation. 
Controlled foreign corporations 
that face high repatriation taxes 
invest more in related affiliates 
and send a bigger share of their 
dividends to other foreign 
affiliates. In addition, they also 
pay off more local debt as they 
accumulate retained earnings.  
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Huizinga, 
Laeven, 
Nicodème 
(2007) 
Amadeus firm-level 
dataset for European 
multinationals and 
their subsidiaries for 
the years 1994-2003. 
Dependent variable: 
financial leverage (total 
liabilities to total assets); 
Independent variables: 
effective marginal tax 
rate, tax incentive to 
shift debt 
The leverage of a firm depends 
on national tax rates as well as 
the international tax rate 
differences and therefore hints at 
international debt shifting. 
These effects are statistically 
highly significant but rather 
small in size. Source level 
taxation seems to be more 
important to the MNE than 
taxation in its parent country 
concerning leverage. Corporate 
taxes seem to matter more than 
withholding taxes, hinting at the 
use of conduit companies in 
third countries. 
Jugurnath, 
Stewart, 
Brooks (2008) 
Annual cross-section 
data from 1982 to 
1992. The 
Datastream 
international 
company accounts 
database (DICA) 
serves as the applied 
firm-level dataset. 
The identification is 
mainly based on 
Australia adopting a 
dividend imputation 
system in 1987 and the 
US employing the 1986 
Tax Reform Act (TRA). 
The paper traces the 
effects of dividend 
taxation on the level of 
corporate capital 
investment, on proxies 
for corporate tax rates, 
financial leverage, 
liquidity, capital 
intensity, and on firm 
size. 
The paper concludes that 
dividend imputation as 
introduced in Australia is an 
effective way to reduce the 
distortions caused by the 
traditional system of taxation. 
Secondly, compared to the US 
TRA, dividend imputation has 
been better able to positively 
stimulate corporate capital 
investment. The TRA effect on 
corporate investment seems to 
be more pronounced in the US 
for firms 
having a net operating loss. 
Neumayer 
(2007) 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis panel data 
set on U.S. outbound 
FDI for the years 
1970-2001 
Fixed-effects estimation; 
Dependent variables: 
logged FDI stock, 
logged FDI stock share; 
Independent variables: 
double tax treaties, 
bilateral investment 
treaties. 
Developing countries benefit in 
form of a higher FDI stock (up 
22%) and a higher share of FDI 
stock (up 20%) originating from 
the U.S. if they sign a double tax 
treaty with the U.S. 
Poterba 
(2004) 
Weighted average 
marginal tax rate 
series from 1929 till 
2003. The share of 
equity owned by 
households, the 
weighted average 
household marginal 
tax rate on dividends, 
and the weighted 
average investor tax 
price are shown one 
by one. 
Using information from 
the US flow of funds 
accounts and income 
statistics, the combined 
statutory tax rate 
consisting of both 
federal and state tax 
elements is grossed up 
to a weighted average of 
tax burdens on various 
investor categories. This 
info is used to conclude 
on the elasticity for the 
affected shareholder's 
tax change in 2003. 
The Job Growth of Taxpayer 
Relief Reconciliation Act 
(JGTRRA) of 2003 reduces the 
individual tax burden on the sale 
of stock and on distributed 
dividends. It should raise the 
after-tax value of dividends 
relative to capital gains by more 
than five percentage points. The 
time-series estimates suggest an 
elasticity of more than three, and 
imply that the recent tax reform 
could ultimately increase 
dividends by almost twenty 
percent. 
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Smart (2010) Outbound panel data 
set of Canadian 
multinationals. The 
FDI data are from 
official Canadian 
government sources, 
and cover 
investments into 94 
countries over the 
1976–2008 period. 
The goal is to estimate 
the effects of host 
country taxes and 
repatriation taxes on 
outbound FDI stocks. 
The paper uses a tax-
treaty indicator variable 
as an instrumental 
variable for repatriation 
tax in order to overcome 
endogeneity and 
measurement issues. 
Canadian tax treaties that 
involve a reform from 
residence-based taxation to 
exemption have increased 
investment into the affected 
countries by 79 per cent on 
average. The resulting tax rate 
elasticity is large and significant. 
Thus, Canada’s general hybrid 
system of international taxation 
has distorted investment 
decisions and entailed a 
substantial loss of profitability 
to Canadian MNCs. 
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7. Form Follows Function? 
-  Evidence on tax savings by multinational holding structures 75 76 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: I provide evidence on the group structures of multinationals and analyze to what 
extent these structures are tax efficient. While the corporate income tax can hardly be avoided 
if a subsidiary is active in a country, withholding taxes depend on the structure in which the 
subsidiary is embedded. By vertically inserting holding companies or adjusting the 
superior/subordinate relationship of subsidiaries, multinationals can often influence their total 
tax burden, especially regarding the repatriation of profits by means of dividends. I analyze 
group structures across 58 countries in the years 1996 to 2008 using the MiDi database 
provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The results show that a higher 
withholding tax between two members of a group located in different countries increases the 
probability of indirect participation. However, in about half of the observations, the existence 
of an intermediate subsidiary does not lower the overall tax burden, and in 5% of the cases the 
tax burden on repatriated profits with such a holding company is even higher than without it. 
Although group structures generally seem to be tax driven, there are non-tax influencing 
factors which sometimes prevail. Besides drivers of the vertical company structure, I provide 
evidence of a horizontal driver: once a form of group taxation is available, groups seem to 
spread their national investments across more subsidiaries. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Taxation, Foreign Direct Investment, Holdings, Multinational Firms, 
Withholding Taxes 
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7.1 Introduction 
Form follows function is a principle usually associated with modern architecture and 
industrial design. 77 According to that principle, the shape of a building or an object should be 
primarily based on its intended function or purpose. In this article, I analyze the extent to 
which the form of multinational groups follows the function of minimizing tax payments. 
By cutting the tax wedge, the legal minimization of avoidable tax payments, ceteris paribus, 
leads to higher after tax net profits, which can be considered the basic goal of a corporation. 
By introducing holdings or adjusting the superior/subordinate relationship of subsidiaries in 
different countries, multinationals can shape their tax duties. Therefore, the kind of 
architecture I have in mind refers to the structuring of multinational groups. 
The setup of a multinational group structure is determined by many influencing factors. 
Organizational considerations and aspects in order to avoid principal agent conflicts can play 
a role and might demand a structure differing from the tax optimal one. I provide empirical 
evidence on multinational structures and I analyze to what extent they are tax optimal. This 
allows me to draw conclusions on the role and weight of tax aspects for multinationals. In the 
theoretical literature, the assessment of the tax impact on corporate decisions varies from 
negligible to paramount. On the one hand, practitioners say that the tax department only 
serves as an enabler of the ongoing business and that managers on all levels have EBIT 
incentives. On the other hand, in public perception, multinationals are often thought of as 
avoiding taxes by utilizing tax havens and clever structures. 
My identification of group structures adds some levels of detail to previous prominent studies 
dealing with the topic such as Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) and Mintz and Weichenrieder 
(2010). These and others are summarized in a short literature review in this section. In Section 
2, I provide an insight into those descriptive variables derived from the MiDi database which 
are of general interest and into those which I think are new to the literature. My new aspect 
particularly refers to the exact identification of the length and elements of holding chains. 
Following, in Sections 3 and 4, I develop and test hypotheses dealing with tax effects on the 
group structure and present several sensitivity tests and variations. Finally, Section 5 
concludes with a summary of the results. 
                                                            
77 The phrase dates back to 1896 when architect L.H. Sullivan used it in his essay “The tall office building 
artistically considered.” It was republished in The Craftsman in 1905 titled “Form and function artistically 
considered”. 
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7.2 Literature Review 
There is some existing literature analyzing holding chains from a tax perspective. Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2010) provide a comprehensive overview of multinational holding structures. 
Their work provides a fine insight into repatriation strategies and shows detailed descriptive 
empirical evidence based on the MiDi database. 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) analyze the role of chains of ownership for U.S. based firms 
operating abroad. They gather empirical evidence from the annual survey of U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and conclude that indirect 
participation of foreign operations has become more and more popular. Even in their data 
from 1997, already 30% of aggregate foreign assets were held indirectly via some kind of 
holding company. In addition, according to the evidence found by Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2002), the concentration of ownership chains is particularly high in Europe. 
Mintz (2004) pays particular attention to the holdings’ function as financing hubs. 
Multinationals are supposed to use these conduit entities for means of indirect debt financing 
instead of directly providing the loans to operative subsidiaries. So-called conduit countries, 
as Mintz (2004) puts it, can be identified by their large amounts of both capital inflows and 
capital outflows. The paper provides a concise model and some descriptive indications, but 
abstains from empirical evidence on a micro level. 
Hines and Rice (1994) provide an insight into the role of tax havens serving as holding 
countries for U.S. multinationals. According to them, these locations played a paramount role 
in the late 1980s, accounting for more than a quarter of U.S. foreign investment and nearly a 
third of U.S. profits. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006a) present more current evidence on the 
aspect of tax havens. They show empirical evidence that international firms with leeway 
regarding their transfer prices are most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven countries seem to 
fulfill two tasks: allocating taxable income away from the high-tax jurisdiction and facilitating 
deferral of foreign income in the credit country.78 Dharmapala and Hines (2009) identify the 
factors determining whether a country becomes a tax haven or not. Apart from low tax rates 
as an obvious attractor, they make out the quality of governments as particularly attractive to 
multinationals. 
                                                            
78 Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b) provide a model for analyzing to what extent tax havens divert economic 
activity.  
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I would like to mention that there are extensive studies on the impact of taxes on the size of 
foreign direct investments. The meta studies of De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) as well as of 
Feld and Heckemeyer (2009) provide overviews of some of the seminal works in this field. 
This paper, however, is not about the level but about the form of investments. Thus, leaving 
aside investment size aspects, it fully concentrates on how taxes influence the structure of 
multinational groups. 
7.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
7.3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals, which is provided by the 
German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). The comprehensive micro database covers 
information on both direct investment positions held in Germany by foreign investors and 
direct investment positions of German investors held abroad.The data allows me to identify 
the structure of groups and to trace it over time. In this paper, I use micro panel data for the 
period from 1996 to 2008. The data collection is imposed by German law, which requires 
reporting for certain international transactions and positions.79 This aspect of MiDi is worth 
emphasizing, as I am thus able to observe virtually all major German outbound investments. 
In this study, I only analyze subsidiaries which are located outside Germany and are owned 
by a group with its headquarters in Germany.80 I consider a sample of subsidiaries located in 
57 countries. My sample consists of the four BRIC countries81, 29 countries which were 
members of the OECD in 200882, and the eight EU member states which were not OECD 
countries in 2008.83 In order to complete the picture of conceivable group structures, I 
additionally include some tax havens84 and those other larger economies showing substantial 
                                                            
79Sec. 26 of Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection to the Foreign Trade and 
Payments Regulation (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Since 2002, FDI has to be reported if the participation is 
10% or more and the balance sheet total of the respective foreign investment in Germany exceeds EUR 3 
million. For details see Lipponer (2008). Though previous years showed lower threshold levels, I apply this 
one uniformly for all years in the panel. For general interpretations of the dataset from a tax and finance 
perspective see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010). 
80 I exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special tax 
regimes may be available. Furthermore, I exclude observations whose German parent is not an incorporated 
and legally independent entity, as well as subsidiaries which are not legally independent. 
81 The BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
82These covered OECD countries in 2008 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
83 These EU countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, and Romania. 
84These tax havens are the Bermuda Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, 
Liechtenstein, and Singapore. 
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investment stocks.85 While the headquarters of the multinational groups covered in my dataset 
are always located in Germany, I can also observe investments in directly held subsidiaries 
and in indirectly held subsidiaries if they are held by 100 percent. 
For this study, I only take into consideration 100 percent participations concerning both 
directly and indirectly held subsidiaries. In the first part of the paper I disregard country 
holdings, since they add no additional information to the international setup of the group. 
Only when dealing with the presence of a group taxation rule country holdings taken are into 
account, as they can be used to net the profits and losses of the national subsidiaries. 
From the data in the MiDi dataset, I have managed to reconstruct and identify the exact group 
concerning 100 percent participations. The dataset only uses two unique identifiers for its 
directly and indirectly held outbound subsidiaries.86 These numbers, titled “nu2” and “nu3”, 
have attached country information and are organized as follows: 
            Border I Border II 
The crucial aspect for my identification is that each “nu3” is a “nu2” in another line of the 
dataset. With this information, I managed to reconstruct the entire group structure concerning 
100 percent participations. For each observed subsidiary, I could spot its exact location in the 
overall group structure. 
What can we make of this information? Descriptively, I can show the length and width of 
group structures and trace them over time. Although it is not permissible to infer cause-and-
effect relationships from these descriptive statistics, their observation over time is interesting. 
There are some drivers suggesting more complex and sophisticated holding structures over 
time and some working against the very same development. The internationalization of 
business and the increased size of multinational groups are supposed to cause more complex 
holding structures. By contrast, generally sinking or even vanishing withholding taxes imply 
leaner structuring, as tax-motivated holding structures from the past might become obsolete. 
                                                            
85 These additional countries are Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay. 
86 See Lipponer (2008) for further details on the MiDi dataset. 
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For my empirical estimations I use the withholding tax rates on dividends. A multinational 
firm has different means to repatriate profits,87 either by paying interest on previously 
provided intercompany loans, by paying royalties or by distributing intercompany dividends. 
The latter can be considered the most important one in terms of volume and also in the 
potential sensitivity to tax treaty regulations.88 That is why I focus on repatriation via 
dividends in this paper. In addition to the simple withholding tax rate, I also regard the 
method of how the interest or dividend is treated in the receiving country, i.e. whether it is tax 
exempt, the tax is credited or deducted, or if there is double taxation. For each year, each 
single country pair is considered. Altogether, each of the four required matrices of 
withholding tax relationships show 58-by-57 combinations each for 13 years resulting in 
42,978 observed values.89 Changes in the withholding tax rates influence the tax efficiency of 
holding structures in the respective sphere. Still, my identification strategy regarding the tax 
efficiency of group structures builds as much on those withholding tax relationships that 
remain unchanged as on those that were changed. This results from analyzing the tax savings 
potential of intermediate subsidiaries for each year of the dataset. Put differently, my analysis 
is dynamic in the sense that it perceives the status of each group structure in each single year. 
7.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
I first present an overview of the length of holding chains and the width of group structures 
over time. General drivers of the supposed development have been put forward above. 
Concerning the length of holding chains, I identify seven vertical levels at maximum. A chain 
so long, however, rarely appears in the dataset. About 70% of all subsidiaries are directly held 
by the mother, some 24% are held via one intermediary subsidiary, and the remaining 6% are 
held via two or more subsidiaries. 
Across all considered years, the average group observable in the dataset consists of about 4 
subsidiaries. Between 1996 and 2008, the average number of subsidiaries per group increased 
from 3.55 to 4.50. Table 7-1 below provides further descriptive insight into group structures. 
 
                                                            
87Altshuler and Grubert (2003) provide an overview of the repatriation strategies available to multinationals. The 
general distinction of how profits may be repatriated and the conclusion that there is a trade-off for the 
subsidiary between reinvesting or transferring excess funds to the parent company are in line with the rationale 
put forward by Altshuler and Grubert (2003). 
88Tax treaties also limit the tax withhold if intercompany interest or royalties are paid. Tax savings are, however, 
very unlikely because these types of income tax treaties or national tax legislation usually consider a credit 
system, whereas the foreign tax credits only include withholding taxes since interest and royalty expenses are 
deductible. 
89See Tables 14 and 15 in the Appendix for an excerpt of the matrix.
 
The full dataset is available upon request. 
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Table 7 ?1: Top 20 subsidiary locations in the sample  
Subsidiary Country Observations Domestic Country #1 Country #2 Country #3
United States 4.865 4.514 Switzerland (95) Netherlands (78) UK (31) 
United Kingdom 3.362 2.916 Denmark (207) Netherlands (160) Sweden (66)
France 3.100 2.585 Netherlands (188) Switzerland (93) Luxembourg (67)
Spain 1.800 1.319 Netherlands (141) Switzerland (134) France (67)
Netherlands 1.773 1.519 Switzerland (103) Belgium (36) Spain (14) 
Italy 1.452 960 Netherlands (157) Switzerland (122) France (98)
Austria 1.168 910 Switzerland (120) Netherlands (67) Luxembourg (17)
Switzerland 1.115 792 Netherlands (165) Austria (52) France (29)
Belgium 816 349 Netherlands (262) France (68) Switzerland (53)
Australia 636 378 Netherlands (63) Switzerland (63) United States (34)
Sweden 601 356 Netherlands (82) UK (61) Switzerland (45)
Canada 557 202 United States (224) Netherlands (61) Switzerland (39)
Brazil 461 241 Switzerland (55) Netherlands (32) Spain (47) 
Czech Republic 448 117 Austria (170) Netherlands (99) Switzerland (40)
Mexico 416 178 United States (135) Netherland (25) Spain (21) 
Denmark 398 207 Sweden (66) Switzerland (52) Netherlands (40)
China 398 132 Hong Kong (86) Singapore (47) Switzerland (46)
Ireland 394 160 Netherlands (64) UK (47) United States (29)
Poland 376 149 Netherlands (81) Austria (70) Switzerland (19)
Hungary 361 139 Austria (156) Netherlands (40) Switzerland (16)
 Observations 24,497 18,123   
This table shows the 20 countries where most of the observed subsidiaries of the sample are located. The 
column Domestic depicts the observations where the observed subsidiary is held by a country holding. The three 
columns to the right show the three countries where most of the holdings of the respective country's subsidiaries 
are located. The number in brackets shows the respective number of total holding observations. For example, I 
count 4.865 subsidiary observations in the USA between 1996 and 2008; 4.514 of which are held by country 
holdings. Most of German multinationals’ US subsidiaries, which are not nationally held, are held by holdings in 
Switzerland with 95 holding observations in total. The second most popular holding country for US subsidiaries is 
the Netherlands, followed by the UK.  
 
The table above displays which countries serve as a host for many holdings. It shows how 
many holdings are located in the respective country. This overview of holding countries 
above is very general. In the development of my hypotheses, I will outline in detail that the 
justification to install a holding company depends on the location of the operating subsidiary. 
This can be explained by different withholding taxes depending on which country dividends 
are paid to. Besides withholding taxes, other aspects, such as the geographical distance, the 
investment risk or the respective currency, might also influence a country’s attractiveness as a 
holding location and are maybe even more obvious. The size effect of the individual 
influencing factors will be worked out later. In this descriptive section I already provide an 
insight into good holding locations given the location of the operating company. In other 
words, Table 7-1 above shows the preferred holding countries depending on the respective 
subsidiary’s location – regardless of why they are the preferred countries. Table 7-2 below 
provides explanations and descriptive statistics of all the relevant variables used in this study. 
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Table 7 ?2: Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Fixed Assets Fixed and intangible assets in the financial statements; in EUR '000. 34,260 373,210 
Group’s Fixed Assets Fixed and intangible assets of a group’s subsidiaries; in EUR '000. 112,410 973,585 
Holding Binary variable distinguishing whether a subsidiary is a holding 
based on its NACE code (1) or not (0). 
.086 
 
.278 
 
Superior Dummy indicating if a subsidiary has a unit below it (1) or not (0). 314 464 
Held Directly Binary variable distinguishing whether the foreign subsidiary is held 
directly (1) or indirectly (0). 
.686 
 
.464 
 
Affiliate Number Number of a group’s subsidiaries 26.26 43.12 
Tax Rate Statutory profit tax rate.  .331 .068 
Withholding Tax The statutory withholding tax on dividends repatriated from abroad 
to a qualifying superior firm unit. It is the smallest of the domestic 
rates and the rate of an effective tax treaty. 
.009 
 
.035 
 
WHT to Germany The statutory withholding tax on dividends repatriated from abroad 
to a qualifying firm in Germany. 
.014 
 
.031 
 
Repatriation Tax The additional tax that needs to be paid effectively on repatriation. 
Differs from Withholding Tax due to recognition of the credit system 
and the company tax. 
.014 
 
.046 
 
Total Tax The total tax to be paid additionally to the corporate income tax on 
the lowest level when repatriating dividends from one subsidiary via 
another subsidiary to a superior firm unit. 
.019 
 
.059 
 
Counter Total Tax The hypothetical equivalent to Totaltax if the intermediate subsidiary 
were non ?existent. 
.037 
 
.052 
 
Holding Advantage The difference of Totaltax minus Countertotaltax with negative 
values showing that the holding reduces taxes. 
  ?.020 .050 
Thin Cap Rule Binary variable if a country has a thin cap rule (1) or not (0). .753 .432 
Holding Regime Binary variable distinguishing whether such a special regime is in 
place in that country (1) or not (0). 
 .377 .485 
Group Taxation Dummy distinguishing if a country has group taxation (1) or not (0). .759 .427 
Euro 
 
Binary variable distinguishing whether the currency of the respective 
country is the euro (1) or not (0). 
.485 
 
.500 
 
EU27 Binary variable distinguishing if a country belongs to the 27 EU 
member states (1) or not (0). 
.631 
 
.482 
 
OECD Binary variable if a country is an OECD member (1) or not (0). .953 .211 
Distance to Germany The distance of the subsidiary to Germany in km '000. 4.677 4.726 
Counterdistance The distance between two subsidiaries km '000, disregarding the 
intermediate subsidiary between them. 
2.799 3.659 
GDP Gross Domestic Product measured in billion USD. 2.218 3.615 
GDP per Capita GDP per home country; measured in current USD '000. 29.363 15.372 
Inflation Rate Inflation rate based on consumer prices. 2.53 7.33 
Country Risk OECD Country Risk Classification Method measures the country credit 
risk.from a low credit risk (0) to a high credit risk (7).  
.189 .764 
The values are generally based on the 134,630 observations used in testing Hypothesis H7-1. Regarding those variables only 
required for testing Hypothesis H7-4, they are based on the 46,368 observations used there. The firm-specific variables in the 
table’s upper part are derived from the MiDi database of the German Central Bank. The tax variables in the middle of the 
table are derived from information taken from the IBFD Tax Handbooks, the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & 
Young, and by the individual bilateral tax treaties. GDP, GDP per Capita and Inflation Rate stem from the World 
Development Indicators, edition 2009. Country Risk is based on information provided by the OECD. 
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7.4 Development of Hypotheses 
I observe and analyze the group structures of multinationals. As pointed out in the section 
above, I have been able to fully identify those group structures. This information is required 
in order to calculate the total tax burden imposed on a dividend repatriated from a subsidiary 
on the lower levels of the group structure to the headquarters. For basic hypotheses, however, 
the information has to be brought to a feasible form. Whether or not the existence of a holding 
is beneficial from a tax point of view can already be determined by looking at parts of the 
total structure. Regardless of its complexity, the structure can be deconstructed into chains 
with three elements. I show this in the following example: 
Table 7-3: Identification method by group structure split up 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“HQ” stands for the group’s headquarters. The subsidiaries denoted by an “H” are some of the possible 
holdings in this exemplary group structure. In the estimations and descriptives further below, each subsidiary 
with at least one company unit above and at least one below it is considered as an intermediary/holding 
subsidiary. 
 
The example shows a group structure with the headquarters at the top and several 
subordinated subsidiaries. As I disregard country holdings in this first part of the paper, each 
subsidiary on a different horizontal level is located in a country different from the country of 
the subsidiary preceding or following it. Each subsidiary which has at least one unit above 
and one unit below it in the corporate structure can be regarded as a holding company. 
Nevertheless, the example only titles some of the conceivable holdings with an “H” to avoid 
confusion and shows some of the bundles which need to be analyzed in order to assess the tax 
value of a holding. The hypothetical situation of a holding company’s non-existence needs to 
HQ 
H  
H 
 
   
H 
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be compared to the given situation. In the hypothetical situation, the subsidiary below the 
holding would distribute its profits directly to the unit above the holding. Neither the actual 
nor the hypothetical situation is affected by the other levels of the group structure. Therefore, 
by comparing the total tax burdens on a dividend distributed within the respective grey box in 
the factual vs. the fictitious case already reveals the tax benefit brought in by the holding.90 
A multinational has two general means of repatriating profits from its foreign subsidiaries: 
either by demanding interest for previously granted loans or by calling for dividends. As 
outlined above, I focus on the latter channel in this paper. Withholding taxes can be an 
important aspect of multinationals’ profit taxation. I provide an overview of their position and 
contribution in the international tax system. The headquarters and the subsidiaries are located 
in different countries. Furthermore, I assume profits. A tax rebate from the headquarter level 
to the subsidiary level is excluded. The following table shows the calculation of the tax 
burden at the level of the subsidiary and of the additional tax at the level of the superior 
company. 
Table 7 ?4: Tax burden on subsidiary level and additional tax burden on repatriation 
1. Exemption:  add = tHQ * (1 – Tax BurdenSUB) * (1 – Exemption in %) 
2. Indirect credit: add = tHQ – Tax BurdenSUB 
3. Direct credit: add = (tHQ – WHTSUB) * (1 – tSUB) 
4. Deduction: add = tHQ * (1 – t SUB – WHTSUB) 
5. Double:  add = tHQ  
 
              Tax BurdenSUB                = tSUB + (WHTSUB – t SUB * WHTSUB) 
The total tax burden depends on the corporate tax rates at the level of the subsidiary and at the level of the 
superior company unit, the withholding tax levied when profits are repatriated via dividends, and the method 
the country of the superior unit uses to recognize previously taxed profits. The superior unit can either be 
another subsidiary of the group or it can be the firm’s headquarters. 
 
The formulas are analogously applicable to the scenario when two subsidiaries of different 
host countries are vertically integrated into the group structure. As can be seen in Table 7-4, 
the impact of the withholding taxes depends not only on the size of the withholding tax 
(WHT) itself, but also on the corporate income tax rates (t) at the subsidiary and the mother 
                                                            
90 For example, if the top unit is located in Germany and the lower unit is located in Japan, the introduction of a 
Dutch holding between these two units reduces the withholding tax due from 10% to 5% altogether. This is 
due to the fact that Japan levies a 10% withholding tax on dividends distributed to Germany, but only 5% on 
those dividends distributed to the Netherlands. The Netherlands do not claim a withholding tax on dividends 
distributed to Germany.  
HQ 
| 
| 
| 
SUB 
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company level, as well as on the method dividends are recognized through in the country of 
the headquarters. I show the tax burden on an investment of a foreign subsidiary and the 
additional tax burden on repatriated dividends in the country of the headquarters. The formula 
on the level of the subsidiary shows that first the corporate income tax is applied and then the 
withholding tax is levied on the remaining net amount which shall be distributed as dividends. 
The formulas on the level of the headquarters show the five conceivable ways repatriated 
dividends might be handled. The possibilities range from the most generous treatment of a – 
possibly partly – exemption to the least advantageous double taxation. The direct and indirect 
credit systems differ insofar as the direct credit system only credits the withholding tax and 
deducts the corporate income tax paid on the subsidiary level, whereas the indirect credit 
system credits both of these previously paid taxes to the tax burden at the headquarter level. 
In the deduction case, both the withholding tax and the corporate income tax are deducted 
from the second level tax base.91 Please refer to the Appendix for a more detailed description 
of methods to avoid double taxation and repatriation taxes. 
Both the example on the corporate structure and the formulas for the tax burden show that the 
tax savings potential of a holding company stems mainly from its ability to reduce the 
applicable withholding taxes on distributed profits. The maximum savings potential of a 
holding structure is determined by the withholding tax which would be applicable if the 
holding was non-existent. Put differently, if there is only a low or even no withholding tax on 
distributions between two units in two different countries, there is only little or even no 
potential tax benefit of interposing a holding between these two units. Based on these 
considerations, I set up the following hypothesis: 
 
H7-1:  A low withholding tax on dividends between the country of a subsidiary 
and the country of its superior foreign unit in the group structure reduces 
the probability that this subsidiary is held indirectly.  
 
In the first hypothesis, I focus on the general tax savings potential which can be realized by 
the establishment of a holding. Once I assume that the withholding tax levied on distributed 
dividends between two units is different from zero, the actual savings brought about by a 
                                                            
91 For models on the country’s rationale behind the chosen method of foreign capital income repatriation, see 
Janeba (1996), Mintz and Tulkens (1996) and Dickescheid (2004). Hines (1994) works out and provides 
empirical evidence that the credit system, as applied by the United States for example, provides incentives to 
finance foreign subsidiaries with considerable debt and to restrict the equity stakes in new foreign 
investments.   
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holding is strongly influenced by the withholding tax rate applicable on dividends distributed 
from the holding country to the superior unit. If this rate is high, any savings made on the first 
level are in vain. Therefore, especially those countries which have established treaties 
guaranteeing low withholding taxes on outgoing dividends are supposed to serve as the 
holding hubs. This consideration is the basis for my second hypotheses: 
 
H7-2:  Operative subsidiaries are held via subsidiaries located in countries with 
low withholding taxes towards the country of the superior foreign-based 
company unit. 
The two hypotheses above aim at analyzing the intermediate subsidiaries which have been set 
up to enable tax-efficient profit repatriations by means of dividends. In my third hypothesis, I 
would like to take a closer look at such subsidiaries. A group can either use its established 
manufacturing subsidiaries to redirect dividends or it sets up new subsidiaries particularly 
fulfilling holding functions. Given that a group might not have operative active subsidiaries in 
the best conduit countries and orienting by the title of this paper, I set up the following 
hypothesis: 
H7-3:  It is pure holding companies and not active subsidiaries which are used 
for group structuring. 
As pointed out above, I identified the whole group structure. The additional information 
available through this identification allows me to get a better insight into the tax savings 
which are actually realized by holding structures. My first three hypotheses shall provide 
initial evidence for groups using holdings in a tax-efficient way. Put more cautiously, the 
answers to these hypotheses shall show in general that holdings are at least not harmful from a 
tax point of view. The question about the size effect of the holding-induced tax savings, 
however, can only be answered by comparing the actual tax burden with the hypothetical tax 
burden if the intermediate holding was non-existent. Therefore, I set up the following 
hypothesis regarding the overall impact of holding structure applications: 
 
H7-4:  Holding companies are applied as a way to lower the overall tax burden 
on dividends paid from a subsidiary to the group’s headquarters or to 
another superior company unit. 
Although holdings are applied more or less in line with general tax considerations, as I will 
show in the results below, the size effect of the savings is disillusioning. Especially in light of 
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the comprehensive theoretical and analytical literature on tax planning via holdings, the actual 
size of tax savings might have been expected to be higher. I mainly referred to the tax benefits 
which could be realized in the case of full and immediate distribution of dividends. There are, 
however, tax effects which might be valued by the multinational, but rather materialize as 
options. A comprehensive setup of double taxation treaties, a location within the European 
Union, a holding regime or a stable currency might be appreciated by the multinational in 
view of plans for future expansion. Therefore, in my fifth hypothesis, I include both 
additional aspects related to taxation as well as non-tax effects such as proximity or a 
country’s investment risk. The fifth hypothesis aims at answering the question about 
determinants of a good holding location. Given that the holding location depends on the 
location of the subordinated subsidiary, I apply a count data model inspired by Winkelmann 
(2008). For the inclusion of multiple influencing factors on the location decision, I formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
H7-5:  Besides the withholding tax, other tax and non-tax effects contribute to 
determining a good holding location given the location of the operating 
subsidiary.   
The five hypotheses above deal with vertical group structuring. In addition, there are 
conceivable tax influences on the horizontal structuring of investments as well. Both country 
holdings and national sister subsidiaries are to be included when focusing on the horizontal 
group structure. If a country provides tax loss consolidation rules, a group could structure its 
investments by means of different separate legal entities. A multinational firm can split up its 
investments according to risks or business segments and, in doing so, benefit from limited 
liability. A well-structured group of several subsidiaries in a country is likely to be 
appreciated by providers of capital. Becker and Fuest (2007) analytically show that symmetric 
taxation alone might ensure only partial neutrality because aspects of limited liability have to 
be taken into account. In a group relief system, for example, losses can be offset for tax 
purposes while there is no need to effectively compensate the loss suffered by an affiliated 
company. Thus, the advantage of a possible tax loss offset comes free of any clearing 
requirements. In countries without a group taxation regime, however, the only way to ensure 
loss offsetting between different parts of the firm is by incorporating all business activities 
into one legal entity. Therefore, I set up the following hypothesis regarding the impact of a 
group taxation regime on the structuring of investments: 
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(7 ?2)
H7-6:   The number of subsidiaries per country established by a parent company is 
higher in those countries providing consolidation of taxable profits and losses 
of affiliated firms, i.e. those countries providing a group taxation regime. 
7.5 Estimation Approach and Regression Results 
7.5.1 Withholding Taxes and Vertical Integration 
Tracing H7-1 and H7-2, I analyze the probability that a subsidiary is indirectly held by a 
superior company unit. The superior company unit can be another subsidiary or the 
headquarters. Formally, the decision of the superior unit j to indirectly hold a subsidiary i 
located in country c in year t is modeled as a discrete choice decision problem and is captured 
in an econometric model using a standard latent variable framework. To keep it simple, when 
tracing H7-1 to H7-3, I focus on the three-unit holding chains with the German headquarters 
at the top and thus reduce the complexity by concentrating on the withholding tax to 
Germany. The observable decision to use either a holding ௝݄௧, or to directly hold the 
subsidiary is related to the latent predisposition to use the holding, ݕ௝௧כ , according to ݕ௝௧ ൌ	?ሾݕ௝௧כ ൐ 	 ?ሿ where 	?ሾǤ ሿ is the indicator function. The parent’s predisposition towards using 
more than one subsidiary per host country is a function of the existence of the withholding tax 
between country c1 and c2 and a vector X of firm- and host country-specific characteristics, a 
common period-specific effect ߛ௧, an unobservable parent-specific effect ݌௝, and a residual ߝ௝ǡ௛ǡ௧. Choosing a linear specification for the latent variable provides us with ݕ௝௧כ ൌ ߚଵܹ݅ݐ݄݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ ܶܽݔ௖ଵǡ௖ଶǡ௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߚଶ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ݌௝ ൅ ߝ௝௛௧ 
where ߚଵ and ߚଶ are the (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated. I apply a fixed-effects logit 
model (Chamberlain, 1980) for this estimation.92 The fixed-effects model assumes that the 
error ߝ௝ǡ௛ǡ௧ is distributed symmetrically around zero, with accumulative distribution function 
G. The binary response model thus takes the form ܲ൫ݕ௝௧ ൌ 	?หܹ݅ݐ݄݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ ܶܽݔ௖ଵǡ௖ଶǡ௧ ǡ ௝ܺ௧ ǡ ௝ܿ൯ ൌ ܲ൫ݕ௝௧כ หܹ݅ݐ݄݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ ܶܽݔ௖ଵǡ௖ଶǡ௧ ǡ ௝ܺ௧ ǡ ௝ܿ൯                   ൌ ܩ൫ߚଵܹ݅ݐ݄݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ ܶܽݔ௖ଵǡ௖ଶǡ௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߚଶ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ௝ܿ൯ 
When dealing with H7-4, the effective additional or reduced tax burden replaces the nominal 
withholding tax rate in equation (7-2). The effective burden is calculated as outlined in Table 
7-4. Concerning H7-5, further variables are included in ௝ܺ௧ such as a country’s investment 
risk, the existence of a holding regime or the distance between the lower and the superior unit. 
                                                            
92 A concise introduction to the logit model is provided by Winkelmann (2009). 
(7 ?1) 
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Table 7 ?5: Impact of withholding taxes on (in)direct structuring 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) 
OLS without group ?fixed effects 
WHT to Germany   ?.051    ?.204***    ?.250***    ?.249***    ?.278***    ?.268***    ?.159**   ?.266*** 
(.082) (.076) (.072) (.072) (.075) (.073) (.074) (.073) 
Group Tax Regime     ?.105***    ?.073***    ?.072***    ?.082***    ?.078***   ?.078*** 
  (.088) (.010) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.010) 
(ln)GDPperCapita     ?.040    ?.040***    ?.035***    .041***   ?.035*** 
  (.006) (.006) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Inflation     ?.001    ?.006    ?.028 .002 
  (.018) (.019) (.023) (.019) 
OECD countryrisk    .020***  .002  .013*** .002 
        (.004) (.005) (.004) (.005) 
Observations  134,630 134,630 134,630 134,573 134,217 134,274 134,217 134,217 
Adjusted R2 .0014 .012 .016 .016 .015 .016 .012 .016 
F ?test .073  10.60 13.22  14.08  15.01  15.06  9.39 14.94 
  .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) .(13) .(14) .(15) .(16) 
OLS with group ?fixed effects 
WHT to Germany .167***    ?.005    ?.017    ?.019    ?.038    ?.036 .054   ?037 
(.061) (.061) (.061) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.061) (.062) 
Group Tax Regime     ?.082***    ?.072***    ?.072***    ?.071***    ?.070   ?.071*** 
  (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
(ln)GDPperCapita     ?.013***    ?.013***    ?.004    ?.009   ?.004 
  (.005) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Inflation   .023 .010    ?.013 .000 
  (.024) (.017) (.013) (.000) 
OECD countryrisk   .009*** .007** .017*** .007* 
        (.002) (.004) (.003) (.004) 
Observations  134,630 134,630 134,630 134,573 134,217 134,274 134,217 134,217 
Adjusted R2 .408 .412 .413 .385 .384 .384 .382 .384 
F ?test  1.89  12.12  11.41  10.91  11.95 13.56  7.84  12.83 
The dependent variable is whether the foreign subsidiary is held directly (1) or indirectly (0) by its German 
mother. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the country/year level. Year 
dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. Estimations in columns (9) - (16) include group-fixed 
effects. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1 %. 
Confirming Hypothesis H7-1, the results in columns (2) to (8) of Table 7-5 show that a higher 
withholding tax of a subsidiary belonging to a group headquartered in Germany reduces the 
probability of direct participation. Put differently, holdings are generally established at 
positions of the group structure where they can at least potentially cause savings in 
withholding taxes. As stated above, this refers to the repatriation via dividends, which can be 
considered the most important as well as the most treaty-sensitive channel. The size effect of  
-.266 in column (8) of Table 7-5 means that a ten percent increase in the withholding tax 
towards Germany reduces the probability of direct participation by 2.66 percent. The results 
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in columns (2) to (7) show that the effect is not driven by a particular combination of the 
controls, but persists even if one or more of them are left out. As can be seen from the lower 
part of Table 7-5, however, the result that high withholding taxes to Germany increase the 
likelihood of a subsidiary to be held indirectly loses its significance once group-fixed effects 
are controlled for. In columns (10) to (14) and in column (16), which includes all the relevant 
control variables, despite a lack of significance, at least the expected negative sign persists. 
The change in results when including group-fixed effects compared to the upper part of Table 
7-5 indicates that there are groups with and other without the motivation to indirectly hold 
subsidiaries, and that this basic distinction does not leave enough room for the individual 
withholding tax and its change over time to play a significant role. 
The coefficients observable at the control variables are as expected. An existent group tax 
regime reduces the motivation to indirectly hold a subsidiary because some netting of profits 
and losses and profit reallocation can already be carried out on the national level. The 
negative effect of the GDP per capita indicates that well-established markets tend to be 
directly linked to the headquarters. This might rather be based on controlling considerations 
than on taxes. Regardless of the tax effect, those important subsidiaries producing in 
important established markets might want to maintain a direct link to the group’s 
headquarters. While inflation is insignificant, the negative and significant coefficient of 
OECD country risk indicates that high risk countries tend to be directly tied to the 
headquarters rather than implementing them further down in a sophisticated group structure. 
Based on the need of close monitoring of such subsidiaries, this is highly plausible. 
Hypothesis H7-2 takes the mirror view: the withholding taxes levied from the holding 
location when distributing profits to the superior company should be comparably low. The 
dependent variable in Table 7-6 is the withholding tax to Germany. The crucial independent 
variable Superior takes the value of one if a subsidiary has other subsidiaries below it in the 
group structure, and takes the value of zero if it does not. The negative coefficient of Superior 
in all columns (1) to (16) of Table 7-6 suggests that subsidiaries in locations levying high 
withholding taxes on dividend repatriation to Germany do not necessarily serve as conduit 
entities. Thus, as stated in Hypothesis H7-2, operative subsidiaries are held via subsidiaries 
located in countries with low withholding taxes towards the country of the superior foreign-
based company unit. Hypothesis H7-2 is confirmed both in the estimations without group-
fixed effects, shown in columns (1) to (8) and in those with group-fixed effects shown in 
columns (9) to (16). 
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Table 7 ?6: Withholding taxes from directly vs. indirectly held subsidiaries 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) 
OLS without group ?fixed effects 
Superior    ?.006***    ?.004***    ?.004***    ?.004***    ?.004***    ?.004***    ?.005***    ?.004*** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Group Tax Regime     ?.016***    ?.014***    ?.014***    ?.012***    ?.012***    ?.012*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
(ln)GDPperCapita     ?.002    ?.001 .002 .001 .002 
  (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Inflation   .048* .041* .036* .040* 
  (.027) (.024) (.021) (.024) 
OECD countryrisk   .002* .004** .005*** .003* 
        (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Observations  145,905 145,905 145,905 145,848 145,354 145,354 145,354 145,354 
Adjusted R2 .029 .062 .064 .072 .074 .070 .061 .075 
F ?test  4.47  5.90  5.53  5.59  6.05  5.68  5.71  5.81 
  .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) .(13) .(14) .(15) .(16) 
OLS with group ?fixed effects 
Superior    ?.008***    ?.006***    ?.006***    ?.007***    ?.006***    ?.006***    ?.006***    ?.006*** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Group Tax Regime     ?.014***    ?.013***    ?.012***    .012***    ?.013***    ?.012*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
(ln)GDPperCapita     ?.002 .001 .002    ?.001 .002 
  (.002) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003) 
Inflation   .029 .033 .037 .033 
  (.019) (.021) (.023) (.021) 
OECD countryrisk   .004*** .002 .003 .002 
      (.002) (.001) (.002)   (.002) 
Observations  145,905 145,905 145,905 145,354 145,354 145,411 145,848 145,354 
Adjusted R2 .190 .211 .211 .207 .218 .215 .216 .212 
F ?test  5.56  6.40  5.99  5.73  6.07  5.79  5.94  5.80 
The dependent variable is the withholding tax to Germany. The crucial binary independent variable Superior 
indicates whether the withholding tax is applied to a subsidiary which has at least one subordinated subsidiary (1) 
or not (0). The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the country/year level. Year 
dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. Estimations in column (2) include group-fixed effects. *, 
**, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1 %. 
 
Just like the previous table, Table 7-7 uses the withholding tax to Germany as the dependent 
variable. The crucial independent variable Holding, however, is not based on the group 
structure like Superior in Table 7-6, but on the NACE code. Thus, Holding takes the value of 
one if a subsidiary exclusively carries out holding activities based on its industry code. The 
binary variable is zero if its NACE code does not label it as a holding but as some other 
function, such as a productive chemical plant. In this second case, the subsidiary might very 
well also carry out some holding functions, but it does not exclusively concentrate on them. 
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Table 7 ?7: Kind of subsidiaries used for group structuring 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) 
OLS without group ?fixed effects 
Holding .003*** .004*** .003*** .003*** .004*** .003*** .003*** .003*** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Group Tax Regime     ?.004*    ?.006**    ?.006**    ?.005**    ?.005*    ?.005** 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.002) 
(ln)GDPperCapita   .002* .003** .003 .002 .003 
  (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Inflation   .030** .029** .026** .029** 
  (.014) (.013) (.012) (.013) 
OECD countryrisk     ?.001* .001 .001 .000 
        (.062) (.001) (.093) (.001) 
Observations  53,587 53,587 53,587 53,582 53,180 53,185 53,180 53,180 
Adjusted R2 .050 .052 .054 .057 .054 .054 .053 .056 
F ?test  4.79  7.97  7.65  7.57  8.33  7.96  7.56  7.82 
  .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) .(13) .(14) .(15) .(16) 
OLS with group ?fixed effects 
Holding .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .000 .001 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Group Tax Regime     ?.003**    ?.005***    ?.005***    ?.006***    ?.006***    ?.006*** 
  (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
(ln)GDPperCapita   .002 .002 .001 .001 .001 
  (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Inflation   .014 .016 .013 .016 
  (.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) 
OECD countryrisk     ?.001***    ?.001 .000    ?.001 
        (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Observations  53,587 53,587 53,587 53,582 53,180 53,185 53,180 53,180 
Adjusted R2 .306 .309  .309 .310 .312 .311 .309 .312 
F ?test  3.96  4.92  4.55  4.47  4.53  4.31  3.52  4.24 
The dependent variable is the withholding tax to Germany. The crucial independent variable Holding 
distinguishes between whether the foreign subsidiary is a pure holding company (1) or has other purposes as 
well (0). The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the country/year level. Year 
dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. Estimations in columns (5) to (8) include group-fixed 
effects. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1 %. 
The positive and significant coefficients of Holding in columns (1) to (8) of Table 7-7 
indicate that the withholding taxes for repatriating dividends to Germany are even higher if 
this is carried out by pure holding companies. This opposes Hypothesis H7-3. Based on 
Hypothesis H7-3, a negative and significant coefficient of Holding was expected, since it 
would convey that once a company is classified as a holding firm – by contrast to some other 
industry type – the withholding tax to Germany is lower in relation to non-holding 
subsidiaries. Once group-fixed effects are included in columns (9) to (16) of Table 7-7, the 
Holding coefficient turns insignificant. Given the parent/subsidiary directive within the EU 
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and the many tax treaties applying zero-withholding tax rates for qualified dividends, the low 
average size effects are not surprising. 
Based on the results from both the upper and the lower section of Table 7-7, Hypothesis H7-3 
cannot be confirmed. There is no evidence pointing to the fact that it is especially pure 
holding companies which are used for group structuring. Based on columns (1) to (8) of Table 
7-7, it seems to be the operative subsidiaries which have lower withholding taxes to Germany 
than the pure holding companies. This carefully indicates that groups rather use their active 
operative subsidiaries for profit redistribution. Such a setup is plausible also from a tax law 
perspective. The German CFC-rules, grossing up passive income to the higher German tax 
level, might be one reason for this phenomenon. Active income is generally not grossed up. 
Hypothesis H7-4 combines the elements of the first two hypotheses. The application of a 
holding should, when also taking into account the tax treatment method at the superior level, 
effectively lead to overall tax savings. Table 7-8 provides some insights into the influence of 
the intermediate subsidiary on the tax burden of repatriated profits. The corporate tax on the 
lowest level is not taken into account, as it is definite and remains unaffected by the group 
structure decision. All other taxes, i.e. the withholding taxes on dividends on each level and 
the corporate tax on the top level(s) are considered. The recognition of repatriated profits, i.e. 
exemption, credit, deduction or double taxation, is considered as well. 
While Table 7-8 provides a detailed insight into the size effect of tax savings by intermediate 
holdings, the regressions of Tables 7-9 and 7-10 further below build on these new findings. 
They trace which kinds of firms actually use tax-efficient constructions. In order to be able to 
set up such regressions, one first has to know where tax savings prevail. This is shown in 
Table 7-8.  
All in all, the results in Table 7-8 show that while many groups do have tax benefits from 
their intermediate subsidiaries, conversely some others even apply tax-harmful structures. The 
split up into sub samples reveals that the size and multitude of tax savings is higher in the 
structure directly below the German headquarters than further down in the group structure. As 
can be seen from column (1), the tax burden in the actual case is only 1.9% at the mean. This 
is the result of the dividend exemption in Germany and the parent-subsidiary directive within 
the EU, which sets withholding taxes stemming from qualified participations to zero. 
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Table 7 ?8: Holding ?induced tax burden advantage 
  .(1) .(2) .(3)
 All observations German Mother ?Sub ?Sub Sub ?Sub ?Sub 
Tax Burden via Holding       
Mean .019 .014 .034 
Std. Deviation (.059) (.051) (.080) 
Min 0 0 0 
Max .712 .455 .712 
HYPOTHETICAL Tax Burden without Holding       
Mean .037 .038 .033 
Std. Deviation (.052) (.042) (.080) 
Min 0 0 0 
Max .700 .370 .700 
Holding’s influence on the tax burden       
Mean  ?.020   ?.024   ?.001 
Std. Deviation (.050) (.050) (.042) 
Variance .002 .003 .002 
Skewness 2,306 2,178 4,633 
Kurtosis 30,502 23,400 105,839 
Tax Advantage (Percentiles)       
1%  ?.170   ?.170   ?.15 
5%  ?.076   ?.076 0 
10%  ?.070   ?.070 0 
25%  ?.020   ?.026 0 
50%  ?.020   ?.020 0 
75% 0   ?.015 0 
90% 0 0 0 
95% .001 .007 0 
99% .180 .185 .119 
Observations  55,808 45,242 10,566 
This table shows descriptive variables. Thus, there is no dependent variable. The samples reported in columns (2) 
and (3) are subsamples of the full set in column (1). Column (2) regards the triples of the German mother and 
two subordinated subsidiaries, while column (3) regards three subsidiaries. All of the subsidiaries are vertically 
embedded in the group structure. The tax burden includes all withholding taxes and corporate taxes, except for 
the corporate tax on the lowest considered level. In the HYPOTHETICAL case, the intermediate subsidiary is 
considered non-existent. The holding’s influence is the actual tax burden minus the hypothetical tax burden. 
In the hypothetical case that the intermediate subsidiary was non-existent, with a value of 
3.7%, the average tax burden on repatriated profits would be almost twice as high as the 
actual case’s 1.9%. Thus, at the mean, the intermediate subsidiaries reduce the tax burden. A 
look at the percentiles reveals that in about 50% of the cases, the existent group structure is 
beneficial, in about 45% of the cases it does not change the tax burden, and in about 5% the 
tax burden would be lower if the intermediate subsidiary was non-existent. This last 5% is 
surprising in light of a comprehensive analytical literature on tax-induced holding structures. 
Obviously, although group structures generally seem to be tax driven, there are non-tax 
influencing factors which sometimes prevail. 
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Table 7 ?9: Characteristics of groups effectively applying holding structures 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) 
                OLS without group ?fixed effects   
ln(Fixed Assets) .012*** .020*** .021***   .021*** .020*** 
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Counterdist .009*** .010*** .011*** .010*** .010*** 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Group Affiliate Number   ?.003***    ?.001***    .001***    ?.001    ?.001*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
(Group Affiliate Number)2 .001*** .002*** .001* .001*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Group's Fixed Assets     ?.065***    ?.069***    ?.060***    ?.035***    ?.063*** 
  (.007) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.007) 
(Group's Fixed Assets)2   .168*** .184*** .184*** .163*** 
  (.034) (.033) (.030)   (.031) 
Observations  46,368 46,362 47,419 55,987 46,368 46,362 
Adjusted R2 .213 .230 .218 .204 .229 .230 
F ?test 59.46 90.90 87.35 36.43 88.06 84.01 
  .(7) .(8) .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) 
OLS with group ?fixed effects 
ln(Fixed Assets) .019*** .020*** .020***   .020*** .019*** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Counterdist .010*** .011*** .013*** .010*** .011*** 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Group Affiliate Number   ?.001***    ?.001**    ?.001***    ?.001    ?.001** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
(Group Affiliate Number)2 .001*** .001**    ?.001* .001** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Group's Fixed Assets     ?.061***    ?.058***    ?.067***    ?.036***    ?.059*** 
  (.012) (.013) (.011) (.004) (.012) 
(Group's Fixed Assets)2   .129** .108* .195*** .122** 
  (.053) (.057) (.042)   (.052) 
Observations  46,368 46,362 47,419 55,987 46,368 46,362 
Adjusted R2 .303 .304 .300 .274 .304 .304 
F ?test 45.53 57.29 50.86 17.75 56.44 51.34 
The binary dependent variable is one if the repatriation of profits in the form of dividends from a subsidiary 
to a company unit two levels above is from a tax point of view cheaper via the existing holding company 
than without it. Put differently, if the holding brings a tax saving, the dependent variable is one, otherwise it 
is zero. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the country/year level. Year 
dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. Estimations in column (7) to (12) include group-
fixed effects. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1 %. 
The regressions of Tables 7-9 and 7-10 build on the information shown in Table 7-8. The 
binary dependent variable is one if the intermediate subsidiary brings a tax saving, otherwise 
it is zero. The independent variables aim at revealing which kinds of firms or groups apply 
such tax-efficient structures. As in the previous tables, the upper part of Tables 7-9 and 7-10 
show results from regressions without group-fixed effects, whereas in the lower part, group-
fixed effects are included. 
7. Form Follows Function 
206 
Table 7 ?10: Characteristics of groups effectively applying holding structures 
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) 
                                                            Logit estimation 
ln(Fixed Assets) .072*** .116*** .117***   .120*** .117*** 
(.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Counterdist .061*** .068*** .068*** .067*** .067*** 
(.021) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.021) 
Group Affiliate Number   ?.016***    ?.002**    ?.004*** .001    ?.002*** 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
(Group Affiliate Number)2 .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Group's Fixed Assets     ?.358***    ?.367***    ?.322***    ?.227***    ?.352*** 
  (.038) (.035) (.032) (.013) (.035) 
(Group's Fixed Assets)2   .786*** .844*** .877*** .783*** 
  (.182) (.175) (.159)   (.171) 
Observations  46,368 46,362 47,419 55,987 46,368 46,362 
Pseudo R2 .167 .185 .174 .163 .185 .186 
Wald chi2 697.54 850.96 918.75 460.95 833.70 868.60 
Probability >  chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  .(7) .(8) .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) 
Panel logit estimation 
ln(Fixed Assets) .147*** .254*** .240***   .261*** .253*** 
(.021) (.022) (.019) (.022) (.022) 
Counterdist .466*** .474*** .496*** .473*** .474*** 
(.021) (.021) (.017) (.021) (.021) 
Group Affiliate Number   ?.018***    ?.003**    ?.006***    ?.001*    ?.004** 
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
(Group Affiliate Number)2 .001*** .001** .001*** .001** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Group's Fixed Assets     ?1.08***    ?.924***    ?1.09***    ?.609***    ?1.04*** 
  (.090) (.080) (.079) (.026) (.093) 
(Group's Fixed Assets)2   2.60*** 2.10*** 3.05*** 2.48*** 
  (.483) (.426) (.411)   (.487) 
Observations  46,368 46,362 47,419 55,987 46,368 46,362 
Number of Groups 12,096 12,094 12,358 14,601 12,096 12,094 
Wald chi2 4,276.21 4,454.24 4,752.65 5,289.83 4,445.13 4,456.87 
Probability >  chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The binary dependent variable is one if the repatriation of profits in the form of dividends from a subsidiary 
to a company unit two levels above is from a tax point of view favorable, i.e. cheaper, via the existing 
holding company than without it. Put differently, if the holding brings a tax saving, the dependent variable 
is one, otherwise it is zero. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the 
country/year level. Year dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. Estimations in column (7) 
to (12) consider the panel dimension. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5%, and 1 %. 
 
While Table 7-9 is based on ordinary least squares estimations, Table 7-10 shows the results 
of logit estimations. First of all, given that ln(Fixed Assets) shows positive and significant 
coefficients in all estimations of Table 7-9 and Table 7-10, it is rather big subsidiaries which 
use holdings above them to redirect profits to upper levels in the group structure such as to the 
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group’s headquarters. This is not surprising, because the bigger subsidiaries can be expected 
to yield higher profits than smaller entities, and therefore the benefit of tax efficiently 
redirecting their dividends is high as well. 
The coefficient of Counterdist is positive and significant in all estimations as well. 
Counterdist is the distance in kilometers between the respective subsidiary and the company 
unit two levels above it. Therefore, the positive coefficient indicates that remotely located 
subsidiaries can and do benefit from inserting conduit entities for redirecting their profits. It is 
rather these remotely located subsidiaries than those in the close vicinity of the upper firm 
unit which benefit from being held indirectly. 
The negative and significant coefficients of Group Affiliate Number and Group's Fixed Assets 
seem surprising at first sight because they indicate that efficient tax saving is rather found in 
smaller groups with little assets. The squared term of both of these variables is, however, 
positive and significant, which at least indicates that the effect gradually vanishes with 
growing sizes. Despite appearing counter-intuitive, even the basic effect can be explained: 
groups with only a few subsidiaries can focus their tax planning and might not need to 
consider other non-tax determinants such as a concise internal reporting structure. The 
variables covering the respective group’s assets might interact by including the respective 
subsidiary’s fixed assets as well. It has to be mentioned that, as can be seen from Table 7-2, in 
this dataset the average number of affiliates per group is only about four. This results from the 
MiDi dataset’s observation of subgroups rather than the inclusion of undifferentiated 
conglomerates. 
Based on the 5% of all firms in Table 7-8, which put up with higher taxes on repatriation by 
inserting an intermediate subsidiary, I concluded that although group structures generally 
seem to be tax driven, there are non-tax influencing factors which sometimes prevail. These 
other influence factors determining preferable holding locations are analyzed when tracing 
Hypothesis H7-5. In tracing this hypothesis in Table 7-11, the number of holding companies 
per country serves as the dependent variable and country characteristics are independent 
variables. In other words, I aim at working out which characteristics make a country a 
preferable holding location. The regression results of Table 7-11 suggest that the existence of 
a holding regime, the existence of a group taxation rule, and a country’s GDP per capita 
positively influence the decision of where to establish a holding company, whereas a high 
country risk negatively influences such a decision.  
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Table 7 ?11: Further tax and non ?tax factors determining a holding location           
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) 
Tax Rate .200 .422 .280 .320 .348 .301 .324 .296 .304   ?.123 .331 .299 
  (.300) (.290) (.301) (.301) (.300) (.300) (.299) (.301) (.300) (.296) (.300) (.301) 
Existence of Holding Regime   .346*** .322*** .330*** .308*** .330*** .322*** .319*** .317*** .319*** .339*** .317*** 
    (.073) (.076) (.076) (.075) (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) (.076) 
Existence of Thin Cap Rule   ?.099***     ?.057   ?.056   ?.056   ?.055   ?.054   ?.056   ?.057   ?.064*     ?.057 
  (.036)   (.037) (.037) (.036) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037)   (.037) 
Existence of Group Tax 
Regime .029** .027*   .026* .027* .026* .026* .026* .026* .025* .028* .026* 
  (.014) (.015)   (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Euro country .973** .707 .715     .495 .798* .688 .720 .981 .797* .721* 
  (.463) (.449) (.449)     (.436) (.439) (.459) (.450) (.614) (.461) (.450) 
EU 27 Member   ?1.11*   ?.767   ?.773   ?.507   ?.844     ?.733   ?.359   ?.793   ?.384   ?.842   ?.795 
  (.603) (.578) (.576) (.587) (.658)   (.549) (.421) (.578) (.603) (.604) (.578) 
OECD Member .609 .386 .435 .611 .891* .419   .722* .435   ?.581 .781* .436 
  (.474) (.450) (.449) (.473) (.493) (.476)   (.411) (.450) (.501) (.463) (.451) 
Distance to Germany   ?.094   ?.080   ?.081   ?.077   ?.076   ?.026   ?.103*     ?.082   ?.139**   ?.076   ?.082 
  (.067) (.063) (.063) (.067) (.079) (.050) (.053)   (.063) (.056) (.066) (.063) 
(ln)GDP .101 .175* .181* .188*   .211** .207** .158   .886*** .148 .175* 
  (.105) (.102) (.102) (.103)   (.099) (.099) (.101)   (.069) (.106) (.103) 
(ln)GDPperCapita .941*** .934*** .924*** .923*** 1.08*** .901*** .910*** .944*** .926***   1.02*** .928*** 
  (.116) (.113) (.113) (.114) (.071) (.111) (.114) (.111) (.113)   (.114) (.113) 
Inflation .001 .053 .055 .054 .055 .051 .053 .055   .012 .021 .053 
  (.001) (.149) (.147) (.151) (.147) (.148) (.148) (.148)   (.017) (.002) (.148) 
OECD countryrisk   ?.175***   ?.163***   ?.167***   ?.167***   ?.164***   ?.166***   ?.171***   ?.165***   ?.165***   ?.182***     ?.166*** 
  (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.034)   (.033) 
Observations  673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 
Number of groups 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Wald chi2(23) 1407.31 1431.40 1431.44 1429.40 1429.71 1431.28 1425.22 1434.98 1434.02 1320.76 1401.35 1434.14 
Prob > chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The dependent variable is the number of holding companies in a country. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the country/year level. Year dummies 
for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. Estimation in column (2) includes group fixed effects. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 %. 
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Based on the positive and highly significant coefficients of Existence of Holding Regimes, 
following the results in column (12), the existence of a holding regime in a country increases 
the number of observed holdings per country and year by 0.317 on average. Table 7-13 in the 
Appendix shows which countries have prominent specific holding incentives in which years 
and how these incentives are specified. 
The number of counted holdings is higher in countries where a group taxation rule exists. This 
can be seen from the positive and weakly significant coefficient of Existence of Group Tax 
Regime. Based on the column (12), on average I count .026 more holdings in countries with a 
group taxation rule compared to countries without it. Thus, the chance to net profits and losses 
on a national level seems to serve as an argument for establishing a holding in such a country. 
The effect is, admittedly, rather small in size and only significant at the 10% level. 
The GDP per Capita has a positive and significant impact on the number of holdings per 
country. Additionally, in several regressions shown in Table 7-11, the GDP also shows a 
positive and significant coefficient. Both variables are applied in logs. The positive 
coefficients indicate that it is rather countries with well-established markets which serve as 
holding locations. 
Not by surprise, the OECD country risk variable, measuring the general investment risk on a 
country/year basis, shows a strongly significant negative impact on the number of holdings 
per country. As shown in Table 7-2, the country risk can take values from 0 (low risk) to 7 
(high risk). Based on the results in column (12), an increase in the country credit risk by 1 unit 
lowers the number of observable holdings in this country and year by about .166 on average. 
7.5.2 Group Taxation Regimes and Horizontal Structure 
Aiming at answering Hypothesis H7-6, I provide an analysis dealing with the impact of group 
taxation regimes on the structure of national subgroups of multinational firms. A national 
subgroup includes all incorporated and wholly-owned subsidiaries located in a certain host 
country and belonging to the same German parent company. I analyze whether the possibility 
of offsetting profits and losses between affiliated subsidiaries affects the legal structures of the 
activities in a host country. 
First, I analyze the probability that there are several, instead of just one, subsidiaries 
established by a certain German parent firm in the respective country. As the dependent 
variable, I consider a binary variable indicating if a German parent company has organized its 
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(7 ?4)
(7 ?5)
activities in a country through more than one subsidiary. If all activities carried out by a group 
in that respective host country are pooled within one subsidiary, the variable is zero.93 
Formally, the decision of parent company j to structure its activities in a host country h in year 
t across more than one subsidiary is modeled as a discrete choice decision problem and is 
captured in an econometric model using a standard latent variable framework. Suppose that 
the observable decision to either use more than one subsidiary, ݕ௝௧, or to use only one 
subsidiary is related to the latent predisposition to use more than one subsidiary, ݕ௝௧כ , 
according to ݕ௝௧ ൌ 	 ?ሾݕ௝௧כ ൐ 	 ?ሿ where 	?ሾǤ ሿ is the indicator function. Suppose, furthermore, that 
a parent’s predisposition towards using more than one subsidiary per host country is a 
function of the existence of group taxation and a vector X of firm- and host country-specific 
characteristics, a common period-specific effect  ߛ௧, an unobservable parent-specific effect ௝ܿ, 
and a residual ߝ௝ǡ௛ǡ௧. Choosing a linear specification for the latent variable provides me with 
 ݕ௝௧כ ൌ ߚଵܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛ǡ௧ ൅ ࢄ࢏࢚ࢼ૛ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ௝ܿ ൅ ߝ௝௛௧ 
where ߚଵ and ߚଶ are the vectors of coefficients to be estimated. I apply a fixed-effects logit 
model (Chamberlain, 1980) for this estimation. The fixed-effects model assumes that the 
error ߝ௝ǡ௛ǡ௧ is distributed symmetrically around zero, with accumulative distribution function 
G. The binary response model thus takes the form ܲ൫ݕ௝௧ ൌ 	?หܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋ ௛݊௧ ǡ ࢄ࢐࢚ǡ ௝ܿ൯ ൌ ܲ൫ݕ௝௧כ หܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛௧ ǡ ࢄ࢐࢚ǡ ௝ܿ൯                           ൌ ܩ൫ߚଵܩݎ݋ݑ݌ݐܽݔܽݐ݅݋݊௛ǡ௧ ൅ ࢄ࢏࢚ࢼ૛ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ௝ܿ൯ 
Secondly, the number of subsidiaries held by a German parent company in one country is 
supposed to be affected by the existence of a group taxation regime. I estimate a Poisson 
model to trace this hypothesis. I model the number of subsidiaries n held by a German parent 
company j in a foreign country h. I am interested in the expected value of njh conditional on 
some control variables Xjh , where Xjh contains, for instance, the country-specific variable 
indicating if a group taxation regime is applied. One way to express this is to use the 
exponential function as a functional form. In order to determine the probability of njh given 
Xjh, I further assume a Poisson distribution orienting by the following probability function: 
,...3,2,1,
!
)exp(
)(  - n
n
Xnf
n
jhjh
jhjh
ll
     
                                                            
93 Note that I only consider host countries where the respective parent company controls at least one subsidiary. 
(7 ?3)
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In order to obtain the Poisson regression model, I use the functional form denoted above for 
the intensity parameter to construct the loglikelihood function. Subsequently, I can estimate 
the vector using maximum likelihood methods. 
In both the panel logit and the panel Poisson estimation, robustness of the standard errors is 
achieved by bootstrapping standard errors with 100 repetitions as suggested by Cameron and 
Trivedi (2009) and Andrews and Buchinsky (2002). A control variable covers the number of 
industries the parent company operates in. It can be expected that a group which shows 
business activities in different industries will split up its investments into more subsidiaries. 
7.5.3 Regression Results Horizontal Integration 
Concerning Hypothesis H7-6, all columns of Tables 7-12a to 7-12c show that the existence of 
a group taxation regime positively influences the number of subsidiaries observed per 
country, year, and group. While Table 7-12a shows the results for the OLS regression, Tables 
7-12b and 7-12c report the regression results of the panel fixed-effects logit model and the 
fixed-effects Poisson model. The dependent variable in Tables 7-12a and 7-12b distinguishes 
whether the group is split up into two or more subsidiaries in a country (1) or not (0). In Table 
7-12c, the dependent variable is the number of subsidiaries per country, group, and year. 
Based on the results of column (12) in Table 7-12c, the existence of a group taxation regime 
increases the number of observed subsidiaries by .089. The probability of a split up into at 
least two subsidiaries per country and year increases by 16.1% if a group taxation regime is in 
place, as can be seen from column (12) in Table 7-12b. 
The control variables show the expected signs. The tax rate in the host country has a negative 
impact on the number of observed subsidiaries per group. A group having a higher variability 
of different industries establishes more subsidiaries per country. Based on column (12) in 
Table 7-12c, if a group operates in one more industry, this increases its number of subsidiaries 
per country by .086. The market size, approximated by the GDP of the host country, has a 
strong and positive effect on the number of subsidiaries founded there. GDP per capita, which 
serves as an indicator for both labor cost and the purchasing power in the host country, also 
shows a positive sign. The country risk control variable shows the expected negative sign and 
is significant. Since a higher value of this variable represents a higher country risk, the 
negative sign indicates that the foundation of several instead of just one subsidiary is less 
likely in riskier countries. This finding suggests that a centralized structure might be assumed 
to be superior for avoiding fraud and for monitoring business in riskier countries.
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Table 7 ?12a: Impact of a group taxation regime on group structure sophistication         
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) 
  OLS with group fixed effects 
Group Tax Regime .078*** .079*** .040*** .017**   .015** .014** .036*** .017*** .015** .018*** .015* 
  (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007)   (.007) (.008) (.008) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Industries   .046*** .046*** .046*** .046***   .046*** .046*** .046*** .046*** .046*** .046*** 
    (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)   (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Tax Rate           ?.206***   ?.210***   .224***   ?.225   ?.207***   ?.191***  ?.212*** 
          (.040) (.041)   (.053) (.043) (.041) (.041) (.041) 
(ln)GDP     .041*** .038*** .045*** .044*** .038***   .044*** .044*** .044*** .044*** 
      (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)   (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
(ln)GDPperCapita       .034*** .024*** .023*** .025*** .028***   .022*** .033 .023*** 
        (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.008)   (.005) (.004) (.005) 
Inflation           ?.001   ?.001   ?.007   ?.020* .003     ?.012  ?.000 
          (.005) (.006) (.008) (.012) (.004)   (.012) (.006) 
OECD countryrisk           ?.011***   ?.009***   ?.007***   ?.010**   ?.020***   ?.010***    ?.010*** 
          (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.003)   (.003) 
Observations  152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 152,125 
Adjusted R2 .278 .285 .300 .302 .302 .295 .302 .292 .302 .303 .302 0.303 
F ?test  8.41 32.53 63.96  66.86 73.36 63.52 65.53 34.55 73.62 75.67 68.86 73,58 
Groups 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 10,417 
Observations per Group 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 14.60 
The dependent variable is the number of subsidiaries per group and country. The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered on the country/year 
level. Year dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. All of the estimations include group fixed effects. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 
10%, 5% and 1 %. 
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Table 7 ?12b:  Impact of a group taxation regime on group structure sophistication         
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) 
  XTLOGIT estimation 
Group Tax Regime .648*** .657*** .182*** .162***   .156*** .162*** .324*** .182*** .160*** .189*** .161*** 
  (.042) (.046) (.052) (.052)   (.051) (.051) (.056) (.047) (.056) (.051) (.051) 
Industries   .261*** .274*** .274*** .273***   .274*** .267*** .274*** .274*** .273*** .274*** 
    (.026) (.029) (.028) (.026)   (.026) (.029) (.024) (.028) (.031) (.028) 
Tax Rate           ?1.96***   ?1.98***   1.88***  2.14***   ?1.98***   ?1.81***
 ?
2.010*** 
          (.336) (.342)   (.324) (.399) (.362) (.345) (.366) 
(ln)GDP     .316*** .313*** .380*** .365*** .312***   .374*** .370*** .368*** .371*** 
      (.021) (.023) (.020) (.018) (.018)   (.024) (.023) (.024) (.023) 
(ln)GDPperCapita     .308*** .231*** .215*** .204*** .229*** .253***   .203*** .291*** .206*** 
      (.032) (.037) (.039) (.040) (.047) (.046)   (.039) (.031) (.042) 
Inflation         ?.323   ?.092***   ?.001   ?.003   ?.005   ?.056     ?.005  ?.002 
        (.292) (.024) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.137)   (.003) (.003) 
OECD countryrisk         ?.056**   ?.099***   ?.079***   ?.056**   ?.072***   ?.186***   ?.085***    ?.082*** 
        (.024) (.024) (.342) (.027) (.027) (.021) (.024)   (.025) 
Observations  94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 94,042 
Groups 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 2,614 
Observations per Group 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 
The dependent variable is if a group has only one subsidiary per country (0) or at least two (1). The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered 
on the country/year level. Year dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 %. 
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Table 7 ?12c:  Impact of a group taxation regime on group structure sophistication         
  .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5) .(6) .(7) .(8) .(9) .(10) .(11) .(12) 
  XTPOISSON estimation 
Group Tax Regime .284*** .284*** .091*** .090***   .089*** .090*** .164*** .098*** .090*** .093*** .089*** 
  (.039) (.037) (.018) (.019)   (.020) (.020) (.024) (.020) (.020) (.012) (.019) 
Industries   .085*** .086*** .086*** .085***   .086*** .085*** .086*** .086*** .086*** .086*** 
    (.007) (.008) (.007) (.008)   (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Tax Rate           ?.553***   ?.552***   1.17***   ?.613***   ?.534***   ?.527***  ?.548*** 
          (.123) (.129)   (.205) (.146) (.140) (.125) (.138) 
(ln)GDP     .146*** .146*** .168*** .161*** .146***   .164*** .161*** .161*** .162*** 
      (.018) (.019) (.021) (.022)  ?20   (.022) (.023) (.022) (.023) 
(ln)GDPperCapita     .090*** .088*** .088*** .081*** .088*** .107***   .082*** .092*** .081*** 
      (.012) (.017) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.020)   (.016) (.012) (.017) 
Inflation       .045*** .073*** .062*** .045**   ?.013 .076***   .052*** .001*** 
        (.018) (.022) (.020) (.020) (.017) (.021)   (.020) (.000) 
OECD countryrisk         ?.004   ?.019***   ?.009   ?.003   ?.007   ?.050***   ?.007    ?.009 
        (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.008)   (.007) 
Observations  150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 150,878 
Groups 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 9,170 
Observations per Group  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5 
The dependent variable is if a group has only one subsidiary per country (0) or at least two (1). The standard errors shown in parentheses are robust and clustered 
on the country/year level. Year dummies for 1996-2008 are included but not reported. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1 %. 
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7.6 Concluding Remarks  
I have provided evidence on the group structures of multinationals and I have analyzed to 
what extent these structures are tax-efficient. Based on the full identification of group 
structures, I have identified that while most indirectly held companies are held by only one 
holding level, several group structures are more sophisticated comprising up to seven layers. 
The presentation of holding countries in dependence of the subsidiaries’ locations shows 
which countries serve as popular hosts. 
My regression results carefully indicate that the establishment of holding structures is 
generally carried out in line with tax saving strategies. If the withholding tax on dividends 
between the country of a subsidiary and the country of its superior foreign unit is low, this 
subsidiary tends to be held directly instead of via a holding. Put differently, holdings are 
generally established at positions of the group structure where they can at least potentially 
cause savings in withholding taxes. Furthermore, operative subsidiaries tend to be held via 
subsidiaries located in countries with low withholding taxes towards the country of the 
superior foreign-based company unit. It is active operative subsidiaries also carrying out 
holding functions rather than pure holding subsidiaries which are applied for tax structuring. 
Despite this general evidence on tax-efficient group structuring, the actual tax savings by 
multinational holding structures appear rather small. On average they only lead to a total tax 
burden reduction of about 2 percentage points as compared to the burden if the holding was 
non-existent. This result is surprising in light of a comprehensive analytical literature on tax-
induced holding structures. Therefore, I identified additional determinants of a preferable 
holding location given the location of a subsidiary, such as the existence of a specific holding 
regime. Concerning the tax impact on the horizontal group structure, I provide evidence that 
the existence of a group taxation regime leads to a wider spread of investments. 
Taxes do matter for the company structure, but given other influencing factors and especially 
given the need for hierarchical clarity, the influence of taxes has limits. “Form follows 
function” holds, but my paper made it clear that the function goes beyond saving withholding 
taxes or netting profits and losses. Multinationals aim at saving taxes by holding structures, 
but in the setup of their business structure, they remain – maybe irrationally – sovereign. In 
weighing tax benefits and a clear and manageable group structure, the directors of 
multinationals might reconsider the credo of Sullivan (1906): “As you are, so are your 
buildings and as are your buildings, so are you.” 
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7.7 Appendix 
 
Methods to Avoid Double Taxation and Repatriation Taxes 
If the exemption method is applied, repatriated intercompany dividends are tax-exempt at the 
level of the firm receiving the dividends. However, in a few countries like France, Germany 
or Belgium, a share ߙ is still subject to tax, whereas in most countries applying the exemption 
method,  ߙ ൌ 	 ?. Then, the tax ݉ imposed on one euro of intercompany dividends amounts 
to:  ݉ ൌ  ߙ ߬ோ ൅ ߱ௌ 
Where ߬ோ is the corporate tax rate of the residence country and ߱ௌ is the withholding tax rate 
imposed on intercompany dividends by the source country. 
In the case of a credit system, intercompany dividends are subject to tax but taxes paid abroad 
reduce the tax liability. If a direct credit is applied, the foreign tax credit includes the 
withholding taxes imposed on intercompany dividends.  Then, the additional tax imposed on 
one dollar of intercompany dividend amounts to:  ݉ ൌ  ߬ோ െ ሼ߬ோǢ ߱ௌሽ ൅ ߱ௌ 
An indirect credit also includes foreign corporate taxes ߬ௌ paid by the subsidiary. The 
additional tax imposed on intercompany dividends is computed in accordance with the 
following expression:   ݉ ൌ ఛೃሺଵିఛೄሻെ ൜ ఛೃ൫ଵିఛೄ൯ Ǣ  ఛೄ൫ଵିఛೄ൯൅ ߱ௌൠ ൅ ߱ௌ 
Expressions (7-7) and (7-8) show that the repatriation tax is determined by the tax rate of the 
residence country. It can be deducted from the formulas that there is a conceivable situation 
where a decrease in the withholding tax ߱ௌ is just subsidized by a proportional increase in ߬ோ. 
This is the case if the tax rate of the residence country exceeds the tax credit. Then, a 
reduction of withholding tax, e.g. caused by a new tax treaty, has no material effect.  
 
 
(7-8) 
(7-6) 
(7-7) 
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Table 7 ?13: Specific holding regimes and comparable tax incentives 
Country Years Explanation 
Austria 2005 ?
2008 
Pooling of the profits of companies is available through establishing companies as 
consolidated enterprises, i.e. through financial, economic or operational control. 
From 2005 on, this is also possible in cross ?border cases. 
Bermuda All 
Examples of exempted companies include investment holding companies, insurance 
companies, and foreign sales corporations. Applications that taxes introduced in 
Bermuda do not apply to such companies are possible until 28 March 2016 and are 
usually granted. 
Bulgaria 
  
All 
Although repealed in 1993, the following incentives were still available to companies 
who had been granted them before the abolishment. Subsidiaries of foreign 
companies as well as companies with more than 49% foreign participation and 
capital investment of more than 100.000 USD are exempt from corporate income tax 
if investing in high technology or the agriculture and food industry. 
1996 ?
2001 
A company with foreign participation of at least 50% which was acquired before 
2000 and shows invested capital of at least 5.000.000 USD can enjoy a tax holiday of 
5 years given it invests 50% of what would have been taxes in fixed assets. This is 
granted till end of 2001.  
Chile 2004 ?
2008 
Under the Chilean Holding Company (CHC) regime, a participation exemption is 
granted with respect to income earned, dividend distributions, and capital gains. In 
effect, foreign investors using the CHC to channel foreign investments into Chile are 
not subject to income tax in Chile with respect to investments held by the CHC 
outside of Chile (that is on income earned on their participations, on distributions of 
the income, and on capital gains earned on disposals of their investments). 
Ireland All 
Extensive incentives for international financial services centers are granted. These 
are, among others, an exemption from local property tax for 10 years, an exemption 
from capital gains tax as well as generous depreciation allowances. 
Liechtenstein All Holding companies are exempt from income tax. They are, however, subject to 
capital tax, but only at a reduced rate. 
Luxembourg All 
Holding companies under the law of July 31, 1929 ("1929 holding companies") are 
not subject to corporate income tax. As the regime violates state aid rules, no new 
such holdings were granted after January 1, 2007. Those holdings which already had 
the status before that date, however, benefit from it through 31 December 2010. 
Netherlands All Foreign losses can be used in financial holdings. Moreover, a tax free reserve of up 
to 80% of the financial service income can be accumulated in the financial holding. 
Singapore All The "enhanced headquarters incentive package" enables headquarters of all types 
to be taxed at rates of only 5%, 10% or 15% instead of the regular rates. 
Switzerland All 
A holding company is regularly almost completely exempt from the cantonal part 
(but not from the federal part) of the income tax. The normal profit tax only applies 
to immovable property located in Switzerland. 
The source of this information is the IBFD European and Global Tax Handbooks as well as tax guides by the big four  audit 
and tax companies. The reference "All" in the column "years" means, that the regime was in place throughout 1996 ?2008. 
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Table 7 ?14: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2008 
 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .05 .3 .15 .3 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .1 0 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .05 0 0 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 .05 .05 0 .07 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .05 0 .05 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 .05 .05
Canada CAN .05 .05 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .05 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .05 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .15 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .05 .35 .15 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .05 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35
China CHN .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1
Columbia COL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .28 .1 0 .05 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 0 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .211 0 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .05 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 0 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .1 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 0 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .1 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 0 0 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .25 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .05 .05 .15 0 0 .15
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15
New Zealand NZL .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR 0 0 0 .25 .25 0 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .25 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 0 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .2 0 0 .2 .1 0 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .2 .1 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 .1 .2 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 0 .1 .2
Romania ROM .05 0 0 .16 .16 0 .05 .16 .16 .1 .16 .05 0 0 0 .16 0 0 0 0 0 .16 0 0 .15 .125 0 0 .1 .07 0 .16 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .16 0 .16 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .15 .15 .03 0 .1 .16
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republ ic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .15 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .18 .15 0 .15 .18 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .18 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .18 0 0 0 .1 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .18
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 0 .05 .3 .05 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .3 0 0 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 0 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 0 0 0 .35 0 0 0 0 0 .35 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .35 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .35 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 0 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 0 .3 .05 0 .05 0 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .1 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table 7 ?15: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2008 
  
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC EX EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table 7 ?16: Method of group taxation 
Country 1996 Method in 1996 Change to 2008 
Australia yes Group Contribution 2002  Consolidation yes 
Austria yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Belgium no    no 
Brazil no      no 
Bulgaria no      no 
Canada no      no 
China no      no 
Cyprus no   2003 Group Relief yes 
Czech Republic no      no 
Denmark yes Consolidation    yes 
Estonia no      no 
Finland yes Group Contribution    yes 
France yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Greece no      no 
Hungary no      no 
Iceland no   1999 Consolidation yes 
India no      no 
Ireland yes Group Relief    yes 
Italy yes TaxCredit Exchange 2000 Group Contribution 
     2004 Consolidation yes 
Japan no   2003 Consolidation yes 
Latvia no   1998 Group Relief yes 
Lithuania no   2004 Group Contribution yes 
Luxembourg yes Fiscal Unity    yes 
Malta yes Group Relief    yes 
Mexico yes Consolidation    yes 
Netherlands yes Consolidation    yes 
New Zealand yes Group Relief    yes 
Norway yes Group Contribution    yes 
Poland no   1997 Fiscal Unity yes 
Portugal yes Consolidation    yes 
Romania no      no 
Russian Federation no      no 
Slovak Republic no      no 
Slovenia yes Consolidation 2007 no no 
South Korea no      no 
Spain yes Consolidation    yes 
Sweden yes Group Contribution    yes 
Switzerland no      no 
Turkey no   no 
United Kingdom yes Group Relief yes 
USA yes Consolidation yes 
In a consolidation or fiscal unity system, the financial statements of companies belonging to the same group are either 
made up together or merged at the end of the fiscal year. When there is a system of group contribution, the profitable 
subsidiary is enabled to contribute a part or all of its profits to the subsidiary which suffered a loss. Correspondingly, 
losses are transferred among subsidiaries in a group relief system. In effect, all of these systems enable the netting of 
profits and losses of different tax subjects. Therefore, I apply a dummy variable indicating if group taxation is available. 
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7.9 Survey 5: Empirical evidence on the tax impact on structuring and location decisions 
Survey 94 Data Methodology Results 
Altshuler, 
Grubert (2002) 
1996 corporate tax 
files compiled by the 
Statistics of Income 
Division of the IRS. 
This data set is based 
on the basic 
corporate tax form 
(Form 1120), the 
form used to claim a 
foreign tax credit 
(Form 1118), and 
Form 5471 which 
reports on the 
activities of each 
CFC of a US parent 
company. The 
regressions use 5,981 
observations. 
Focus on investment-
repatriation strategies and 
the empirical validation of 
a sophisticated model. In 
this model, the subsidiary 
located in the low-tax 
country can either repatriate 
taxable dividends to the 
parent or invest in its own 
real operations. This 
investment can be targeted 
to passive assets the parent 
can borrow against, or at 
related affiliates. 
The availability of 
alternative strategies, as 
described in the 
'methodology' section, can 
affect real investment 
throughout the worldwide 
corporation. This particularly 
refers to the strategies using 
related affiliates. 
Buettner, Ruf 
(2007) 
Outbound side of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. The 
observations cover 
subsidiaries in 18 
host countries during 
the years 1996 till 
2003. 
The identification measure 
is the international variance 
in statutory tax rates and in 
effective average tax rates. 
An increase in the statutory 
tax rate significantly reduces 
the probability that a 
multinational opts for this 
location when making its 
investment decision. The 
effective average tax rate 
only serves as a reliable 
predictor of location 
decisions if it sresses the 
statutory tax rate. 
Buettner, 
Wamser (2009) 
Observations of 
foreign subsidiaries 
in 18 host countries 
during the years 
1996 till 2003. 
Outbound side of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. 
The identification measure 
is the international variance 
in statutory tax rates. 
Furthermore, the 
differences in depreciation 
allowances and in several 
other kinds of taxes besides 
profit taxes are utilized for 
identification. 
An increase in the statutory 
tax rate significantly reduces 
the probability that a 
multinational opts for this 
location when making 
investment decisions. 
Depreciation rules and taxes 
other than profit taxes do not 
seem to have a significant 
influence on multinational 
groups' location decisions. 
Desai, Foley 
and Hines Jr. 
(2002) 
Annual survey of 
U.S. FDI by the 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, covering 
the years 1982 
through 1997. 
Regressions are 
based on between 
20,346 and 185,813 
firm observations. 
Analysis of the role of 
chains of ownership for 
U.S.-based firms operating 
abroad. While other 
elements of the paper such 
as the tax impact on FDI 
are traced in regressions, 
the analysis of ownership 
chains remains foremost 
descriptive. 
Some 30% of aggregate 
foreign assets were held 
indirectly via some kind of 
holding company. 
Furthermore, the 
concentration of ownership 
chains is particularly high in 
Europe.  
                                                            
94 Some of the methodologies’ and results’ summaries quote the respective papers literally. 
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Desai, Foley, 
Hines Jr. 
(2006a) 
Direct reference to 
Desai, Foley, Hines 
Jr. (2006b), where 
the data source is 
properly described. 
Panel of data on the 
financial and 
operating 
characteristics of 
U.S. firms operating 
abroad. It is provided 
by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
annual survey of 
U.S. direct 
investment abroad 
and it covers the 
years 1982 through 
1999. 
More current evidence on 
the question if 
multinationals' activity in 
tax havens diverts activity 
from non-havens. An 
instrumental variables 
approach is described, 
which applies the economic 
growth rate of investment 
countries as the instrument 
for a firm's level of foreign 
direct investment in a non-
tax haven country. Instead 
of presenting the outcome 
directly, the authors refer to 
the tables in Desai, Foley, 
Hines Jr. (2006b). 
International firms with 
leeway regarding their 
transfer prices are most 
likely to use tax havens. Tax 
haven countries seem to 
fulfill two tasks: allocating 
taxable income away from 
the high-tax jurisdiction and 
facilitating deferral of 
foreign income in the credit 
country. The evidence 
suggests that tax haven 
activity does not divert but 
even enhances activity in 
nearby non-havens. 
Desai, Foley, 
Hines Jr. 
(2006b) 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis annual 
survey of U.S. direct 
investment abroad 
covering the years 
1982 through 1999. 
Affiliate-level panel 
provides financial 
and operating firm 
characteristics. The 
regressions are based 
on up to 137,895 
firm observations. 
Analysis of what types of 
firms establish tax haven 
operations, and what 
purposes these operations 
serve. Extensive descriptive 
statistics on the amount and 
spread of tax haven 
affiliates, using three 
different tax haven lists. 
Dependent variables, 
applied one by one: dummy 
of whether a parent owns 
an affiliate in a haven; the 
ratio of affiliates in havens 
to all affiliates, ratio of 
affiliate sales in havens to 
sales from all the parent's 
affiliates, and growth rate 
of sales. IV approach using 
the average foreign GDP 
growth rates, calculated 
using firm-specific weights 
as the instrument for 
changes in firm activity 
outside of tax havens. 
Larger, more international 
firms, and those with 
extensive intra-firm trade 
and high research and 
development intensities are 
the most likely to use tax 
havens. The primary use of 
affiliates in larger tax haven 
countries is to reallocate 
taxable income, whereas the 
primary use of affiliates in 
smaller tax haven countries 
is to facilitate deferral of 
U.S. taxation of foreign 
income. One percent greater 
sales and investment growth 
in nearby non-haven 
countries is associated with a 
1.5 to 2% greater likelihood 
of establishing a tax haven 
operation. 
Faccio, Lang 
(2002) 
Ownership dataset 
covering the ultimate 
ownership and 
control of 5,232 
corporations in 13 
Western European 
countries. Using 
Worldscope as the 
starting point, the 
data is enriched by 
exclusively gathered 
information provided 
Broad and very informative 
descriptive analysis of 
ownership structures, 
presenting exemplary 
groups, ultimate ownership 
patterns by concentration of 
control, by listing and by 
internationalization and an 
additional analysis of dual 
class shares and their 
implications. There are no 
regressions. 
Typically, European firms 
are widely held (36.93%) or 
family controlled (44.29%). 
Widely held firms are more 
important in the UK and 
Ireland, whereas family 
controlled firms are so in 
continental Europe. 
Financial and large firms are 
more likely widely held, 
while non-financial and 
small firms are more likely 
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by Bolsa de Valores 
de Lisboa, 
Commerzbank, 
Helsinki Media Blue 
Book, Hugin, the 
Union Bank of 
Switzerland, and by 
the Vienna Stock 
Exchange. 
family controlled. 
Gomes-
Casseres (1989) 
Data from over 1,500 
manufacturing 
subsidiaries of 180 
U.S. multinationals. 
Dataset builds on 
Harvard's 
Multinational 
Enterprise Project 
which, over a period 
of ten years, gathered 
detailed data on 
almost 20,000 
subsidiaries of the 
187 largest U.S. 
MNEs. It is 
supplemented by 
information from the 
PIMS database and 
from World Bank 
statistics. 
Search for answers to the 
question how multinational 
enterprises select 
ownership structures for 
their foreign manufacturing 
subsidiaries. Taxes as a 
potential driver are not the 
main focus. Dependent 
binary variable: whether an 
individual MNE subsidiary 
was organized as a jointly 
or a wholly-owned venture 
or not. Independent 
variables either measure the 
subsidiary’s business or the 
relative capabilities of the 
multinational's parent. 
Logit estimation approach. 
Multinationals are found to 
prefer a joint venture with a 
host-country firm over a 
wholly-owned subsidiary 
when: (1) the capabilities of 
the local firm complement 
their own, (2) the 
contributions of both firms 
are costlier to transfer 
contractually than through 
ownership channels, and (3) 
costs due to shirking by 
partners and conflicts 
between them do not 
outweigh the benefits of 
joint ownership. 
Grubert, 
Slemrod (1998) 
US American firm-
level observations 
using tax data 
provided by the 
Internal Revenue 
Service. Cross-
section focusing on 
the year 1987. 
The international sector-
specific variation of 
effective average tax rates 
is used for identification. 
Furthermore, the paper 
distinguishes by the sector-
specific share of internal 
transactions and the group's 
expenditure in research and 
development.  
A higher volume of internal 
group transactions and of the 
parent's research and 
development expenditures 
increases the probability that 
a US group has at least one 
subsidiary in a low-tax 
country. 
Hines, Rice 
(1994) 
Data from the US 
Department of 
Commerce's 
comprehensive 
benchmark survey of 
US foreign direct 
investment for the 
year 1982. The 
bundling of firm 
information to 
country cells shrinks 
the regression 
samples in some 
cases from 82 to 58 
countries. 
Insight into the role of tax 
havens serving as holding 
countries for U.S. 
multinationals. Broad 
descriptive statistics 
presenting tax haven lists, 
tax rates, and the spread of 
tax haven affiliates. OLS 
estimations and regressions 
following IV approaches 
are presented in a parallel 
manner. Dependent 
variable is log of net pre-
tax non-financial income. 
Tax haven locations played a 
paramount role in the late 
1980s, accounting for more 
than a quarter of U.S. foreign 
investment and nearly a third 
of U.S. profits. Based on the 
behavior of US firms in 
1982, it appears that US 
firms report extraordinarily 
high profit rates on both their 
real and their financial 
investments in tax havens. 
The calculated tax rate that 
maximizes tax revenue for a 
typical haven is about 6%. 
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Hubert, Pain 
(2002) 
Panel data set on 
outward investment 
by German 
multinationals to the 
European Economic 
Area in the years 
1980 till 1996 in 
seven industries and 
eight host 
economies. 
Analysis of the structural 
change in the industrial and 
geographical FDI patterns 
in Europe. Specifically, the 
influences of national 
governments on location 
decisions by means of 
corporate taxes, 
infrastructure investment, 
grants and subsidies are 
worked out. Ample 
descriptive graphs and 
statistics, followed by OLS 
estimations. 
Generally mixed evidence. 
Tax competitiveness appears 
to be important but is 
sensitive to the model 
specification. The 
government's infrastructure 
investments attract private 
firm investment. Fiscal 
policies seem to have a 
permanent influence on the 
location of economic 
activities. 
Masulis, Pham, 
Zein (2011) 
Dataset of 3,007 
family group firms 
drawn from 28,635 
listed firms across 45 
countries for the 
years 2003 till 2006. 
The compiled dataset 
combines the Osiris 
database by Bureau 
Van Dijk and the 
Worldscope database 
by Thomson Reuters. 
Analysis of family-
controlled businesses' 
motivations regarding 
financing, control structures 
and organizational choice. 
Country-level descriptive 
statistics on family business 
groups. Multivariate OLS 
regression analyses on the 
prevalence of family 
business groups, on the 
structuring of family 
business groups, on the 
impact of firm 
characteristics and group 
organization choices, and 
on family group 
membership's impact on 
firm performance. 
Particular group structures 
emerge not only to 
perpetuate control, but also 
to alleviate financing 
constraints at the country 
and firm levels. Family 
groups are more prevalent in 
markets with limited 
availability of capital. At the 
firm level, investment 
intensity is greater for firms 
held in pyramidal rather than 
in horizontal structures, 
reflecting the financing 
advantages of the former. 
Within a pyramid, internal 
equity funding, investment 
intensity, and firm value all 
increase down the ownership 
chain. 
Mintz (2004) Foreign direct 
investment inflows 
and outflows of ten 
countries for the 
years 1997–2001, as 
provided by the 
International 
Monetary Fund. The 
paper is mainly 
analytical with data 
only provided to 
illustrate and support 
the model 
considerations. 
Focus on the holdings’ 
function as financing hubs. 
Multinationals are 
supposed to use these 
conduit entities for means 
of indirect debt financing 
instead of directly 
providing the loans to 
operative subsidiaries. 
Indirect financing 
structures by means of 
conduit entities provide an 
opportunity to achieve at 
least two deductions for 
interest expenses for an 
investment made in the host 
country. 
So-called conduit countries 
can be identified by their 
large amounts of both capital 
inflows and capital outflows. 
The paper provides a concise 
model and some descriptive 
indications, but abstains 
from empirical evidence on a 
micro level. Due to the tax 
benefits of indirect 
participations, particular 
cross-border investments 
may be substantially favored 
over purely domestic 
investment. 
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Mintz, 
Weichenrieder 
(2010a) 
Outbound side of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. Firm-level 
information covering 
the years 1989 till 
2001. The 
regressions are based 
on up to 19,417 
observations. 
Analysis of the role of 
holding companies and 
conduit entities in German 
inbound and outbound FDI. 
Identification of the 
relevant conduit countries 
acting as stepping stones. 
Several tax and non-tax 
factors for the setup of 
indirect structures are 
empirically identified. Very 
detailed and informative 
descriptive graphs and 
statistics, followed by logit 
regressions. 
Withholding taxes, credit 
systems in capital exporting 
countries, and the possibility 
of group consolidation are 
shown to be empirically 
important for the design of 
ownership chains in foreign 
direct investment. 
Mintz, 
Weichenrieder 
(2010b) 
Firm-level 
information covering 
the years 1989 till 
2001 and stemming 
from the outbound 
side of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. 
The book provides a 
comprehensive analysis of 
investment structures' 
determinants. Building on 
insights from previous 
working papers, it 
particularly focuses on 
indirect financing structures 
and on the role of holding 
companies in ownership 
chains. 
While the importance of 
investors who take 
advantage of stepping stones 
in a third country seems on 
the rise, direct financing 
arrangements that use a 
simple structure still form 
the majority of cases. 
Withholding taxes as well as 
conduit entities seem to play 
an important role for 
ownership chains. 
Morck (2003) Country-level 
information, 
presenting dividend 
treatment regulations 
on 33 countries. 
Structure 
information on 
selected prominent 
groups stem from the 
Directory of 
Intercorporate 
Ownership, Statistics 
Canada, 1997, as 
well as from other 
sources. 
Descriptive statistics and 
illustrative real world 
examples by group 
structure outlines. There are 
no regressions. 
Arguments for eliminating 
the double taxation of 
dividends apply only to 
dividends paid by 
corporations to individuals. 
Evaluation of US tax reform 
proposals not distinguishing 
dividends paid to individuals 
from inter-corporate 
dividends. By eliminating 
double taxation on both sorts 
of dividends, this might 
enable pyramidal groups in 
the US again for the first 
time since the 1930s. 
Mutti, Grubert 
(2004) 
US American 
subsidiary 
observations in 60 
host countries. 
Cross-section 
analysis based on the 
year 1996. 
The analysis builds on the 
international variation of 
effective average tax rates 
and on sector-specific 
differences in the export 
intensity. 
A tax-induced increase in the 
cost of capital by one percent 
lowers the probability of 
having a subsidiary at this 
respective location by 
0.16%. This impact is even 
more pronounced concerning 
multinationals operating in 
export-oriented sectors. 
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Overesch, 
Wamser (2009) 
Outbound side of the 
Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. The firm 
observations stem 
from 30 European 
countries during the 
period 1989 to 2005. 
Analysis whether different 
types of FDI are 
asymmetrically affected by 
corporate taxation. 
Investment projects are 
classified according to 
several characteristics such 
as the general motivation 
for FDI, the type of 
business activity, or the 
degree of 
internationalization of the 
multinational. Count data 
model with the number of 
German outbound 
investments in European 
countries serving as the 
dependent variable. 
Vertically-integrated 
investments are more 
sensitive to host-country 
taxation than horizontal FDI; 
larger tax rate elasticities are 
estimated if business 
activities are considered 
highly mobile; in accordance 
with profit-shifting 
arguments, subsidiaries of 
more internationalized 
companies are less tax 
responsive to host taxation. 
Swenson (1994) US-based affiliates 
belonging to foreign 
multinational groups 
headquartered in 46 
different countries. 
The firm-level 
observations cover 
the years 1984 till 
1994. 
The analysis uses the 
variation of business taxes 
across US federal states. 
Furthermore, it builds on 
the different tax systems in 
the investors' home 
countries. There is also a 
differentiation across 
different types of 
investments.  
A one percentage point 
increase in a country's tax 
rate leads to a reduction of 
multinational subsidiaries 
located in this country by 
0.108%. New foundations 
decline by 0.11%, additional 
investments decline by 
0.069%, and M&A increase 
by 0.065%. 
Wamser (2008) Microdatabase 
Direct Investment 
(MiDi) provided by 
the German Federal 
Bank. The 
regressions are based 
on up to 14,487 
panel firm 
observations from 
the period 1996 to 
2005. 
Identification of influence 
factors on multinationals' 
decision of whether to 
pursue a direct or an 
indirect investment 
strategy. Indirect 
investment strategies 
involve at least three 
corporate entities and 
enable enhanced 
opportunities for 
international tax planning. 
A switching regression 
approach takes account of 
the structural choice's 
endogeneity. 
An increase in the cost of 
capital reduces indirect 
investments more than direct 
effects. Conduit structures 
enable income to be 
transferred to the German 
parent without tax 
deductions, implying that 
multinationals actually 
exploit indirect investment 
structures to avoid taxes. 
Almeida, Park, 
Subrahmanyam, 
Wolfenzon 
(2011) 
Ownership data 
stemming from the 
Korean Fair Trade 
Commission. The 
first panel consists of 
1,085 firm 
observations of 47 
groups observed in 
years between 1998 
and 2004. The 
second panel applied 
in the paper uses 
Analysis of the evolution of 
Korean chaebols (business 
groups) using ownership 
data. There is either vertical 
growth (as pyramids) or 
horizontal growth (through 
direct ownership). The tax 
impact on the group 
structure evolution is only a 
side aspect in this study. 
OLS regressions with the 
stand-alone profitability, 
The main contribution of this 
paper is to shed new light on 
the process through which 
groups form. Ownership 
structure is not given 
exogenously. The evidence 
is consistent with the 
selection of firms into 
different group positions and 
ascribes the 
underperformance of 
pyramidal firms to a 
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2,643 observations. dividend measures, Tobin's 
Q and acquisition intensity 
serving one by one as the 
dependent variable. 
Industry-, group- and year-
fixed effects are applied. 
selection effect rather than 
tunneling. 
Hoshi, Kashyap, 
Scharfstein 
(1991) 
Panel data set of 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms, 
gathered from the 
Nikkei Financial 
Data tapes. The 
regressions are based 
on samples of up to 
297 firm 
observations 
covering the fiscal 
years 1977-1982. 
Comparison of the 
investment behavior 
between two sets of 
Japanese firms: one set has 
close financial ties to large 
Japanese banks serving as a 
primary source of external 
finance, and are more likely 
to be well-informed about 
the firm. The second set of 
firms has weaker links to a 
main bank and presumably 
faces greater problems 
raising capital. Taxes are 
only one of the analyzed 
influencing factors. 
The evidence suggests that 
information and incentive 
problems in the capital 
market affect investment 
structures. Investment is 
more sensitive to liquidity 
for the set of firms without 
close ties to a bank than for 
the first set. Capital-market 
imperfections contribute to 
excessive output 
fluctuations. In this view, 
high current profits increase 
current liquidity, thereby 
generating investment and 
increasing future output and 
profitability. 
La Porta, 
Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer 
(1999) 
Data on ownership 
structures of large 
corporations in 27 
wealthy economies 
to identify the 
ultimate controlling 
shareholders of these 
firms. One sample 
consists of the top 20 
firms ranked by 
market capitalization 
of common equity at 
the end of 1995. 
Another sample 
collects smaller 
firms, however still 
requiring common 
equity of at least 
$500 million at the 
end of 1995. 
Ownership structures of 
prominent firms such as 
Microsoft, Barrick Gold, 
Hutchison Whampoa, 
Toyota Motor, Samsung 
Electronics, Damiler Benz 
AG, ABB AG, Fiat SPA, 
and Electrolabel SA are 
shown in the first part of 
the descriptive section. This 
is followed by broad and 
informative mean and 
median value reports of 
structure drivers. There are 
no regressions. 
Except in economies with 
very good shareholder 
protection, relatively few 
firms seem to be widely 
held. Firms are typically 
controlled by families or the 
State. Equity control by 
financial institutions is far 
less common. The 
controlling shareholders 
typically have power over 
firms significantly in excess 
of their cash flow rights, 
primarily through the use of 
pyramids and participation in 
management. 
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8. Summary of Results 
 
Essay #1: The Impact of Corporate Taxes on Investment 
1. Corporate taxes have a negative effect on investment. A 10 percentage point increased 
(reduced) corporate tax rate causes a 5.32 percent reduction (increase) in investment, 
measured by fixed assets. 
 
2. Companies with an existing loss carryforward are less concerned with tax rates in their 
investment decisions. About half of the negative tax rate effect is compensated for firms 
with an existing loss carryforward. If the pure tax rate effect is -0.553 and the interaction 
term of an existing loss carryforward and the tax rate is 0.299, the summated effect is 
merely -0.254. A tax rate increase of one percentage point therefore only leads to a 
reduction in investment of 0.254%. 
 
3. Especially holding companies are set up by multinational corporations in tax-favorable 
destinations in order for investments to be able to be structured tax-optimally. A decrease 
of ten percentage points in a country’s corporate tax rate causes an increase in the share 
of holding companies in all subsidiaries in that location by 0.55%. The effect is even 
stronger regarding withholding taxes. A ten percentage point decrease in withholding 
taxes causes an increase of 0.80% of holding companies relative to all kinds of 
subsidiaries. 
 
Essay #2: Investment Impact of Tax Loss Treatment 
4. There are significant effects of the inter-temporal loss offset provision when paying 
particular attention to the probability of making losses. A limitation of the maximum loss 
carryforward to five or less years has a detrimental effect on investments of a subsidiary 
which faces a high loss probability. 
 
5. As far as existing loss carryforwards are concerned, there is a direct effect on investment. 
Due to liquidity and signaling effects, lower investment occurs in the presence of a loss 
carryforward. 
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6. Existing loss carryforwards also cause a reduced tax elasticity of investment for 
companies actually shielded by existing losses. Thus, the negative impact of a high 
corporate tax rate is lowered if a firm has a loss carryforward. The point estimator for the 
tax rate of 0.614 and the point estimator for the interaction term between the tax rate and 
the dummy indicating an existing loss carryforward is 0.305. This means that the 
presence of losses absorbs about half of the negative tax rate effect. 
 
Essay #3: Empirical Evaluation of Interest Barrier Effects 
7. The new German interest barrier made firms lower their debt to assets ratios and their net 
interest payments. Opposing the original intention, it seems to be national rather than 
multinational firms which adjusted their capital structure, and it is external rather than 
internal debt which is reduced. So, at large, the interest barrier does indeed affect 
financing decisions, but predominantly not in the intended way and not the intended 
firms. 
 
8. Highly-leveraged firms reduce their internal debt to assets ratios. This reaction can, 
however, only be reliably identified for national firms. It is unclear if, at least, the most 
likely targeted multinationals were influenced by the new interest barrier in the intended 
way. 
 
9. Firms which are likely to be subject to the interest barrier because they have very low 
profitability tackle the threat of non-deductible interest by relatively reducing their debt 
to assets ratios. This interest barrier effect, however, is overcompensated by such firms' 
basic need for debt financing to keep their business running. Therefore, in total, low 
profitability firms relatively increased their leverage after the reform. 
 
Essay #4: The Impact of Tax Treaties and Repatriation Taxes on FDI Revisited 
10. Different types of investment are adversely affected by changes in repatriation taxes. 
Fixed assets are negatively affected by higher repatriation taxes while, at the same time, 
passive investment in financial assets rises. These findings are in accordance with 
theoretical expectations on the effect of repatriation taxes and they might explain 
previous findings of an insignificant effect of tax treaties on aggregated FDI. 
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11. Firms postpone repatriation because they have the general expectation that, due to new 
tax treaties, high repatriation taxes will decrease in the future. With a lack of local 
investment opportunities, the respective funds are then invested in the capital market and, 
in particular, in shares of affiliated firms. Accordingly, I find a positive effect of 
repatriation taxes on financial investments. 
 
12. The behavioral response to repatriation taxes is also confirmed by corresponding effects 
of repatriation taxes on financial structures of the subsidiaries, especially regarding the 
structure of equity finance. Higher repatriation taxes are associated with a significantly 
higher share of revenue reserves and, at the same time, with significantly smaller new 
equity injections. 
 
Essay #5: Form Follows Function? 
13. If the withholding tax on dividends between the country of a subsidiary and the country 
of its superior foreign unit is low, this subsidiary tends to be held directly instead of via a 
holding. Put differently, holdings are generally established at positions of the group 
structure where they can at least potentially cause savings in withholding taxes. Operative 
subsidiaries tend to be held via subsidiaries located in countries with low withholding 
taxes towards the country of the superior foreign-based company unit. 
 
14. Despite general evidence on tax-efficient group structuring, the actual tax savings by 
multinational holding structures appear rather small. On average, they only lead to a total 
tax burden reduction of about 2 percentage points as compared to the burden if the 
applied intermediate holding company was non-existent. Therefore, other determinants of 
a preferable holding location given the location of a subsidiary, such as the existence of a 
specific holding regime, need to be regarded. 
 
15. Concerning the tax impact on the horizontal group structure, the existence of a group 
taxation regime leads to a wider spread of investments. The existence of a group taxation 
regime increases the number of observed subsidiaries per group in a country by .089. The 
probability of a split up into at least two subsidiaries per country and year increases by 
16.1% if a group taxation regime is in place. 
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Table A ?1: Combined statutory profit tax rates in 189 countries from 1996 till 2010 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Albania 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 23,00% 20,00% 20,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Algeria 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Andorra 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Angola 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Anguilla 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Antigua & Barbuda 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Argentina 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Armenia 20,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Aruba 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 
Australia 36,00% 34,00% 34,00% 36,00% 36,00% 34,00% 34,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Austria 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Azerbaijan 25,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 27,00% 27,00% 25,00% 24,00% 24,00% 22,00% 22,00% 22,00% 22,00% 20,00% 
Bahamas 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Bahrain 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Bangladesh 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 27,50% 27,50% 
Barbados 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 37,50% 36,00% 36,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Belarus 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 27,00% 27,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 
Belgium 40,17% 40,17% 40,17% 40,17% 40,17% 40,17% 40,17% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 
Belize 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Bermuda 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Bolivia 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Botswana 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Brazil 25,00% 25,00% 33,00% 33,00% 37,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 
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British Virgin Islands 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Brunei 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 27,50% 25,50% 23,50% 
Bulgaria 40,00% 40,00% 37,00% 34,30% 32,50% 28,00% 23,50% 23,50% 19,50% 15,00% 15,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Cambodia 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Cameroon 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 
Canada 44,60% 44,60% 44,60% 44,60% 44,60% 42,10% 38,60% 36,60% 36,10% 36,10% 36,10% 36,10% 33,50% 33,00% 31,00% 
Canary Islands 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 38,01% 35,74% 35,74% 35,74% 
Cayman Islands 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Ceuta and Melilla 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 38,01% 35,74% 35,74% 35,74% 
Chile 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 16,00% 16,50% 16,50% 17,00% 17,00% 17,00% 17,00% 17,00% 17,00% 
China 43,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Columbia 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 34,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 
Congo 49,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 40,00% 39,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 36,00% 
Costa Rica 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Cote dIvoire 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 27,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Croatia 25,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Cyprus 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 15,00% 15,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Czech Republic 39,00% 39,00% 35,00% 35,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 28,00% 26,00% 24,00% 24,00% 21,00% 20,00% 19,00% 
Dem. Republic of Congo 50,00% 50,00% 50,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 
Denmark 34,00% 34,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 28,00% 28,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Djibouti 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Dominica 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Dominican Republic 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 30,00% 29,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Ecuador 25,00% 32,00% 36,25% 15,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Egypt 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
El Salvador 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Equitorial Guinea 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Estonia 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 24,00% 23,00% 22,00% 21,00% 21,00% 21,00% 
Ethiopia 50,00% 50,00% 50,00% 50,00% 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Faroe Islands 27,00% 27,00% 27,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 18,00% 18,00% 18,00% 
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Fiji 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 34,00% 32,00% 32,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 29,00% 28,00% 
Finland 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 
France 36,66% 36,66% 41,66% 40,00% 36,66% 36,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 34,93% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 
French Polynesia 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 
Gabon 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Gambia 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 33,00% 
Georgia 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Germany (distributed) 38,05% 38,07% 37,55% 37,57% 37,59% 39,35% 39,35% 40,66% 39,38% 39,43% 39,38% 39,35% 30,95% 30,95% 30,95% 
Germany (retained) 57,25% 57,25% 56,51% 52,35% 52,35% 39,35% 39,35% 40,66% 39,38% 39,43% 39,38% 39,35% 30,95% 30,95% 30,95% 
Ghana 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 32,50% 28,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Gibraltar 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 33,00% 27,00% 22,00% 
Greece 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 32,00% 29,00% 25,00% 25,00% 35,00% 34,00% 
Greenland 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 31,80% 
Grenada 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Guadeloupe 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Guatemala 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 27,50% 25,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 31,00% 
Guernsey 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Guinea 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Guyana 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 
Haiti 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Honduras 40,25% 40,25% 40,25% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Hong Kong 16,50% 16,50% 16,50% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 17,50% 17,50% 17,50% 17,50% 16,50% 16,50% 16,50% 
Hungary 19,64% 19,64% 19,64% 19,64% 19,64% 19,64% 19,64% 19,64% 17,76% 17,71% 17,56% 21,38% 21,44% 21,44% 20,84% 
Iceland 33,00% 33,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 18,00% 18,00% 18,00% 18,00% 18,00% 18,00% 15,00% 15,00% 18,00% 
India 43,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 38,50% 39,55% 35,70% 36,75% 38,88% 36,59% 33,66% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 33,99% 
Indonesia 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 28,00% 30,00% 
Iran 54,00% 54,00% 54,00% 54,00% 54,00% 54,00% 54,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Ireland 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 12,50% 12,50% 12,50% 12,50% 12,50% 12,50% 12,50% 12,50% 
Isle of Man 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Israel 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 34,00% 31,00% 29,00% 27,00% 26,00% 25,00% 
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Italy 53,20% 53,20% 41,25% 41,25% 41,25% 40,25% 40,25% 38,25% 37,25% 37,25% 37,25% 37,25% 31,12% 31,12% 31,12% 
Jamaica 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 
Japan 51,00% 51,00% 51,00% 48,00% 42,00% 42,00% 42,00% 42,00% 42,00% 40,76% 40,76% 40,76% 40,76% 40,76% 40,76% 
Jersey 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Jordan 55,00% 35,00% 35,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Kazakhstan 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Kenya 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 33,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Kuwait 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 55,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Kyrgyzstan 10,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 20,00% 20,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Latvia 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 22,00% 19,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Lebanon 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Lesotho 40,00% 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Liberia 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Libya 60,00% 60,00% 60,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 
Liechtenstein 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Lithuania 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 24,00% 24,00% 22,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 19,00% 18,00% 15,00% 20,00% 15,00% 
Luxembourg 40,29% 39,34% 37,45% 37,45% 37,45% 37,45% 30,38% 30,38% 30,38% 30,38% 29,32% 29,32% 29,63% 28,59% 28,59% 
Macao 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 
Macedonia 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 12,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Malawi 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Malaysia 30,00% 30,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 27,00% 26,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Maldives 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Malta 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Mariana Islands 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Marocco 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Marshall Islands 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Martinique 36,66% 36,66% 41,66% 40,00% 36,66% 36,43% 35,43% 35,43% 35,43% 34,93% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 34,43% 
Mauritania 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Mauritius 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 22,50% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Mexico 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 34,00% 33,00% 30,00% 29,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 30,00% 
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Micronesia 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Moldova 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 25,00% 25,00% 28,00% 25,00% 22,00% 20,00% 18,00% 15,00% 15,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Montserrat 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Mozambique 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 
Myanmar 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Namibia 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Nauru 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Nepal 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Netherlands 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 31,50% 29,60% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 25,50% 
Netherlands Antilles 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 34,50% 
New Caledonia 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
New Zealand 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Nicaragua 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Nigeria 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Norway 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 
Oman 50,00% 50,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 
Pakistan 43,00% 30,00% 30,00% 35,00% 43,00% 34,65% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Palau 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Panama 30,00% 37,00% 37,00% 37,00% 37,00% 37,00% 37,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Papua New Guinea 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Paraguay 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 20,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Peru 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 27,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Philippines 35,00% 35,00% 34,00% 33,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Poland 40,00% 38,00% 36,00% 34,00% 30,00% 28,00% 28,00% 27,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 
Portugal 36,00% 36,00% 34,00% 34,00% 32,00% 32,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 27,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 26,50% 
Qatar 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 10,00% 
Romania 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 
Russian Federation 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 35,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Rwanda 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Samoa 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 39,00% 35,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 27,00% 27,00% 27,00% 27,00% 
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San Marino 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 24,00% 
Saudi Arabia 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
Senegal 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Serbia 25,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 14,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Seychelles 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 33,00% 
Sierra Leone 47,20% 47,20% 47,20% 47,20% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Singapore 27,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 26,00% 25,50% 24,50% 22,00% 22,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 18,00% 18,00% 17,00% 
Slovak Republic 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 29,00% 29,00% 25,00% 25,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 19,00% 
Slovenia 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 23,00% 22,00% 21,00% 20,00% 
Solomon Islands 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
South Africa 35,00% 42,20% 42,20% 42,20% 37,80% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 29,00% 29,00% 29,00% 28,00% 28,00% 
South Korea 28,00% 30,80% 30,80% 30,80% 30,80% 30,80% 29,70% 29,70% 29,70% 27,50% 27,50% 27,40% 25,00% 25,00% 22,00% 
Spain 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 40,30% 38,01% 35,74% 35,74% 35,74% 
Sri Lanka 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 42,00% 32,50% 35,00% 32,50% 32,50% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
St Kitts and Nevis 40,00% 40,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
St Lucia 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,00% 33,00% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 33,30% 
St Vincent 33,30% 33,30% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Sudan 60,00% 60,00% 60,00% 60,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 40,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Surinam 45,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 38,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 36,00% 
Svalbard 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 16,00% 
Swaziland 37,50% 37,50% 37,50% 37,50% 37,50% 37,50% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Sweden 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 26,30% 26,30% 
Switzerland 25,82% 25,82% 25,09% 25,09% 24,93% 24,70% 24,42% 24,10% 21,32% 21,32% 21,32% 21,32% 21,20% 21,20% 21,20% 
Syria 50,00% 50,00% 50,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 45,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 
Taiwan 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 20,00% 
Tanzania 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Thailand 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Trinidad and Tobago 38,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
Tunisia 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 33,00% 33,00% 35,00% 35,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
Turkey 44,00% 44,00% 44,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 
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Turks & Caicos Islands 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Uganda 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 
UK 33,00% 33,00% 31,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 
Ukraine 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
United Arab Emirates 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Uruguay 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 32,00% 28,00% 30,00% 30,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
US Virgin Islands 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 
USA 41,18% 41,18% 41,18% 41,18% 41,17% 41,17% 41,17% 41,18% 41,18% 41,18% 41,18% 41,18% 38,30% 38,30% 37,87% 
Uzbekistan 37,00% 37,00% 35,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 33,00% 20,00% 18,00% 15,00% 12,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Vanuatu 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Venezuela 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 34,00% 
Vietnam 25,00% 30,00% 35,00% 35,00% 32,50% 32,00% 32,00% 32,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 28,00% 25,00% 25,00% 
West Bank/Gaza 38,50% 38,50% 38,50% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 15,00% 
Yemen 36,00% 32,00% 32,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Yugoslavia 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 14,00% 14,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 10,00% 
Zambia 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 
Zimbabwe 37,50% 37,50% 37,50% 35,00% 35,00% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 30,90% 
Combined statutory tax rates on corporate profits. Source: own data collection based on information in tax handbooks and databases of the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD) as well as in tax handbooks of the big four tax and audit companies Deloitte, Ernst & Young, PwC and KPMG. 
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Table A ?2a: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 1996 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .15 .25 .25 .07 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 .1 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .15 0 .25 .1 .25 0 .1 .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .25 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .15 .1 .15 .18 .05 .1 .1 .15 .25 .25 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .25 .25 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .15 .15 .15 .1 .25 .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .15 .25 .15 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .15 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 .25 .1 .25 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .05 .05 .25
Denmark DNK .15 0 0 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .15 .05 0 .05 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .25 .2 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Finland FIN .15 0 0 .28 .15 .1 .1 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 .05 .28 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 .1 0 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .15 .2638 .2638 .1 .2638 .15 .1 .05 0 .2638 .25 0 0 0 .2638 .05 .15 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .2638 0 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 .05 .2638 .05 0 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 0 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .2 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 0 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2
India IND .15 .2 .15 .2 .15 .2 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .15 .2 .05 .15 .15 .2
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .324 .15 .1 .15 .324 .324 .1 .324 .1 .15 .15 0 .324 .27 0 0 0 0 .324 .324 .324 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .324 .324 .324 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .324 .1 0 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .324 .15 .15 .324 0 .05 .324
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .12 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .2 .2 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .25 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .1 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .1 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 0 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 0 0 .05 .05 .15 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .15 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .2 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .25 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 .25 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .15 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .2 0 .05 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .1 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .2
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 0 0 .15 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .25 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 .1 .18 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .15 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 .05 .1 .35 .35 .05 .15 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 .15 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .35 .35 .1 0 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2b: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 1997 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .15 .25 .25 .07 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 .1 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 0 .25 .1 .25 0 .1 .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .25 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .15 .1 .15 .18 .05 .1 .1 .15 .25 .25 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .25 .25 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .25 .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .15 .25 .15 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .05 .05 .25
Denmark DNK .15 0 0 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .15 .05 0 .05 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .25 .2 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Finland FIN .15 0 0 .28 .15 .1 .1 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 .05 .28 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 .1 0 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .15 .2638 .2638 .1 .2638 .15 .1 .05 0 .2638 .25 0 0 0 .2638 .05 .15 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .2638 0 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 .05 .2638 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 0 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2
India IND .15 .2 .15 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .15 .2 .05 .15 .15 .2
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .324 .15 .1 .15 .324 .324 .1 .324 .1 .15 .15 0 .324 .27 0 0 0 0 .324 .324 .324 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .324 .324 .324 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .324 .1 0 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .324 .15 .15 .324 0 .05 .324
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .12 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .25 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .1 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .05 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 0 0 .05 .05 .15 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .15 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .2 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .15 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 0 .05 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .1 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 0 0 .15 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .25 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 .1 .18 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .15 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 .05 .1 .35 .35 .05 .15 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 .15 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .35 .35 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2c: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 1998 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .15 .25 .25 .07 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 .25 .15 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .15 .1 .15 .18 .05 .1 .1 .15 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .15 .25 .15 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 .1 .1 .1 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25
Denmark DNK .15 0 0 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .15 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .25 .2 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Finland FIN .15 0 0 .28 .1 .1 .1 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 .28 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 .05 .28 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 .1 0 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .15 .2638 .2638 .1 .2638 .15 .1 .05 0 .2638 .05 0 0 0 .2638 .05 .15 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .2638 0 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 .05 .2638 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 0 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 .15 .15 0 .27 .27 0 0 0 0 .27 .1 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .27 .27 .27 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 .1 0 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .27 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .12 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .05 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .15 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .2 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .15 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 0 .05 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .1 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .15 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 .1 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .25 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 .1 .18 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 .05 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 .15 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2d: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 1999 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .15 .25 .25 .07 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 0 .25 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 .25 .15 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .15 .1 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .15 .25 .15 .1 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .1 .05 .1 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 0 .25 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .2 0 .25 0 0 .25
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Finland FIN .15 0 0 .28 .1 .1 .1 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 .28 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 .1 0 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .15 .2638 .2638 .1 .2638 .15 .1 .05 0 .2638 .05 0 0 0 .2638 .05 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .2638 .05 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 .05 .2638 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .2 0 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 .15 .15 0 .27 .27 0 0 0 0 .27 .1 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .27 .27 .27 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 .1 0 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .27 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .12 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .05 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .05 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .2 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 0 .05 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .1 .05 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .15 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 .1 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .25 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 .1 .18 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 .05 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 0 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .2 .2 .15 .15 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .15 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2e: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2000 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .15 .25 .25 .07 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 0 .25 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .15 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .1 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .1 0 .25 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 0 .25 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .25 0 0 .25
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26
Finland FIN .15 0 0 .29 .1 .1 .1 .29 .29 .1 .29 .05 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .29 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .29 0 0 .1 0 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .29 .15 .15 .29 0 .05 .29
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .15 .2638 .2638 .1 .2638 .15 .1 .05 0 .2638 .05 0 0 0 .2638 .05 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .2638 .05 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 .05 .2638 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 .05 0 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .2 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 .15 .15 0 .27 .27 0 0 0 0 .27 .1 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .27 .27 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 .1 0 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .05 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .25 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 .25 0 .05 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 0 .05 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 .1 .18 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 .05 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 0 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .25 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .2 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .1 .165 .05 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .165 .1 .15 .15 .165
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .1 .1 .3 .3 .05 .3 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2f: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2001 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 0 .25 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .1 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .1 0 .25 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .05 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 0 .25 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .25 0 0 .25
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .29 .1 .1 .1 .29 .29 .1 .29 .05 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .29 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 0 0 .29 .15 .15 .29 0 .05 .29
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 .25 .25 .05 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .15 .2638 .2638 .1 .2638 .15 .1 .05 0 .2638 .05 0 0 0 .2638 .05 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .2638 .05 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 0 .2638 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .2638 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 0 .2 .05 0 .05 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .2 0 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .2 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 .15 .15 0 .27 .05 0 0 0 0 .27 .1 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .27 .27 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 .1 0 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 .25 .25 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .05 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 0 0 .25 .05 .15 .25 0 0 .25
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 0 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .18 .15 .05 .15 .18 .18 .1 .18 .18 .18 .05 0 .18 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 .05 .18 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .18 .18 .18 0 .18 .18 .05 0 .18 .1 .18 .05 0 .1 .1 .18 .05 .18 0 0 .18 .1 .18 .18 0 .1 .18
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 .05 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 0 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .1 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .1 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .1 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .1 .165 .05 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .165 .1 .15 .15 .165
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2g: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2002 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 .1 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .1 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .05 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .1 0 .25 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 .05 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .28 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .29 .1 .1 .1 .29 .29 .1 .29 .05 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .29 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 0 0 .29 .15 .15 .29 0 .05 .29
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .15 .1 .05 0 .211 .05 0 0 0 .211 .05 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .211 .05 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 0 .211 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .15 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .2 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 .15 .15 0 .27 .05 0 0 0 0 .27 .1 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .27 .27 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 .1 0 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .25 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .29
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .2 .15 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 0 .2 .2 0 0 0 0 .2 .05 .05 .2 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 0 .25 .05 .2 .05 0 .05 .1 .05 .05 .2 0 0 0 .2 .05 .15 .2 0 0 .2
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 0 .25 0 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .15 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 0 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 0 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .18 .15 .05 .15 .18 .18 .1 .18 .18 .18 .05 0 .18 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 .05 .18 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .18 .18 .18 0 .18 .18 .05 0 .18 .1 .18 .05 0 .1 .1 .18 .05 .18 0 0 .18 .1 .18 .18 0 .1 .18
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 0 .05 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .35 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .1 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .1 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .1 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .1 .1 .05 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .165 .1 .15 .15 .165
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA .15 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 .05 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2h: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2003 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 .1 .1 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 .25 .15 .25 0 .05 .15 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 .1 0 .15 .05 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 .25 .25 .25 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 .25 .1 0 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .25 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .05 .05 .15 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .25 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .25 .1 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .25 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .1 0 .25 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .05 .05 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .28 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .29 .1 .1 .1 .29 .29 .1 .29 .05 .29 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 .05 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .29 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 .05 0 0 0 .29 .15 .15 .29 0 .05 .29
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 .1 .1 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 .05 .25 .05 0 .05 .05 0 0 .15 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .15 .1 .05 0 .211 .05 0 0 0 .211 .05 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 .05 .211 .05 0 .05 .05 .05 0 .15 0 .211 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 .1 .1 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 .05 .05 .05 .2 .2 .05 .05 .05 .1 .2 .2 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .1 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .05 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 .15 .15 0 .27 .05 0 0 0 0 .27 .1 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .27 .27 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 .1 0 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .1 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .25 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .2 .15 .05 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 0 .2 .2 0 0 0 0 .2 .05 .05 .2 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 0 .25 .05 .2 .05 0 .05 .1 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .2 .05 .15 .2 0 0 .2
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 0 .25 0 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 0 .25 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .25 .05 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .05 .25 .25 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .2 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 0 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 0 .05 .05 0 .15 .05 .15 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 0 .25 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 .25 .1 .25 .1 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .03 .1 .1 .1
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 0 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15
Slovenia SVN .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 .1 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .15 .1 .15 .15 0 .1 .15
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 .05 0 0 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 .05 0 .1 .05 .1 0 .05 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 0 0 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .35 .05 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .165 .165 .15 .1 .165 .1 .165 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .165 .165 .15 .1 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .15 .1 .165 .15 .15 .15 .165 .165 .1 .165 .1 .165 .165 .1 .165 .165 .1 .1 .165 .15 .1 .1 .05 .165 .165 .15 .165 .165 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2i: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2004 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .15 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .25 0 .25 .05 .25 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .15 .25 .25 .1 .25 .1 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 .05 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15
Canada CAN .05 .05 .15 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO .15 0 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .28 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .29 .1 .1 .1 .29 .29 .1 .29 .05 0 0 0 .29 0 0 0 0 .29 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .29 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .29 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .29 .15 .15 .29 0 .05 .29
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .15 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 .05 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 0 0 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .15 .15 0 0 .1 .05 0 .2 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .2 0 .2 0 0 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .15 .1 .2 0 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .2 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .05 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .05 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .2 .15 .05 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .05 .2 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .2 0 .2 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .2 0 0 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .05 .15 .2 0 0 .2
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 .05 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .15 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 .05 0 .25 .05 0 0 0 .2 .25 .1 0 .15 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 .25 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .19 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .1 .1 .25 0 0 .25 .1 0 .25 0 0 .25 0 .1 0 .25 .1 .25 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .125 .03 .1 .1 .07 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .03 .1 .1 .15
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .15 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .15 0 0 .1 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .15 0 .1 .15
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .3 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 .35 .05 0 .35 .35 .05 0 0 .05 .35 .1 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .35 .05 0 .05 .35 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .165 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 .05 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2j: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2005 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .15 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .25 0 .25 0 .25 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 .05 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .07 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .05 .05 0 0 .07 0 0 0 0 0 .07 0 .07 .07 .07 0 0 .07 .05 0 .07 0 0 .07 0 .07 0 .07 .07 .07 0 0 .07 .07 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .07 0 .07 .07
Canada CAN .05 .05 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .28 .1 .1 .1 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .15 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 .05 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN .15 0 0 .2 .15 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .05 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .15 .15 0 0 .1 .05 0 .2 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .2 0 .2 0 0 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .15 .1 .2 0 .05 .15
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .05 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .05 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .2 .15 .05 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .05 .2 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .2 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .2 0 0 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .05 .15 .2 0 0 .2
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 0 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 0 0 .25 .25 .15 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .25 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .19 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .25 0 0 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .1 .1 .25 0 0 .25 .1 0 .25 0 0 .25 0 .1 0 .25 .1 .25 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 0 .1 .25
Romania ROM .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .125 .03 .1 .1 .07 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 .1 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15 .03 .1 .1 .15
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .15 0 0 .1 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .15 0 .1 .15
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .3 0 .05 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 0 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 0 0 0 .35 0 0 0 0 0 .35 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .35 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 .05 .35 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 0 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .165 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2k: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2006 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .15 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 0 .25 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 .1 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 .05 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .07 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .05 .05 0 0 .07 0 0 0 0 0 .07 0 .07 .07 .07 0 0 .07 .05 0 .07 0 0 .07 0 .07 0 .07 .07 .07 0 0 .07 .07 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .07 0 .07 .07
Canada CAN .05 .05 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .1 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .05 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .28 .1 .1 .1 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .211 .15 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .15 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 .05 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 .1 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 .1 .05 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .15 .25 .05 .05 .25 .25 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .25 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .25 0 0 .2 .15 .05 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .05 .2 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .2 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .2 0 0 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .05 .05 .2 0 0 .2
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .25 0 0 .25
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 0 0 .25 .25 .15 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .25 0 0 .1 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .19 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .2 0 0 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .1 .1 .2 0 0 .2 .1 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 .1 .2 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .2 .2 0 .1 .2
Romania ROM .05 .15 .05 .16 .16 .1 .05 .16 .16 .1 .16 .05 .1 .1 .1 .16 .1 .05 .1 .05 .16 .16 .05 .16 .15 .125 .03 .1 .1 .07 .1 .16 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .05 .16 .1 .16 .05 .1 .15 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .16 .15 .15 .03 .1 .1 .16
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .15 0 0 .1 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .05 .15 0 .1 .15
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 .1 .05 .3 .05 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .3 0 0 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 0 .35 .35 .05 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 0 0 0 .35 0 0 0 0 0 .35 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .35 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .35 0 0 .1 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 0 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 .05 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2l: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2007 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .1 .3 .15 .3 .15 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .07 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .05 0 0 0 .07 0 0 0 0 0 .07 0 0 .07 .07 0 0 .07 .05 0 .07 0 0 .07 0 .07 0 .07 0 .07 0 0 0 .07 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .07 .07 .07 .07 0 .07 .07
Canada CAN .05 .05 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .05 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .05 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .15 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .15 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .05 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35
China CHN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia COL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .28 .1 0 .05 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 .05 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .211 0 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .05 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 0 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .2 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 0 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .2 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 0 .05 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .25 .15 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .05 .05 .15 0 0 .15
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 .05 .15 0 0 .15
New Zealand NZL .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR .15 0 0 .25 .25 0 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .25 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 0 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .2 0 0 .2 .1 0 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .1 .1 .2 0 0 .2 .1 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 .1 .2 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 0 .1 .2
Romania ROM .05 0 0 .16 .16 0 .05 .16 .16 .1 .16 .05 0 0 0 .16 0 0 0 0 0 .16 0 0 .15 .125 0 0 .1 .07 0 .16 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .16 0 .16 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .15 .15 .03 0 .1 .16
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .15 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .18 .15 0 .15 .18 .05 .1 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .18 0 0 .18 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .18 0 0 0 .1 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .18
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 0 .05 .3 .05 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .3 0 0 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 0 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 0 0 0 .35 0 0 0 0 0 .35 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .35 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .35 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 0 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 .05 .3 .05 .05 .05 0 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .1 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?2m: Withholding tax rates on dividends in 2008 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN .FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 0 .15 .15 .05 .3 .15 .3 .05 .05 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 0 .05 .3
Austria AUT .15 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .25 .07 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .25 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .25 0 0 .05 .25
Belgium BEL .15 0 .25 .1 0 .05 .25 .25 .1 .25 .05 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .15 0 .25 0 0 .15 0 .05 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .05 .05 0 0 .25
Bermuda BMU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil BRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria BGR .05 0 0 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 .05 .05 0 .07 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .05 0 .05 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .05 .05 .05 .05 0 .05 .05
Canada CAN .05 .05 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 .1 .1 .25 .05 .15 .05 .05 .18 .05 .05 .05 .05 .25 .25 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .05 .05 .25 .05 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .05 .25 .15 .25 .05 .05 .05 .25
Cayman Islands CAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CHL .35 .35 .35 .35 .1 .35 .1 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .15 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .05 .35 .15 .05 .1 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .05 .05 .35 .35 .35 .35 .05 .35 .35
China CHN .1 .07 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .15 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05 .15 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .07 .1 .1 .1
Columbia COL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia CRO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic CZE .05 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .05 0 .05 .15
Denmark DNK 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 .05 0 .28 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .28 0 0 .28
Dominican Republic DOM .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .18 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
Estonia EST .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21 .21
Finland FIN 0 0 0 .28 .1 0 .05 .28 .28 .1 .28 .05 0 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .28 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .28 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .28 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .28 .15 .15 .28 0 0 .28
France FRA .15 0 0 .25 .15 0 .05 .25 .15 .1 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 .25 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .25 0 0 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 .25 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .25
Germany GER .15 0 0 .211 .211 0 .05 .211 .211 .1 .211 .05 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0 0 .211 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 .15 .05 0 .211 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .211 0 0 0 .05 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .211 .15 .15 .05 0 0 .15
Greece GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary HUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceland ISL .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 0 .15 .05 0 .05 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 .05 .15 .05 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .1 .15 .05 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .15 .15 .05 .05 .15
India IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia IDN .15 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .15 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .15 .2 .1 .1 .15 .15 .2 .1 .1 .125 .15 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2
Ireland IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ITA .15 0 0 .27 .15 0 .15 .27 .27 .1 .27 .1 0 0 0 .27 0 0 0 0 0 .27 0 .27 .15 .1 0 .1 .1 0 .27 0 0 .1 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .27 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .27 .15 .15 .05 0 .05 .27
Japan JPN .15 .1 .1 .2 .125 .1 .05 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .05 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .05 .2 .2 .2 .05 .05 .2 .05 .05 .15 .05 .2 .1 .2 .1 .15 .05 .1 .2 .1 .05 .05 .2 .15 .1 .2 0 0 .2
Korea KOR .15 .05 .15 .25 .15 .05 .05 .25 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .25 .1 .1 .05 .05 .25 .05 .25 .15 .1 .1 .1 .05 .25 .25 .05 .1 .1 .05 0 .1 .15 .15 .25 .05 .1 .07 .05 .1 .05 .05 .1 .1 .1 .25 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .25
Latvia LVA .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .05 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1 0 .05 .1
Liechtenstein LIE .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
Lithuania LTU 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15
Luxembourg LUX .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .15 .15 .05 .15 .15 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 .05 0 .05 0 .25 .05 .15 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .05 .05 .15 0 0 .15
Malaysia MAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta MLT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MEX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands NLD .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15
New Zealand NZL .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .3 .3 .3 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .3 .3 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .3 .15 .15 .15 .3
Norway NOR 0 0 0 .25 .25 0 .05 .25 .05 .15 .25 .15 0 0 0 .25 0 0 0 0 0 .25 0 0 .15 .15 0 0 .05 .15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 .25 0 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .25 .1 .2 .25 .05 .15 .25
Peru PER .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041 .041
Poland POL .15 0 0 .19 .19 0 .15 .19 .05 .1 .19 .05 0 0 0 .19 0 0 0 0 0 .19 0 0 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 0 .19 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .19 .19 .1 .05 0 .05 .19
Portugal PRT .2 0 0 .2 .1 0 .1 .2 .2 .1 .2 .2 0 0 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 .2 0 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .2 .1 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 .1 .2 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .05 .2 0 .1 .2
Romania ROM .05 0 0 .16 .16 0 .05 .16 .16 .1 .16 .05 0 0 0 .16 0 0 0 0 0 .16 0 0 .15 .125 0 0 .1 .07 0 .16 0 0 .1 0 .1 0 .16 0 .16 0 0 .15 .05 0 0 0 0 0 .16 .15 .15 .03 0 .1 .16
Russia RUS .05 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .05 .05 .1 .1 .15 .15 .05 .05 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15 .05 .15 .15 .05 .1 .15 .15 .15 .05 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 .05 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .05 .15
Singapore SGP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovak Republic SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia SVN .15 0 0 .15 .15 0 .05 .15 .15 .05 .15 .05 0 0 0 .15 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .15 .05 .15 0 0 .15 .05 0 .15 0 0 .15 0 .15 0 .15 .15 .15 0 0 0 .1 .15 0 0 0 0 .15 .1 .1 .15 0 .05 .15
Spain ESP .15 0 0 .18 .15 0 .15 .18 .05 .1 .05 0 0 0 0 .18 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0 .05 .15 .1 0 0 .1 .1 0 .18 0 0 0 0 .05 0 .15 .1 .18 0 0 0 .1 .18 0 0 0 0 .18 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .18
Sweden SWE .15 0 0 .3 .15 0 .05 .3 .05 .1 .3 .05 0 0 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 0 .1 .1 0 0 .05 .1 0 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 .15 0 .3 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .1 .15 .15 .3 0 0 .3
Switzerland CHE .15 0 0 .35 .35 0 .05 .35 .35 .1 .35 .05 0 0 0 .35 0 0 0 0 0 .35 0 .05 .1 .1 0 0 0 .1 0 .35 0 0 .05 0 .05 0 .15 0 .35 0 0 0 .05 .1 0 0 0 0 .35 .1 .35 .35 0 .05 .35
Taiwan TWN .1 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .2 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .125 .25 .25 .1 .15 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .1 .1 .25 .25 .25 .1 .25 .25
Thailand THA .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Turkey TUR .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .1 .15 .1 .1 .1 .15 .15 .1 .15 .15 .15 .1 .05 .15 .1 .1 .05 .1 .05 .15 .15 .15 .1 .1 .15 .15 .15
United Arab Emirates UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom UKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States USA 0 .05 .05 .3 .3 .3 .05 .3 .3 .1 .3 .3 .05 .05 0 .3 .05 0 .05 0 .3 .3 .05 .05 .15 .1 .05 .05 0 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .3 .05 0 0 .15 .15 .3 .05 .05 .1 .05 .3 .05 .05 .1 0 .05 .3 .1 .15 .3 0 .3
Uruguay URY .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .1 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07
The figures shown in the table are those of the dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the left column (="Source Country") to the owner company located in the country of the individual columns. For example, a dividend paid from a company in the Cayman Islands to 
its owner company in the United States is taxed at 0%, whereas a dividend flowing from the United States to the Cayman Islands is subject to 30% withholding tax in the United States. 
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Table A ?3a: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 1996 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC DC DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE IC IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC DO IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 EX IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3b: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 1997 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC DC DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC DE EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC DO IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
Appendix 
257 
 
Table A ?3c: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 1998 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC DC DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC DE EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC DO IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE EX IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3d: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 1999 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC DC DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC .95 IC EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC DO IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3e: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2000 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC DC DO IC IC IC EX EX IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 IC EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE IC IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC DO IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3f: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2001 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC DC DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX DE .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3g: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2002 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3h: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2003 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3i: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2004 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX DC .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3j: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2005 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3k: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2006 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC EX EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3l: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2007 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC EX EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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Table A ?3m: Methods of dealing with incoming dividends in 2008 
 
 
Source Country Code AUS AUT BEL BMU BRA BGR CAN CAY CHL CHN COL CRO CYP CZE DNK DOM EST FIN FRA GER GRC HKG HUN ISL IND IDN IRL ITA JPN KOR LVA LIE LTU LUX MAL MLT MEX NLD NZL NOR PER POL PRT ROM RUS SGP SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TWN THA TUR UAE UKI USA URY
Australia AUS EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Austria AUT DC .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Belgium BEL DC EX DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Bermuda BMU DC EX .95 IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Brazil BRA DC EX .95 DO DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Bulgaria BGR DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Canada CAN DC EX .95 DO IC EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Cayman Islands CAY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Chile CHL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC EX IC DE EX DC EX DC .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
China CHN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Colombia COL DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Croatia CRO DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Cyprus CYP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Czech Republic CZE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Denmark DNK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Dominican Republic DOM DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Estonia EST DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Finland FIN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
France FRA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Germany GER DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DC
Greece GRC DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Hong Kong HKG DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Hungary HUN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DC
Iceland ISL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
India IND DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Indonesia IDN DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Ireland IRL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Italy ITA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Japan JPN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Korea KOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Latvia LVA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Liechtenstein LIE DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC IC EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO IC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Lithuania LTU DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Luxembourg LUX DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Malaysia MAL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Malta MLT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Mexico MEX DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Netherlands NLD DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
New Zealand NZL DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC EX IC IC DO
Norway NOR DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Peru PER DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Poland POL DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Portugal PRT DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Romania ROM DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Russia RUS DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Singapore SGP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC DC EX IC EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Slovak Republic SVK DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Slovenia SVN DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Spain ESP DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX EX IC IC DO
Sweden SWE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC IC DO
Switzerland CHE DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC IC EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC DO
Taiwan TWN DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX IC IC DO IC IC DO
Thailand THA DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC EX EX IC IC DO
Turkey TUR DC EX .95 DO IC EX IC DO IC IC IC EX IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Arab Emirates UAE DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC IC EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 IC EX EX DO IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX IC EX EX DC IC EX IC IC DO
United Kingdom UKI DC EX .95 DO IC EX EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC .95 IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC EX IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
United States USA DC EX .95 DO IC DC EX DO IC IC IC IC EX EX EX DC EX EX .95 .95 EX EX EX EX IC DC IC IC IC IC EX EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC EX DC IC IC IC DC IC DC EX EX EX EX DC IC EX DO IC DO
Uruguay URY DC EX .95 DO IC DC IC DO IC IC IC IC IC DE EX DC EX DC DE .95 IC EX EX DE IC DC IC IC IC IC DC EX EX EX IC IC IC EX IC IC DC IC IC IC DC IC DO EX EX EX EX DC IC IC DO IC IC
The abbreviations used in the table are the following: EX = exemption, .95 = exemption by 95%, IC = indirect credit, DC = direct credit, DE = deduction, DO = double taxation. The methods refer to a dividend flowing from a company located in the country of the column to the left 
(="Source Country") to its owner company located in the country of the individual columns of the table. For example, France exempts a dividend from a Japanese company by 95% whereas Japan uses the indirect credit method for dividends flowing in from French companies. 
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